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A TRG President's Foreword
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a
special interest group at the 7 th Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our
membership base has expanded rapidly, and now includes over 400 active transportation
researchers, policy- makers, industry executives, major corporations and research institutes from
28 countries. Our broad membership base and its strong enthusiasm have pushed the group
forward, to continuously initiate new events and projects that benefit the aviation industry and
research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG would hold an international conference at least once
a year. As you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada. Over 90 papers,
panel discussions and invited speeches were presented. In 1998, the ATRG organized a
consecutive stream of 14 aviation sessions at the 8th Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17:
Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every
successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolcls-Feighan of the University College of Dublin.
As in the past, the Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent
Bowen, Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings of the I998 ATRO
Dublin Symposium (being co-edited by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan and Professor Brent
Bowen), and the Proceedings of the 1998 WCTR-ATRG Conference (being co-edited by
Professors Tae H. Oum and Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG members, I would like to
express my sincere appreciation to Professor Brent Bowen and to the staff at the Aviation
Institute of UNO for their efforts in publishing these ATRG proceedings. Also, I would like to
thank and congratulate all the authors of the papers, for their f'me contribution to the conferences
and the Proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG newsletter and the ATRG
website (www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrgO which will keep you informed of the ATRG operations
and forthcoming events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would also appreciate
it very much if you would encourage others in the field, to sign up for ATRG membership.
Thank you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President, ATRG
ATRG c/o Prof. Tae H. Oum
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mail
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z2
Canada
E-mail: Atrg@eommerce.ubc.ca
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Abstract
Strategic alliances have occurred in a broad spectrum of industries including the airline
industry. This paper presents a model that examines the effects on market outcome and welfare
of two types of strategic airline alliances: complementary vs. parallel alliances. It is identified
that the two alliances have different effects on total output and consumer surplus. The
complementary alliance is likely to increase total output, While the parallel alliance is likely to
decrease it. Consequently, the former increases consumer surplus, while the latter is likely to
decrease it. We find sufficient conditions under which each type of alliance improves total
welfare. The empirical test results from the trans-Atlantic alliance routes for the 1990-94
period, confirm the theoretical predictions on partners' outputs and total output.

1. INTRODUCTION
Strategic alliances have occurred in a broad spectrum of industries including the automobile,
commercial aircraft, electronic equipment, robotics, steel, and telecommunications industries
(Business Week July 27, 1992; Economist September 11, 1993). Among these industries, the
airline industry has had a large number of alliances which have been spurred on by regulatory
barriers such as the lack of access to domestic markets by foreign carriers, limits on foreign
ownership, or simply the fear of being left behind (Gallacher and Odell, 1994).
In order to attract more passengers in an increasingly competitive environment, major
international airlines have been seeking to extend the range of their network and access new
markets, t Some carriers have tried to expand overseas services by adding foreign spokes to
their domestic hub cities. Since this approach requires enormous funding to build such a
global network, with bilateral restrictions sometimes limiting their ability to expand
international services, most international carriers have focused on integrating two or more
existing networks through international airline alliances.
Strategic alliances allow carriers to expand the reach of their networks and services to many
parts of the world where it may not be economical to do so on their own or where there may
be a lack of authority to operate their own flights. These alliances range from simple route-
by-route alliances to broad commercial alliances, and to equity alliances. 2
Alliances may provide opportunities for partners involved to reduce costs by coordinating
activities in some fields: joint use of ground facilities such as lounges, gates and check-in
counters; codesharing 3 or joint operation; block space sales; 4joint advertising and promotion;
' In airline markets, there are demand forces such that consumers prefer airlines which serve a large number
of points over ones which serve a smaller number of points, with all other factors such as prices held constant
(Tretheway and Oum (1992)).
2 We analyzed 46 international alliances being formed between the world's top-30 airlines in order to
identify the areas of joint activities between alliance partners and measure the extent of coordination. Based on
the extent of coordination, 28 cases were classified as simple route-by-route alliances, 9 cases as broad
commercial alliances, and 9 cases as equity alliances. The equity alliance is the most advanced and durable
form of alliances. It involves strategic linkage between both partners' flight network. One example is the
KLM/Northwest alliance signed in January 1993. KLM invested in 25% of Northwest's voting shares and 49%
of its equity as of March 1993, and they received antitrust immunity from the U.S. government in November
1992. Although each carrier's management remains separable due to foreign ownership limit, they can closely
coordinate. They are able to achieve a high level of integration without fear of legal challenges from
competitors and are able to discuss market strategy and pricing.
3 A codesharing agreement is a marketing arrangement between two airlines whereby one airline's
designator code is shown on flights operated by its partner airline. For example, Lufthansa has been
codesharing on United Airlines' flight between Frankfurt and 25 U.S. interior cities via two of United's hubs
(Chicago O'Hare and Washington Dulles). For the effects of codeshariag, see Hadrovic (1990) and Gellman
Research Associates (1994).
4 If two carriers make a block space sale agreement, each carrier can buy a block of seats in the other
carrier's flights and resell them to passengers. For example, Air Canada and Korean Air have signed on such
an agreement on the Seoul-Vancouver-Toronto route, under which each buys 48 seats from the other's flights
exchange of flight attendants; and so on. As a result, the partners may become more cost-
effective and increase their competitiveness.
Alliances also produce several benefits for consumers. Alliance partners can better
coordinate flight schedules to minimize travellers' waiting time between flights while
providing sufficient time for connections. Joint baggage handling eliminates the need to
retrieve and re-check baggage at connecting places, and thus reduces the risk associated with
interline handling in which no one carrier has the sole responsibility for the baggage.
Consumers'.choices can increase due to alliances. For example, consider a passenger who
wants to fly from Indianapolis to Lyon. She could fly Indianapolis-Washington, D.C.-
Frankfurt-Lyon on United-Lufthansa partners' flights. She could also fly Indianapolis-
Pittsburgh-London-Lyon on British Airways-USAir alliance flights. Alternatively, she could
fly Indianapolis-Detroit-Amsterdam-Lyon on KLM-Northwest alliance flights. Without the
alliances, she would have to interline on several different carriers with great inconvenience.
Although alliances generate benefits for both partners involved and consumers, it may reduce
the number of competitors and thus increase the combined market power of alliance partners.
As a result, the partners may increase air fares if they behave collusively and abuse their
strengthened market power. On the other hand, it is also possible for air fares to decrease
since alliances between non-market-leaders can increase their competitiveness against the
market leader. By focusing on "complementary" alliances in the tram-Pacific markets, Oum,
Park and Zhang (1996) empirically show that the alliances between non-leaders reduce the
leader's equilibrium price.
Despite the growing importance of international airline alliances, few researchers have
devoted effort to constructing formal models of the alliances. 5 This paper constructs a formal
model to examine the effects on market outcome and economic welfare of different types of
alliances: "complementary" and "parallel" alliances. The "complementary" alliance refers
to the case where two firms link up their existing networks and build a new complementary
network in order to feed traffic to each other. Major strategic alliances such as
KLM/Northwest can be regarded as this type of alliance. For example, KLM and Northwest
signed the "complementary" alliance by which they were able to connect 88 U.S. cities to 30
European and Middle Eastern cities via Northwest's hubs (Boston, Detroit, and Minneapolis)
and KLM's Amsterdam hub, as of December 1994 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995).
The "parallel" alliance refers to collaboration between two firms competing on the same
routes. Two types of parallel alliances are considered: "no shut-down" and "shut-down"
parallel alliances. The difference between the two is that each partner continues to
individually provide services on the route in the first type, while two partners integrate their
on the route.
5 The international airlinei._'ueshave been investigated by researcher's. The effects on pricingof bilateral
agreements were investigated by, among others, Abbott and Thompson (1991), and Maillebian and Hansen
(1995). The effects of alliances have been empirically investigated by, among others, Youssef and Hansen
(1994), Gellman Research Associates (1994), and Oum, Park and Zhang (1996).
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servicesin thesecondtype.Forexample,Air CanadandKoreanAir implementedthe"no
shut-down"parallelallianceon the Vancouver-Seoul route. Delta and Sabena formed the
"shut-down" parallel alliance on the New York-Brussels route on which Delta stopped flying
and purchased a block of seats from Sabena.
More specifically, this study investigates the following questions: After alliance partners
make a particular type of alliance in a specific market, what happens to the partners' and non-
aligned competitors' outputs in that market as well as in other markets? What happens to
profit for the partners and the competitors due to the alliance? What happens to total output
and air fare in that market as well as in other markets? Under which conditions do the
alliances improve economic welfare?
In the next section, the Basic Model is considered to compare pre-alliance, complementary
alliance, and parallel alliances situations. Section 3 examines the effects of complementary
alliance on market outcome and total welfare. Section 4 investigates the effects of two types
of parallel alliances on the partners' outputs and total welfare. Section 5 provides the Extend
Model by relaxing some conditions assumed in the Basic Model. Section 6 tests some
testable predictions associated with the effects on firms' output and total output. Section 7
concludes.
2.THE BASIC MODEL
2.1 Pre-allianceSituation
Inordertoanalyzetheeffectsofallianceson marketoutcomeand economicwelfare,we need
toconstructapre-allianccsituationfirstwhere noneofairlineshaveyettomake any typeof
alliance.As depictedinFigureI,anetworkisconsidered,consistingofthreegatewaycities
locatedindifferentcountries:A, B and H. Therearcthreeoriginand destinationmarkets,
AH, BH and AB, and threefirms(orcarriers)arcoperatinginthenetwork. Firm I is
assumed to serveallthreemarkets(AH, BH and AB) using itshub-and-spokenetwork.
Firms 2 and 3 areassumed toserveAH and BH markets,respectively.6
If travellers want to fly from city A and arrive at city B by firm l's airplanes, they must
change airplanes at the hub airport H. Or, they can use two segment flights, separately
provided by firms 2 and 3, in order to arrive at their final destination. However, it is
assumed that in the pre-allianee situation, travellers do not use multiple carriers' interline
connecting services because of poor connections between firms 2 and 3. _
6Notethatwonationalcarriersareassumedtooperateoneachrouteofthenetwork.Sinceinternational
airservicesbetweentwocitiesaremainlydecidedbybilatcraiagreementsbetweenthetwocountriesinvolving
thetwocities,thisassumptionseemstobereasonable.
7 If connectionsmust be made at connecting airports or hubs, less of the traveller's time will be required
with a single airline than when the trip involves switching airlines, because a single airline's connecting flights
are more likely to reduce waiting time at the connectingairports and lower probabilityof baggage being lost
than multiple airlines' interline connecting flights.
2.2 ComplementaryAllianceSituation
Considera situationwherefirms2 and3 make a "complementary" alliance. Both firms
jointly provide connecting services for passengers travelling between cities A and B, while
continuing to provide local services as before. In order to compete with firm l's connecting
services, the partners enhance quality of their connecting services. For example, the partners
can adjust arrival and departure flights to minimize waiting time between flights while
providing sufficient time for connections. They can also re-locate departure gates for
connecting flights close to arrival gates, coordinate baggage transfer, and cooperate other
joint activities at the connecting airport. They agree to share revenues and costs arising from
the connecting services.
To examine the effects of this alliance, we need to consider demands and costs. Consider
demands ftrst. The "full" price demand model is considered from the viewpoint that each
fLnu's demand in each market depends not only on its air fare, but also its service quality (De
Vany, 1974; Panzar, 1979). Assuming that consumers can place a dollar value on service
quality, each firm's demand in each market in the complementary alliance situation may be
written as
I I d u) for i=t,2, i.j
Ot D t . t ! .
all = sutPmu, Pnu) fori=l,3, i*j
i IQ_m=D_j(p,ta,_j) for t=I, 2+3, i,_j
where p_ is the full price of using carrier i's service in market k, which is the sum of air
fare, denoted by p_, and value of service quality. Solving the demand functions for P_ may
yield the following inverse demand functions:
t t tp,--a,(Q,,Q/,) for i,:.
We assume that outputs of rival carriers are substitutes in each city-pair market:
m<0,
aQ/
for k =AH, BH,AB, i*j. O)
The value of service quality can be regarded as cost of service quality from the viewpoint of
carriers. Two different costs of service quality are considered: (i) schedule delay cost on
each route, and (ii) inconvenient connecting cost at the connecting airport.
The schedule delay cost is a passenger's schedule delay time arising from the difference
between the passenger's desired departure and actual departure time. Research has found that
the schedule delay cost depends largely on the carrier's flight frequency, which in turn
depends on its total traffic (e.g., Douglas and Miller, 1974)i Thus, if Q is the total
passengerscarriedbycarrieri onroutek, thentheschedule delay cost may be written as
g_(Q). It is assumed that g/(.)<0, that is, the schedule delay cost of an airline declines with
l t
its traffic on the route. The schedule delay cost for the non-stop services is gt(Qk +QJm) for
k = AH and BH, while the schedule delay cost for the connecting service is the sum of the
( i t l i I
schedule delay cost on each of two local routes, g,4H(QaH + Q,4D) +gmH(QBll + QaB)"
The second component of the cost of service quality is a passenger's inconvenience cost due
to connections. Carlton, Landes and Posner (1980) estimate that travellers place an extra cost
of $13-17 (in 1978 dollars) for a single carrier's one-stop connecting services, as compared
to its non-stop services. This extra cost for alliance partners' connecting services will be
even larger, if the partners' connecting service is inferior to the single carrier's connecting
service. For convenience of analysis, without loss of generality, we assume that the
inconvenient connecting cost for the single carrier's connections is zero, but that for the
partners' connections, denoted by y, is positive. However, the partners' connecting cost will
decrease as the level of their coordination increases at the airport H.
Carrier i's production cost function on route k may be expressed as C_(Q), implying its
ronnd-trip cost of carrying Q passengers on the route. Note that Q represents total
passengers carried by the airline on the route. This production cost function reflects
i I III
economies of traffic density, satisfying U, (Q)>0 and Ck (Q)<0.
Given these demand and cost specifications, profit function for the non-aligned carrier and
aligned partners can be expressed as:
I d I 1 2 1 l 3 l 1 1
+Qa a(QJs, ldAn ) -g_ntk_H +Q,_a) -gmH(QaH (2)
i 1 1 I I
- * g_...)- Ci.(g.. ÷
(3)
' Caves, Chtistensen andTretheway(1984) distinguishbetweeneconomies of trafficdensity and economies
of firmsize. Economiesof traffic density meanthatoutputis expanded by increasingflight frequency within
a given network. Economi_ of firm size imply that outputis expanded by addingpointsto the network. Many
studies reacha common conclusion: roughlyconstant returnsto ftrm size exist, while sizeable economies of
traffic densityexist up to fairly largevolumes of traffic(See, for example, Caves, Christeusen, Tretheway and
Windle(1987)).
where superscript c stands for complementary alliance.
It can be shown that _ aQ,la0Qau = 0. This implies that there
complementarities between local services. We can also show that
c_ t' t" d I
=-2g, (-)-g, (-)-(Q,t+Q_n)-C , (-), k=AH, BH.
a'a'Q,
are no network
(4)
In (4),thefasttermispositivebecausean airline'sscheduledelaycostdecreaseswithits
traffic.The secondtermispositiveifg islinearor concave.The thirdtermisalsopositive
becauseof economies oftrafficdensity.(4)can be positiveven ifg isconvex. More
generally,we assumethat(4)ispositive,implyingthatthereexistnetworkcomplcrnentaritics
between localand connectingservices.Inotherwords,a carrier'smarginalprofitfrom a
localserviceincreasesasitsconnectingpassengersincrease.
In (1), outputs of rival carriers are assumed to be substitutes in each city-pair market. We
furtherassume thatineachmarketa carrier'smarginalprofitdecreasesastheoutputofthe
competitorincreases:
_w<0, k=.dH,BH, AB, i@j,
aQloQ (s)
which implies that within each market the outputs of duopolists are "strategic substitutes" in
the terms of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
2.3 Parallel Alliance Situation
Next, consider another post-alliance situation where fn'ms 1 and 2 make a "parallel" alliance
ina sensethattheywere competitorsintheAH segmentofthenetworkbeforethealliance,
butnow theycoordinateor integratetheiroperationsinthatsegrncnt.For convenienceof
notation,among theparallelalliancepartners,firm1 iscalledasa hub partner,and firm2
asa non-hubpartner.Firm 3 iscalledasa non-partner.
Two typesofparallelalliancesareconsidered.The Rrstisthateachpartnercontinuesto
provide local services in the AH segment and choose their quantities to maximiTe their joint
profits.For example,AirCanada (ahub partner)and Korean Air (anon-hubpartner)have
implementedthisstyleofparallelallianceon theSeoul-Vancouver-Torontor utesince1993.
AnothertypeisthatthepartnersintegrateservicesintheAH segmentina way thatthehub
partnercontinuestoprovidelocalservices,butthenon-hubpartnerstopsproducinglocal
services.For simplicityofanalysis,itisassumed thatthepartnersequallysharerevenues
and costsarisingfrom thejointservices.For example,Deltaand Sabenaformedthissortof
parallelallianceon theNew York-Brusselsroutewhere Deltastoppednon-stopservicesafter
thealliance.
Since the non-hub partner shuts down its operation in the second case, the first case is
referred to as "no shut-down" parallel alliance, the second as "shut-down" parallel alliance,
hereafter. For both cases, firm 3 continues to operate alone in the BH segment as before.
For consistency of analysis, we consider the same demand and cost specifications as used in
the complementary alliance. In particular, by using the "full" price demand specification,
the inverse demand functions for the parallel alliance may be written as
/ I l
p.. =a;,.(Q.u,_.) for,'=1,2, i,j
l I 1p.. = ai.(Qu, £J..) /o. ,'=I, 3, i,,j
a =ar._m(QAJ)
where Q,_ is positive for the "no shut-down" case; Q,j_ is zero for the "shut-down" case.
We still assume that conditions (I), (4) and (5) hold.
3. EFFECTS OF COMPLEMENTARY ALLIANCE
3.1 Effects on Firms' Outputs and Profits
Let us first analyze the effects of the complementary alliance. We consider an equilibrium
that arises when the non-aligned carrier (i.e., firm 1) and the aligned partners (i.e., firms
2+3) play a Coumot game in each market of the network. 9 By using vectors Qt and QZ, (2)
and (3) can be simplified as
max Ht , =ill,( Q I,Qt Q_) (6)
max
p., 112"=IP'CQ '. Q 2; r) (7)
where Q - at, QsmQ fori = 1, 2. For convenience of notation, superscript 2+3 is
replaced by 2. Assume that there exists a "stable" Coumot-Nash equilibrium _Qt(y), Q 2(y))
which satisfies the following first-order conditions for maximization of (6) and (7): to
9The Coumot assumption is notcrucial in theduopoly market. Branderand Zhang (1990) and Oum, Zhang
and Zhang (1993), using conjecaa'alvariations,findsome evidence that airlines in duopolymarketsbehave like
Coumot competitors.
,o This stability assumption is important. If an equilibriumis not stable, then a slight deviation by one
player does not cause the equilibriumto returnto thatpoint. The stability of CournobNash equilibriumhas been
studied by, among others, Seade (1980), Dixit (1986), Slade (1994), and Zhang and Zhang (1996). In
particular, Zhangand Zhang (1996) extendssingle-market conditions for stabilityof Cournot-Nash equilibria
to multinmrketconditions.
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_(Q _(Y), Q 2('Z); Y) _ o
(8)
(9)
Assume that the second-order conditions arc also satisfied,
matrices are negative definite for i = 1, 2:
i
i.e., the following Hessian
With the present specifications, it can be shown that as compared to the pry-alliance situation,
firm 1 (the partners, respectively) produces less (more, respectively) output not only in the
market where the complementary alliance occurs, but also in the other markets.
Proposition 3-1. Under the complementary alliance conditions, fu-m 1 produces less output
inmarketsAH, BH and AB, butthealliancepartnersproducemore outputinboththeklocal
marketand theAB marketthanunderthepre-allianceonditions.
Proof. Differentiating(8)and (9)withrespecto Y yields
iil_ dQ i + HI_dQ _
]_ dQ 1 + rrl¢ dQ '_
where I_-=[0, 0, -I]r.Solving(10)and (11)for(dQ1/dy,dQ'/dy),we have
l¢-l 1," I#-I ._¢ I 1¢-l I¢ I¢'I I¢
dy
dQ 2 2¢ -I 2¢ 1¢ -1 1¢ ! 2¢ -1 2c
(12)
(13)
Differentiating(8)with respectto Q 2 yieldsthefollowing3-by-3"derivative"matrixof
2 2 == 1¢ -I Ic
carrier l's reaction functions: R:¢=-ORI¢(Q )/OQ --(IIn) H12 where R 1¢(Q"(. )) is carrier
l's reaction function for the aligned partners' outputs. Similarly, a "derivative" matrix of
the partners' reaction functions for firm l's outputs can be defined as
2¢ -1 2¢
8
In what follows, we show that every element of R_ c, R_ c matrices is negative: First, it turns
(If'c)"'out that both Hessian inverse matrices are negative matrices, u can be expressed as
['[|C ,r[[@ --_'" I "WT'" "11"1" T'['" _""
_nu:au_.'AalAal BU_Aa_ _AU:Anj_aU:Aa_ - --AUcAB a_nu:an_
--ABtAHI_RHIAR! _AHIAHI--ABtAB I - _ .sHIAB I ] - _AHIAH|_BitIAB |jn::l
_,rl-le -i-i.lc
_A_._Uj_BU_SU, rile .1-T1¢ .i-l-it .[-i.ic-- __AHIAHj.,.J.ABIBII! --AIIIAllI_Bil|BH !
By the second-order conditions and the network complementarities condition (4), every
|*-l. (]_)-'is alSOnegative matrix. Secondly, If',; and I_element of (I111) m negative. Similarly,
are negative diagonal matrices because of the strategic substitutes condition (3). Thus, both R_ c
and R_c are negative matrices.
By using R_c and R_c , (12) and (13) can be rewritten as
le R:2c I 1¢ 2#-1 (14)
2 2¢ lc I 2c -1 2c
dy
The stabilityof Cournot-Nashequilibriumimpliesthatthemagnitudeoftheeigenvaluesof
matric__R: andR:R_,mustbel_ thanone(ZhangandZh_g,1996).Hence,bythe
Since R/_R/* is a posidve matrix, then/--'-'_-It_R[_} ": is also a posidve matrix.
Therefore,aQ'/dy>o andaQ'/a,t<osince,_* isa neg_ivematrixandI_ is a negative
vector. Q.E.D.
The intuitiveexplanationsforProposition3-I areas follows:Ifthepartnersprovidebetter
qualityofconnectingservicesinmarketAB, inconveniencecost(y) willdecrease,which in
turnincreasesconnectingtrafficforthepartners,thatis,dQ.,_3/dy<0. This connecting
trafficincreaseimpliesthatthepartnerscan feedmore traffictoeachother.As a result,
s_ Neumann lemma is thatif R is a real square matrix and themagnitude of eigenvaluesof R is less than
one, then (I-R)-_ exists and (/-R) -L=_ R _. See, for example, Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970, p.45).
t-0
schedule delay cost for local non=stop services will decrease (i.e., service quality for the local
services increases) and average operating costs on the AH and BH routes will decrease due
-- 2*3
to economies of traffic density. Consequently, increases in fd,(, lead to decreases the
partners' air fares in the AH and BH markets, which in turn increases AH and BH traffic as
well. Therefore, it is possible that increasing qualities of service and decreasing operating
cost are jointly achievable if the partners collaborate very well.
2_3
On the other hand, increases in IdAs due to the better coordination decrease QJj, resulting
in increased carrier l's unit cost on the AH and BH routes and increased schedule delay cost
for its local services. As a result of the complementary alliance, carrier I decreases output
not only in the AB market, but also in the other market,
AlthoughfirmIreducesitsoutputinmarketsAH, BH and AB, itdoesnotnecessarilyimply
thatitdecreasesitsprofit,becauseitsprofitisaffectednot only by itsoutputin these
markets,butalsoby correspondingairfares.Thus, itisworthwhiletoinvestigatewhcthcr
each firm'sprofitincreasesordecreasesdue tothecomplementaryalliance.
Proposition 3-2. Under the complementary alliance conditions, firm 1 earns less profit, but
the aUiance partners cam more profit, as compared to the pre-alliance conditions.
Proof. Substituting the Coumot-Nash equilibrium (Q _(y), Q 2(y)) into (6) and (7), and
differentiating these with respect to ¥, we have
d ' d ' 0d, dQ:
ay t-aS Qt t=,_u t-An Qt0 t dy OQ: d7 0 x dy
By thefirst-orderconditions,thefirstermofthefight-handsideofthefirstequationsof(16)
(zT)
and (17) disappears. By condition (1), 0IIt'/0y>0 and 0iP*/0"t <0. Q.E.D.
3.2 Effects on Market Outcome and Economic Welfare
According to Proposition 3-1, it is not clear whether total output in each market increases or
decreasesdue tothecomplementaryalliancesincefirm Idecreasesoutputineachmarket,
while the alignedpartnersincrease.Thus, in thissection,wc examine theeffectsof the
allianceson totaloutputand consumer surplusineachmarket,and totalwelfare.
In ordertoexamine changesintotaloutputdue tothecomplementaryalliance,we further
assumethatthealignedpartnersand non-alignedcompetitorsarcsymmetricand thepartners
can provideconnectingservicesatthesame qualityasthenon-partner's(i.e.,y =0 ).
Proposition 3-3. For the symmetric case, the complementary alliance results in (i) increased
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total output and (ii) decreased "fulr' price in markets AH, BH, and AB. Therefore,
consumers in these markets are better off due to the complementary alliance.
Proof. Let Q be total output vector and p(Q) be corresponding "full" price vector. By
definition of Q,
a_kQ= + (18)
d'{ dy d'},
Rearranging (10) and using R_ #= (II l¢l-lr[Ic
- -4 11/ _la, we can have
dQ t 1#dQ l
-R2 _ (19)
dy dy
Substituting (15) and (19) into (18) yields
._:__+_t,lf._a,_t,l-t,.,,.2,,-,.,.,_ (20)
2¢ -1 2o
By using the symmetric condition and R_ c- -(I_2 ) ]_1, (20) can he rewritten as
(21)
Using the result (AB) "_ = ,8 -*A -_, we can further simplify (2i) as follows:
+ 2c 1 2c (22)
Notice that both I_; and I_ matrices are negative definite. Consequently, I_; +[I_ is a
negative clef'mite matrix. Its inverse matrix, _I_;+ I_;)-'can be expressed as
T'[A_ ]'1.2*
zcz_c_z
wa¢ /_2¢ _,l# 'l
TT_ _u .TT:* I
:': v,r:c _..2u _2¢
where subscripts A, B and, C represent A/I, BH, and AB, respectively. Since every element
I_vector implies, we have ap./avl.,.,<o. Thus, ap(Q)/a_tlT.,>o. Consequendy,
consumer surplus in each market increases due to the complementary alliance. Q.E.D.
Inorder to analyze changes in total welfare due to the complementary alliance, we assume
a partial equilibrium framework in which consumer demand for air travel in each market is
11
derivedfromautility functionwhichcanbeapproximatedbytheform
AB
U t ÷
_(Q,,Q2) z
-AH
where Z is expenditure on a competitively supplied numeraire good, and OU_/OQ_ = PJk.
1 I 1..Recall that p_ is the full price of nsing carrier rs service in market k, i.e., P_=Pk +g_(').
Then consumer surplus in each market can be written as
U i 2 2cs, ,(Qk, Q_) - i I= PkQt - PtQk, (23)
and total surplus can be written as
AB
w= }2
k =AH
CS,+( ri'l + ]:P) (24)
where W may be interpreted as "World Welfare" if the markets under consideration involves
different countries.
Substitution of (2) and (3) into (24) can yield the following expression for W:
w Ev, c_',Q:) ' ' ' ' ' '.(g_ +gAn)"(g_ +Q_a) ' '= = +ga.(QsH +Q_a)+QAa)"(QaH
k=A_¢ #=I
2
, , ] '+CaH(Qa.+P.Ja)- _Q.Aa
Ill
(25)
where again, for simplicity, superscript 2 +3 is replaced by 2.
Proposition 3-4. For the symmetric case, total welfare rises due to the complementary
alliance.
Or./"0- _ t i ,Proof. Differentiating (25) with respect to y and using L/ g_ : Pk :Pk +gt, we can show
d,, r, ,,._, '
aY"7"-Z.,r.lk-aa/''_k -g* "tgk +g'liP kJdY
(26)
2 [ su / , .ld- t 2
Notice the first and second bracketed terms of (26) are positive by the first-order conditions.
Since dQ_/dy > 0 and dO_/dy < 0 for each market k, the overall effect of the complementary
alliance on total welfare is not clear.
However, under the symmetric condition and y : O, (26)can be reduced to
12
awl = E i "'-' 'dr v-o t-An
" dr ÷ drJ
By the first-order conditions and Proposition 3-3, dW/dr[, t ., <0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3-4 provides sufficient conditions for the complementary alliance to raise welfare.
However, welfare can increase even for a small positive r. For example, in (26),
dW/d r [r-* < 0 if the partners' markup in each market is greater than firm 1' s markup and the
r.(dQ]aldr) term is sufficiently small.
4. EFFECTS OF PARALLEL ALLIANCE
4.1 Effects of No Shut-down Parallel Alliance
Let us turn to the effect of the parallel alliances. We first analyze the effect of the "no shut-
down" parallel alliance where two partners continue to individually provide local services
after their alliance. However, it is hard to directly sign the "overall" effect of the no shut-
down parallel alliance since the effect involves switching from one situation (i.e., individual
profit maximization) to another (i.e., joint profit maximization). Farrel and Shapiro (1990)
use differential techniques in order to avoid similar difficulties faced in the analysis of
horizontal merger effects.
To use the differential techniques, we define 0 as: 0 = I for post-parallel alliance; 0 =0 for
pre-alliance. We then treat 0 as continuous in the range 0 < 0 < 1, and assume that carrier
i's output in market k, Q_(0), is continuous and differentiable in 0 in the entire range. By
these assumptions, the overall effect of switching from the pre-alliance to the "no shut-down"
parallel alliance can be calculated as the integral of the infinitesimal effect as follows:
t
a
It turns out to be easy to sign the infinitesimal effect, dQtk(O)ld O. Consequently, the overall
effect, AQ_(0), can be determined as well if the sign of the infinitesimal effect remains
•unchanged in the range, which can be verified.
Based on the demand and cost specifications in Section 2, each ftrm's post-alliance profit
function can be expressed as
max
Q, II'p(Qt, Q2, Q';0) ,,W +flip
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max Q' ;6) • _ * 0.1"1"1
max
0 3 _.,,(Q I, R3). _
where superscript p stands for parallel alliance; Q '=_t t 'a) Q'- 2 Q_= ,
I= I I l I I I I I I l I I
We will show that unlike the complementary alliance, parallel alliance partners are more
likely to decrease their total output in market AH after their alliance.
Proposition 4-1. If the non-hub parmer (i.e., firm 2) produces the same amount of output
after the "no shut-down" parallel alliance, then the hub partner (i.e., firm 1) produces less
output in all three markets, and the non-parmer (i.e., firm 3) produces more output in market
BH than under the pre-alliance.
Proof. Since the non-hub partner does not clmage its output in the parallel alliance, the first-
order conditions for firms 1 and 3 may be respectively written as
IIt_P =0, IL_' =0.
Assuming that there exists a "stable" equilibrium, (Q '(0), Q'(0)), which satisfies the first-
order conditions for trams 1 and 3, that is,
nl'(e,(o),e'(o);o)---o
e'(o)), o
Differentiating (27) and (28) with respect to 0 yields
lllp dQ I + lllp dQ ) Ip
+rr,o= o,
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
,p 2 , l ]r, the first element of which is negative by condition (1).where II,o-[Q_d(Od_'_lOQ_u) , 0,0
Since both (I_)-*and I_ are negative matrices, dQ lldO and dQ'/dO have opposite signs
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(seeequation (30)).
have
Now, we show dQ rid0<0. Solving (29) and (30) for dQ t/dO, we
dQ l _ L o Ipo,p]-qr:pl-l_l,
- -L' (31)-"3 "'t J _"u/ _'-te
where R_p- -(II, t) II,, and -= derivative matrices of firm l's (firm 3's,
respectively) reaction function for firm 3's (firm l's, respectively) output. Imposing the
on yio * vo i  vo  howo
Ip -1.
in Proposition 3-1, every element of (Iiu) is negative because of the second-order conditions
and the network complementarities condition (4). Therefore, dQ t/dO < 0 and dQ 31dO> O.
Next, we show that the signs of dQ '/dO < 0 and dQ 3 dO > 0 remain unchanged in the entire
range of interest. In (31), the third term, lIl_, remains as negative in the range since the first
element of I'PI_ is always negative regardless of any value of 0 in the range. By similar
arguments, the signs of the first and second terms remain unchanged in the region. Q.E.D.
ipNotice that the condition which IIlo<0 plays a crucial role in Proportion 4-1. In fact,
rl-_p= rr2 thus implying that firm 2's profit decreases as fa-m 1 produces more output in10 - '_'1 '
marketAH. Thus,theintuitionbehindProportion4-1 isthatby formingthe"noshut-down"
parallelallianceand maximizingthejointprofit,thehub partnerchoosesQ t withtaking
accountof thenegativeexternalitiesof thehub partner'soutputon thenon-hubpartner's
profit.Thisleadstodecreasesinthehub partner'soutputinmarketAH. Consequently,the
hub partnerdecreasesitsBH and AB trafficdue tothenetworkcomplementarities.
Similarly, we can show
Proposition 4-2. If the hub partner (i.e., firm 1) produces the same amount of output after
the parallel alliance, then the non-hub partner (i.e., firm 2) decreases its output, and the non-
partner (i.e., firm 3) produces the same amount of output, as compared to the pre-alliance
situation.
The next question naturally arises: what if both Q rand Q 2 are chosen endogenously? If the
two partners endogenously decides their outputs, they cannot simultaneously increase output
in market AH after the parallel alliance.
Proposition 4-3. dQ lldO and dQ :/dO cannot both be positive.
Proof. Denoting a "stable" equilibrium by (Q 1(0), Q :(0), Q _(0)), and differentiating the
first-order conditions with respect to O, we have
_lt, dQ 1 + FflpdQ 2 . _tp dQ 3 tp
"-76- -':76- " " :76- ÷n,o --o, (32)
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I_dQ t+ rr=PdQ 2
II_ =o, (33)
2p I I 2
where_.- Q,,_(a<_#aQ,,,,)<o.
Again, from (34), it can be easily verified that dO, _/dO and dQ J/dO have opposite signs.
Equations (32) and (33) show that dQ t/dO and dQ 2 dO are interdependent with each other.
Solving (32)-(34) for dQ t/dO and dQ = dO yields
aQ' _,,_,:-,/.-,.,,_-,(_.,,.,._,, aQ' / (35)
or
(36)
Sinc.cII,2<0'p and II_<0 due to the strategicsubstitutescondition,both do.'/dO and
do.'/dOcannotbe positivein(35)and (36). Q.E.D.
Nodce that if dQ=/dO=O, then (35) reduces to (31) and Proportion 4.1 follows. Similarly,
if dQ t/dO =0, then (36) can be used to show Proposition 4-2.
Although both dQ t/dO and dO.21dOcannotsimultaneouslybe positivein(35)-(36),itis
possible that both dQ t/dO and dQ a/dO are negative in (35)-(36). This can be illustrated by
the following numerical example. Assume that demand is linear as follows:
dk(Q:,Q/) = (z -(Q: + g/) , for k=AH, BH, AB.
Assume further that schedule delay cost, gk(" ), is also linear and that operating cost, Ck(. ),
is concave:
_t(.Q,_ for k =AH. BH.AB (38)= , c'(o.b , ,
where tt represents the extent of increasing returns to traffic density. Given these
specifications, the explicit expressions of equilibrium output can be obtained for each firm
• under the pre-alliance and the "no shut-down" parallel alliance situations. In particular, when
(x = 4, 8 = 0.03, tt = 0.04, both of the partners decrease their outputs, while the non-
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partnerincreases its output. More accurately, changes in each firm's output due to the "no
shut-down" alliance are AQ ! _ QJu, AQ_,, QA ffi (-0.2142, -0.0009, -0.0119);
A02= 2 =-AQ,_, -0.1404; and AQa_AQ_ = 0.0009, respectively.
To sum up the effects of the "no shut-down" parallel alliance on each fhTn's output,
the partners' total output is likely to decrease, while the non-partuer output may increase Coy
Proposition 4-1), remain unchanged (by Proposition 4-2), or decrease (by dO l/d0>0 in
Proposition 4-3). Thus, consumer surplus in market AH is likely to decrease due to this type
of parallel alliance.
4.2 Effects of Shut-down Parallel Alliance
We now analyze the effects of the second style of parallel alliance where the partners
integrate local services in the AH segment in a way that the hub panner continues to provide
the local services, but the-non-hub partner stops producing the local services. However, it
is intractable to compare the pre-alliance and shut-down parallel alliance by using general
functions since the number of the first-order conditions for the former is not the same as that
for the latter. For tractability of analysis, we impose more structures on the model. First,
demands and schedule delay costs for all three markets are assumed to be symmetric.
Secondly, in order to use a common cost function, we assume that the distances between
cities A and H, and between B and H are the same. Thirdly, we use special functions (37)-
(38) for demand, schedule delay cost, and operating cost. 12
Comparing the solution of the pre-alliance situation to that of the "shut-down" parallel
alliance, we Rrst examine the effects of the "shut-down" parallel alliance on each firm's
output.
Proposition 4-4. Under the "shut-down" parallel alliance conditions, the partners produce
less output in market AH, but produce more output in markets BH and AB, and firm 3
produces less output in its local market BH than under the pre-alliance conditions.
The proofs of the "shut-down" parallel alliance are provided in the Appendix. The intuitive
reasons for Proposition 4-4 axe as follows: First of all, since the AH market is now serviced
only by the name of the hub partner, this market becomes a monopoly market. The hub-
partner produces more than its pre-alliance output in this market, but less than total pre-
allianceoutput, i.e., ,b r_ lP{fr_t'+2_'l,_ rJ ib+_OAU < ,_Au_-_u /- _A. =Au- Secondly,thehub partnerincreases
itsBH and AB trafficdue tothenetworkcomplementarities.Thirdly,thenon-partnerwill
decreaseitsBH trafficsinceitsreactionfunctiontothehub partner'soutputinmarketBH
isdownward sloping.
Next, the effects on each firm's profit are examined. In general, the post-alliance profit of
thenon-hubpartner(i.e.,firm2)increaseswhen thesizeofmarkets(a) issufficientlyarge
for a given economies of traffic density (t_). Joining the "shut-down" parallel alliance, the
12The linear demandand concaveoperatingcost functionsare alsoused in Brueckner and Spiller (1991),
Brueckner,Dyer and Spiller (1992), and Nero(1996).
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non-hub parmer decreasesrevenue from market AH sincetotaloutputin thismarket
decreasesdue to thealliance.But,thenon-hub parmcr becomes more cost-effectiveby
jointlyproducingthehub parmcr'sconnectingserviceson theAH route.Ifthesizeof
marketsislargeenoughfortheparmcrstoproduceagreatvolumeoftrafficon thcAH routc,
firm2'sgainsfrom thecost-cffcctivcnessdominateitslossesfrom thedecreasedrcvcnuc.
Proposition 4-5. Under the "shut-down" parallel alliance conditions, the hub partner earns
morc profit than under the prc-alliancc conditions. Given the economies of traffic density,
the non-hub partner cams more (less, respectively) profit when the size of markcts is
sufficiently large (small, respectively) than under the pre-alliancc situations. Firm 3 earns
less profit, as compared to the pre-alliance conditions.
We nextexaminetheeffectsofthe"shut-down"parallela lianceon totaloutputand consumer
surplusineachmarket. AccordingtoProposition4-4,passengersinmarketAH arcworse
offsincetotaloutputinthismarketdecreaseswhilethecorresponding"full"priccincreases.
Thus, consumersurplusinmarketAH decreasesduc totheparallelaUiancc.However, itis
notobviouswhetheror notconsumers inmarketBH arebetteroffdue tothealliance.
Proposia'on 4-6. The "shut-down" parallel alliance results in (i) increased (decreased,
respectively) total output and (ii) decreased (increased, respectively) "full" price in markets
BH and AB (market AH, respectively). Therefore, consumers in these markets (this market,
respectively) are better off (worse off, respectively) due to the parallel alliance.
Although Proposition4-6 shows increasesinconsumer surplusinmarketsBH and AB due
totheparallelaUiancc,itcan be verifiedthatdecreasesinconsumer surplusinmarketAH
dominatetheincreasesinmarketBH and AB.
To summarize theeffectsofthe"shut-down"parallelallianceon eachfirm'soutput,
thepartners'outputdecreasesinmarketAH and increasesinmarketsBH and AB, whilethe
non-partner'soutputdecreases.Likethe"no shut-down"parallela liance,consumer surplus
inmarketAH decreasesduc tothe"shut-down"parallelalliance.
5.THE EXTENDED MODEL
The Basic Model have analyzedthe effectsof threetypesofallianceson thebasisof an
assumptionthatthereareno demand shiftsdue tothealliances.We now extendtheBasic
Model by takingintoaccountthepotentialcodesharingeffecton demand shiR. Under a
codesharingagreement,one airline'sdesignatorcode isshown on flightsoperatedby its
partner. The codesharingallowsthe partnersto offera higherfrequencyserviceto
consumersshouldthepartnersmaintainorincreasetheirespectivefrequency.For example,
before the alliance,LH and UA provided one daily non-stop servicebetween
Washington,D.C.and Frankfurt,respectively.ARer thealliance,theywereabletooffertwo
dailynon-stopserviceson theroutethankstothccode.sharing.Itisthereforepossiblethat
demand functionsforthepartnersarcshiftedup by thccodesharingeffect.
5.1 Complementary alliance
Assuming thatthepartners'"full"pricedemand functionsineachmarketareshiftedup duc
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to the partners' codesharing, the partners' post-alliance (inverse) demand shifts may be
written as
p: 2 I 2=di(Qt,Qt)+_, for k=AH, BH, AB
where [ is an exogenous demand shift due to the codesharing effect.
The post-alliance profit function (6) and (7) can be rewritten as
max iIt, =IP'cQ 1Q t , Q _) (39)
max (40)
Q2 IP'--n_(g t, Q2; ?, _) •
In the Basic Model, _ is set to zero. Assume that there exists a "stable" Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, fi2 t(y, _), Q 2(y, _)), satisfying the first-order conditions for (39) and (40).
Differentiating the FOCs with respect to _ and solving for dQ z/(3_ and dQ z/a_, we have
aQ 1 [r _ 1,R =,'l'iR l,[_lc_'l_.2c
=-t,-K= , J : _Lt2=]tt2_ (41)
(42)
where I_-=[1, 1, 1 ]r. Since -R_R: t>O, R_'<0, and _,] <0, then c3Q '/c3_<0 and
aQ 2/c_> O. This implies that the codesharing effect on the partners' demand shifts does not
change the propositions derived from the Basic Model. In particular, for a given y, under
the demand shift situation, (i) the partners (non-partner, respectively) produce more output
(less output, respectively) in the three markets, and (ii) total output in each market increases
more than under the Basic Model situation.
What ifthenon-partner'sdemand functionisalsoshiftedup due tothepartners'codesharing
effect?Iftheparmcrscannotfullycapturedemands createdby thecodesharingeffect,some
ofthedemands may be leftovertothenon-partner.We shallassumethatthenon-partner's
"full"pricedemand functionisslightlyshiftedup, as compared tothepartners'demand
shifts.Wc alsoassume thatthenon-partner'spost-alliance(inverse)demand shiRmay bc
expressedas
1 1 1 2 +pk=dt(Qt,Qt) (Z_, O<Ct<l.
Then, it is straight forward to show that
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8Q l F. _ ic_ lll-ir[r.¢icl-l,-,.l< _ ic_,-rlc_-i.-,.lc_
a_
+ 2c lc -1 Ic,,, n.<}
(43)
(44)
lc - lc
where IIl_=[a, a, al r. Notice that if II_ is a zero vector, then (43)-(44) reduce to (41)-
(42), respectively. Notice that the sign of the second bracketed term of the right-hand side
of (43)-(44) is indeterminate. If demand functions for both the partners and non-partner are
simultaneously shifted up, the effects of the complementary alliance on each firm's output and
total output are no longer clear.
However, if we assume that the partners and non-partner are symmetric and the partners can
provide connecting service at the same quality as the non-partner's, then we have
Proposia'on 5-1. In case where demand functions for the partners and non-parmer are
simultaneously shifted up by the complementary alliance, both competitors can increase
output under the symmetric and y = 0 conditions.
(44) can be rewritten as
aQ, 1 r_ I_ c_ll]-lr[,,.,,tcl-I_l¢ __ lc -1 i¢
c 1 |c -1 2.," l# -I lc
a_
(40")
According to the stability condition, the magnitude of the eigenvaines of matrix, (R c_, must
be less than one, and so does R c Thus, 0Q2./0_>0 since the second bracket term of (46)
is negative. It is also possible that aQ _/a_>0, depending on _. Q.E.D.
5.2 Paralld alliance
We will focus on the analysis of the "no shut-down" case here since the same results can be
obtained for the "shut-down" case by the same analysis. Assuming that the partners' "full"
price demand functions in AH market are shifted up, the partners' post-aUiance (inverse)
demand shifts may be written as
I 1 i +paHfd_x(Q'au, QIAs) _; for i,j = 1,2; i*j.
Denoting a "stable" equilibrium by _ I(0, _), Q 2(0, _), Q )(0, _)), and differentiating the
first-order conditions with respect to _, we have
Hit OQ l + iiIp OQ2. . trip OQ _ ip (47)
2O
II:'aQ' .,,aQ'
=0
(48)
(49)
lp_ twhere r/,_ =[i o, o ]r and I_[-= I .
From (49), it can be easily verified that OQ t/c3_ and aQ '/a_ have opposite signs.
(47)-(48) for OQ _/0_ and aQ 2/a_ yields
aQ ' ,, ,,, ,,)-,( ,, +rr,, OO: l
Solving
(50)
or
aQ: l...,eV,( .,-.2, ,,-.2paQ' 1 (51)
Notice that the sign of the last term of (50)-(51) can be either positive or negative, depending
on the difference between the positive direct effects of the demand shift on each partner's
1,
marginal profit (i.e., H,_ and I_[) and the negative indirect effects due to strategic
substitutes condition (i.e., ][',_.(aQ:IO_) and _,.(oQ'/o_)). If the direct effects
lp
simultaneously dominate the indirect effects in (50)-(51) (i.e., ITS,_I> Irr:_'-(aQ_/aOI
andl1_[l > ll_[.(aQ'za_)l), then aQ'la_>o andaQ'/a_,>o. Therefore,
Proposition 5-2. If the parallel alliance shifts both partners' demand functions upward and
the direct effects of the demand shifts dominate the indirect effects, it is possible for both
partners to simultaneously increase output in market AH. It is therefore possible that total
output in market AH increases and thus consumer surplus increases.
6. EMPIRICAL TEST
This section carries on an empirical test for some propositions regarding the effects of the
alliances on each firm's output and total output. Previous sections have shown that
complementary and parallel alliances have different effects on each firm's output and total
output. After the complementary alliance, the partners increase local traffic (see Propositions
3-1 and 5-1). The non-partner can increase (see Proposition 3-1) or decrease (see Proposition
5-1) local traffic, depending on the degree of demand shift. Consequently, total output
increases in the local markets (see Proposition 3-3).
On the other hand, from the analysis of the parallel alliances, the partners are likely to
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decreaselocal traffic on the AH segment under both the "no shut-clown" and "shut-down"
cases (see Propositions 4-1, 4-2, 4-4 and 5-I). Changes in the non-partners' outputs are
uncertain under the "no shut-down" case, but the non-partner decreases local traffic on the
BH segment under the "shut-down" case (see Propositions 4-4). Consequently, total output
on the AH segment is likely to decrease in market AH (see Propositions 4-3 and 4-6).
In order to test those predictions, wc selected seventeen trans-Atlantic routes where either
complementary or parallel alliance occurred between US and European carriers. Since major
alliances in the North Atlantic markets were formed in the early 1990's, annual data for two-
ways of the seventeen routes (e.g., Atlanta to Amsterdam, and Amsterdam to Atlanta) were
collected for the 1990-94 period. Observations were collected for alliance partuers and their
strongest competitor 13for each of the seventeen routes. The total numbers of observations
available for the alliance partners and the largest non-aligned carriers are 151 and 97,
respectively.
Data associated with strategic alliances were mainly taken from the Offidal Airline Guides:
Worldwide Edition. To classify the data into pre-, post-complementary, and post-parallel
alliance situations, we used a variety of data sources including Airline Business (1994),
GeUman Research Associates (1994), and U.S. General Accounting Office (1995). Thirty-six
observations were classified into the complementary alliance situation, while sixteen were
categorized into the parallel alliance situation. Four cases were classified as a mixture of the
two types (Lufthansa/United on Chicago-Frankfurt and Washington, D.C.-Frankfurt routes).
The aligned-partners' traffic, non-partners' traffic, and total traffic data on the seventeen
routes were gathered from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) publication,
Traffic By Hight Stage. The mean value for the aligned-partner's passenger volume during
the period is 108,200 people, while the mean value for the total traffic is 247,770 people.
The number of carriers on each route was also obtained from the ICAO publication.
The aligned-partners' traffic, non-partners' traffic, and total traffic, respectively, are treated
as a dependent variable on each set of regression. As explanatory variables, presence of
complementary alliance (CA), presence of parallel aUiaace (PA), the number of airlines on
each route (NUM), year-specific characteristics (YR), and route-specific characteristics are
considered. Route Atlanta-Amsterdam and year 1990 is used as a base route and year in the
regression. For robustness of analysis, we test the hypotheses by using four different
specifications for each set of regression.
Table 1 shows test results. The test results generally confirm the theoretical predictions.
First, as shown in the first column of Table 1, the test result on alliance partners' outputs is
consistent with the corresponding propositions. As excepted, all coefficients of CA are
estimated as positive, regardless of specifications. More importantly, the coefficients of CA
are estimated as highly sigm'ficant under the specifications (1) and (2). This result conf,'ms
la In order to control a fa'm size effect, we restrict our attentionto the strongest non-aligned f'u'm, the
largest firm other than alliance parmers on each of the alliancemutes. Notevery non-alignedfirm on the route
may reactto the alliance. Presumably,small finns are not likely to do so.
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that eachof complementary alliance partners increases its traffic after the alliance. For
parallel alliance partners' outputs, all coefficients are estimated as negative, implying that
demand shift effects on the partners' outputs are weak. The coefficients of PA under the
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated as negative and significant.
Second, the last column of Table I shows that test result on total output is highly consistent
with the corresponding predictions. The coefficients of CA and PA are estimated as properly
and s!gnificanfly, regardless of specifications. Following the complementary alliance, total
traffic increases by an average of 11-17 per cent of the average total traffic. In' contrast, total
traffic decreases by an average of 11-15 per cent of the average total traffic, due to the
parallel alliance. Notice that total passenger volumes of years 1993 and 1994 are not
significandy different from that of year 1990.
Third, the second column of Table I indicates that the test result on non-partners' outputs is
partly consistent with the corresponding propositions. In general, the signs of the coefficients
are consistent with the propositions, but statistically insignificant. In three out of the four
specifications, the coefficients of CA are estimated as positive. As shown in the Extended
Model, the complementary alliances in the North Atlantic markets may generate new
demands, some of which cannot be served by the alliance partners and can be left over to
non-aligned competitors. The signs of the coefficients of PA are consistent with the theory,
although the coefficients are estimated as insignificant.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study analyzes the effects on market outcome and welfare of two types of alliances:
complementary vs. parallel alliances. To recapitulate major findings of this study,
First, the complementary alliance in a specific market has indirect positive effects on the
partners' outputs in the other markets. Coordination in connecting markets allows the
partners to increase service quality and decrease average operating costs in local markets.
This is because muldple products are serviced through the same network and thus the alliance
in a specific market has indirect impacts on each firm's output in the other markets within the
same network.
Second, the two types of alliances have different effects on total output and consumer surplus.
Given the symmetry, the complementary alliance increases total output, and decreases "full"
price. Thus, consumer surplus increases as a result of the complementary alliance. On the
other hand, both the "no shut-down" and "shnt-down" parallel alliances are likely to decrease
total output on the alliance route. Consequently, consumer surplus is likely to decrease due
to the parallel alliance.
Third, we find sufficient conditions under which complementary alliance improves total
welfare. Total welfare can rise if the partners and non-partners are symmetric and if the
partners can coordinate to the extent that they are able to provide the same level of connecting
services as finn 1's.
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Four, the Extended Model finds that demand shifts due to strategic alliances play a crucial
role on changes in firms' outputs under certain conditions. For the complementary alliance
case, it is possible for both alliance partners and non-partner to simultaneously increase their
outputs in cases where there are some created demands being spilled over to the non-partner.
The Extended Model identifies sufficient conditions under which parallel alliance partners
simultaneously increase their outputs on the alliance route, resulting in increasing total output
in the market.
Finally, the empirical test results generally confirm the theoretical predictions on alliance
partners' outputs and total output. The test results indicate that the partners' traffic increases
due to the complementary alliance, while the parmers' traffic decreases due to the parallel
alliance. The results also show that total traffic increases by an average of 11-17 per cent of
the average total traffic due to the complementary alliance, while total traffic decreases by
an average of 11-15 per cent of the average due to the parallel alliance.
These findings have some important policy implications. Government agents should be very
careful to allow would-be parallel alliance partners to have antitrust immunity. Since the
partners are significant competitors in the same markets, competition may be reduced if they
are able to integrate operation with the protection of antitrust immunity. As a result, the
parallel alliance reduces consumer surplus and is more likely to decrease total welfare.
However, under certain conditions, allowing more complementary alliances may have the
potential of creating a more competitive environment and improving welfare.
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FIGURE 1. A Simple Air Transport Network
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APPENDIX
This part provides the proofs of Propositions 4-4, 4-5, and 4-6. Each firm's pre-alliance
profit function can be expressed as
BH
II_= _ Qk (Qk,Qk)-z(Qit
It=AH It" AH It= AH
: d _ : 2 - (Q,4.). 3 d ' 3 ,
where superscript b stands for before-alliance. Using specifications (37)-(38) and solving the
first-order conditions, we have the following pre-alliance quantities
Q2 '-- (42-24 (A1)
2(342-74+3)
Q,_ = (! -4)[(3 +4)a - 12]
2 (3 42 -7 _ +3) (A2)
QA_ = Q.J._- (2 -s 4)_ - 40 -34)
2(3 42 -7 4 +3) (A3)
where _ -=.25 + tt. It can be shown that the second-order conditions for each firms' profit
maximization problem reduce to t < 2/3. Since outputs and marginal revenues (costs)
shouldbepositive,_ isconstrainedsuchthat6/(_+3)<a<16(I -A)]/I_(5-4A)] for0<L<2/5.
The shut-downparallel-allianceprofitsforthefn'mscan be expressedas
BR"
- 3 d t 3 - (Qsn)
It =AH
where superscript p stands for parallel alliance. Solving the first-order conditions for the
shut-down parallel alliance yields the following parallel alliance solutions:
" t3 (t .2_ _ (43 - 5 12 + 11 4 - 6) a +2(42 - 8 4 + 6) (A4)
6 43 -2742 +34 4 - 12
Q81t_= (4_-542 +6 4-4)tX+2(42-21+4)
6_ 3 -2712 +34t - 12
(A5)
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Q_ = (t-/,)[(;_2_6)a -2(53.-12)] (A6)
6/)-273. z +343. -12
Qs'_,= (2-3.)[(53.-2)a -2(63.-2)]
613 -273.2+343.-12
(A7)
Again, itcan be shown thatthesecond-0rd.erconditionsreduceto /,< 2/3. From the
positiveoutputsand marginalrevenuesconstraints,6--!..,<a< 2_'e-167"'n for_.<2_..
_*3 _.(4_,0-17_L÷12) 5
Proof of Proposition 4-4. Using (A1)-(A6), we can calculate changes in the partners' output
due to the shut-down parallel alliance:
t3 (,*a_, tb 2b (3. - I)(512 - 14l +6)[(2 - 51)(x + 12l -4]AQ_, ,2_- _. -[Q_ + +24.]--
(613 -273.2 +343. - 12)(33.2-71 +3)
(AS)
aQj =_ - =_ 3.CI-3.)[(5X2-171+6)a-2(63. 2-201 +6)]
2 (6 3.' -27 3.2 +34 3. - 12)(3 3.2 -7 3. +3)
(Ag)
12 (2 - 3.) [(2 - 5 3.) a +2(6 3. - 2)]
2 (6 3.' -27 3.2 +34 3. - 12) (3 3.2 -7 3. +3)
(A10)
Since the denominator of (A8)-(A10) is negative for 3. < 2/5, the sign of these equations
depends on the numerator. It can be shown that the numerator of (A8) is negative, while
those of (A9) and (A10) are positive for the feasible a and 3.. Similarly, we can calculate,
using (A3) and (A7), changes in firm 3's output
:,Q,:, _ = 3.2[(2-sx)a +2(63.-2)]
2(63.3-273.2+343.-12)(33.2-73.+3)
which is negative for the feasible range. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4-5. Using (A1)-(A7), we can compute changes in the partners' profit
and changes in fn'rn 3's profit
A]'[Ip = ]"lip_ ]'[Ib= I¢X2 +Ja +K (All)
4(6_. 3 -27X 2 +343. - 12)2(33. 2 -71 +3) 2
A IT_ ,. I_P - I_b = L a 2 +M a +N
8 (6 3.3_ 27 3.2+34 3. - 12)2(3 3.2_ 7 3. +3)2
(A12)
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AyI'3p - I'Pp - I'Pb = _L2(_.-2)(12_L3-53 ;L2+68_L -24)[(5 _.-2)(x+2 -6_,]
8(6_) -27_,2+34_. - 12)2(3_2 -7,_ +3) 2
(A13)
where I=90_. 10-942_? +3949). t -8041 _: ,6312). t ,5352_. s - 16539 _/+ 15333)) -6794_? + 1344_. 172,
J = - 2(144 _? + 1302).* + 4768 _._ - 8614_._ + 5640)- s ÷ 7522) 4 - 19480_) + 17324_. z - 7176). ÷ 1152),
K = - 4(324 _.M_4302 _.X+23973 _.b- 74128 _.=+ 141439 _.K_174420 _) + 140005 _.1- 70648 _.e÷20292 _. - 2520),
L = 180_._- 1344_" 1592_.X÷ 14019_.^- 63462_._+ 120822_.K- 124872_) +71846_ I -20996_.e +2064_. + 144,
M ffi-2(2016_.M-22620_. x+ 104444_.A-256128_.K +357312_.K-276612_.L ÷96936 j_.l+5912_. e- 14160_.+2880),
N = 4(648 _.M-6300 _.X+22218 _.A-27160 _._ -30210_" K+136392_) - 180338 _.! + 119176_.e-39768 _.÷5328).
It can be numerically shown that (All) is positive while (A13) is negative for the feasible c_
and _.. The sign of (AI2) varies depending on value of _x and _.. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4-6. From (A8), AP_. > 0. Thus, ACS_. < 0. Similarly, from
(A9), APx_ < 0. Thus, AC$_ > 0. Using (A1), (A3), (A5), and (A7), we can calculate
;1.2(I -_) [(2 -5 _.)a +2(6 _. -2)]; -P.,,=
2(6_) -27_? +34_, - 12)(3_.2-7_ +3)
which isnegativeforthe feasiblerange. Consequently, AQ_. > 0 and ACS:_. > O. Q.E.D.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Globalisation has resulted in international trade progressing beyond the stage where national firms specialise in
finished products. Specialisation now occurs in the production of components and the modern trading enterprise
engages in global sourcing (Frank, 1995). Improvements in communications and transport have made this
possible, but competition, rising customer expectations and the need to expand markets beyond national
boundaries leave many businesses with no alternative but to "go global". Growth ambitions can be accommodated
through merger and acquisitions, but the imperative to seek out the most efficient ways to serve markets is leading
to new forms of organisation afal relationships among organisation. Collaborative relationships have made it
possible to serve a global market, to achieve economies in production, to employ the latest technology and to gain
access to markets. As a result, the strategic alliance has been integral to the globalisation process in a diverse set
of sectors ranging from clothing and footwear to aeronautics (Ohmae, 1989; Lorange et aL, 1992).
Against this background, researchers have paid increasing attention to the attempts in the airline industry to
globalise (Gialloreto, 1988; Doganis, 1994). While it is true that the larger international carriers compete
simultaneously in several inter-continental markets, restrictions on foreign investment and commercial operating
rights generally deny airlines the opportunity to become global businesses in their own r_ghts. Airlines do not
have free access to markets, nor do they have the freedom to invest and operate wherever they want. The
principles of comparative advantage do not prevail in the trade in airline services and consequently, airlines are
prevented from developing efficient global networks. Alliances allow airlines to circumvent restrictions on market
access while simultaneously permitting them to co-ordinate schedules and to pursue other practices designed to
reduce costs and improve customer service. The strategic alliance has become the key instrument for global
expansion.
The regulatory response so far has been relatively tolerant. The United States has had the clearest policy of
accepting alliances that operate within competitive markets. When an alliance results in dominance of a market,
the US approach has been to reduce any barriers to entry entrenched through route allocations and control over
landing slots at hub airports. Other governments have tended to deal with individual cases on their own merits.
Airlines have justified the alliances on the basis of better service and lower costs. However, the regulators and the
industry they oversee both share concerns about where the alliances are leading and the ability of the regulatory
system to respond to evolving conditions (Burton and Hanlon, 1994; Aiamdari and Morrell, 1997). Furthermore,
the problems are becoming increasingly complex as coalitions among key airlines fluctuate and as it becomes
more and more difficult to define the relevant market for the purposes of analysing concentration. While airlines
are developing network strategies, the regulatory framework tends to focus attention on point-to-point services.
The proposed alliance between American Airlines and British Airways has brought matters to a head in trans-
Atlantic relations when the regulatory bodies in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European
Commission each proposed different requirements. Australia has been reluctant to approve an extension of the
code-share agreement between British Airways and Qantas Airways (Findlay e: al., 1997). Airlines are under
increasing pressure to demonstrate that alliances are not anti-competitive and that they deliver long-term benefits
to consumers. The initial focus of researchers was on the formation of alliances and their role in globalisation
(Pustay, 1992; Burton and Hanlon, 1995; Park eta/., 1995). Code-sharing has been a key instrument used in
airline alliances and there is considerable interest in the way this device is used in competition and its value to
consumers (Humphreys, 1995; Hannegnn and Mulvey, 1996). A particular theme is how alliances, especially
code-sharing, have an impact on market shares and on the performance and strategic positioning of the carriers
(Oum et aL, 1993; Park, 1997). Further contributions have examined the process of alliance formation and the
conditions that favour success (Flanagan and Marcus 1993; Park and Cho, 1997).
A common theme is that strength and permanency are achieved through exchanges of equity (Tretheway, 1991).
This results in the airlines becoming "mutual hostages" and minimises the risks of partners pursuing opportunistic
actions. Merger and acquisition can be used to address these problems, but restrictions on foreign ownership in
the international airline industry favour the strategic alliance. However, the role of equity has been
overemphasised. We argue that this has diverted attention away from contributions in management theory that
explain how contracts, constructs and property rights are being used to forge new types of relationships within
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strategicalliances. It is common for partners to enter into a series of alliances and therefore, it is necessary to
consider this organisational form in a dynamic setting (Gulati, 1995).
While we do not deny there is a strong .basis for the presumption that alliances among international airlines are
largely the result of regulatory conditions, we believe it is useful to explore the question "would alliances persist
in competitive world markets?". On the basis of experiences in other forms of business and our understanding of
the economics of airline operations we consider globalisation and alliance formation to be a natural condition in
the airline sector. By investigating the likely form of alliances under competitive conditions we aim to shed
insights into the benefits that alliances are capable of delivering. However, this raises fundamental questions
about the nature of airlines as organisations and about the way they arc likely to evolve in response to competitive
pressures in the globalisation process.
2 GLOBALISATION, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND AIRLINES
Cooperative behaviour in the international airline industry has been evident ever since pioneering cax_ers began
to develop their networks and airlines do compete simultaneously in several continental markets. However, this
does not mean that airlines have been forming "strategic alliances" and "globalising" throughout their history.
These terms have particular meanings in organisational theory, and we commence with an explicit discussion
about these topics before considering their implications for contemporary behaviour in the airline industry.
In the post-war period, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATI') promoted free trade by establishing
a set of rules and principles that were non-discriminatory and it sought to w impediments to trade through
govemn_nt regulation. Nevertheless, the dominant model for a successful business was to develop a profitable
domestic market and exporting played a relatively minor role. During the 1970s and 1980s, multinational
corporations came to the fore, but the approach was to replicate production processes with strong control from the
centre of the organisation. Often the multinational corporation invested abroad to take advantage of lower costs of
production and output, especially in developing countries. The global enterprise represents a higher order of
evolution in response to a set of environmental conditions.
The emergence of a large middle class, most notably in Asia, has expanded markets at the same time, increasing
the power of the consumer. Markets tend now to be "pulled" by consumers rather than being "pushed" by
suppliers. Barriers to competition have been reduced within and between economies so that businesses are under
pressure to deliver better quality with higher levels of customer service at lower costs. Many businesses have
found that their growth ambitions cannot be realised unless they expand out of their home markets, especially
those firms that serve niche markets with highly specialised products and services. Harmonisation of product
standards also has widened the scope for global competition. In some industries, the invesunent required to
research and develop new products has escalated, and global expansion allows businesses to tap a wider pool of
expertise as well as making it possible to spread the costs and risks.
Taking advantage of lower costs of production remains a powerful incentive to invest abroad, but the approach
now is to source components and services from the most competitive suppliers. Developments in communication
and information technology have made it possible to coordinate diverse activities more easily while delivering a
greater amount of information to consumers. Under these conditions, intra-indnstry trade has boomed on a world-
wide basis and even small to medium-sized enterprises have become important within global supply chains. The
distinctive features of global businesses are in the ways they plan and organise sourcing and in the scope of their
marketing.
Is it true then that the international airline industry is an example of globalisation? Deregulation of domestic travel
markets has increased competitive pressures and in many economies has resulted in greater integration of
domestic and international operations (Hooper, 1997). In the United States, at least, the major carriers have
pursued growth abroad as it appeared the domestic market was approaching maturity during the early 1990s
(Pilarski and Thomas, 1995). Information technology, especially in the form of computer reservation systems, has
made it possible to expand the scope of distribution systems and to compete effectively in more distant markets.
Competitive strategies built upon hub-and-spoke operations, frequent flyer programs, and code-sharing have
increasedthemarketingstrengthsof the large carriers. As travel markets have expanded with rising incomes,
destinations have come into direct competition with each other. Some of the traditional destination regions also
have become important sources of travellers. There has been a convergence of "domestic " and "international"
tourism markets and most of the world's largest airlines in the 1990s have developed complementary domestic
and international networks as well as distribution systems.
All of these factors suggest that the "globalisation" is a natural state for the airlines. It also is true that increasing
competition has forced airlines to reduce their cos_. In some notable cases, airlines have responded to this by
adopting global sourcing practices. Cathay Pacific, for example, was reported to have saved US$25 million a year
when it began employing its air crews from bases in the USA, UK and Australia in 1996 (Hewitt, 1996), having
already located its data processing in Australia. £mflhansa has suffered from high labour costs in Germany and
was considering how an alliance with a US carrier would allow it to reduce overheads by sourcing in North
America (McMullan, 1992a). BA Engineering and Lufthansa Technik specialise in performing overhaul
operations /or other airlines. Atlas Air is another to take advantage of outsourcing initiatives by developing a
strength in air cargo operations.
However, airlines are not free to mobilise their skilled workforces on a world-wide basis due to varying industrial
legislation and restrictions on "doing business". There are limits on how much aircraft maintenance, catering,
refuelling, administration and training can be provided by suppliers in other economies. Problems associated with
coordinating crew rostering led to Cathay Pacific abandoning its attempt to establish a crew base in Bangkok for
short-haul mutes in 1997 (13allantyne, 1997). The opportunities to reduce costs and improve customer service lie
mostly in network development and the optimal use of aircraft within those networks.
In situations where airline markets have been deregulated, carriers have used mergers and acquisitions to
rationalise networks and to pursue growth and diversification strategies. The primary motivation for a merger is to
increase the combined wealth of the enterprises involved, increase the wealth of shareholders and create
opportunities for improved operations. Mergers are highly visible and represent lumpy investment decisions in
which the buyers and sellers consider they will be better off because of the synergies between the two
organisations and the efficiencies that can be achieved under a single management. Competitive strength increases
through combined marketing, production and distribution in addition to improved financial economies in the form
of lower transaction costs and better coverage by financial analysts and media. The merged entity is able to
eliminate excess capacity and perhaps is able to exert increased market power.
However, s_rategic alliances can be used to pursue these benefits and they can give competitors a low-cost route
to gain new technology and access to markets. High fixed costs can be shared and complementary resources can
be brought together. The sharing of technology and information can be linked to long-term commitments that
require complex integration and large capital costs. The .joint venture is one option for managing this integration.
but strategic alliances rely on a more co-operative arrangement. Given that many strategic alliances involve equity
swaps to reduce risks of dissolution and opportunistic behaviour, it is necessary to be clear about what
distinguishes an alliance from a merger or joint venture.
Definitions about what constitutes a "strategic alliance" abound in the literature, but there are two essential
characteristics that need to be considered. Firstly, the emphasis on "strategy'; one business chooses to cooperate
to a greater or lesser extent with another in order to pursue its corporate objectives and/or in response to
opportunities/threats arising in the external environment. Secondly, businesses become "allies"; each partner
maintaining a separate identity with scope for independent action and dissolution. Mergers and acquisitions
definitely are not strategic alliances and this is further elaborated below. Joint ventures and equity swaps have
many of the necessary characteristics of alliances, but they are difficult to classify. The scope of the strategic
alliance includes arrangements to pool resources, to ally and link systems, businesses become better "PALs"
through strategic alliances (Kanter, 1989). In summary, strategic alliances are characterised by:
* a coalition of two or more organisations in an on-going relationship, but each is free to exit the
relationship
• specific goals/objectives
• the pursuit of mutual, though not necessarily equal, benefits
• sharing resources or, at least, integrating resources to improve performance
* sharing risks and rewards and decision making
• covering only part of the activities of each partner so that each maintains a separate identity, with some
functions not included in the agreement
• systems that are difficult to break down into constituent elements
• a concern for long-term issues facing members to develop and maintain a sustainable competitive
advantage
Strategies are relevant only when there is the potential to create a degree of market power. In a highly competitive
situation the enterprise has no option but to seek minimum costs and accept market prices. The adoption of a
strategy suggests there is a choice and that the alliance will have scope to influence the market. However, the
issues of control and scope for independent action raise fundamental questions about the nature of organisational
forms emerging in response to globalisation. We will pursue these below, but first draw attention to some
characteristics of airlines that make them candidates for alliance formation.
3 POTENTIAL OF AIRLINES AS CANDIDATES FOR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
First and foremost, the airlines have a history of co-oper4tive behaviour. For example, in 1933 Qantas, then a
small regional airline, entered into a joint venture with Imperial Airways to win a contract to carry mail from
Singapore to Anslrniia (Findlay 1995). The result was Qantas Empire Airways, and the alliance partners were able
to counter the development of a rival service proposed by KLM. As the international airline industry grew,
collaboration played a vital role in fostering markets, in improving the economic positions of the carriers and in
developing and transferring technical skills as carriers shared technical knowledge, performed maintenance on
each other's aircraft, and co-operated in training. It is common for one airline to carry out ground handling and
passenger processing on behalf of others. Also, airlines sell interline tickets as well as pooling revenue on routes
and co-ordinating flight scheduling.
However, with advanced technology collaborative behaviour now code-sharing, block-booking arrangements,
common computer reservations systems (CRS), joint frequent flyer plans, and equity swaps. These practices have
been interpreted as manifestations of strategic alliances in the formation of global airlines (Gialloreto, 1988;
Tretheway, 1991). The rush to forge alliances in Europe and the United States in late 1992 led one analyst to
question whether they were simply a product of financial stress in the airline industry and panic about "being left
isolated" (McMullen, 1992b). Others have observed that the process of alliance formation has had the
characteristics of an "epidemic" with serious doubts about the claim that they are "slrategic" (Alamdari and
Morrell, 1997). The distinction between marketing alliances and genuine strategic alliances is an important one.
Clearly, co-operative behaviour is pervasive in the airline business but it is questionable that many of the current
alliances would prosper in liberal aviation markets.
Deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the United States provided hard evidence that hub-and-spoke
networks allow carriers to improve productivity while ineaeasing the effectiveness of marketing. The strategy of
consolidating traffic at hubs requires that some mutes be considered as the line haul and others serve a feeder
role, and this hierarchy is evident in domestic markets through the distinction between major and regional airlines.
Profits in the airline industry are highly leveraged around the break-even load factor and connecting traffic is
important for survival at all levels of the airline industry. As a result, many of the most important competitive
battles are fought in creating "seamless" travel for connecting passengers, for example, by co-ordinating
schedules and transferring baggage. The customer is sold a single ticket with the designation of the major carrier
(code-sharing) and the entire journey accrues frequent flyer points with the major carrier.
Vertical integration has its attractions and there are many cases where the major airline has acquired the feeder
airlines, but it is possible to achieve a great deal within broad marketing alliances (Lovin 1986; Oster and
PickreU, 1987). Despite the need to integrate regional and major carriers' operations and marketing, there are
important differences in terms of the density of markets, sector distances and the size of aircraft. Cost structures
and organisational cultures can differ markedly and even when the major carrier has acquired the regional airline,
separateidentitiesare maintained.The regionalairlineimprovesitsmarketingsucngththroughtheassociation
withthemajorcarrier,butitstillneedstomaintainitslocalidentity.Itisimportantinthesea_angemantstoallow
thesmallerpartnertheflexibilitytomanageina way thatisappropriateoitscircumstancesand notbcswamped
bythepoliciesadoptedbythemanagementofthelargercarrier.
These lessonsfrom domesticderegulationhave implicationsat theinternationallevel,but thereare some
differencestoconsider.The broadeningand incrensingintegrationofdomesticand internationaltravelmarkets
resultsinsimilarhierarchiesoffeederand trunkcarriers,althoughitisnotclearthatthiswillbcexpressedtothe
same extentindominanthubs.Some ofthemajorhubs arccongestedand therearcconstraintshatprevent
expansion of capacity. Also, high frequencies arc not as important in long-distance travel and there is a greater
incentive to open direct mutes versus consolidating traffic through hubs. F._hnoccntric behaviour is strong in the
travel market and international airlines arc very reluctant to abandon their national identifies. More significantly,
the cultural differences that would nccd to bc accommodated within the one organisation pose a major challenge
for the global airline.
In the absence of any restrictions on foreign invesuncnt in the airline sector, it is likely that mergers and
acquisitions would occur and that networks with feeder and trunk services would develop to some degree.
However, mergers and acquisitions would encounter major problems in terms of strategic and cultural fit as they
attempt to mesh incompatible strategies, values and leadership styles. Alliances offer advantages in this context.
Globalising airlines can use alliances to gain access to marknts with less commiunent of resources and a means to
acconunodatc these problems. Strategic alliances go funhea than cooperation to link services. Through
organisational change, strategic alliances make it possible to reap the full benefits of globalisation. The global
alliance makes it possible to cnstomisc products to the needs of national markets while simultaneously, optimising
operations and sourcing.
It follows from the review above that the overriding motive for the formation of strategic alliances is the urgency
to manage a persistently, changeable environment (Qulnn, 1992). With this in mind, the uncertainty regarding the
future of an alliance is ever-present. It can be concluded from the review above that airline alliances arc 'hollow'
networks with little genuine organisational integration amongst members. The key defining feature of the strategic
alliance is the degree of integration required to share decision making and resources as well as the willingness to
pursue long-term competitive advantage. On this basis, wc first examine this latest concept of organisation, most
importantly focusing on the nature of the relationship between partners and conclude with a set of propositions
nssociated with the development of strategic alliances.
4 STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AS NEW CONCEPT OF ORGANISATION
4.1 Intelligent enterprises
As previously stated, strategic alliances primarily are an aggregation of autonomous organisations that essentially
retain their own identity and governance. The purpose of forming strategic alliances focuses on commercial
objectives, strategic vision and leadership and ways of gaining a competitive advantage in volatile markets. More
specifically, strategic alliances seek to acquire a form of organisational flexibility to adjust to change, to develop
the organisational capacity (skills and resources) to develop successful products and services and to achieve
operating economies and efficiencies (Powell, 1987).
In understanding this new concept of organisation, Qulan (1992) referred to strategic alliances as 'intelligent
enterprises' that comprise complex, global information and decision support systems superseding many of the
control and operational functions of their conventional counterparts. These issues in turn lead to a new concept of
organising in terms of recreating a 'flatter' hierarchy with a membership-orientated culture concentrating on
shared values, new learning and knowledge, and integration (Webster, 1992). The manner in which this is
achieved varies from one organisational context to another (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) and will be elaborated
on below.
Transformational leadership is an important aspect in forming strategic alliances and nmnaging change within
them. The pressure to align enteap_ brought about by new market muctures and the extension of market
boundaries beyond national ones is redefining the future organisational form in the airline industr 7. There is
increased pressure for enterprise leaders to understand the organisational prerequisites for successful alliances
such as a well-developed infrastructure of culture, process of organisational learning and rewarding ways to
achieveintegrationamongst alliancepartners.
4.2 Membership culture
In a sWategic alliance,each enterpriserepresentsa culture that has a varying degree of influenceover its
member' beliefs and behaviour. Enterprises ' ..like persons, have values and these values are integrated into
some coherent value system., in any [enterprise], the members generally have a set of beliefs about what is
appropriate and inappropriate organisational behaviour' (Ooodetein, 1983, pp. 203-4). In the same way that
personality is not a direct explanation for a person's actions, enterprise culture is only one factor contributing to
the performance of an alliance. Culture is related to the concept of 'strategic fit' as well as to the question as to
the extent of similarity and diversity that exists between potential enterprise members in a strategic alliance. One
assumption is the greater the similarity between the value systems of potential memben, the more likely they will
find accord. Enterprises whose cultures are more similar to than different from each other will develop alliances
more timely and successfully (Harrison, 1972; Malekzadeh, 1988), and have greater financial success (Porter,
1985).
4.3 New learning and knowledge
An important aspect of developing membership culture is the process of organisational learning that alliance
members engage in jointly and separately (Arygris, 1977). Incre_ing competitive pre._ures are fuelling concern
over the extent to which alliances can "learn' jointly. One pe_tive is that strategic aHiancns are less likely to
.foster learning when exposed to competition, instead levering their market position to obtain competitive
advantage (Barnett and Burgelman, 1996). The fundamental dilemma for any strategic alliance is how to maintain
its enterprise identity while simultaneously developing the alliance. Alliance development generally calls for
substantial shifts in maintenance strategies to effect the active support and contribution of alliance members.
Strategic alliances require that members convey their learning to one another, develop shared understandings and
externalise what they have learnt (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992). Organisational learning occurs when the actions of
one party, in this case an enterprise member, contests the values of another and there is pressure to replace 'their'
ideas with 'different' ones. A high level of cultural synergy may inhibit organisational learning where enterprise
members 'think' in a similar way. In other words, too much similarity may conslraln the potential benefits of the
alliance because too little in tem_ of added-value and innovation is being contributed by enterprise members to
the alfiance. Others have arguad, for example Parkh¢ (1991) that inter*firm cultural and organisational diversity
adversely affects performance. However there is another perspective, cultural synergy may not equal cultm'_
similarity. Two dissimilar cultures may reach synergy through the process of 'double-loop' learning (Arygris,
1977).
Members do not agree upon clearboundaries,cannot identifyshared solutionsand do not reconcilebeliefsand
multipleidentities,let,thesemembers contend theybelong toa culture.They share a common orientationand
ovemrching purpose,face sinu'larproblems,and comparable experiences.However, theseshared orientations
and purpos_ accommodate differentbeliefsand incommensurable technologies,theseproblems imply different
solutions,and these experienceshave multiplemeanings... Thus,for at lenstsome culturesto dismiss the
ambiguitiesinfavour of what isclearand shared isto excludesome of the most centralaspectsof members'
culturalexperienceand toignoretheessenceoftheirculturalcommunity. (Meyerson elaL, 199 I,pp 13I-2)
In other words, learning jointly allows 'culture' to be 'unbundled' into its important components in a way that
might not occur within a single enterprise. Yet. learning is often a slow process simply because, as enterprises are
currently structured, they retard the uansfemng of information, ideas and expertise amongst partners.
Organisational learning is instrumental to collective efficacy defined as the belief of enterprise members about
whether they can perform successfully or not within a strategic alliance (Bandura, 1977). Alliances that have a
low sense of efficacy are more inclined to respond negatively to organisational change than those with high
efficacy (Beehr and Newman, 1978). How is high efficacy achieved'?.
Cousensns-building with interactions amongst members plays a significant part in developing collective efficacy.
Strategic alliances provide "blurred boundaries' for learning to occur. The process of developing collective
efficacy in alliances is assisted by 'skilled organisers' who span the enterprise boundaries of each member and
transfer learning (Brown and Hosking, 1986). Innovations by one member need to lranslate into alliance-wide
innovation. The alliance needs to be structured in a way that facilitates the emergence and action of these types of
liaison roles for organisational success.
5 ORGANISATIONAL PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL ALLIANCES
5.1 Organisational performance and organisational outcomes
In practice, alliances have had a high failure rate and this has been no less the case in the airline business
(Flanagan and Marcus, 1993). This has led to a focus on the factors that contributed to the formation of the
alliance, but these may have little do a failed outcome. Success of a strategic alliance is predicated on
organisational performance (OP) and organisational outcomes (OC). OP is a function of actions congruent to
organisational goals. Action takes the form of establishing a shared vision, communicating clearly, building inter-
member mast. collaborating and sharing knowledge and decision making. These processes grounded in an
impelling business strategy are essential from the outset of alliance formation (Kanter, 1994).
Performing successfully in a strategic alliance not only involves capability but also choices, for example, the
choice to expend effort and to what degree as well as the choice to commit resomr_ including knowledge and
trust. Organisational ou_ include the degree to which enterprise members have met the goals and the extent
to which they are satisfied with the suategic alliance. If one of the members perceives the alliance to be unfair the
choice about their potential investment will be modified. The relationship between OP and OC is best understood
in terms of the concept of organisational integration.
A strategic alliance rests on the premise that each member brings unique commitments to the alliance, requiring a
process of integration. To integrate member commitments, each constituency in the alliance needs to understand
and share in a collective mission. Success has to be grounded in the integration of human resources which leads to
a greater probability of strategic and operational attainmenL However, ff the interrelationship between the
partners is based largely on self-interest, competition and overt conflict, the members' attachment to the alliance
is loose. Conversely, when the relationship between the constituencies is collaborative, partners become engaged
in an alliance characterised by collective interest and equality. One of the difficulties in integrating the separate
goals of various members in an alliance is the fundamental conflict over their individual control of scarce
resources. Sources of conflict include information (technical expertise, quality); capital, physical resources, time
(to learn) and intangible assets (industry reputation (Barney, 1986; Hill, 1990). The relative control of these
resources is reflected in each transaction within the alliance. Conflict over resources also mirrors the degree of
trust amongst members.
5.2 Alliances based on exchange
To explain this point in more detail, a relationship of exchange is compared to that based on integration. Strategic
alliances are firmly established on a relationship of exchange highlighting the interdependence between the
enterprise members. An alliance based on 'exchange' is founded on a reciprocal relationship, with the members'
contributions each linked to the other basc.d on fair exchange of contributions, and outcomes proportional to
investment. Trust is also an important part of an exchange relationship in terms the extent to which each members
believes that the other(s) will meet their commitments to the alliance. Exchange sets up a competitive context, the
nature of which is characterised by each members in the alliance declaring 'If I give you something, I want
something in return'. The outcome subsequently leads to 'winners' and 'losers', depending on which member is
best able to maximise their control over scarce resources. 'Losers' are more likely to resort to threat as a form of
reprisal. Su'ong competition and fear of reprisal can be minimised through structuring the alliance along equitable
lines. This is achieved by, for example, ensuring that each party has equal access to resources and opportunity to
control them. In an alliance based on exchange, there is an element of uncertainty that is reduced with each
transaction. Under these conditions, the culture of the alliance is at best 'co-operative' but remains a 'hollow'
network as we witness amongst carriers at presenL
5.3 Alliances based on integration
Alliances that go beyond exchange and slrive for an integration of interests, goals, resources and values take on a
different 'rationality' from those based pttrely on self-inmest. A number of reseaz_ers (Johanson and Mattson,
1988; Malekzedeh, 1988) have stressed the significance of integration as an ideal process for strategic alliances.
Consultants Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1985) reported that cultural integration was the most important factor,
ahead of financial and strategic factors, in the success of acquisitions.
A strategy of integration establishes common interests amongst members through a process of ongoing
negotiation. With the understanding that not all alliances are founded totally on conflict or calculative action,
integration is the approach most likely to lead to the initiation, development and maintenance of a strategic
alliance. An integrative strategy U_refore encourages a 'negotiated order' within the alliance (Strauss, 1978).
Negotiation is aimed at the maximisation of equitable outcomes for all members. Negotiation allows each
constituency not only to preserve a cohesive social relationship but also to dissent without fear of reprisal about
contribution and outcomes in the alliance. Members experience a sense of working towards a *commonality'
characterised by 'what is good for us is good for the alliance'. Integration is associated with enhanced efficacy
and ultimately organisational capacity of the alliance. Strategic alliances based on integration are genuinely
adding-value for customers and shareholders.
Walter (1985) found culture is a significant factor in the performance of hybrid organisations. A strategy of
integration involves a major 'jelling' of distinct cultures, woridorces and orientations. Integration requires a
collective orientation to strategic purpose implying a mutual understanding and acceptance of the goals and
strategies by various members. An integrative strategy addresses four main factors that affect the performance
outcomes of alliances: breadth of purpose, boundary determination, value creation process and stability
mechanisms (Borys & Jemison 1989). The purpose of the alliance is dynamic and varies over time as markets
fluctnatc, technologies change, legislation is modified and work structures are redesigned.
9
Sowhatdosuccessfulstrategicalliancesrequire?If themeans to the end have changed (as evidenced by
allianc_'..s, mergers and acquisitions), new strategies are called for, requiring a renewed 'responsiveness' from
enterprise members who are located either at the 'centre' or its boundaries. Strategic alliances often mean that
people essentially have 'divided' loyalties and ambiguous commitment. Alliances will be less 'hollow' and
successful when:
• new ways of thinking and doing emerge, and blockages are 'unfrozen'
• underlying conflicts are identified and addressed
• there is an emphasis on the interactive processes among people
• people engage in genuine problem solving
• tensions between dominant and weak logics and between old and new ones are overcome
• stakeholders who possess the most appropriate organisational knowledge are identified
• it is predetermined under what conditions it is appropriate for the dominant member to possess information
without sharing it
• psychological contracts support and reinforce innovative behaviour
6 AIRLINE ALLIANCES IN A COMPETITIVE, GLOBAL MARKET ,
In a recent survey by Airline Business, it was revealed that there are more than 360 alliances among international
carriers (Gallacber. 1997). Few of these display any strong commitment to organisational integration and it is
more appropriate to regard them as competitive actions to pursue relatively short-term objectives. We consider
them to be "hollow organisations rather than genuine attempts to develop new organisational relationships as pan
of a globalisation strategy. In the long-term, coalitions would continue to be formed, but specific memberships
would vary depending upon the set of competitive conditions at any time. There can be no doubt that the
existence of regulatory barriers to entering markets and to investment favour alliance formation. In the absence of
the regulations, it is probable that genuine strategic alliances would continue to develop as an alternative to
strategies based on mergers and acquisitions. We believe the key reason for this is that globalisation in the airline
industry requires a network of services operating in regions with widely differing cultural conditions. Attempts to
co-ordinate actions through merger and acquisitions will be confronted with problems of cultural fit and they will
need to tailor services to local demands. Strategic alliances, though, are markedly different than simpler marketing
and operational alliances. Alliances allow greater flexibility and added-value. More important, the model for
success addresses the fundamental issues directly.
The benefits from these strategic alliances potentially accrue in improved performance and responses to consumer
needs. The formation of swategic alliances allows carriers to question more actively, to overturn existing logics
and to intervene more effectively in change. Strategic alliances force each enterprise address the nature of their
contribution to hybrid organisation by identifying their core competency, expertise, resources and where they will
add value. Strategic alliances present _hallenges to the airline industry that are not entirely novel, but they need to
be reconsidered as a potential solution to many of the difficult questions facing it such as out and in-sourcing,
downsizing and business failure.
Implicit in the pursuit of competitive advantage is the assumption that there is scope for market power. Business
strategies seek to establish and defend positions in the market. The fundamental question for regulators is whether
competition in the airline industry is a sufficiently strong enough force to produce outcomes that are "better" than
what can be achieved under regulated conditions. The issues of concentration of market power, whether it be
through mergers and acquisitions or through alliances, still need to be confronted. However, the organisational
structures that emerge in strategic alliances are more complex and it will become progressively more difficult for
individual governments to influence their behaviour. Moreover, regulators need to consider how their actions
affect the development of genuine strategic alliances that have the potential to deliver long-term benefits.
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7 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We believe it is inappropriate to label most of the arrangements among the world's airlines as "strategic alliances"
formed as part of a "globalisation process". It is better to regard them as competitive responses to current
conditions, that is 'hollow' networks based on a relationship of exchange and not integration. To a large extent,
the alliances are a by-product of the regulatory system. The key questions from a regulatory perspective are
whether increasing concentration of market power is likely to occur in liberal market conditions and how this
would have an impact on performance.
The current set of regulations restrict access to markets and prevent airlines from investing in each other. We
believe that the regulations also inhibit the development of genuine strategic alliances because they impose issues
of national sovereignty on a process where genuine integration that is, co-operation and a commitment to decision
and resource- sharing is required.
We have argued that alliances would survive in liberal market conditions but they will be a more complex
organisational form with a stronger commitment to the exploitation of the benefits of globalisation than dominant
t'h'ms that see global expansion as simple extensions of their networks.
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Abstract
Aviation is becoming increasingly internationalized not only because
international traffic is itself growing rapidly but also because airlines are
themselves beginning to lose their national identity as cross-equity holdings
expand and as airline a/Hances grow in number. These changes affect the
commercial and the regulatory environment in which aviation services are
provided but they also have potential implications for air transport safety.
Although air transport safety is often treated as part of public policy, it is
also influenced by the commercial interests of the airlines themselves. While
there has been a recognition of the need for a public policy response to the
new world of giobalization and strategic alliances that are now part of the air
transportmarket,thispolicyresponseneeds tobe made inthe contextof
changingprivateincentivesaffectingairlines'own attitudestosafety.This
paperfocuseson thechangesinprivateincentivesthatthegrowthinairline
alliancesinparticularmay haveon safety.
Introduction
The number of major aircraft accidents in 1996, combined with concerns expressed by the
aircraft manufacturer Boeing, that, while in statistical terms civil aviation may be slowly
gettingsaferor,atworst,no more dangerous,thesheergrowthof aircraftmovements in
future years will result in a rise in the absolute number of accidents, has brought forth a
response from the aviation sector (THEECONOMIS'r,1997). In the US, for instance, there
has been the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
Thishasalsohappenedatatimewhen theairtransportmarketisexperiencingconsiderable
change.As with many othersectors,airtransportservicesuppliersarerespondingto
commercialpressuresforincreasedinternationalizationoreapbenefitson boththecostand
demand sides.The growth of internationalirlinealliancesis the most transparent
manifestationf thisalthoughtherehas beenan evenmore rapidgrowthin pointspecific
alliances.Alliancesare seenby carriersas a means of exploitingeconomiesof scale,
densityand scope in theprovisionof servicesand as a means to exploiteconomies of
marketpresence in terms of patronage.
The growthinnumber and thenatureof modem allianceshave raiseda seriesof policy
issuesconcernedmainlywith anti-trustissues.The concernof thispaperisto look at
anotheraspectof the globalizationf the airlineindustryand of thegrowth of various
forms of air_e alliances and thatisthepotenfml effea of these developmentson a£rline
safety.In particular,itlooks at the way market forceschange and can influencethe
comn_rcialincentiveforairlineoperatorsto offersafeservices.Publicpolicyregarding
safetyhasbeenreactingtochangingconditionsinaviationmarketsbutsuchreactionshould
be in the contextof the new commercialenvironmentin which airlinesprovidetheir
services.
The paper initially outlines some of the broad trends in globalization that are influencing
and beinginfluencedby developmentsincommercialaviation.Itthenturnsto look at
ex_.flywhatistakingplaceregardingairlinealliances,and particularlythoseof a strategic
nature.An importantpointhereisthatconceptuallythedetailsof any a_rlinealliancemay
have specificsafetyimplications.A model of how airlinesafetyisincorporatedin both
corporateandpublicpolicyisthendevelopedand subsequentlytheimplicationsof strategic
alliances am set within this context. The discussion is entirely concerned with aviation
marla_ts in what might be termed the industrial wodd. Strategic airline alliance.s do exist in
many parts of the world but here we content ourselves with considering those involving
partnerships between carriers based in the major, economically developed countries. The
arguments may be somewhat different for other parts of the world.
Globalization and aviation
Globalization and internationalization am two of tic major industrial trcnds of the late
twentiethcentury('rlCJROW,1996).part of thesetrendsam reflectedin the significant
growth of tradethathas taken placein the 1990s with realexportgrowth in the
industrializedcountriesthatmake up the OrganisationforEconomic Cooperationand
Development(OECT)) runningatover7% per annum. Put anotherway, from 1964 to
1992,firstworld productionwas up by 9%, but exportswere up by 12%, and cross-
borderlendingwas up 23%. Equally,thcrehasbeenasignificantriseinforeignowncrship
ofassetsthatarcnow estimatedtototalabout$1.7trillion.
Whether these trends are passing fads or represent genuine long term adjustments to the
way that production and trade is conducted it is perhaps premature to judge. The
preliminary indications are, though, that they are more than transient trends.
This has also been taking place at a time when the institutional structure in which air
transport services are provided has seen significant developments. The US deregulation of
its domestic markets for air freight from 1977 and for passengers from 1978, combined
with its subsequent commitment to an 'Open Skies' approach to international aviation the
following year, have been instrumental in changing the way not only US policy is
conducted but also, through both demonstration effects and direct knock-on effects, the
ways in which many other air transport markets are now regulated (BtrrroN, 1990; Btrrr_
and SWANN, 1989).
The intra-European market, in particular, is moving rapidly towards a situation akin to that
found within the United States. Many European countries have unilaterally liberalized their
own domesticmarkets while the European Union (ELI)l has since1988 through a
successionof 'packages'moved toa positionthatby themiddleof 1997 willleaveair
transportwithintheUnion largelyfreefrom economicregulation('BtrrroN,1996a).These
measuresinitiallyopened up regulatedfareand capacitybands withintheEU, but then
wenton tolimitfareand entrycontrolsonlytoinstanceswhere governmentsatbothends
of a route agreed to them. The creation of a Single European Market from 1993 means that
international air transport within Europe is essentially deregulated with full cabotage within
member states being allowed from 1997 (BtrrroN and SwAr_, 1992).
t The titleEuropean Union (ELI)isa comparativelynew one and terms such as
EuropeanCommunity orEuropeanCommunitiesprecededit.For simplicityofexposition,
however, itwillbe used throughoutthispaper.Currentlythe EU consistsof Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France,Finland,Germany, GreatBritain,Greece, I.rcland,Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands,Portugal,Spain,Sweden. Otherstatesuch as Norway and
Switzerlando haveimportantagreementswiththeEU, forinstance,regardingaviation,
that icthem tothelattcr'soverallpolicy.
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Lntra-Europeanmad_tliberaliz_onhas alsobeenaccompaniedby liberalizationof many
bilateralgr_ments involvingEuropean statesand the USA. The fu'stsuch agreement
involvedtheNetherlandsand theUS in 1992 butsincethattimea significantumber of
smallerEuropeancountrieshavemade similarliberalagreementswiththeUS and in1996 a
majorOpens Sky agr_ment was alsoreachedwithGermany.
Outside of Europe and North America, the majority of national markets in South America
have been liberalized with extensive privatization programs of different types. The markets
in Australia and New Zealand have also been deregulated. Additionally, the establishment
of the World Trade Organization has also brought into play, albeit in an exu'emely small
role,a new and geographicallywider policymaking institutiontosupplementthe roles
alreadyplayedby bodiessuch as theInternationalCivil'AviationOrganizationand the
InternationalAirTransportAssociation(IATA).Aviationissuesarealsoon theagendaof
new regionalgroupingssuch astheAsian-PacificE onomic Council.There iscontinued
pressure,therefore,forthisinternationalliberalizationprocesstocontinue(ORGANISATION
FORECONOMIC_TION AND DEVELOPMEtcr,1997)
Thiscombinationofmarkettrendsand institutionalreforms,combined withrisingincomes
and increasedleisuretime,havecontributedtothesteadygrowthindemand thathas taken
placein aviationmarkets.Additionally,technologyadvances have meant thataircraft
efficiencyhas risenand airtrafficcontrolsystems,despitetheircontinuedinadequacies,
canhandlegreatervolumes oftrafflc.Thishas exertedpositiveffectson thecostsideof
theinternationalairtransportequation.
As a resultofthesetrends,since1960 airpassengertraffichas grown world wide atan
averagerateof 9% a year and freightand mail trafficby some II.0% and 7.0%
respectively.This means thatin 1995,forexample,some 1.3 billionpassengerswere
carriedby the world'sairlines.Civilaviationis,therefore,a major serviceindustry
contributingto both domesticand internationaltransportsystems. It facilitateswider
businesscommunicationsand has beena key component inthegrowth of tourismthatis
now one of theworld'smajor employment sectors.In additiontopassengertransport,
aviation is also an important form of freight transport and some estimates suggest that it
carries up to 60% of world trade by value.
Further, all the indications are that as a sector it will continue to expand into tim foreseeable
future albeit at differential rates in various geographical sub-markets. While forecasting of
aviation markets, as with many other activities remains an art rather than a science, it seems
likely that passenger traffic will grow at a ram of between 5.0% and 7.0% into tim
foreseeable future with much of this growth in the Asian-Pacific region (up to 9.0% a
year). The forecasts arc also for slower growth in tim more mature US-European markets
where North Atlantic traffic grew at an annual ram of 8% between 1982 and 1992 and by
5.0% for mid Atlantic routes over the same period. Nevertheless, the absolute size of the
trans-Atlantic traffic flows, some 38.0 million passengers (about 13.9% of the world
aviation market) in 1992, makes it quantitatively a very important aviation market. Further,
takentogether,the intra-European,US domesticand transatlanticmarkets currently
account for some 60% of world air traffic.
Strategic airline alliances
In line with many other sectors, aviation has experienced significant moves towards
globalization and internationalization in terms of its market structure. Indce.d, it is tim smmd
objectiveof themajor UK carrier,BritishAirways thatitintendsto become a 'global
carrier'.Inpursuitofwidermarketcoverage,and in an effortoenhancetheirown internal
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efficiency, airlines have followed a number of courses. The recent development of various
forms of airline alliances is perhaps currently the most controversial of these (BuTtoN,
1997).
The exact definition of what constitutes an a_rline alliance is a vague one especially given
that the institutional arrangements linking airline activities is continually changing. The
notion of airline alliances is, however, one that has recently come under public scrutiny in
the wake of several much publicized efforts by number of major international airlines to
link their operations. The nature of the ties differ between groupings and so has the success
of airline partners in gaining both official ratification and in the subsequent way partners
have been able to operate and manage their alliances.
Historically,internationalalliancesinaviationcan be tracedbackas faras 1945 when the
IATA was establishedprimarilytocoordinateinternationalairfares.The bilateralstructure
of agreementsthatemerged followingtheinabilityof the 1994 Chicago Convention to
initiatefreeinternationalaviationmarketsregulatedfares,routings,schedules,designated
carriersand oftenembraced revenuepooling.The primaryaim of theimmediatepost-war
structurewas toprotectnon-US carriersata timewhen, as a resultoftheSecond World
War, the US had built up a dominant fleet of aircraft that could be transferred to commercial
uses. Subsequently, the regime was often used to protect economically inefficient state
owned carriers from the rigors of market competition.
The late1980sand early1990ssaw thegrowthofnew formsof internationalalliancesthat
have embracedsomewhat differentcharacteristicsand thatservedifferentpurposes.They
havebeenlessinstitutionalizednthattheyhavegenerallybeen formedby privatelyowned
commercialairlinesoutsideof any governmentalor inter-governmentalagencyinitiative.
The main growth has alsobeen in internationalalliances.The firstof these,between
American Airlinesand Qantas,was signedin1985.The number of alliancesinvolvingUS
carriersthengrew rapidlyuntilby 1992therewere61.
Alliancesarealsoinacontinualstateofflux.AccordingtotheAirlineBuaines_survey,for
instance,theSpanishcarrierIberiareduceditsalliancesfrom 27 in 1995 to 13 by May
1996.Over thesame periodAustrianAirlinescanceledsixagreementsand added fournew
ones,Swissalradded sixagreementsand droppedthreewhileUnitedAirlinescanceledsix
but added two. These changesgenerallyarepartof a tidying-uprocessesas carriers
formulatemore coherentnetworkstrategies.
The exact number of airline atliances that now exists is unclear, not only because of the
dynamic nature of the arrangements that make it almost impossible to keep abreast of
changes but, also because the term 'alliance' is a generic one with no precise definition. It
can, in a strict legal sense, mean some degree of equity ownership of one carder by another
but it is more often interpreted in looser terms to embrace such things as code-sharing
agreements, interchangeable frequent flier programs and coordinated scheduling of
services. Equally, airlines are often involved in a large number of different alliances,
sometimes embracing a single partner but may involve several others carriers. A more
recentfcaun_isthatincreasinglyseveralmajorcarriersare[inkingtheiractivitiesin so-
called'galaxies'.
An annual survey by Airline Business a_mpted to track alliances involving the major
carders and to report changes in the main features of the alliances (Table 1). The growth in
strategicairlinealliancesisimmediatelyobviousas isboththerelativelysmallquantitative
importanceof alliancesinvolvingan equitystakeand theslow growth in theirnumbers.
The datapresentedisnot,however,definitiveand one finds,forinstance,The Economist
in 1995 producing slightly different figures and claiming that there were then 401 alliances,
doublethenumberit estimated four years earlier. The overwhelming, conclusion, though,
is that the number of alliances is large and increasing.
Table 1, Airline alliances 1994-1996
I I I
, ,, 1996 1995 1_94 %¢ha_qe
Numberof aliances 389 324 280 38.9
_th equity stakes 62 58 58 6.9
_thout equly stakes 327 266 222 47.3
New allbnces 71 50 - -
Nuffberof m-lhes 171 153 136 25.7
NotR: New alimCeS m'e those enteeed into alnce emund May of the pre_ous year and not Olen
ibte0 asplanned. Al|iances ms_cted to frequent fler co-operation were included in 1994, but
e30_uded in 1995-6. The actual number of allmncesin 1994, _e 5rst year
compied inforrnation, was ma_inallyhigher than staled as some al|ances went unreported.
However, some domas_cregional operalorsowned by mejorswere included in 1994, but
ex_uded in 1995.6.
The North Atlantic market embraces a number of major strategic alliances that involve the
airlines code-sharing and cooperating in other ways across a large number of routes so as
to strategically link their networks. This type of strategic alliance dates back to the
formation of the Global Excellence alliance formed by Swissair, Singapore International
Airlines and Delta in 1989.
Other alliances, such as that between Continental and Alitalia and United and British
Midland, ate regional in their orientation involving code sharing between specific regions.
The vast majority of alliances, 'point-specific' alliances, are, however, relatively minor,
targeted affairs that usually generate few controversies. Blocked-space agreements are often
a feature of point-specific affiances with airlines purchasing and reselling blocks of seats on
each others flights.
Point specific alliances, in their various guises, may in some cases lead fears of to the
prospect of monopoly domination of an individual route. The mnitifaceted, strategic
alliances in which the large international carders are increasing becoming engaged are now
seen as potentially posing challenges of a somewhat greater magnitude (US GENERAL
ACCOUNT_G Oi_C_ 1994).
In detail, alliance an'angements may take a number of different forms 03trrr_, 1997).
Full mergers of domestic airlines were a feature of the US domestic market following
deregulation under the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act as the initial period of instability
moved into one of consolidation and rationalization. For example, of the 34 new jet
scheduledcarrierstoentertheUS marketbetween 1978 and 1992 only2 remainoperating
withthevastmajorityoftheothersbeingmergedwith incumbents.Mergersofthistypeare
themost extremeform of allianceand have been a traditionalway inwhich carrierscan
coordinatetheiroperationsand otheractivities.They areclaimedtoenjoytheadvantagethat
completecona'olof a carrierisin thehands of a singleboard and thatresourcescan,
therefore,beallocatedmore effectively.
In practice, though, mergers are not always successful. As a generalization, mergers
lin_/ngoverlappingnetworksinanytransportindustrytendtoofferfewereconomiesthan
thosethatcombineinterfacingetworks(eitheringeographicaltermsorwithrespectothe
typesofserviceoffered).In some instancesproblems alsoarisebecausethoseinvolved
havemiscalculatedthecostsoftransition.
Mergers generally involve the need to obtain institutional approval from various authorities.
Tradidonally, in virmaUy all cases cross-border mergers are not possible because of
regulations limiting the degree of permitted foreign ownership in an airline. A notable
exception to this being the joint ownership of SAS. Cross-border mergers also pose
problems in terms of the implications for international air transport agreements since the
nationality of a carrier can become blurred in these circumstances.
Even within countries mergers are often controlled by national governments although the
degree of control can vary. In the US, for instance, the Department of Transportation took
a very passive stance on mergers following deregulation of the domestic market.
Individually, European countries have taken a variety of positions as has the EU in recent
years. In many cases mergers, such as those between British Airways and British
Caledonia and Air France and LITA, have only gained approval by the airlines reIinqnishing
routes or slots.
The strongest form of airline alliance short of direct mergers or rake-overs involves either
unidirectional (as with the USAir/British Airways and Northwest/KLM alliances) or cross-
equity holdings. While mergers still take place, more recendy there has been a tendency for
the level of equity holdings to fall short of a full merger (Table 2). This is particularly so
when airlines from two countries are involved and national laws limit the extent of foreign
ownership. What the table does not show, however, is the degree of control thai equity
holdings can affordan airline and, in particular, voting rights are often less than the relative
amount of capital involvement.
Table 2. Forei_,n ownership of maior airlines
Cour_ty Aidhe % CounW Airline %
EUROP E NO RTH AMERICA
Austria Austdan 20 USA America West
Lauda 40 Conthental 20
B_gbm Sabena 49 Dela 20
France TAT 4g Ha_ia_ 10
Germany .Deutsche BA 49 No.west 33
Hungay Malev 30 USAir 24
Luxembeurg Luxm" 13 Canacla Canedm 22
Russia AkRussia 31 33
UK AirUK 45 AUSTRALASIA
BMA 40 Australia QuB_tas 29
New Z_land Anset! I_ __ 1O0
Source." _ December 1905
The relativeimportanceof airlinealliancesinvolvingequitystakestendsto be declining
withAirlineBusinessrecordinglessthan16% ofagreementsinMay 1996involvingequity
investmentscompared with18% in1995 and 21% in 1994. This,nevertheless,does not
mean thattherehas not beena largeincreaseintheirabsolutenumbers and othersurveys
indicatethatfrom 1992ownershipstakesofabove20% havepredominated.
Potential travelers have traditionally suffered from a dearth of information regarding the air
transport opdons open to them. The problem was compounded from the late !970s as fare
deregulation and the widespread adoption of yield management techniques by airlines
introduced a massive array of continually changing fare options. The use of computer
reservation systems (CRSs) provides the interface between the carriers and the potential
travelers. Airlines combine to make use of the information channels provided by CRS
systems to stimulate their joint traffic flows. This involves code-sharing. Code-sharing is
now often seen as the main feature of any airline alliance and the number of code-shares
has grown considerably in recent years.
TeChnically, a code-share is a marketing arrangement between two carriers that allows them
to sell seats on each other's flights under their own designator code. In the ease of
connecting flights of two or more code-sharing carriers the whole flight is displayed as a
single carrier service on a CRS. From the customers' perspective what it does is to give the
impression of an on-line service or, at the least, offer some features of an on-line service
such as single check-in, common frequent flier program and coordinated flight schedule.
Code-shares can be across a wide range of services, as with the major strategic alliances
but more often just involve a single service or a small network of services, A stronger form
of code sharing involves blocked space arrangements. In this case one carrier buys space
on another airline's aircraft that it then seLls in its own right and using its own designator
code.
Hub-and-spoke operations, and in particular the "banking' of flights, that are a concomitant
of effective hub-and-spoke operations, can be more efficient ff carriers coordinate their
flight schedules. Hub-and-spoke operations, by allowing traffic to be consolidated and
transshipped between flights can enhance load factors and allow airlines to reap any
economic benefits of economies of scope and scale that exist, By agreeing to coordinate
schedules two allied airlines can increase the potential amount of traffic that on-lines across
their combined networks.
Franchising has been almost a tradition in sectors such as fast food and clothing. Its appeal
in aviation is that it allows a major carrier to spread its brand name and generate revenues
on thin routes without the necessary commitment major capital investments. It is now a
form of alliance thatis growing in popularity in international markets and especially in
Europe where British Airways has been particularly successful in developing franchising
activities. Some other carriers have been less enthusiastic about franchising arrangements
and have been slower to adopt them.
The aviation safety equation
The incentive for any airline to provide safe services is the potential for lost business that it
would suffer ff its accident rate or, more strictly, its perceived accident rate, exceeded the
net benefits that passengers enjoy from making use of its services. Safety is one of the
attributesof an airlines'characteristicsthatpotentialcustomers, and subsequently
investors,look at in making decisions2. This inherentmarket pressureisboostedby
regulationsand codes of conductimposed on theindustryby government.Government
involvementis usuallyjustifiedbecauseof imperfectionsin the market thatmake it
impossibleforpotentialpassengerstounderstandfullytherisksconfrontingthem or,even
ifinformationisadequate,have insufficientmarketpower to ensurelevelsof safetyare
optimized.
One simple way of looking at air transport safety from an analytical point of view is to
think in terms of theincentives that influencetheactionsof thoseprovidingairtransport
services. Essentially, the incentive function takes the general form:
Safety is a very general term for which there is no strict definition. This is because
accidents can take a variety of forms and be of differing intensity. Also the actuarial
probability of an accident may differ from an individual's perception of the chance of being
in an accident (MOSES and SAVAGE, 1990). No attempt at a strict definition of safety is
offered here but rather the subject is treated in general terms.
S- f(E,G, I) + ¢ (I)
where:
• S reflects the safety standard level adopted by an airline,
• E reflects the private economic incentive to be safe (e.g. reputation, insurance
premiums, lost business, share price and the interest of flight personnel);
• G represent the government safety codes and policies (e.g. regarding aircraft safety
features, maintenance standards and crews working hours and conditions);
• I represents infrasm_cture considerations (e.g. airport design and air traffic control).
There is an additional random element in the function, _, indicating the risk of someone
else, such as a missile or bomb, causing the accident 3.
With respect to safety levels pursued by a carrier, there is no reason to assume that it is
socially desirable for an airline to be 100% safe. There are o_p,portunity costs associated
with devoting resources to safety and it is clear from individuals decisions on such things
as the speed they drive at or the choices they make regarding car travel over air travel that
factors such as drnc savings or cost saving often over-ride safety considerations. Indeed,
many argue that aviation is excessively safe and with better information about relative
safety records society would put less resources into aviation safety (KAHN, 1988).
R_garding the items on the right hand side of the equation, while these may be expressed as
independent factors they will, in practice almost certainly exhibit some degree of
correlation. The nature of infrastructure provision, for instance, is inevitably linked to the
safety regulatory re,me adopted by the authorities. Equally, the internal economic
incentives influencing an airlines pursuit of safety cannot be completely separated from the
institutional regime within which the carder operates. Nevertheless, the three-way division
is helpful in tying together the implications of globalization and strategic alliances with
aviation safety considerations.
Strategic airline alliances and the safety equation
If we consider equation 1 then there are a number of ways in which changes in the
institutional structure of the airline industry, including the creation of strategic alliances, can
have a bearing. These are both in terms of the internal structure of the airlines' operations
and in the ways in which the authorities may respond to them.
What we do not have at present is a very large body of rigorous empirical evidence linking
strategic airline alliances to safety questions. Alliances are too new for detailed statistical
analysis of the type required; short term fluctuations in airline accidents rates involving a
very small number of incidents does not make for easy econometric work. What one,
therefore, must generally rely on in looking at the safety implications of alliances are
parallel experiences of aviation developments that have also influenced the structure of the
sector and on anecdotal evidence gleaned from the experiences of alliances to-date..
• Aggregate air travel demand
The creation of strategic alliances is claimed in a number of studies to generate, when
controlled within an appropriate economic regulatory regime, significant consumer benefits
(e.g. US GENERALAO_UNTn_G O_'l_CE, 1995; UK CIVn. AV_TION AUTHORrrY,1994). In
3 The issueofterrorismand thegrowthof strategicairlinealliancesisoutsideof the
domain ofthispaper.
particular, the various economies enjoyed by carriers combined with service enhancements
and lower fares for users have lead to more travel by air;, the latter being a reflection of
enhanced consmucr surplus. This, however, only occurs provided carriers do not
excessively expolit any monopoly powers associated with the market strngth that alliances
couldpotentiallygenerate.
More airtravelbeyondtheincreasethatwould occurwithoutthegrowthof allianceswould
of it.serfleadtomore aviationaccidentsaccordingtotheargumentspresentby Boeing in
1996.The added economic efficiencythatalliance,s bringabout and the accompanying
additionaltrafficwillinevitablyincreasethe potentialaggregatenumber of aviation
incidents.Publicpolicy(G inequationI)isinevitablygoingtorespondtothis.IntheUS,
for example,the FederalAviationAuthority(FAA) has alreadybegan releasingmore
informationon safetyin an effortto keep the publicbeuer informed,althoughthe
complexityof aviationsafe_ issuessuggeststhatsuch informationwillin practicenot
reallyofferany grc_insights.
Equally,in terms of I in equationI, tbe provisionof and use made of aviation
infrastructuremay bechanged.At presentmany airportsand airtrafficsystemsarcworking
at, or above theirdesign capacityand are also,in many cases,using out-dated
technologies.Therewillbe enhancedpressuresbothfroma purelyairtransportperspective
and from a safetystandpinttoensurethatexistinginfrastructureisused betterand new
infrastructurep ovidedwherejustified.
Thereis,though,anotherway oflookingatthisaspectofthesafetyissue.What ismissing
from many calculationson the implicationsof increaseddemand for airtravelis the
opportunitycostelement.Ifindividualswerenottravelingby airtheywould be engaged in
some otheractivitythatofitselfhas a safetyaspectattachedtoit.In thissense,itisnot
altogetherclearthatmore airtravelwillresultinmore deathsand injuriesinaggregate.
Little empirical work has been conducted into this aspect of airline safety. What evidence
there is mainly relates to experiences with domestic airline liberalization in the US after the
enacuncnt of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act (RosE, 1989; MORmSONand WINSTON,
1988; OSTER, and ZORN, 1989). The limited amount of analysis undertaken here indicates
that on many routes where US airlines could compete with automobile travel then the
diversion effect from car to plane as the result of improved services offered by airlines
reduced the number of road deaths. The calculations am made difficult, however, because
of the inhe,rent problems in defining counterfactuals, but BYLOW and SAVAGE (1991)
estimatesome 275 highway fatalitiesw reavoidedby themodal switchestoairtravel.
Not onlyarctheUS estimatesverytentativefortechnicalreasons,butextrapolationtothe
effectof su'ategicairlinealliancesposes particulardifficulties.While the alliancesdo
involvesituationswhere new structuresof fares,servicesand routescan inducemodal
transfers,many of there.allyimportantalliancesfocuson longdistancetravel,oftenover
oceans,wherecommercialaviationistbeonlyviatransportoption5.What thealliancesdo
4 MosEs and SAVAGE (1990)make theargumentthatafterany institutionalchange,the
safetyauthoritiesmay adjustheirpreferredlevelofsafety-essentiallyrecognizingthatthe
economicbenefitsassociatedwith thenew regimeareworth tradingforpossiblylower
safetycriteria.Thisdoesnot,however,mean thatno safetyreformsarcneededtomeet this
new safetystandard;put simplyalltheparametershave shiftedand adjustnmntsmay be
neededtosafetyregulationsetc.toallowforthisevenatanew safetylevel.
5 There still remains the broader issue of what induced travelers would have done
with their thne even they would not have been traveling by an alternative mode of transport.
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seem todo withinthenarrowconfinesoftransportistoinducetravelersaway from carriers
outsideof alliances.This,forinstances,isseenveryclearlyintheanalysisthathas been
completedon the strategicalliancesaffectingthe North Atlanticmarket where the
KLM/Northwest and BritishAirways/USAir alliancesdemonstrablytook traff'icfrom
competitors(Gn.LMAN RF.SEARCHASSOCL_TES,1994; US GENERAL ACCOUNT_G OFFICE,
1995). From the safetyperspective,the issuethen becomes one predominantlyof
discoveringwhetherthealliancecarriersaresaferthantheirnon-allianceounterparts.This
issueisaddressedseparatelylater.
• Consumer information
Airlinealliancesaffecthetypeof information,thattravelersenjoy regardingthe actual
carriertheyflywith.As can be seenfrom FigureI,thatprovidesa simpleschema of the
linksinvolvedforSwissairintheGlobalQualityalliancein1994, alliancestructurescan
become verycomplex,k isnotdifflculttosee,inthiscase,why, forinstance,someone
bookingamulti-segmentflightwithSwissalrcouldbe p,Tzledatbeingcarriedon aDelta
aircraft.Blockedspaceagreementsarepotentiallyevenmore confusing.
- i 2.7%
I
5%
Equity _dllamco
..... Ma_e_ing agmm_nt
Figure 1.Swissairand theGlobalQualityalliance1994.
Intermsofsafety,consumerinformationraisestwo importantquestions;theseconcernthe
identityof thecarrieractuallytakingthepassengerand thetypeof aircraftused forthe
Althoughthevariationsareverysmall,airlinesdo have differinghistoricsafetyrecords.
Thisisnotonlyintermsofthenumber ofaccidentstheyhaveexperiencedbut alsorelates
to thedegreeto which theyhave been heldnegligentfor accidents.Airlinesalsooffer
different,frequencies,qualitiesof serviceand fares.In a perfectworld, potential
passengersshouldbe abletomake theirchoicesand trade-offthe variousattributesof
carrierswhen selectingthe airlinetheywish to fly.In thecaseof alliances,itis often
Allhuman activitieshaverisksofaccidentsassociatedwiththem and many of thoseexceed
thoseriskstodo withflying.
6 There is alsothe supplementaryissueof who is responsiblefor an accident
involvingpassengers from severalairlineson an allianceflightand how is
compensensation to be extracted. This is not dealt with here.
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difficult to know exactly what are the various portfolios that are available because the actual
carrier providing the flight is not immediately transparent.
There have been public policy efforts to ensure that alliance code-sharing arrangements are
not used to misinform or disadvantage passengers. This involves not just direct issues
revolving around individuals having information on the exact airline they will travel on but
extends to such things as responsibility for missed connections, direction to connecting
flights and ensuring appropriate information systems are available at airports. To prevent
screen padding on CRS systems the European Union now limits codeshared flights to
being displayed twice. The United States has no such limit on displays in this way. What
the US rules do require is that passengers are informed by US airlines of the actual carrier
with which they travel. The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) has a similar
•code for disclosure but is not legally binding on member states.
It is not just airlines that have differing safety records, aircraft also do 7. There are
arguments that that potential travelers' perception of the safety of different aircraft types can
affect their decisions and that information on plane types should be transparent. Airline
alliances could hide or make it more difficult for passenger to have information regarding
aircraft type.
The most documented case of the commercial impact of an aircraft crash on its producer
relates to the McDonnell Douglas 13(2-10 after two major crashes (one in 1979 and the other
in 1989). Here there was evidence of significant falls in the producer's share prices
immediately after the 1979 incident that could only be accounted for in terms of lower
anticipated sales (Crt_a.K, 1986). Fo.rtm.s (1989) extended this analysis to look at the share
prices of airlines such as American that flew DC-10s and found that their share prices were
also adversely affected after the accident s. In contrast to this the 1989 DC-10 crash seemed
to have no long term adverse effects on the McDonnell Douglas' share prices. There is also
no evidence that the share prices of Boeing or Lockheed have fallen significantly affect an
accident suggesting the impact of the 1979 DC-10 crash was atypical (CH_a.K, 1986).
• Alliances versus non-alliance carriers
One very vocal concern expressed at the time of the liberalization of the US domestic air
transport market in 1978 was that free markets would force some carriers to cut comers
with regard to safe operations to keep their fares competitive. The argument was
resurrected after a series of accidents in the mid-1980s and the fining of a number of
carriers for violating maintenance and safety regulations (N_CE, 1986). In fact the
evidence seem to be that in this case market changes seem to have had little effect on the
overall level and trend of accidents in the US market (Mop.Rtsot_ and W_s'roN, 1988).
What the experience has shown, though is that there does seem to be variations in the
inputs airline put into safety. The US National Transportation Safety Board, for example,
expressed concern about budget constraints restricting maintenance although this may well
have reflected the actual safety regulations in place for such operations (US CONO_.ss,
7 In general, jet aircraft have a better safety record than turboprop aircraft but there
are also difference within these two broad categories. For example, Boeing 747 (100, 200,
330 series) aircraft have about 1.6 crashes per million departures; Airbus A300-600 aircraft
have about 1.4 per million departures while Boeing 737 (300, 400, 500 series) aircraft
have about 0.5 per million departures.
s Focusing on patronage rather than financial performance, however, BAm,tETrand
LoF_o (1983) found that the crash had no impact on the market shares of routes where
DC- 10s were flown.
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COMMrrrmoNGo_ OPERATIONS,1977).Followingderegulationin the US
domesticmarket, a number of studies produced evidence of reduced expenditure on
potentiaUy safety related activities, such as maintenance and training, in some segn_nts of
the'market (L.e)mm ANDF,t_e_,S, 1989). Even ff this did not produce more incidents
immediately, there is an argument that in the longer term a legacy effect would result in
accidents. Assessing the validity of this argument is not easy. Technical advances,
especiatly in jet engines, has reduced maintenance needs and isolating this shift in the
maintenance cost function from the impact of institutional changes is not easy.
There is also another set of findings of importance, namely linkages between the actual
financial position of an airline and an airline's accident record. Rose (1989; 1990) finds in
analysis of US domestic carriers, that there was a one year lagged positive effect on
accidents rates of higher operating profits although the effect is negligible amongst the
largest carriers.
Where does this lead with regard to the growth in strategic alliances? From the evidence
obtained on North Atlantic routes, alliances tend to attract passengers from non-alliance
carders. One consideration relates to the financial pressures on alliance carriers; are the
market pressures to cut comers on such things as maintenance and to employ cheaper, less
experienced crew greater for alliance carders. In general, the evidence is that alliance
carriers, especially when there are mergers or equity holdings involved, have a larger
resource base and are, therefore, less prone to liquidity difficulties. Indeed, in the case of
many alliances (e.g. British Airways/USAir; KLlVl/Northwest and American/Canadian)
significant financial injections were made by one partner into the other to bolster a flagging
f'mancial position. This suggest, a priori, that many alliance airlines are in stronger financial
positions than they would be operating in isolation. This in itself, though, may not mean
overall improved safety even if it were true that a strong financial performance correlates
with less accidents. This is because the non-alliance carders on these routes would be the
subject of greater financial pressures.
Comparisons between alliance carriers and non-alliance carders also bring two other
different elements into consideration.
First,blockedspacealliancearrangements,whereby a carrierbuys capacityon another
plane,and coordinatedschedulingby code-sharingpartnerscan leadto theuse of larger
aircrafton theroutesinvolved.The evidencethatisavailableisthatlargeraircrafttendtobe
saferthansmallerones (OST_ andZoRN, 1989).
Second, and to complicate the situation, where alliances do in some way rationalize the use
of the partners' capacity this can free up the market to allow new entry. This may come
about for purely commercial reasons or it may be driven by institutional factors. For
instance,inseveralmergersinvolvingEuropean carrierslotwere relinquishedby the
partners to meet anti-u'ast requirements. Similar arrangements seem important in the efforts
of British Airways and American to form a strategic code-sharin_g alliance. This raises
questions as to Whether the new entrants arc safer than incumbents'. The evidence, which
again is mainly from US experiences, is that there is little difference in the safety record of
9 One of the problems with the work that has been completed in this area is that many
new entrants into scheduled aviation arc not new to airline operations per se. In many cases
they am charter carriers that have extended their operations _ 1989). This may not
have been a problem in the past, after all where the newcomers originate from is not
relevant to the safety equation which is merely concerned with the implications of a change
in supply on accidents, but in many markets there are now more genuinely new airlines and
their potential safety characteristics are now important.
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established carriers and incumbents measured in terms of accidents (Os'mR, and ZORN,
1989; ROSE; 1989) )°.
Tl_ airlineswitcheffectsof strategicallianceon safetyare,therefore,farfrom clear.It
doesnotseem, however,thattherearestrongforceslikelytoleadtoreducedsafetyas a
resultof theway trafficmay switchbetween airlinesonce an allianceis formed in a
particularmarket.Indeed,therecouldbe made a casethatffanythingthechangeswould,
on balance,haveapositiveffecton safety.
• Managerial incentives
There are also a number of other ways in which the E component in equation 1 may change
as a result of alliances being create& Does the establishment of an airline alliance, for
example, influence the management incentive of the partner carders to change their
approach to safety? The available evidence is not altogether conclusive as to the
implications for airlines of accidents. Much depends on the circumstances involved and on
how the airline manages the crisis.
One argumentisthataccidentswilldiscouragepeoplefrom usingthecarrierconcerned
evenaftertheimmediateimpacthaspassed(BORENSTeN andS, 1988).While this
may ormay notbe true,measurementofthiseffectismade difficultby thenaturalresponse
ofanycarrierwhich isadverselyaffectedinthisway tolowerfaressoastokeep itsmarket
share(ROSE,1990;1992).The airlineinasenseisloweringitspricetocompensateforany
publicperceptionofalowergeneralisedqualityofservice.
An alternativeway oflookingatthetopicistheimpactofaccidentsdirectlyon thefinancial
statusof an airline.Simplyeye-bailingthesharepricesof ValuJetand TWA (Figure2)
shows significantdeclinesintheirespectiveshareprices(bothactualand againsta moving
average)followingcrashes involvingtheiraircraftm May 1996 and July 1996
respectivelyI:.The contrastisparticularlyclearwhen compared to American Airlinest2.
American did,though,experiencea major crashduringthisdam period,the lossof a
Boeing757 inColumbiaduringDecember 1995,butthisdoesnotseem tohave adversely
affectedthesmoothedsharevalueindex.The differencewould seem tolieinthelocationof
thecrash,theAmericanincidentbeingoutsideoftheUS, and intheperceptionof whole
was atfault.
Thisratherunevenpatternofstockmarketimplicationsi inconformitywithmore rigorous
studiesthathave been completedlookingatthe financialimplicationsfor an airlineof
crashes.Inthiscontextherehasbeen work on a number ofthemes,much of itconcerned
withUS experiences|3.
10 Incidentsinvolvingnew entrants,otherthingsbeingequal,however,tendtoresult
inmore fatalitiespo siblydue tothelesserexperienceofpilots.
H The Valu.let case is complicated by the temporary closure of the airline by the FAA
for violation of safety and maintenance cedes just after one of the airline's DC9s crashed in
FIorisda.
12 Thislackofany apparentimmediatelinkbetweenairlinesafetyrecordsand profits
isalsoconsistenwiththefindingsofGOLBE (1986).
_ Outside of the US, the Edwards Report in the UK concluded in 1969 that
independent operators were less safe than regularly licenced carriers for the period 1955to
1966 and that smaller carriers and chareter operators were more susceptable to accidents.
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Figure 2. Share prices and volume of trading for TWA, Valu.Iet and AMR.
An.accident seldom costs an airline in terms of immediate payments because all carders
tend to be extensively, and frequently excessively, insured. What it may do, however, is to
affect an airline's image and to impact on future insurance premiums it must pay. Mrrcl.m_
and MALONEY(1989), for instance, looked at insurance rate adjustments after crashes and
'brand name effects' and found that share price fails can be attributed both to the projected
fuv.u'e costs of higher insurance and to a brand name effect associated at-fault attribution. In
contrast to this, CHANCEand FERIUS (1987) find an immediate dip in share price of an
airline involved in an incident, although it is exu'emely short lived, but no impact on the
industry in general. GOLaE (1986) in his study of the early years of US domestic
deregulation concluded, "There does not seem to be a statistically significant relationship
between safety and profits". BOR_SmIN and _ (1988), in contrast found that
airlines suffered an equity loss of about 1.0% as a result of an accident. The picture is not,
therefore, very clear on this topic.
"Where does the establishment of alliances fit into this picture? Much depends upon the
nature of an alliance. If the structure is extremely loose then there would seem to be litlle
reason or pressure for the managemnt of any carder to changes its behavior patxems with
regard to safety. Where there is, however, a closer relationship, especially involving equity
holdings, there may be grounds for expecting airlines to closely monitor each other's safety
performance,especiallyifeachfearsthatany diminutioninreputationof one airtinewould
adverselyaffectheother.Empiricalevidenceon thisissimplynotcurrentlyavailableat,
thestrategicairlineaUiancesarcsimplytoo new and thei_structurestoovariableto allow
any sortofdetailedtesting.
• Lobbying power
As wellaslookingattheimplicationsofalliancesfortheinternaleffectstheymay haveon
airlines'attitudestowardssafetyand managements'reactionsto this,airlinesalsooften
exerciseconsiderablepoliticalpower. In generallargesuppliersexercisemore political
power thando smalleronesand soone would expectalliancestohavemote politicalsway
thanindividualairlines.Looked atin anotherway, airlineallianceseffectivelychange
supply conditions,and therefore,thiscould potentiallyhave implicationsfor the G
component ofequationI.
One possibleway of lookingat thismore systematicallyisto treathoseinvolvedin
supportingany aviationpolicyas a coalition(_, 1984).Following thisapproach
strategicalliancesservetheinterestofa number ofdifferentparties.Intermsof an airline
allianceactingtoaltergovernmentpolicyon aviationsafetyone mustlook,inthecontextof
coaltions,atthefactorsmotivatingthoseinthe'rulingcoalition'.
There would seem to be littler asonfor the usersof aviationto tryto reducesafety
standardsunlesstheywere initiallyfeltobe excessive.From a compaitiveperspective,
therewould seem tobe littler asonformember airlinesof an alliancetocompromise on
standardsince,generally,theyarethelargercarriersthathave solidsafetyrecordsgiving
them a comparativeadvantageovernon-alliancerivals.The exceptionto thisiswhen an
alliancehas a monopoly positionand itisto thecombined advantageof thepartners'to
reduceoverallsafetystandardsand tosaveon theircosts.There arcfew incentivesforthe
bureaucracyresponsibleforsafetytocompromise on existingstandardssincethiswould
redacetheirpower and influence.Equally,airlineproducerswould sccm tobe littleaffected
intheirattitudeto safetyand in theirlobbyingpositionsby theformationof a strategic
alliance.
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What one can concluded from these few observations is that there is unlikely to be any
significant changes in the attitudes of those concerned with alliances to manipulate public
policy in a way tha_ would be detrimental to current safety conditions.
Conclusions
Recently much debate has taken place concerned with the implications of strategic airline
alliances on the efficient internal workings of aviation markets. Much less attention has
been paid to the implications of strategic alliances for airline safety. In fact, air transport is
extremely safe and any institutional change is unlikely to have more than a marginal effect
on it. Nevertheless, in part because of the intensity of single incidents and in part because
the media fred it cost effective to cover the limited number of air crashes rather than the
much more numerous but dispersed motor accidents, the public still remains concerned
about aviation safety matters.
The strategic global airline alliances that represent the cornerstone of the internationalization
of the aviation sector are in many ways still in an embryonic state. Large numbers of
alliances fail. Contemplating their implications for safety is, consequently, far from easy.
They also take many different forms. There does not, however, seem to be any justifiable
reason to suppose that airline alliances will have any major adverse effect on aviation safety
and, in some ways, they are likely to reinforce the strength of the safety record of the
sector.
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I INTRODUCTION
Since deregulation of the U.S. airline market twenty years ago, airline competition has been
the subject of intensive research. Interest has been sustained by the ongoing evolution of
the U.S. market, deregulation in Canada in the 1980s, and the evolutionary process of
deregulation underway in Europe.
Competition between airlines occurs in various dimensions, including fares, capacity, flight
schedules, frequent flier programs, computer reservations systems, code-sharing agreements
and alliances. This paper focuses on competition in fares and flight schedules. Fare
competition has been the subject of many studies in the literature. The importance of
schedule frequency has also long been recognized; see for example Douglas and Miller
(1974), Panzar (1979), Dorman (1983), Hansen (1990) and Norman and Strandenes
(1994).
The timing of flights is clearly another important factor determining the attractiveness of an
airline because oftraveller's preferences for when they depart and/or arrive. Because flights
can be viewed as products located at points in time around the twenty-four hour clock, the
considerable literature on spatial price and location competition can be brought to bear.
However, certain features of airline markets have yet to receive a definitive treatment in this
literature, and there have been few applications to airline markets per se. One recent
contribution is Daniel (1995) who estimates a model of airline flight departure/arrival time
choice. Airlines in his model trade offqueuing time at airports and schedule delay costs.
Neither business stealing between rival airlines nor fare competition is considered. Another
recent study is Encaoua et al. (1996) who develop a model of duopolistic competition on a
simple network. The airlines engage in a two-stage game, choosing departure times for their
flights in the first stage and fares in the second. While illuminating, their model has several
restrictive features, including only one flight per airline on each route, a uniform distribution
of the traveller population in terms of desired departure time, and price-inelastic aggregate
demand.
Another focus of this paper is predation in airline markets. Predatory behaviour can take
various forms: increasing seat capacity by adding flights or using larger planes, matching
rivals' flight schedules, offering deep discount fares, etc. Descriptive evidence of such
behaviour has been documented in several markets, including British Airways against
Loganair on the Edinburgh --Manchester route (Hanlon, 1994), Northwest Airlines against
People Express on the Minneapolis/St. Paul --Newark route (Kahn, 1991), and Air Canada
against Canadian Airlines International on routes in Canada (Tomaszewska, 1997).
Predation has been the subject of considerable theoretical economic research, and there are
a few empirical studies of alleged predatory behaviour in terms of product location (e.g.
supermarkets by Von Hohenbalken and West (1984), andcity bus markets by Dodgson and
Newton (1992) and Dodgson et al. (1993)). There are also some insightful discussions of
predation in airline markets; e.g. Kahn (1991) and Hanlon (1994). But there has been little
formal analysis of airline predation by any means and, to the best of our knowledge, none of
predatory behaviour in departure time schedulingJ
The purpose oftlds study is to exploreboth nonpredatory and predatory flight schedule and
fare competition using a HoteUing-type spatial competition model. The market considered
is a single city pair served by two airlines. The airlines play a two-stage noncooperative
game, choosing the timing of their flights in the first stage, and fares in the second stage.
The numbers of flights offered by each airline and the seating capacities of flights are treated
parametrically. Subgame perfect equilibria to the two-stage game are computed
numerically using an iterative tatonnement-like procedure.
Section 2 of the paper develops the model, including variants that incorporate flight
capacity constraints and predatory behaviour by one of the airlines. Section 3 describes
nonpredatory and predatory equilibria ofthe model for two hypothetical markets. Section 4
provides a summary, and suggests directions for further research.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 Basic specification
Consider a single city pair market served by two airlines, indexed i=1, 2. Airline i has N_
flights that it schedules for departure at times _ " (x, .... ,x m ). Departure times are
chosen on the 24 hour circle. Airline i's ./th flight is denoted _#. The airline chooses a
vector of.fares pj = _.!s ..... Pro,)., where P,s is the single fare2 for F#. For re.asons of
computational tractab/hty potential travelers are aggregated into mass points, indexed
k=-l...K. Mass k has population m, and a preferred departure time x t = (k/K)T, where
T=_24is the length of the clay in hours. Individuals incur quadratic schedule delay costs
from departing at other than their preferred times. An individual in mass k who takes flight
F,, pays a generalized cost p + t(x k _ x):, where t is a parameter that measures the¢ aJ _J
strength of departure time preferences.
Traveler behaviour is described by a discrete choice model. Each individual has three
decisions: whether to fly, and if so with which airline and on which of its flights. An
individual in mass k choosing F,, receives a utility U_ = aI - p, - t(x _ - x ,)z _-"_
k _ . ¢ . _ V _ . ¢ ....
= V_ + e _, where a_ Is a constant that ts common to everyone, e _ ts an md_wdual-spectfic
• . • • .o * ° . _ • .°
(not mass- specific) |d,osyncrat|c uuhty for asrhne t, and V_s denotes systemauc uuhty. The
a, coefficients can differ between airlines because of differences in actual or perceived
quality (viz. in-flight service, on-time performance, baggage handling, safety and so on).
Idiosyncratic individual preferences for airlines can arise because of differences in personal
flying experience, or differences in memberships with frequent flier programs and usage of
l Tomaszcwska(1997) tests for predatorypricingand capacitycx-pansionby Air Canada againstCa_dia_
Airlines International overthe period1988-1994.
2 Themodel thus abstracts frommultiplefareclasses thatairlines typically operatedarough airlineseat
managementprograms.
them: The model thus includes elements of both horizontal and vertical production
differentiation between airlines.
Individuals in mass k who fly with airline i choose its flight with the lowest generalized cost:
._ A_min t 2 .t • • .j, = . p.. ÷ tCx -x..). Let It'. • denote the:r corresponding systematic utility. An
J v v" I
individu_I from any mass who chooses not to fly receives a utility U o = Vo + _ o, where V0
is a constant that is common to everyone, and e o is individual-specific utility for money
spent on other goods. If the e"_ and e" o are identically and independently distributed
Gumbel variates with scale parameter/a, then the probability that an individual in mass k
flies with airline i is given by the familiar multinomial legit formula:
t e v_'a/_
Q_ =
eV{*J_ ÷ eV_ I_ ÷eVo/_
Because the numbers of flights scheduled by each airline are treated as given, the fixed costs
of flights are immaterial to the analysis and are normalized to zero. Marginal costs of
passengers can be deducted from the a_ (see below) and accordingly are set to zero also.
The variable profits of Airline i, H, then coincide with its revenues, which are given by the
formula
i=1
where P_ = 1 ifj = j'7 t and P_ = 0 otherwise.
Airlines are assumed to maximize variable profits and to play a noncooperative two-stage
game: In Stage 1 they simultaneously choose their flight schedules, Xt and X 2. In Stage 2
they choose their fares, p_ andp:. How these choices are implemented is described in the
next subsection.
2.2 Computation of equilibrium
Equilibria are computed numerically using an iterative "tatonnement" procedure. The
timing of each flight is constrained to the set { Ax, 2Ax, 3Ax... T}, where Ax is a time step
..... 0 0 • • •
that dmdes evenly mto 7'. Iruttal schedules X I and X 2 are chosen for each aarhne. A grid
search is then performed over a time interval [x *_ , x m'] within which the equilibrium
3Idiosyncratic preferences for the flights of a given airline could also be introduced. Thiswas initially
done using a nested logit framework, but difficulties were encountered in getting the algorithm (described
below) to converge. Arguably the main differences bctxs_en flights are their departure times, and prefer-
ences for flight times are accounted for in the model.
4 Both ex'plicit and tacit collusion between airlines are ruled out. Evidence that airlines do behave
noncooperatively is reported in Brander and Zlhang (1990), Good, Roller and Sickles (I993) and Neven and
Roller (1996). In contrast, Evans and Kessides (1994) find that farts are higher on routes served by carriers
with extensive interroute contacts. Such carriers may refrain from aggressive pricing on a given route for
fear of retaliation on other routes.Such belmvionr would be tacitly collusive.
schedules can be reasonably assumed to lieJ The grid search is first done for Airline l's
flights, then Airline 2's, then back to Airline 1's and so on. Throughout, the order in which
each airline's flights are scheduled is preserved. Thus, xn is incremented in time steps ofzlx
over the interval [x "_ , xl_ - Ax] (or [x 'm , x "_'j ifN I= 1) holding the timing of all other
flights constant. For each value of _Jl a fare equilibrium for all flights of both airlines is
computed using another tatonnement procedure similar to that described in de Paima et al.
(1994). When the rescheduling off n is completed, x n is fixed at the value that yields the
highest a"L Next, a grid search is performed for x_2 over the interval [x]z + Ax, x13 - Ax],
and so on. Sister flights are prevented from locating at the same time, but can coincide with
a rival flight. When all of Airline l's flights have been shuffled, the procedure is repeated
for Airline 2. This completes one major iteration of the search. Major iterations continue
until there is no change in either airline's schedule between successive iterations. An
exluilibdum is then deemed to have been reached. *
2.3 Capacity constraints
The modal described in Section 2. I ignores the fact that the number of passengers that can
be accommodated on a flight cannot exceed the plane's seating capacity. One way to
incorporate capacity constraints is to treat a flight as a congestiblc facility for which utility
decreases with the number of people who use it. This approach has been taken by Panzar
(19"79), Dorman (1983), Kohlberg (1983), and Rierveld and Rouwendal (1996). A second
approach is to treat a flight as a loss system, in which each traveler is either accommodated
at a constant quality, or not accommodated at all (Powell and Winston, 1983; Inzerilli and
Jara-Diaz, 1994). In this paper flights are treated as loss systems. It is true that some
aspects of flight quality deteriorate with the load factor, such as time to board, deboard and
retrieve baggage, space in overhead luggage compartments and speed of in-flight service.
But being able to fly at all is arguably the predominant consideration for travelers.
Space constraints preclude a complete description of the approach, but the essentials are as
follows. Individual travel demands are stochastically generated during the weeks prior to
the day of travel in question. The rate of demand generation is the same for all potential
travelers; i.e. independent of both preferred departure time and idiosyncratic preferences.
Aggregate demand is deterministic (a Law of Large Numbers is at work). As demand is
generated, it is loaded onto flights according to individual preferences in the way described
in Section 2.1.) Ifa flight fills up, it is removed from travellers' choice set. Loading ends
when each prospective traveler is either hooked on a flight, chooses not to fly, or wants to
fly but can't because all flights are full. Finally, the algorithm described in Section 2.2 is
s In practiceflight times maybe congtaincdby airport ordinancesthatlimit operating hours.
(This proce.dur¢is similarto thatemployed by An.san et al. (1994)_ The scquentiai "shuffling"of
schedules isnot guaranteedto re.acha global profit maximumfor eachairline in any majoriteration of the
algorithm. But thealternative of conductinga grid search overall possible scheduleconfigurationswould
bc slower,and is impractical when airlines have multipleflighLs.
The loadingproc_urc is inspiredbyPowcll and Winston (1983). Their procedure is differenthowever
becauseaggregate demandis randomin their model.
usedwithonly minor changes to compute equilibrium.'
2.4 Predation
Predation has been a longstanding and controversial research topic in economics; see
Ordovcr and Saloner (1989) for a review. Predatory behaviour by a firm can have various
objectives, including forcing a rival to exit from the market, deterring future entry or, less
drastically, inducing a rival to withdraw capacity, raise prices, or otherwise adopt a less
aggressive posture. Typically, predation involves a loss of profits in the short run in return
for higher future profits if the strategy succeeds.
One possibility is that a rival will 'capitulate' if its profits, or perhaps cumulative profits, fall
below a predetermined threshold. Hanlon (1994) discusses this possibility in an airline
market setting. In many circumstances, however, a predator will be unsure about how long
it will take for aggressive behaviour to pay off, or indeed whether it ever will. Uncertainty
is endemic to airline markets. Demand for air travel fluctuates unpredictably with the state
of the national or world economy. Demand shocks can occur, such as the downturns that
followed the 1990-91 GulfWar and the recent Asian economic crisis. Airline costs
fluctuate with exchange rates and fuel prices. And there may be uncertainty about the depth
of a rival's financial pockets, or the possibility of government intervention or bailout?
Given these uncertainties it seems appropriate to take as the predator's objective function
its long-tun expected present discounted profits, where the probability in each time period
of a favorable change in the rival's behaviour is a decreasing function of the rival's profits.
Suppose Airline 1 is the predator and Airline 2 the rival or "victim". j° In our model, with
the numbers of'flights assumed fixed, predation can involve changes in schedules and/or
fares. The first-order condition for the fare of Airline l's jth flight will take the form
ap,, ap,j
where _ > 0 depends, in a possibly complicatedway, on Airline I's long-tun objective
function. An analogous condition obtains for x_j. The intertemporal linkage between
Airline I's strategy in the current period and its future profits can be implemented in our
static model framework simply by adopting as Airline l's objective function _l - 8_2-
s Recall that the algorithm preservesthedepartureorderof each airline's own flights. This is inconsequen-
tial as long as the planesare identical(v/:. have the same capacity),which is assumed for thesimulationsin
Section3.
9 For e.xample,after many months of suspense about its survival, in December1992 CanadianAirlines
Internationalsigned an investment agreement_ith AMP,Corp.,the' parent companyof American Airlines,
andobtainedloan guaranteesof$120million(Canadian)fromthe Canadianfederalgovernmentandthe
provincialgovernmentsof Albertaand BritishColumbia.
ioR is assumed thatthe victimdoesnotengage in strategic bohaviour itself. Opposing arguments have
beenmadeas to whetherfinns in financialdistresscompetemore or less aggressively (Borensteinand Rose,
1995).
The numericalvalueof 6willdependon variousfactors,includingthediscountrate,the
relative sizeof the two airlines, features of their route networks, the expectedgrowth rate
in demand,the hazard rate for a changein Airline 2's behaviour, the expected present-value
profit gain to Airline 1 from a change,and the possibilityof further evolution in market
structure-- suchas entry by anotherairline or a changein regulation. A numberof heroic
assumptionsare needed to quantify theseelements,but it seemsplausiblethat _ could
exceed one.
In this framework, Airline 1 acts in a predatory fashion R'it takes into account the impact of
its actionson the future viability or behaviour of the rival. This definition is consistentwith
thoserecently proposed by Adams et al. (1996) and Cabral and Riordan (1997).
In particular, predation entailsbehaviour that would not be optimal if the rival's future
existenceand behaviour were treated as given.
This framework can be criticized on the grounds that it treats one route in isolation,
ignoring network aspects of competition that are important in today's aidine markets. It is
true that the scope for predation on a route may depend on an airline's ability to cover its
losses with profits earned on other routes. And predation on one route may be intended to
deter entry on an airline's other routes. Thus, a complete cost-benefit analysis of predation
from the perspective of an airline would require consideration of its route network as a
whole. However, the intenemporal tradeoffbetween current and expected future profits
incorporated into the simple framework above re_ains valid in this bigger picture, as do the
modified objective function and first-order conditions. Our purpose is to explore the
implications of predatory behaviour on a given route, ignoring precisely what motivates the
predatory airline to act in this way.
Table 1: Predation scenarios
Scenario X I X: P/ P2
A Fixed Fixed Fixed
B Fixed Fixed
C Fixed
D
Several predatory scenarios can be envisaged according to whether the predator adjusts its
schedule and/or fares, and how the rival or victim responds. With today's sophisticated
airline seat management programs and computer reservation systems, fares can be changed
on short notice. Changes in schedules are more costly, and generally involve lead times of
weeks or months. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that a predatory airline can change
its fares more quickly than its schedule, and that a rival can respond more quickly with fare
changes of its own than by modifying its flight schedule. For purposes of analysis the four
predation scenarios depicted in Table 1 will be considered.
Inmarketswherefaresareunregulated,ScenarioAwillapplyonly in the very short run
possibly a few hours. Once the rival has enough time to respond, Scenario B becomes
relevant. Scenario C applies to the longer run when the predator can adjust its schedule,
and Scenario D when the rival can respond in kind.
2.5 Existence and properties of equilibrium
Existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium in spatial markets have been the
subject of intensive research over the years. Roughly speaking, several features of our
model are conducive to existence of a unique equilibrium, including idiosyncratic
preferences for airlines, quadratic schedule delay costs and price-elastic demand. But these
are not enough to assure either existence or uniqueness. The sufficient conditions for
existence derived by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) are violated by our assumption that the
distribution of departure time preferences is discrete rather than continuous. Bester's
(1992) conditions for existence and uniqueness are also not satisfied. Resort to mixed
strategies can restore equilibrium, but it seems doubtful whether mixed strategies are
relevant to interfirm rivalry, particularly in airline markets where fares are quickly and easily
adjusted.
Determining whether an equilibrium exists is further complicated when there are capacity
constraint-_. Kohlberg (1983) and Rietveld and Rouwendal (1996) have shown that in
location games with fixed prices, capacity constraints militate against existence of
equilibrium. By contrast, Wauthy (1996) has demonstrated that in price games with fixed
locations, capacity constraints can restore existence. Temporal peaking of demand is
another factor that can cause nonexistence of equilibrium (q(ietveld and gouwendal, 1996).
And if an equilibrium does exist, it may be asymmetric. For example, Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995) show that with a triangular consumer density on a Hotelling line market, no
symmetric duopoly location-price equilibrium exists. The only equilibria are asymmetric,
with one firm located outside the market. Similarly, Ansari et al. (1994) obtain asymmetric
equilibria when the density of consumers has a beta distribution.
A final complicating factor in our model is that a predatory airline's objective function is a
weighted sum of its own profits and the rival's profit. To the best of our knowledge, neither
the existence of equilibrium nor the characteristics of equilibrium if it exists have been
investigated for such a game.
Let us now assume that a unique equilibrium to the two-stage schedule-fare game exists,
and consider its properties. It is straightforward to show that flight times are homogeneous
of degree zero in the parameters {al,a2,t, In, Vo }. Fares and profits are homogeneous of
degree one in the same parameters. If the costs of carrying passengers were included in the
model, profits would also be homogeneous of degree zero. in at, a2, and marginal passenger
costs. Thus, the a_parameters can be thought ofas airline-specific systematic utility net of
marginal costs.
A question of central interest in the paper is whether airlines prefer to space their flights
out over the day, or to concentrate them at certain times. Spacing flights out has the
advantage that more prospective travelers can be offered convenient flight times. It also
reduces "cannibalization" of business between sister flights. However, load factors can be
increased by scheduling flights at times of peak demand. Borenstein and Netz (1991) refer
to this as "natural crowding" of schedules.
Another question is whether airlines prefer to schedule their flights close to rival flights, or
away from them. Two competing forces are at work. On the one hand, competition for
market share encourages agglomeration, a tendency which is accentuated by natural
crowding. On the other hand, distancing flights from rivals reduces the intensity of fare
competition. Indeed, Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988) and Bensald and de Palma (1994)
have shown that two-product duopolists competing on a circular market may choose to
locate their products at the same point in order to minimize price competition. Depending
on the relative strengths of the opposing forces of attraction and repulsion, two types of
equilibrium scheduling patterns can emerge. In one, rival flights are "interlaced". In a
duopoly this would mean that Airline 1, say, operates the first morning flight, Airline 2 the
next flight, followed by Airline 1's second flight, and so on throughout the day. The other
scheduling pattern involves "segmentation", whereby each airline schedules its flights in a
time interval or bank that does not overlap rivals' flights. Brander and Eaton (1984),
Anderson (1985) and Bensaid and de Palma (1994) have shown that both interlaced and
segmented equilibria can exist in a given spatial market. Thus, location-price equilibria with
multi-product firms need not be unique.
3 NONPREDATORY AND PREDATORY SCItEDULE-PRICE EQUILIBRIA
In this section we investigate the nature of nonpredatory and predatory location-price
equilibria in an airline duopoly. Two abstract markets are considered. The first is a
prototypical market with a single demand peak. Each airline schedules one or two flights
per day. The main purpose of this example market is to explore the comparative static
properties of schedule-price equilibria. The second market features a double demand peak
that is more characteristic of airline markets. Each airline schedules three flights per day.
3.1 Market 1
Market 1 has a symmetric triangular population density function, as in Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995). The distribution is approximated with 288 consumer mass points, spaced at five
minute intervals. The density peaks between mass points 144 and 145 at two and a half
minutes past noon (12:02:30). Peak density is three times the minimum density, at mass
points 1 and 288. n The time step, zLv,between feasible flight times is also set at five
minutes. The number of potential travelers is fixed at 1,000. Other base-case parameter
values are a_ -- a2 = (7,t = 10, g = 25, and Vo = -25, measured in U.S. dollars) 2
!1In three dimensionsthedistributionlooks likea ship's funnel,with a circularbaseand a rakedprofile.
t2 Adjustedfor inflationthe value oft is comparable to estimates for businesstravelersreportedby Morri-
son andWinston(1985) and Norman and Strandenes(1994). Thevalueofp is broadlyconsistentwiflt
3.1.1 One flight each
Equilibria for the base-case parameter values when each airline schedules one flight per day
are described in Kow I of Table 2. Airlines schedule their flights symmetrically on either
side of the demand peak. _3 Each plane carries 69.3 people ( Dt and Dz denote the airline's
respective demands) at a fare of $35.30, and cams a revenue of$2,448. _4 About 14% of
the population of 1,000 individuals chooses to fly. The proportion is small because
schedule delay costs are relatively high, and because only two flights are available to
prospective travelers throughout the day. The equilibrium price elasticity of demand is -
1.22, which is within the range of estimates commonly found.
gows 2-7 of Table 2 illustrate how equilibrium is affected when either a key parameter
value, or the distribution of consumers, is changed. When the schedule delay cost
parameter, t, is halved (Row 2) flights are moved 20 minutes away from the peak. This
happens because, with lower schedule delay costs, fare competition becomes more intense
and its repulsive force outweighs the attraction of gaining market share. Fares drop only
marginally, but demand rises appreciably because the generalized cost of travel is lower.
In Row 3 the scale parameter for idiosyncratic utility, P, is quadrupled. Airlines reschedule
their flights slightly closer to the peak. _5 With the higher idiosyncratic utility, systematic
difference_ in utility become relatively less important in determining travelers' choice of
airline. This weakens fare competition, and encourages agglomeration. In P,ow 4, utility
from the outside good is reduced. This makes traveling more attractive and increase
competition between the airlines. As a result, flights are scheduled further apart, while
fares, demand and profits rise. _6
Row 5 introduces an asymmetry between the airlines by raising ax to $25. Airline 1
reschedules its flight 40 minutes closer to the peak, while Airline 2 moves an hour further
away. Airline 1 raises its fare and its profits nearly double. In Row 6, the demand
distribution is made more peaked by reducing the minimum density to zero. This increases
the incentive for agglomeration and flights are rescheduled closer to the peak. Fares change
little, but demand and profits rise because, with a more concentrated population
distribution, the average generalized cost of travel falls. Finally, in Row 7 the population
Morrisonand Winston's (19S9)estimate of the benefitper tripfrom a frequent flier program.
13By contrastTabuchiand Thisse(1995) findthat no symmetric equilibriumexistswith a triangular
demanddistribution. However,their modeldiffers in thatdemandis price-inelasticand idiosyncraticutility
is excluded,
14Thefare mayseem low, butrecallthat themarginal costof caro'ing passengersis set to zeroand no
flight capacityconstraints areimposed.
15Similarresultsare foundin dePalmaet al. (198S) and Neven (1986).
16The slight asymmetryof the equilibrium(Airline2's flight is five minutescloserto thepeak)is attribut-
ableto imperfectionsin the algorithm.
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distributionismadeuniform.Withoutanyincentivetoagglomerate,airlinesnowschedule
theirflights twelve hours apart. Generalized costs rise, and demand and profits fall.
Table 2: Comparative statics properties ofnonpredatory equilibrium: Market 1, N I= N2---I.
Row Case x, x2 p, P_ Dl D2
1 Base 10:25 13:40 35.3 35.3 69.3 69.3 2448
2 _5.0 10.05 14:00 35.14 35.14 93 93 3266
3 p=100 10:30 13:35 122.3 122.3 81.2 81.2 9929
4 Vo=-50 10:10 13:50 43.51 43.51 105 105 4565
5 atffi25 11:05 14:40 43.63 35.32 111 64.8 4846
6 Triangle 10:45 13:25 35.09 35.08 86.7 86.3 3045
7 Uniform 6:00 18:00 35.32 35.32 53.6 53.6 1893
2448
3266
9929
4586
2287
3026
1893
Table 3 summarizes the predatory equilibria that result in Market 1 with the predation "
parameter set to ¢Y_I. For ease of comparison, the nonpredatory equilibrium is reproduced
in the first row as Scenario NP. Variables that are fixed in each predation scenario are
marked in bold face.
In predation Scenario A the predator (Airline 1) reduces its fare slightly, inflicting a minor
loss on the rival of less than $6/day. The predator accomplishes this at a cost to itself,
shown by the ratio AnJAI"h in the last column, that is only half as great, iv In Scenario B the
rival responds by reducing its fare very slightly. Its own profits recover by only a few cents
per day." In Scenario C, the predator reschedules its flight nearly two hours closer to the
peak and drops its fare more sharply. Profits of both aidines now fall appreciably. Finally,
in Scenario D the rival moves its flight away from the peak, further from the predator's) 9
This weakens the impact of'the predator's attack, and it responds by pulling its flight back.
IT Since the predator is at a profit maximum in the nonpredatory equilibrium, the loss of profit from
changing fare slightly is, by the envelope theorem, second-order small in the neighborhood of the equilib-
rium.
is Again this follows from the envelope theorem.
it In ScenarioD the algorithmdoes notconverge to a locationequilibrium, butenters a location
cycle:(Xtt ,X2l) = (11:55, 14:55) - (12:10, 14:55)- (12:10, 9:10) - (11:55, 9:10) .... Airline 2 attempts
todistance its flight from Airline l's by scheduling itat the oppositehalf of the day, while Airline I follows
in pursuit. To avoid tiffs_sti¢ outcomethe algorithm was rerun with Airline 2 constrainedto
schedule its flight in the afternoon. This resulted in a smaller locationcycle: (12:05. 15:05) - (12:10.
15:05)- (12:10, 15:10) - (12:05. 15:10) .... Fares and profitsdiffer little across these four locationpairs.
Thesmallest gain from rescheduling a flight is for Airline i from (12:05. 15:05) to (12: I0. 15:05). On
tiffsbasiswe chose (12:05, 15:05) as the equilibrium.
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Paradoxically,thepredator'sprofitrecoverstoa level higher than in the nonprcdatory
equilibrium,even though its objective there was to maximize its currentprofits. This
happensbecauseaggressivebehaviourby the predator leads,in equilibrium, to defensive
behaviourby the prey that actsto the predator's advantage.=
Table 3: Predatory equilibria: Market l, Nj = Nz=l, base-case parameters, c_r=1.
ZD.II
Scenario x, x2 Pt Pe _ //_ /!/72 _rr""_.
NP 10:25 13:40 35.3 35.30 2448 2448 --
A 10.25 13:40 33.87 35.30 2445 2442 -5.6 0.50
B 10:25 13:40 33.86 35.29 2445 2442 -5.6 0.50
C 12:20 13:40 28.41 33.28 2167 2019 -428 0.66
D 12:05 15:05 33.68 35.16 25 34 2206 -242 -0.36
To test the sensitivity of the results, predatory equilibria were recomputed with 6=0.5.
Qualitatively the same pattern obtains for Scenarios A-C as in Table 3, although as expected
Airline l's predatory efforts are muted. Scenario D differs in that, rather than pulling back
when the rival moves away, Airline 1 advances its flight further from 11:05 to 11:20. This
leads to a further reduction in the rival's profits.
The impact of predatory behaviour in Market 1 may appear rather modest. But if operating
costs were netted out, the proportional effects on profits would be much greater. And the
effects would be larger with a larger _. As noted above, the value of this parameter is
determined by a number of route- and airline-specific factors.
In the base case nonpredatory equilibrium, flights carry 69 passengers each. To examine the
effects of capacity constraints it was assumed that planes can only carry 50 passengers.
Table 4: Equilibria for plane capacity 50: Market 1, N1= N2=I, base-case parameters, 5=1.
Scenario xl x_ p, p_ /7, _ za_ an/arz_
NP 10:40 13:35 46.69 46.4 2334 2321 -- --
C 12:00 13:35 44.92 43.6 2246 2180 -141 0.62
D 12:05 15:05 47.86 43.7 2393 2184 -137 -0.43
= More precisely, the change in the predator's objective function shifts its scheduling reaction curve. For a
generaldiscussion of tiffs effect see Bulow et al. (I985).
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The first row of Table 4 depicts the nonpredatory equilibrium for this game. Because
excess demand is unprofitable, 2| airlines raise their fares above the equilibrium fares that
obtain with no capacity constraints until demand is reduced to capacity. They also
reschedule their flights slightly closer to the peak (compare Table 2). This happens because
capacity constraints soi_en fare competition, so that at the uncapacitated equilibrium
locations the attraction of locating closer to peak demand outweighs the repulsive force of
greater fare competition.
In all four of the predation scenarios capacity constraints bind. Predation by cutting fares
alone is completely ineffective and so exluilibda for Scenarios A and B are not reported. In
S_nario C the predator reschedules its flight to noon, closer to the prey's flight. Though
the predator's flight is now at the demand peak, both airlines have to cut fares to keep their
planes fi_ll. The reason for this is that, being closer together, the two flights are jointly less
attractive to consumers. The predator inflicts on its rival a profit reduction of $1411day
(6.0% of base-case profits) at a cost to itselfof$88/day. Once the prey is able to react
(Scenario D) it reschedules its flight 90 minutes later. This does little to alleviate its losses,
and the predator ends up better offthan as a nonpredator. Thus, just as when capacity
constraints are absent, it is possible for predation to raise current profits as well as expected
future profits.
3.1.2 Two flights each
Equilibria when each airline operates two flights are shown in Table 5. In the nonpredatory
equilibrium, rival flights are interlaced. Each airline schedules one flight in the morning and
one in the afternoon. "Peak period" flights (those near noon) carry more passengers (65),
than "off-peak" flights (57). But fares are almost the same because the elasticity of demand
depends only on the shape of the consumer distribution and not on the density.
The pattern of predatory behaviour in Scenarios A and B is similar to the pattern when
airlines have one flight each. In Scenario C, the predator reschedules both its flights much
closer to the prey's flights. This inflicts a heavy loss in profits for both airlines. In Scenario
D, the prey moves its flights away from the predator's. The predator responds by partially
backing offits schedule attack, and the prey recovers much of its profit loss. The
predator's profits recover too, but unlike the case with one flight each//t remains below
the nonpredatory equilibrium level.
21BoyerandMoreaux (1988, 1989) haveshown tlmtin a Stackelbergduopoly game fl_eleadercan profitby
rationingitsconsumers becausethis inflales fl_efollower'sdemand curveand induces it to raiseits price.
Boyerand More,aux arguethatbargain-priceairlines may behavein this wayto curbcompetitionfrom other
airlines. Suchbehaviouris not profitablein ourmodel, whereairlines movesimultaneously. Furthermore,
becauserationing boostsprofitsfor thefollowermore thanfor tile leader,rationing would no!bedesirable
fora predatorthat is tryingto damageitsrival.
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A
B
C
D
Table5:Equilibria: Market I, N_ = N2=2, base-case parameters, 6=I.
Xll, XI2 X21,X= Pll, Pl2 P_l, P=
7:30,13:15 10:40,16:25 35.30,35.00 34.99,35.30
7:30,13:15 10:40,16:25 33.74,31.02 34.99,35.30
7:30,13:15 10:40,16:25 33.73,31.02 34.92,35.28
10:05,15:00 10:40,16:25 25.50,28.76 32.05,33.46
9:20,13:55 11:35,17:15 31.69,30.75 34.29,35.34
II l 11a All2 IIJMI
4277 4285 m
4253 4237 -47 0.51
4253 4237 -47 0.52
3694 3533 -752 0.78
4187 4013 -272 0.33
3.2 Market 2
Market 2 differs from Market I in featuring a bimodal distribution of demand from Miller
(1972); see Figure 1. (Circles in Figure 1 represent flights in the nonpredatory equilibrium,
discussed below.) The first peak corresponds to early morning outbound business trips, and
the second to evening return business trips. 22 Each airline is assumed to operate three
flights per day. To limit computation time 23the number of consumer mass points was
reduced from 288 to 96, and the time interval between feasible flight times was
correspondingly increased from 5 to 15 minutes. Other parameter values are the same as
for Market 1.
The nonpredatory equilibrium is described in Row NP of Table 6. In Figure 1, flights of
Airlinelareshown by solidcirclesand flightsofAirline2 by hollowcircles.As inMarket
I with N_ =N_ = 2, dvai flights are interlaced. Morning flights of each airline are paired on
either side of the morning peak. Similarly, evening flights are paired near the evening peak.
Midday flights are further apart because the time period between them has a trough in the
density function, giving airlines little incentive to locate there, u
The pattern of predatory behaviour is broadly similar to that in Market 1. In Scenario A,
the predator cuts its traffic-weighted average fare, pt, by 19% to $27.79. This reduces the
" The preciseshape of tile distributionwill depend on theroute. For example, preferreddeparturetimes
tend to be more concentrated on routes where travel times are long. Slmpe also varies with the relative
importance ofbesinesstravel.
23Computation time fortheequilibriadescribedinRows NP and D of Table 6 below rangedfrom 2 to2 ½
hourson a Cyrix 166 PC with 32 megabytesofRAM. Computation time isroughlyproportionaltothe
productofthenumber ofconsumer masses,K, and thenumber offeusibledeparturetimes,T/Ax.
2( Tile comparative statics of equilibrium are similar to those of Market 1. For example, raising p from 25
to 50 causes all three pairs of rival flights to cluster. Both morning flights end up being scheduled at 8:45.
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prey's profit by $354 (5%). The predator's sacrifice of profits is half as great. The prey
responds in Scenario B with a small fare cut. zs In Scenario C, the predator reschedules each
of its flights closer to the rival's flight with which it is "paired", and the loss in prey's profits
grows to 13%. Finally, in Scenario D the prey reschedules its flights, although only its
midday flight changes much. The predator's evening flight ends up departing before the
rival's evening flight, and the arrangement of flights is no longer interlaced.
Figure 1: Departure time preferences for Market 2
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The effects of capacity constraints on equilibrium are examined in the same way as for
Market 1 by imposing a limit of 50 passengers per flight. Again, capacity constraints bind in
all predation scenarios so that price predation alone is ineffective. Comparing Table 7 with
Table 6 it is evident that equilibrium schedules are similar.to those with no capacity
constraints. But fares rise appreciably to eliminate excess demand. And even predatory
The prcy's profits fall (by $I) because the predator's average fare fails marginally from $2%79 to $2"/.77.
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Table6: Nonpredatory and predatory equilibria: Market 2, N 1ffiN2=3, c_,=l.
m All s
NP 9:30 15:45 19:00 8:15 12:15 18:00 34.2 34.3 6782 6962 --
A 9:30 15:45 19:00 8:15 12:15 18:00 27.8. 34.3 6603 6608 -354 0.51
B 9:30 15:45 19:00 8:15 12:15 18:00 27.8 33.9 6580 6607 -355 0.57
C 8:45 13:00 18:15 8:15 12:15 18:00 25.7 32.6 6317 6063 -899 0.52
D 8:45 12:30 18:00 8:00 11:15 18:15 26.1 32.9 6382 6027 -935 0.43
Table 7: Equilibria for plane capacity 50: Market 2, NI = N2=3 , c_l.
N 9:30 16:15 19:15 8:30 12:30 18:00 46.2 46.1 6937 6912 --
P
C 9:15 16:30 19:15 8:30 12:30 18:00 46.2 46 6930 6892 -20 0.32
D 8:30 12:00 18:00 9:15 16:15 19:15 45.9 46.1 6886 6914 2 -24
schedule adjustments are relatively ineffective. Indeed, in Scenario D the prey ends up
marginally better off than in the nonpredatory equilibrium, while the predator ends up worse
off!. Once again this illustrates how changes in a firm's objective function induce changes in
its reaction function(s) that can have counterintuitive effects on the resulting equilibrium.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has explored the nature of schedule and fare competition in an isolated city-pair
market served by two airlines. Airlines play a noncooperative two-stage game: choosing
flight times in Stage One and fares in Stage Two. Numbers of flights and aircraft capacity
are treated as given. In the nonstrategic (nonpredatory) variant of the game, each airline
maximizes its current profits. In the predatory version one airline, the predator, attempts to
maximize its expected long-run profits by maximizing its current profits minus some
multiple of the rival's profits.
Equilibria for both types of game are computed numerically using a two-stage tatormement
procedure. Depending on the characteristics of the market and parameter values, an
equilibrium may or may not exist. If it exists, equilibrium may not be unique and may not be
symmetric. In most, but not all, of the simulations that have been undertaken equilibria do
exist. And no case of multiple equilibria has been encountered.
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Equilibria were computed for two hypothetical markets, one with a single demand peak and
one with a double demand peak_ Nonpredatory equilibria are characterized by interlacing of
rival flights, and moderate concentration of flights near times of peak demand.
Four predation scenarios were considered. In Scenarios A and B, the predator can change
its fares but not its flight schedule, while in Scenarios C and D, the predator can change both
its fares and its schedule. Predatory fare cutting alone is found to be relatively ineffective in
inflicting damage on the rival, whether or not the rival can respond. Indeed, cutting fares is
futile if flights are capacitated. Predatory rescheduling of flights closer to a rival's flight has
greater potential for inflicting substantial losses. The extent of damage depends on whether
flights are capacitated, and whether the prey can respond with schedule changes of its own.
When the prey can respond its profits sometimes recover, and sometimes drop further.
Similarly, the predator's profits can rise or fall. Thus, the effects of predation can be varied
and sometimes counterintuitive.
There are several directions in which the analysis of the paper could be emended.
1. Demand is assumed to be stationary from day to day, so that a given flight is always
capacitated or always uncapacitated. In practice demand for a flight fluctuates
systematically by day of week and by season. Demand also fluctuates unpredictably.
Thus, a flight can be full on some days and relatively empty on other days. The
uncapacitated and capacitated equilibria computed here'are polar extremes that may or
may not bracket "reality". The model could be extended, at the cost of increased
computation time, to allow for both predictable and unpredictable fluctuations, perhaps
following the procedure of Powell and Winston (1983).
. Prospective travelers are assumed to be identical in terms of their aversion to schedule
delay and their sensitivity to fares. An obvious extension would be to introduce market
segments. One possibility, as in Norman and Strandenes (1994), would be to distinguish
between business and tourist class.
. In the two hypothetical markets considered, airlines scheduled at most three flights. Yet
some routes, such as Los Angeles -- San Francisco, are served by dozens of flights. With
more flights the average interval between rival flights falls, and fare competition becomes
more intense. It remains to be seen whether interlacing persists as the equilibrium
configuration, or whether segmentation develops. Predatory behaviour could also take
the form of"bracketing", whereby the predator squeezes a rival's flight by scheduling
two flights nearby, one earlier and one later.
= Finally, attention has been limited to a single market in isolation. Yet many routes are
interconnected through hub-and-spoke networks. Interconnection imposes constraints on
the timing of flights. For example, Borenstein and Netg (1991) report that flight
schedules tend to be more concentrated on routes with fewer connecting passengers, as
well as on longer routes -- which are less likely to involve connections. Thus, the
analysis could be extended to airline networks to see how this affects departure time
competition and crowding. The work of Encaoua et al. (1996) is a step in this direction.
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The liberalization process of the air transport industry in Europe, which officially ended in
April 1997, echoes the American Air Deregulation Act (ADA) that was passed some
twenty years earlier, in 1978. Quite logically, the European observers try to infer from the
American experience what the evolution of the industry can be on their own continent. In
particular, one of the most spectacular consequences of the ADA was the continent-wide
development of hub-and-spoke systems, in which all passengers, whatever their origins and
destinations, are charmelled to a hub airport, where they find convenient intraline
connections to reach their final destination. Such networks were initially developed by the
major air carriers to minimize their operating costs (owing to the flow consolidation on the
spokes); hubbing also gave them the opportunity to monopolize the hub airport's resources
(by the concentration of incoming and outcoming flights on a short time span) and is
therefore an interesting tool to lower the contestability of the hub markets.
Although the American experience has been extensively analyzed, very little can be learnt
to help forecast the future of the European flag carriers' networks. In this purpose, a two-
stage duopoly model is proposed in this paper, which considers both prices and network
patterns as endogenous variables. This model structure is suggested by the American
experience - that made it clear that a carrier's network can act as a strategic tool just like
other more classic device, such as marketing or prices- and by the industry practices
themselves: the two-period structure is meant to more or less reproduce the fact that at
every season for the next one the carriers choose the slots they will need at the airports they
want to serve, publish their timetables, while their prices generally keep on varying until
the last ticket is sold.
The paper is organized as follows: section I presents the model, which is then solved in
section II; the empirical test of the model is conducted in section III on American data.
1. PRESENTATION OF THE DUOPOLY MODEL
The model illustrates the situation where two airlines compete (non-cooperatively) first in a
variable that defines their network structure and then on the price of their product. The ftrst
period decision concerns the quality of service of their flights, that can be either connecting
or direct. Note that only connecting or direct flights will be considered (no one-stop or
multi-stop flights with no change of aircraft).
More specifically, two airlines A and B compete to serve the same (given) set of n cities.
The competitive game between them is_the following two-stage game with imperfect and
complete information:
First stage: the carriers simultaneously and independently choose their network pattern.
On each market with origin i and destination j, carrier A (respectively B) chooses PATi_
(resp. PATia), with value 1 if A (B) proposes a direct flight on market i-j, to 0 otherwise.
It should be noted that the airlines' choice of PATi_ and PATi_ results from a trade-off
between their market share and their cost level: the more the network is centralized (many
............................ ,-.r--_7 a,_-___
connecting flights), the lower the costs (fewer panes to operated, higher load rates) but the
higher the risk of losing market share if the rival offers direct flights t.
Second stage: Each carrier learn about their rival's network pattern choice, and then
A B Vi,j= l..n,i_j.simultaneouslyand independentlychoosetheirpricesPijand Pij,
Each carrierchoosesitspriceand patternvariablestomaximize itsprofitlevel.
1.1.General Hypotheses
The two airlines are symmetric and have the same profit function. In the case of non direct
flights between two cities, the following hypotheses are made:
- non direct flights are one connection flights only;
- when for a given carrier flights are not direct, passengers can only connect on one airport
among the ns. This airport, that will be noted HA and H B according to the carrier, is
to be linked to the other cities with direct flights only: PATi_, = PAT_^ i = 1supposed
Vi _ H A , and PATi_B = PATHBBi = 1 Vi. H B. This airport is obviously the potential hub
of the carrier.
- the passengers only have online connections (no interlining).
- each carrier offers only one routing per O-D market.
Concerning the demand: O-D traffics are exogenous and non null, equal to Qij, ij = 1..n, is
j. All demand is served by the two carriers. The O-D flows are symmetric and there is no
distinction between passenger classes (e.g. business and tourism).
Concerning the carriers' fleets: both carriers operate the same type of aircraft, the number
and type of which being given. There is no constraint from the fleet on the routing quality
decision of the airline and it is also supposed that the immobilization cost of the aircraft
and the airport utilization cost are null. There is no aircraft capacity constraints (aircraft are
supposed to never be 100 % full).
1.2. Demand and Yield Functions
The carrier's yield is an additive function of the yield obtained on each O-D market, which
is of course equal to the price paid by every traveler on the market times the number of
passengers carried. As the whole demand is served by the two carriers, the number of
passengers on O-D market i-j can be written as the total demand on i-j, Qij, times A (B) 's
market share on i-j, MS_ (or MSijB) with MS_j+MsiB=I and 0___ MSi_,MS B <1.
Furthermore, to ensure that the price paid by the traveller will depend on the O-D market
t Underthe assumption that the travelers preferdirect to connectingflights, ceteris paribus.
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length,it will besupposedthatthepricevariable,thevalueof whichis chosenby the
carriersat thesecondstageof thegame,is theunit priceperkilometer.Consequently,
carrierA'syieldfunctioncanbewrittenasZ:
rl rl
A A
_'_,Qi/'MSij-Pij-dij
i=l j=lj*i
where dij is the great-circle distance (in km) between i and j.
The market share on market i-j is written as a logit function of the strategic variables, Pij
and PATij:
exp(a+ b.p_+ c.FATiA)
MS (p 'pB'pAT  'PAT  )=exp(a+ b.p_+ c.PATi_)+exp(a+ b.p_j+ c.PATip) (2)
where b<0, c>0.
The travelers are supposed to prefer (ceteris paribus) direct to connecting flights and low
prices: therefore parameter c is positive and b is negative.
1.3. Cost function
The operating cost function is equal to the sum of the operating costs born by the carrier on
each segment served by a (direct) flight. Following Pavaux (1984), the latter is a function
of the distance flown and of the number of passengers aboard:
Cij = (x + 13.dij + `/.(number of passengers), with a, 13,Y> 0
The two first terms (ct + 13.dij) can be interpreted as the cost to bear for installing capacity
K on link i-j (where K is the seat capacity of an aircraft), bom at the first stage of the game,
while the last term, "/.(number of passengers), can be interpreted as a production cost, born
at the second stage of the game. In other respects_ the independence of the first terms from
the production cost ensures that the cost function exhibits both link economies of scale to
the number of passengers (economies of density) and economies of scope, as it is usually
the case in air transport.
The number of passengers on board, hence the cost born on a segment, depends on the
network pattern. For carrier A (for example), it equals to:
EQikMSAk.( 1 A A
-PATik)+QiH^.MSiH^ on linkiH A, i_:HA (3a)
k
and PATi_.Qij.MS _ on link ij, ijail A (3b)
2 To avoid redundancy,given the symmetry between the two airlines, only carrierA's equationswill be
mentioned, except when carrierB'sare of interest in themselves.
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Carrier A's total cost is therefore equal to:
+ A A+ A
C h = Z o_ + _.diH ^ y.(_Qik.MSik.(l- PATik ) QiHA.MSiH^)
i_eH ^ k
%.MSu.(1- PA_ ) Q.^;MS.^)+ E a +[3.dH, j+y.C_ A A + A
j;tH A ]
+ E Z PA_'.(_ + _.d_j+ _.Q_j.MS_)
i_H ^ j_H ^
(4)
Finally, carrier A's maximization program is the following:
Max _A =
A A • •
p,j ,PA_i ,l,j=l..n
n n A Ad _
 Z.,X,Q,j.Ms,j.p,j.,j ,..^Xo+,,.A
'- x +,.^, +,czQ,jMs¢<,-PAT,f)+%^jM%?
j*H ^
- x X PA'r_'.(,_+I3.d_j+r.Q_;MS_)
ittH A j.H ^
with Vi d = 1..n, l#j: (5)
(PATiA,PATi_) e {0, l}2
,, B p.2(Pu ,Pij ) e
2. PRICE AND PATTERN EQUILIBRIA
This two-stage game is classically solved by solving it first for the second stage variable
(price): we obtain the expression of the equilibrium prices where the routing quality
variable enters as a parameter. Then the solving of the first stage game produces the
equilibrium values of the PAT variables, hence the equilibrium of the whole game.
The second sub-game is solved by simply deriving the profit function, since it can be "
shown to be concave in the price variable at least for pertinent values of this variable.
Consequently, so long as each carrier's market share is non null, the equilibrium price is
given by:
A* y. (2 - PATi_ ) I
Pij = dij b.(l- A A* (6)MSij (Pij))
whcrc thc starcxponcnt denotes equilibriumvalues.
The case when MSi_ = 0 (or MS_ = 0) isa limitcase,sincethe market share can only bc
A +oo).The priceequal to zero when the price become infinite(MSA---->0 whcn Pij''>
variablewill thercforcbc supposed totakc only finitepositivevalucs.
As the PAT variablecan only take two values,the corresponding sub-gamc willbc solved
using thc normal form of the gamc, whcrc the payoffsarc the incrcmcntalprofits(which is
differentfrom the profitas dcfincd abovc).Thc incremcntalprofitobtaincd on amarkct is
thc diffcrcnccbctwccn thc yicldobtained on itand the incrcmcntalcost,which isthc part
of thc opcrating cost only attributablcto the market under consideration.This notion
avoids double counts of joint costs. The hypothesis according to which iHA or HAi (ill B or
Hbi) -type markets are served by direct flights only makes it possible to write the
incremental cost (or profit) on market i-j: for any connecting flight on this market, the cost
of installing capacities on segment iH^ (for example) can be attributed to O-D market iHA,
even when it is a joint cost; it is then possible to attribute to each market the part of'the cost
that varies with the number of passengers carried. More precisely, the incremental profit
obtained by carrier A on return O-D market i-j, i,j ¢ H A is noted n_ and equals:
_ --2"{QijMSi_'(P_dij-T)-(a+[3dij)} wheni-j is served direct ( PATi_ =l) (7a)
or
_ = 2.QijMS_.(p_d_ - 2_,) when i-j is served via H A (PATi_ =0 ) (7b)
2.1. Solving the PAT sub-game
As the solving of the price sub-game is quite straight-forward, we shall pass directly to the
solving of the routing sub-game; details can be found in Molin (1997). As noted above, the
first stage game is solved using the normal form of the game with incremental profits as
pay-offs (Cf. table I). The values of the incremental profits in table l's ceils were
computed for every possible pattern values and given the equilibrium prices as produced
by the solving of the second period sub-game.
The analysis that follows only deals with i-j type markets (i,j_HA,HB), which does not
involve hubs, since by hypothesis the markets from or to a hub are served direct by the
hubbing carrier. The i-H A and i-H B cases appear as degenerated cases of the general sub-
game applying to the i-j markets; consequently the solving of the game is focusing only on
the i-j markets, as the results obtained on i-j include those that can be obtained on the i-H A
and i-H 8 markets. In practical terms, considering the i-H A market (for example) amounts to
restricting table 1 to a one line (since by hypothesis there is no case when PATIO^ =0) - two
column table.
............. - -.._ : ....
Table 1 : Normal form of the routing quality game (symmetric duopoly)
Carrier A
i-j direct
( PATif = I)
i-j via H A
( PATiA = 0)
Carrier B
i-j direct ( PATiB = 1 )
• ZQijdij -2(c_ +13dij ) = Xij ;
b
2Qijdij 2(a + 13dij) Xij
• b
i-j via H a ( PA'i'i_ = 0 )
2Qijdij MSi_
- 2(ct + [Mij) = Yij ;
b MSij
2Qijdij MSB
b A = ZiJ
MSij
where PATi_ =I=I-PATi B in
and
2Qijdij MSA
b MSB = zij ;
B
2Qijdij MSij
- 2(cc + IMij) = Yijjb MSA
where PATi_ = 0 = l - PATiB in
MS_ and MSijB ( A <, < BMSij V2 MSij ).
( 2Qijdij "_
X'ij'b
- 2Qijdij = X'ij
b ,_
The equilibrium is characterised by various values for (PATi A ,PATiB), according to the
values obtained for the incremental profit. Omitting ij indices, we know that: X<Y, X<X'
and Z<X' but the order between Y and Z, Y and X', X and Z is unclear. There are three
possible cases3:
(1) Y<X' ""
which produces one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: (PATIO' = PATi_ = 0);
Each carrier will prefer to offer connecting service on market i-j rather than get a larger
yield from direct service (the larger yield cannot compensate the additional cost because of
direct service). The cost factor is the driving force of each carrier's pattern decision.
(2) Z < X
which produces one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: (PATi] _ = 1; PATi] _ = 1).
Each carrier prefers offering direct service on market i-j rather than benefiting from cost
savings owing to connecting service (the cost savings are not high enough to compensate
3. The case when Z < X < Y < X' is not relevant here since it can be shown that (Z < X) _ (X" < Y).
the lower yield stemming from connecting flights). The yield factor is the driving force of
each carrier's pattern decision.
(3) X < Z and X' < Y
This twofold condition leads to two Nash equilibria in pure strategies:
(PATi_ = 0;PATi_ = 1) and (PAT_A = 1;PATi] _ = 0); there is one Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies, where each carrier "plays" PATij = 1 with probability (inferior to ½):
_+Y - X' 1 13dij
_ _ =-+ ( MsB(0], _ (vector (3 indicates the values taken by
tJ hi][
PATerandPAJ inthecomputationoftheco=espondingmarketsh_es)
In this case, carrier A and B's (expected) incremental profits on market i-j equal:
X'-Y -X+ X-Z y = 2.(¢t + 13dij)
'_J=x-z+x.-,,,x-7.+x.-,,,_s0(:)-_s,_(o,) (_)
Each carrier prefers avoiding head-on competition with its rival, which explains its own
indifference between the two possible patterns. Its strategy can be viewed as an "avoiding
strategy', and is reminiscent of the maximal differentiation strategy in the duopoly with
product differentiation, to avoid direct price competition.
2.2. Synthetic Representation of the Network Pattern Solutions
Each of the three equilibrium conditions is expressed as a function of the cost, demand and
distance parameters and variables. The study of these functions produces reduced forms
that can easily be represented on a graph.
Let fand g be as follows (omitting the ij indices):
_=x.-,, Q_Ms,,(.)-_'(o')
= ct+ 13d4 (9)
2 b MSB(_) ._
and:
x-z Q,__"(_)-_B(o'). {_s"(0-_'%')}_
g = ""7 = b MSA(_) -I,¢z +13d)= -f + Qd (10)
.s_(:).s.(_)
The conditions for Case 1 (PAT ^ = PAT B= 0) are met when f is positive; the conditions for
Case 2 (PAT A= PAT 8 = l) are met when g is positive. Finally, when both f and g are
negative, the equilibrium situation corresponds to Case 3 (PAT A= 1-PATB).
Whenthestructuralparameters(typeof aircraftanddemandsplit function)aregiven,the
emergenceof oneof thethreepossibleNashequilibriadependson thevalueof two
variables:totalO-Dtraffic,Q,andO-Ddistance,d.In orderto determinetheportionsof
the(Q,d)planecorrespondingto eachNashequilibrium,wedefinethefunctionsQrandQg
of d,suchthatf(Qf,d) v_ 0 and g(Qg, d) = 0. As Qr is always inferior to Qg, the zone where
f> 0 is always below the Qr curve, while the portion of the plane where g > 0 is always
above the Qg curve. Easy but laborious calculations (Cf. Molin, 1997) lead to the following
graph (figure 1):
Figure 1: Synthetic representation of the equilibrium pattern strategies
CASE 2: PAT*=PAI'a=I
k _ (g >0, f<0)
CASE 3:_",.,. (yield max. strategy)
CASE 1; ",.,.{g < 0. f < 0)
............... _
-b_ (g <0, f> O) __.,_o=dmg strategy)
• ................................................................qf
'd
It should be noted that according to intuition, for given O-D distances, the higher the O-D
traffic levels, the more liable a carrier is to offer direct flights rather than connecting
flights. However, for given O-D traffic levels, the shorter the distance, the more the carriers
tend to offer connecting services, which is counter-intuitive. This is due to the relative
variation with distance of BPrices and market shares when PATA=PATB=0 compared to
when PAT A= 1 = 1-PAT . When distance .decreases, the increase in carrier A's uiled
compesnates the decrease in its market share all the more when it chooses PATA=0 than
when it chooses PA'I'A=I as its rival chooses PATB=0. See Molin (1997) for more
explanations.
Figure 1 allows a discussion on the market conditions for such and such air network
patterns at equilibrium, and more especially hub-and-spoke networks.
2.3. Application: Conditions for Hub-and-Spoke Netnvorks at Equilibrium
In this paragraph, we analyse the conditions on total O-D passenger traffic levels (Q) and
O-D length (d) to have both carriers choose the hubbing network pattern at equilibrium. In
accordance with the European air transport industry, we only consider the case when the
potential hubs, H A and HB, are located on different airports. For the sake of simplicity, it
will be supposed that carrier A's hub, Ha, corresponds to point n and carrier B's hub, H a, to
point n-1 (H A ;e Ha).
Generalizedhub-and-spoken tworksappearatequilibriumwhen(withH h :g: HB):
A*
on markets i-j, i,j_HA,H B, we have PAT_t^H 8 = PATB_HB = 0 (Case 1),
on markets i-H A, i#HA,H a, we have PATi_, = 1=1- PATIO*B (degenerated case of Case 3),
on markets i-H B, i#HA,H B, we have PATi_ _ = 0 =1- PATIO*B (degenerated case of Case 3),
on market H A -H a, we have PATt_;Ft. = PAT_HB = 1 (Case 2).
The profits obtained by carriers A and B equal:
_A =
n-2n-2t_..rl .. )) [
,""-''"'-"+_,_-w "-z_(.Q,._,._-ox :,[,:,(,,:..^(.)-p_.,,(:)l+_]+(_,+_d,.,.
i=l b
-2J i lj=l (1 la)
/
11-2 /
A* o _ B* o + //+( i:l D J
and
lgB =
r n-_,-2,')..,-,..,_" ', n- ' ))}
+ ..°_ o
(+/ n_.2( QiH^diHA exp[b(PiH^(o)B* , _PiH^(o))A*' --¢_ + (QHAH_ HAH' +(Ct+I_dH^HB
The two carriers have hub-and-spoke networks at equilibrium when the conditions
represented on figure 2 are met:
Figure 2 : Conditions for general hubbing at equilibrium
(the carriers have distinct hub locations)
QI _ PA'_=PAI"e=I
..................... .P_,_.=I._.A._....._. Qg
i-_ links, i=1..n-2,
-I-I8 links, i=l..n-2
........................................... Qf
-d
I0
Thecitiesservedwith connectingflightsonly arelow densitymarkets;the longerthe
distancebetweenthem,thethinnertheirtraffic levels.Conversely,thecitiesservedwith
directflightsonly shouldcorrespondto highdensitymarkets,thedensitybeinghigheras
O-Ddistanceis low.As theflightsbetweenthehubsthemselvesaresupposedirect,the
hubairportsshouldbesuchthattheygeneratehighleveltraffic,whichis thecageof the
"natural"hubsinEuropethatformthebasisof theflagcarriers.
Furthermore,to obtaingeneralizedhubbingat equilibrium,theremust alsobe some
marketswherethe mixed situationprevails(PATA=I-PATB):this situationcan be
interpretedasan unstableequilibrium,i.e. the competitivesituationwheretwo rival
carrierschoose the hub-and-spoke pattems might correspond to an unstable equilibrium.
This result (equilibrium in mixed strategies) is a consequence of the model's structure,
where the competing carriers are supposed to simultaneously choose their network pattern.
The mixed strategies can be seen as reflecting each firm's uncertainty about its rival's
choice. Consequently, the hub-and-spoke pattern can also appear as one of the best
equilibrium pattern of an air carrier when faced with uncertainty.
Finally a last result of the model should be noted: because of the existence of the (non-
empty) intermediary zone (equilibrium in mixed strategies where PAT A= I-PATB), the
carriers - that were supposed to be symmetric - choose asymmetric network pattern at
equilibrium.
III. EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE MODEL
The empirical work is currently being carried out on American data. An updated and
complete version of the paper will be provided when results are available.
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1. Introduction I
As a result of the strong growth of air transport over the past decades, the ex-
ternal costs of aviation have become an important concern in public policy. In
order to analyze the problem of externalities and formulate policy responses, one
needs to know how decisions made in airline markets affect other sectors of the
economy. It can be argued that in many transport markets, frequency of service
is one of the main factors determining the external cost total in a market. In
airline markets, for example, the size of externalities as noise and the emission of
pollutants depends largely on the number of landings and take-offs. On the other
hand, frequency of service is also a measure of quality in transport and as such
affects consumer welfare. In order to analyze these conflicting effects on welfare,
this paper models frequency equilibria in duopoly air transport markets.
The problem of frequency and fare determination in (air) transport markets
is not new, nor is the basic spatial model used in this paper. Relevant articles
using such a model include Panzar (1979), Greenhut et al. (1991) and Evans
(1987). These articles, however, model airlines as monoproduct firms: each airline
offers one flight and airlines enter the market until profit for each departure is
zero. Norman and Strandenes (1994) have modified the spatial model to allow
for multiple departures in symmetric oligopoly equilibria. This paper presents
an extension of the latter paper by modeling airline competition as a two stage
game in frequency and prices, while allowing for asymmetric equilibria: when
airline costs differ or consumer preferences are biased, the equilibrium frequency
and price choices are not likely to be symmetric. Furthermore, the time structure
implied in a two stage proces seems relevant too: while prices may vary daily in
the airline industry, departure frequencies are much less flexible.
The model is essentially an application of spatial multiproduct oligoply to a
circular air transport market. _ Relevant spatial or localized models of multiprod-
uct competition in a circular market are Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988) and
Bensaid and de Palma (1994). These papers analyze the three decisions of prod-
uct number, location on the circle and price with inelastic demand and conclude
that in the duopoly case, price competition can prevent product proliferation, i.e.,
IFinancial support from the Netherlands' organization for Scientific Research is gratefully
acknowledged.
2We use an air transport market here, but the model applies just as well to other transport
markets.
firmsselloneproductonly.An importantsimplificationhereis that wemakethe
assumptionofexogenousmaximalproductdifferentiationandexogenousmaxima]
interlacing.In thecontextoftransportmarkets,thismeansthat thetimedistance
betweensuccessivedepartures(the 'headway') is assumed constant and equals the
total time span considered divided by the munber of departures. Furthermore, a
departure of airline A is, if possible, always followed in time by a departure of a
competing airline B: clustering of departures operated by one airline in time is
minimized. We thus effectively take away the product positioning decision and
focus on the product number and price decision in order to increase tractability.
This is not to say that the choice of headway or position is not interesting or
relevant. However, abstracting from this problem reduces complexity and allows
us to focus on our main question of interest, the determination of frequencies and
prices.
In the following section, we specify the basic model structure and analyze
spatial multiproduct configurations. Then we discuss properties of frequency and
price equilibria for the cases of inelastic and elastic demand. In section 3 we
illustrate the model with numerical results using an empirical simulation model
for the Amsterdam - Maastricht market." The resulting equilibria are used to
evaluate the welfare effects of airline deregulation for alternative types of post-
entry competition. Using a simple specification of the external cost function, the
costs of noise annoyance and emissions are included in the analysis.
2. A model of airline competition
2.1. Demand
We consider a simple market for air transport, in which carriers offer consumers
flights from some airport Y to some destination Z. A (potential) traveler derives
gross utility _ from taking this trip, and faces a price p. For simplicity, we assume
linear schedule delay costs: a consumer suffers a utility loss of 0x when the flight
leaves at a time distance x = [tdep- t_el] from his or her preferred departure
time. 3 When the gross valuation exceeds the sum of price and schedule delay
3We thus make the assumption that the utility lo_s caused by taking a flight at a time
distance x earlier than the preferred departure time is equal to the utility loss caused by taking
a flight at x later than the preferred departure time. The term 'schedule delay cost' is meant to
capture both types of utility loss.
cost, the traveler buys a ticket.
Potential travelers are distributed uniformly with respect to desired departure
time on a circular market of (time) lenght L = 1 and density D. The departure
times of flights are also located on this circle: we consider the departure times of
flights i and i q- 1, t_ and t_+l respectively, which are separated by a headway H.
Potential passengers who are 'located' at some preferred departure time x E (0, H)
face a time distance x with respect to the departure time t_ of flight i and a distance
(H - x) with respect to t¢+1. These potential'passengers derive the following net
utilities or consumer surplus from the two options:
v, = V-p,-gx (2.1)
vi+l = v-P_+l-O(H-x)
Clearly, a consumer will choose the flight belonging to the larger of the above
expressions and buy a ticket if the net utility is positive. We can now derive the
distance Xb between ti and the boundary between the market areas of the two
flights as that x for which vi = v1+1. This gives
Pi+l - Pi "1"OH (2.2)
Xb+ = 20
All potential passengers located between ti and xb+ will take flight i, if they fly at
all, and those located between Xb+ and t_+l will choose flight i + 1, again, if they
fly at all.
When potential passengers can decide not to take the trip, i.e., when aggre-
gate demand is elastic, total demand for flight i from potential passengers with
preferred departure times later than ti can be obtained by adding the number of
passengers over all preferred departure times x between ti and xb+, giving
q,+ = D fo x*+ s(p, "+ Ox)dx (2.3)
where s (Pl + 0x) is the share of potential passengers that do decide to fly. In
order to arrive at total demand for flight i, qi, we have to include the demand
from passengers with preferred departure times earlier than t_, q__. The derivation
of qi_ is similar to the one used for qi+ outlined above. 4 Therefore, aggregate
demand for flight i is
q_ (Pi,Pi-I,P_+1, H) f_b+
=D _ 8(p,+Ox) (2.41
4In the same way, there exists a location Xb- which marks the boundary between the market
Clearly,thespecificationof thisdemandfunction is crucial for the results.
2.1.1. Configurations
We now consider the multiproduct equilibrium. There are three possibilities: de-
parture i operated by an airline l may have either two, one or zero neighbouring
departures offered by a competing airline l; we refer to such departures as 'un-
friendly neighbours', while we call two neighbouring flights operated by one and
the same airline 'friendly neighbours'.
The expression for the market boundary Xb in the demand per flight function q
depends on the configuration of the departures. With an interlaced configuration,
for each departure i the price for both the earlier and the later departure (i_ 1 and
i+1 respectively) are set non-cooperatively by a competing airline. _ A departure
i with two unfriendly neighbours faces market boundaries
P,-1 -'- P, + OH
X b_ _- 20
P_+I - P_ + OH (2.5)
Xb+ = 2t_
from which demand for flight is derived using equation (2.4). We refer to this type
of flight as completely competitive. In the case of a 'semi-competitive' flight i ,
i.e., a flight with only one unfriendly neighbour i - 1 and one friendly neighbour
i + 1, the price of the latter always equals the price of flight i. Therefore, this
type of demand is derived using the boundaries
P_-1 -P_ +gH
Xb- _- 2t_
p_ - p_ + 0H H (2.6)
Xb+ = 28 -- 2
For the sake of completeness, we note that for a non-competitive flight (with no
unfriendly neighbours), demand is derived from the market boundaries Xb- =
areas of flight i and an earlier flight i - 1 at time t,_ ,, with
P,- 1 - P_+ OH_
Xb- = 20
SNore that in case of a duopoly the price of both competing departures is the same. Fur-
thermore, each airline sets one and the same price for all its tickets.
H
xb+ = ¥. We conclude that for any demand specification, completely competitive
demand is more price sensitive than semi-competitive demand.
For the market as a whole, we can now distinguish between two extremes. In
a monopoly market, all departures are o_dre.d by the same airline; on the other
hand, there is the completely interlaced equilibrium, in which all flights have un-
friendly neighbours. Of course, there are many possible configurations between
these extremes• The range of configurations implies that with multiproduct com-
petition, monopoly and oligopoly become relative rather than absolute concepts.
We consider two configurations in figure 1.
A
B
A
A
B
(la)
A symmeWi¢ completely
intedac, ed duopoly
configuration
(tb)
A slishtly asymmctriu non-
interlacedduopoly
configuration
Figure I: Multiproduct configurations
The firstconfiguration in figure1 isa completely interlacedduopoly. When
a duopolist analyzes the effectof a small increase in departure frequency, he
necessarily considers a 'slightly asymmetric' configuration. As is illustrated in
figure lb, all non-symmetric duopoly configurations are non-interlaced.
2.2. Cost and profit
For each flight, costs consist of a (major) fixed part FC and a small marginal cost
c per passenger. 6 Revenue per departure is pq, so that profit for departure i is
ri = 09_ - c)qi - FC (2.7)
When the total number of flights of a particular airline l is fl, aggregate profits
over all flights for this firm are given by
fl
II, = _ [09i - c)qi - FC]
i=1
(2.s)
3. Market equilibria
The model analyzes frequency and price decisions as the outcome of a two-stage
game in an airline duopoly. In the first stage, each airline chooses a frequency and
in the second stage, each airline chooses a price given the first frequency choices.
As usual in such a model, the solution is derived backwards by calculating the
price solution first and using this solution in the calculation of the first stage
frequency choice.
A stylized representation of the first stage frequency competition is given by
the following pay-off matrix.
airline 2
air line 1
frequency choice low high
high (l'I_ow, IIhiah) (nh,_h, YIh,t_h)
The symmetric cases on the diagonal are a dividing line. It has been outlined in
the previous section that aggregate demand for airline 1 becomes less price elastic
6Fixed flight costs depend on aircraft capacity (type) k. Aircraft choice is mainly determined
by the distance flown. Given the stage length of the city-pair market under consideration, k
may be assumed constant.
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whenthisairlinehasmoreflightsthanits competitor,i.e.,whentheconfiguration
becomes non-interlaced. This is the case for the frequency pairs on the right hand
side of the diagonal. For airline two, the same holds for the pairs on the left hand
side of the diagonal.
The implication is that the form of the airlines' profit function changes at
]'1 -- f2. The profit function of each airline therefore consists of two parts. Profits
of airline 1 are
H1 = ]'1 (Pl - c)q0o - fife if ]'1 < ]'2 (3.1)
121 = (fl-/'2)(p_-c)q,c+f_(pl-c)q==-f_FC if f_>_f2 (3.2)
The profit function of airline 2 has exactly the same form. 7 Clearly, when the first
line is relevant for one airline, the second is relevant for the other. Only when
fl = f_, the two parts of the profit function give the same value.
In order to derive results, we now turn to the specification of demand. We
distinguish between inelastic and elastic aggregate demand in the following sec-
tions. In the next section, we assume that aggregate market demand is inelastic,
e.g. as in Bensaid and de Palma (1994). In other words, the reservation value
is so high as to be never binding. In the case of elastic demand, some consumers
buy a ticket and others decide not to fly.
3.1. Inelastic demand
In this case, all consumers fly and we thus have s (p_ + Ox) = 1. Demand in (2.3)
simplifies to
qi+ = D ldx = Dx_. (3.3)
We now investigate the equilibrium frequency and price choices of the airlines
and the resulting equilibrium configuration. In particular, we are interested in
the question whether a symmetric and interlaced frequency choice emerges as an
equilibrium.
3.1.1. Price equilibrium
As has been outlined in the previous section, the solution to the second stage price
game depends on the configuration of departures: in a symmetric and thus inter-
7Note that the form of the profit function is dictated by the assumption of maximal
interlacing.
laced configuration, pricing is competitive for all departures. In a non-symmetric
duopoly configuration, at least two departures are friendly neighbours.
We consider the solutions for the price game, i.e., the simultaneous solution
to the problem for each airline
max 1-It (P,,P-t, ft, f-t) l = 1, 2 (3.4)
Pi
Like the profit function, the profit maximizing price consists of two parts:
(2ft+f2)o _"
p*_ = c + 3S_(S,+f_) _ fl > .[2 (3.5)(f_+2f_)op_ c + 312(It+12)
We define d -- fl - f2 _> 0 and write the difference between the profit maximizing
prices as (f, - A) o dO
- =
3f2 (fl + f2) 3f2 (fl + f2)
Clearly, in the symmetric departure solution, the ticket fares are equal. We note
that with ]'1 >- f2, the profit maximizing price of airline 2 p_ decreases in f2. P_,
however, increases in ]'1. The latter is quite intuitive, because the 'monopolisation'
of the market by firm 1 increases in fl (for fl > f2). With these price solutions
in terms of frequency choices, we now turn to the frequency choice game.
3.1.2. Frequency equilibrium
The price solutions found in the previous section are now used to derive the
frequency equilibrium. We consider the profit functions of both airlines given the
second stage price solutions for fl _> f2.
(2fl+ f2) O ( -d" l+d)HI f20 3f2 (fi + f2) f2) f_ + f23f (71:i- + - f, FC (3.6)
II2 = f2 f---_-_2 + -/2FC (3.7)
The profit function of airline 2 strictly decreases in its own flight frequency. Fur-
thermore, both profit functions strictly increase in the frequency difference d.
Therefore, we may already conclude that ]'1 = f2, a symmetric interlaced config-
uration, is not a likely equilibrium. The equilibrium frequency difference clearly
dependson the fixed costs per flight FC. If these would be zero, an equilibrium
with a maximal frequency difference would prevail. For firm 2, the equilibrium
choice is a 'minimal' frequency. For each value of fl (with fl _> f_), the best re-
sponse of airline 2 is to minimize frequency. We refer to this minimum frequency,
say 1 flight, as fmia. s
Airline i chooses the profit maximizing frequency given the minimum fre-
quency chosen by airline 2. The equilibrium frequency for airline 1 f" is found by
solving
2D (2f ° + f_,) 0 = FC (3.8)
9 (f* -[- f_i_) a
The left hand side of the above expression decreases in f. If we let FC be the
value of FC for which f* = f_. is the solution to (3.8), we may conclude the
following.
Proposition 3.1. The two-stage game o[ [requency and price choice with inelas-
tic demand, exogenous interlacing and ma.rimal product differentiation does not
have a symmetric equilibrium for FC < F---C. For FC >_ -F-C, there is a symmetric
equiIibrium with f_ = f_ = from. For FC < FC, the two asymmetric equilibria
are (f', fm_) and (f_o,f') where f" is the solution to (3.8).
The proposition states the maximal frequency difference result: only for rel-
atively high fixed costs (FC > ]_/_) a symmetric equilibrium is possible. With
two identical firms, the equilibrium is not unique: both (f*, fmin) and (f_io, f*)
are equilibria.
The equilibrium payoffs differ between the two firms: the high frequency
airline, say airline 1, earns a higher profit than the low frequency airline 2. In a
symmetric equilibrium both airlines earn the same profit. However, for FC < -F-C,
an increase in the frequency of airline 1 raises its own profit, while it lowers the
profit of airline 2. The pay-off structure of the frequency choice game is therefore
a variation on a classic example in game theory named 'Battle of the Sexes' or
'Bach or Strawinsky' (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) in a gender neutral version.
In this case, however, the positive payoffs are not on the diagonal: referring to
the matrix in figure 1, each airline wants to choose 'low' when the competitor
Slf the airline further decreases frequency, it ceases to operate in the market.
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chooses'high' andviceversa,but bothwouldratherhavethe highfrequency.°
Just as in BoS there are two pure strategy equilibria, each with an asymmetric
pay-off.
Finally, we note the similarity between the result of (maximal) differentia-
tion in the number of products derived here and results in two-stage models of
(monoproduct) differentiation. First of all,'using quadratic transport costs in the
model of two-stage duopoly competition in location and price, d'Aspremont et al.
(1979) show that in the unique equilibrium, product (location) differentiation is
maximal. Firms move away from each other's location in order to soften price
competition. Note that the choice of location does not involve costs for the firm.
In a model of vertical product differentiation or quality choice, Shaked and Sutton
(1982) derive a maximal differentiation result too (despite the fact that quality is
costless to produce); this equilibrium is, however, not unique when firms are iden-
tical. The latter two models have in common that the (maximal) differentiation
result is driven by the price competition in the second stage.
In the present model, maximal differentiation in the number of products does
not occur, except when fixed costs per product are zero. As we are dealing with
frequency choice as the number of products, this assumption is not realistic. How-
ever, the result of differentiation causing an asymmetric frequency equilibrium
remains.
3.2. Elastic demand
We now turn to the elastic demand model, where not all potential passengers
necessarily buy a ticket and investigate how. the equilibrium derived above is
affected. A problem is that, even using simple specifications of elastic demand,
equilibria in the above model become analytically untractable. Therefore, we have
to confine ourselves to pointing out some properties of the elastic demand model
and then illustrate the results with numerical solutions.
One of the important properties of the inelastic model is the strictly negative
frequency derivative for the second airline. The elastic demand model, however,
does not have this property. While we cannot present the reaction functions
analytically, we derive an expression for the derivative of the profit function of
9In the BoS game, two people want to go to a concert together, but have different tastes.
Their main concern, however, is to go out together. In our case, the pay-offs have shifted.
Tile game is now 'Bach and Stravinsky' and describes the case where two people with identical
musical taste want to avoid seeing each other at a concert.
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the 'lowfrequency'airline with respect to frequency. The question is then whether
the first order condition for profit maximization with respect to frequency may
hold at all for the second or 'low frequency' airline.
We consider the profit function of the 'low frequency' airline. For this airline
the profit function is now
H, = f_ ((p* - c) q(p', fL + f-,) - Re) (3.9)
The first order condition for the airline is then
= q+ -c/-- +
--- (p*-c) (q(p*,f,q-f-t)÷ f, O_f)-FC =0 (3.10)
J
k vd j
The latter simplification follows from the envelope theorem: the effect of a fre-
quency change on the equilibrium price cancels because the bracketed term that
follows it is evaluated at the profit maximizing price p* and therefore equal to
zero. Thus, the sign of the profit derivative for the 'low frequency' airline is no
longer strictly negative, but depends on the value of FC and on the sign of the
second term in brackets in (3.10). The latter is strictly positive for particular
demand structures, e.g. linear demand (see the appendix for details). There-
fore, the result of maximal differentiation of the frequency choice no longer holds
with elastic demand while the first order condition for profit maximization for the
second airline may be satisfied in a symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. /.n the two-stage game of frequency and price choice with elas-
tic demand, exogenous interlacing and maximal product differentiation, the 'low
frequency' airline's first order condition for profit maximization with respect to
frequency choice is no longer strictly negative and can be satisfied in a symmet-
ric equilibrium. Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium may exist depending on the
demand structure and the values of the demand and cast parameters.
Obviously, the profit derivative in (3.10) decreases in the fixed flight cost FC.
Furthermore, it can be shown that the product of the two terms in brackets and
thus the profit derivative (3.10) increases in "the schedule inconvenience cost 0.
In other words, the marginal profitability of each flight increases, so that the
equilibrium frequency increases in 0. The intuition is that for high 8, the relative
importance of price in the utility function is small and thus price elasticity of
demand is relatively low.
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4. A simulation model
We illustrate the above results by presenting some simulation results, using a
linear demand model. This demand model is baked on Greenhut et al. (1987) and
has the general form
where _ is a demand parameter. The frequency equilibria are derived by calculat-
ing first the best price responses of the duopolists in the second stage of the game
for each set of frequency choices. Then we calculated the best frequency responses
in the first stage of the game to obtain the Nash equilibrium while paying special
attention to the role of the schedule inconvenience cost 0.
The values of the model parameters have been found by calibrating the model
using actual data for the Amsterdam - M_stricht market. The calibrating pro-
cedure is similar to the one used by Norman and Strandenes (1994). At present,
the Amsterdam - Maastricht route is a KLM monopoly. Therefore, observations
for price, quantity and frequency for the years 1996 / 1997 have been substituted
in the first order conditions for profit maximization with respect to price and fre-
quency for a monopolist. Using these two conditions and the demand function, we
were able to solve for the unknown parameters, viz., the intercept c_, the schedule
inconvenience cost (or 'shadow wage') 0 ar/d the density D.
Before proceeding to the results, we should say that the calibration procedure
used here is rather crude so that the parameters obtained represent an order of
magnitude. First of all, we constructed a price for a one-way ticket of Hfl 206,-
as a weighted average of a number of full fare classes. We obtained the average
number of passengers of 20 per flight from the CBS statistics, at a frequency of
5 flights on a typical day. We did not dispose of actual cost data. Therefore, we
imposed an arbitrary marginal passenger cost of Hfl 25,- and a fixed flight cost of
Hfl 2000,- .10
The elasticities of demand per flight with respect to price and frequency for
the monopoly situation are respectively eq,p = -1.14 and eq,! = -0.45.11 Using
1°This fixed flight cost implies an approximate cost of 15 dollar cent per ASM. This cost
figure is more than twice as high as the figure for US airlines using a B737-100 on average stage
lenghts of around 500 miles. The cost difference may be justified because of the much smaller
stage length of 132 miles and the smaller aircraft, viz., the BA /46 (64 seats).
11The elasticity of demand over all departures w.r.t, frequency is positive, 0.55, in the
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thesefiguresfor themonopolysituation,wesolveforthedemandparameters.An
overview of the parameters used in the base simulation is given in the table below.
Table 1:
simulation coefficients
calibrated parameters
a 487.42
0 83.33
D 0.023
exogenous parameters
c 25
FC 2000
4.1. Simulation results
4.1.1. Identical airlines
Using these parameters in the two stage frequency price model, we have simu-
lated airline duopoly competition between two identical airlines. The frequency
equilibrium of this base case is symmetric. In equilibrium, both airlines operate
3 flights each at a ticket fare of Hfl 182,-.
as indicated above, both the equilibrium total number of flights and the equi-
librium price increase in the schedule inconvenience cost. When 0 increases, the
relative price elasticity decreases and therefore the oligopolists are able to charge
a higher price (for each frequency choice). This implies an increase in the prof-
itability of the marginal flight, and thus to higher equilibrium frequencies. The
latter also holds for decreases in the fixed flight cost FC.
However, changes in the parameters 0 and FC may have an effect on the sym-
metry of equilibrium too. As explained in the previous sections, an important fea-
ture of the model is that it allows for asymmetric frequency choices. Asymmetry
may occur for various reasons: with identical airlines, asymmetric configurations
may occur due to the depressing effect of extra departures on the equilibrium
price. It may be more profitable for an airline to choose a smaller frequency than
the competitor; this confers monopoly power to the competitor which raises the
monopoly regime.
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equilibrium prices of both firms) 2 We therefore conclude that both an increase
in the schedule inconvenience cost 0 and a decrease in the fixed flight cost FC
have two distinct effects. On the one hand, both parameter changes increase the
profitability of the marginal flight. At the same time, however, higher frequency
choices have a depressing effect on prices. Therefore, the equilibrium frequency
choice may be become asymmetric.
4.1.2. Non-identical airlines
When airlines are not identical, this in itself may result in asymmetry of the
frequency equilibrium. Such asymmetry of airlines may be due to differing cost
structures or consumers preferences for a particular airline (e.g. because of fre-
quent flyer programmes). We illustrate both cases. Firstly, we present the case
where airline 2 has fixed flight costs of Hfl 1000 in stead of Hfl 2000. Clearly, at all
symmetric frequency choices the marginal profitability of a frequency increase will
be higher for the second airline. Therefore, the frequency equilibrium will become
asymmetric for two reasons: the low cost airline will increase its frequency because
it has lower costs, which depresses prices. "In order to temper price competition,
the high cost airline decreases departure frequency.
Secondly, we analyze the case where all consumers have a preference for one of
the two airlines. This preference is reflected in the utility function by a parameter
b which is added to gross utility. We therefore have as the utility derived from
flying with the preferred airline
vr,.,! = (_ + b) - p_! - Ox
in stead of the original utility function. In the simulation we have taken airline
1 as the preferred airline and use b = 60. Again, the frequency equilibrium
is asymmetric because of both consumer preferences and the second stage price
competition. The simulation results for the base case (identical airlines) and the
two asymmetric cases are summarized in table 2 below. As a fourth case, the
combined effect of cost difference and consumer preferences is presented.
t2In the previous simulation, at a fixed flight cost of FC =- 1500, the equilibrium is asym-
metric. Equilibrium frequency and price choices are (4,3) and (186,177) respectively. If the 'low
frequency' airline would raise its frequency, the resulting symmetric profit maximizing price
choices would be so much lower (169,169) that a symmetric configuration is not an equilibrium.
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Table 2: Simulation reault_
airline 1 airline 2
Case 1: identical airlines
frequency 3 3
price 182 182
Case 2:FC1 = 2000, FC2 = 1000
frequency 2 7
price 171 207
Case 3: bl = 60, b2 = 0
frequency 4 2
price 199 177
Case 4:1 and 2 combined
frequency 3 6
price 177 184
4.2. Welfare effects of airline deregulation
The above results can be applied in order to analyze the welfare effects of airline
deregulation in the case of the Amsterdam - Maastricht market. The welfare
analysis clearly involves a number of assumptions. We assume here that with free
market access, entry costs are such that one airline enters the market so that the
KLM monopoly turns into a duopoly. We use the above cases of identical and
non-identical competitors, and calculate the resulting welfare effects in terms of
consumer surplus, profitsand external costs.
In order to include the external costs of aviation in the welfare analysis,we
make use of a simple external cost function:we take intoaccount only the costsof
emissions. As the measurement ofsocialcost and the valuation of environmental
goods falloutside the scope of thispaper, we relyon the resultsPerlet al. (1996).
Emission costs are calculated as
E = F(t. v) (4.2)
where F isthe totalflightfrequency (number of landings and take-offsor LTO),
t isthe emission index (kilogram emitted per LTO) and v the value lossper unit
of a particularemission type. Parameter values can be found in the appendix.
In the calculationof welfare effectswe use the cases as presented in table 2,
while referringto airlineI as the incumbent and airline2 as the entrant. The
welfare resultsare presented in table 3.
16
The results show that welfare changes from deregulation depend critically on
the type of entry and the resulting frequency equilibrium. As we have seen above,
price competition is affected in two ways by frequency choice. First, the more
symmetric the frequency equilibrium, the more intense the price competition; sec-
ondly, the higher total frequency, the more intense the price competition which
depresses prices and increases consumer benefits. On the other hand, higher fre-
quencies also lower schedule inconvenience (time) costs, which improves consumer
welfare too. The four simulation cases illustrate the above mechanisms for differ-
ent competitive contexts, all of which show a substantial improvement in the sum
of consumer surplus and profits.
We briefly note a few interesting features. Comparing cases 1 and 2, we see
an almost identical consumer surplus (change) for two very different equilibria.
The high total frequency depresses price and lowers time costs, but this effect
is countered by the 'monopoly power' of the low cost - high frequency entrant.
These effects are at work in case 4 too, but here the effect of consumer preference
(loyalty) with respect to the incumbent makes the equilibrium more symmetric.
This results in higher consumer benefits than in case 2. In case 3 total frequency
is lower because there is no low-cost entry, while the equilibrium is asymmetric:
therefore, the increase in consumer welfare after entry is less than in the other
cases. The difference between the cases with and without low-cost entry shows up
clearly in the industry profit changes. With the large cost difference assumed here,
industry profit after deregulation improves because the low-cost carrier captures a
large market share. 13 This effect makes the welfare changes even more pronounced.
Finally, the market outcomes allow us to calculate external costs as a function
of departure frequency. Using the above simple specification of the external cost
function, we are able to include emission costs in the welfare analysis. We note
that this analysis only takes into account the emission part of the external cost
total, while the parameters of the external cost function require further research.
Also, capacity constraints and aircraft choice may be included in the analysis. In
the present simulations, capacity constraints were not binding; however, in cases
where capacity constraints are binding, (e.g. in Norman and Strandenes, 1994),
the choice of aircraft type becomes relevant, which will clearly have an impact on
the external cost parameters.
13Note, however, that the incumbent incurs profit losses in all cases.
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Totalnumberof departures
Price(%change)
Passengers(%change)
_I_b|e 3: Wel/are eifect_ of deregulation
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
6 9 6 9
incumbent 3 2 4 3
entrant 3 7 2 6
incumbent -11.8 -17.1 -3.3 -14.4
entrant -11.8 0.2 -13.3 -10.7
22.7 29.1 16.2 36.7
24.9 25.0 21.5 37.6Consumer surplus (% change)
Profits (% of monopoly profit)
incumbent 44.6 15.2 68.3 32.9
entrant 44.6 122.2 22.9 81.8
Aggregate profit (% change) -10.8 37.4 -8.7 14.7
Profit + CS (% change) 17.1 34.9 14.2 43.5
Emission Costs (% of welfare sum) 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08
5. Conclusion
The model developed in this article is an extension of the model in Norman and
Strandenes (1994). A first modification is that we model competition in frequency
and prices as a two stage game: in the first stage, airlines choose frequencies, in
the second stage they choose prices. As such_ the model is similar to models of
multiproduct oligopoly. A second modification is that we allow for asymmetric,
non-interlaced frequency equilibria. The latter allows us to analyze competition
between non-identicalairlines.
The two-stage setup of the model allowsairlinesto choose frequency equilibria
such that pricecompetition isavoided. This featureismost pronounced in the case
of inelasticdemand, for which we have derived a maximal differentiationresult.
The latterresultdoes not hold in the case of elastic(linear)demand. However,
in the elasticdemand case asymmetric equilibriado frequently occur. When
competing airlinesairlinesare not identical,asymmetric equilibriaare particularly
relevant.
The model allows us to analyze the welfare effects of airline deregulation for
various types of post-deregulation entry, in terms of consumer surplus, profits and
external costs. The size and distribution of the welfare effects prove to depend
on the type of entry. Low cost entry results in the highest welfare gains, both as
18
a resultof price decreases and of frequency increases. The latter, however, give
rise to higher external costs. Therefore, the specification of technical and value
parameters in the external cost function is an important extension of the paper
in order to arrive at a complete welfare analysis of airline deregulation.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Sign of the profit-derivative of the low frequency airline in sym-
metric equilibrium
We consider the profit derivative of the 'low frequency' airline as given in (3.10).
Given that price is above marginal cost in all equilibria (in other words, that
airline profits are not negative), we have to show that the second term in brackets
is positive, i.e.
o_
q(P*,ft+ f-,)+ f,_'_ >
0 (A.1)
We show this for the linear demand function which can be written as (see e.g.
Greenhut et al., 1987)
DL ( " OL) (A.2)q=Tf
where a isa demand parameter. Note that both airlineshave the same number
of flights, i.e. f = _F, in a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, we have
; 2F-'-i-- - (" - f) (,.3)
Substituting (A.2) and (A.3) in (A.I),we findthat in symmetric equilbrium
q(p, f, + f_,) + ft0_ _-- 6._D_DF(_ p') > 0 (A.4)
The latterholds because a is the demand interceptor the maximum price con-
sumers are willingto pay. Therefore, the term in brackets on the RHS of the
equality sign is positive and we may conclude that the profit-derivativeis not
strictlynegative;rather,it'ssign depends on the value ofthe fixedflightcost FC.
2O
A.2. Emission costs
In the calculations, the following parameter values have been used.
• Emission index t (kilogrammes per LTO):
- NOx : 4.85
- HC : 1.52
- S02 : 0.32
- CO : 12.03
- C02 : 1855.08
• Value estimates v are the "Urban/potential" values reported in Perl et al.
(1996).
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THE USE OF MARKET POWER IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
AND TOURISM
Abstract
In order to make international trips, visitors must use some form of transport, such as
aviafioz_ Countries possess a degree of market power over tourism within their borders,
and they often seek to use this. This market power also transfers over to aviation; they
control air routes jointly with their trading partners, and they oRen restrict supply,
sometimes with the intention of generating profits. However, they must share tra_c and
profits with their partners. Governments also levy taxes on tourism, but these affect
domestic tourists and residents. A model is developed which combines all these features.
It is possible to use it to characterise the best possible combination of aviation and
tourism policies fi'om the perspective of an individual country. A country typically does
not have full control over aviation policies, and this can be allowed for. What is desirable
from the perspective of an individua[ country is not desirable from a world perspective. In
tourism, and to a lesser extent, countries are able to levy optimum tariffs, which benefit
themselves but lessen overall world welfare. There is evidence that countries are
becoming more aware of their market power, as international aviation becomes
increasingly liberalised, countries are imposing more taxes on tourism.
1. Introduction
In recent years countries have been explicitly recognising that they possess market power
in international aviation to their borders. They share this power with other countries on
the routes they control. Granted this, they have been questioning what policies are best
from their own viewpoint. Even countries predisposed to take a liberal view are noting
that their airlines may be profiting from regulation on some routes, and that it may be
travellers from other countries who are paying the higher prices which enable these
profits. In effect they may be able to levy an optimum tariff on aviation, though their
ability to do so depends on their partner's policies. While individual countries may gain
from imposing restrictive policies, from a world perspective, a liberal environment would
he more efficient. Part of the unwillingness of some countries to liberalise may be
explained by this; it may not be simply a matter of them being protectionist towards their
airlines.
International aviation is linked to international tourism; they are close complements. If
there are no distortions at the tourism level, it will be sufficient to examine international
aviation on its own. This is unlikely to be the case, since even if tourism is not specifically
taxed, the goods and services purchased by tourists will normally be subject to general
taxation, such as VAT, which creates a divergence between what tourists pay and the cost
of provision. Further, tourism is often seen by countries as a generator of positive or
negative externalities. Tourism is sometimes taxed for revenue raising reasons. Taxes such
as accommodation taxes are intended to be passed on to the tourist, who is often from
another country. If this is so, it is necessary to consider international aviation policy
together with tourism policy: they cannot be analysed in isolation form one another.
From a worldwide efficiency perspective, tourism taxes pose even more difficulties than
aviation regulation. It is easier for countries to increase this taxation, as the taxes are
spread over tourists from across a range of countries, and no one country is likely to find
it in its interest to retaliate to a country's tourism taxes. The countries whose nationals
pay the tax have less countervailing power than they do in aviation. Tourism taxes are a
trade distortion which will be very difficult to negotiate away, since it is in some
countries' individual interest to levy them. Indeed, as countries are under more pressure
to liberalise their international aviation, they may be relying more heavily on taxation of
tourism instead. Trade liberalisation at the airline level has been very difficult to
accomplish; liberalisation at the tourism level may be even more difficult.
For many countries, such as Australia, most tourists come by air. Thus, policies which
affect costs and prices of international aviation affect the gains fi'om tourism. This link is
perceived, though not oRen ¢xan_ed. (For some discussion, see Findlay and Forsyth,
1988, and some recognition, Productivity Commission, 1998). Thus tourism interests
always support low ak fares, and ah-lines claim they are creating externalities by bringing
tourists; there is little guidance as to where the best mix of policies might lie. The
question of how the benefits from tourism and international aviation can be maximised is
considered in this paper.
ThePolicyEnvironment
A governmentwhichseeksto maximisethebenefitsfromaviationandtourismfor itsown
citizensmustoperatein an environmentwhichconstrains it. It can raise prices for
tourism services, but residents touring at home will be affected as well as foreigners. It is
often all, cult to discriminate between them. Residents also make international trips - it
can be difficult to distinguish between residents and foreigners on international aviation
(though ways exist and are used). When tourists come to a country, they create
externalities, positive and negative. These could be significant, yet difficult to correct
fore. On international routes, traffic and profits are normally shared by airlines of
different countries. A route is jointly regulated by govermnents at either end, and no one
government can obtain its preferred from and level of regulation. Subject to their
partner's preferences, governments do have some freedom to choose international
aviation policies.
It should be apparent from the list of factors above that there are no simple policy
prescriptions for tourism and aviation from an individual country's perspective. The best
set of policies depends on the balance of forces that applies in a particularcase. The ways
these interact can best be shown by setting out a formal model, and this is done in this
paper. The purposes are to characterise the key relationships, and thereby elucidate the
policy choices available to a government. No empirical data are examined - this can be
readily done, as the model is quite adaptable to empirical application. The paper thus
cannot come to firm policy conclusions, though some suggestions are made.
In section 2, the model is outlined, and in section 3 it is analysed. Several different
variants of the model (e.g. corresponding to different constraints on the home
government) are considered. The model supposes a simple market structure for
international air routes - this is subjectedto scrutiny in section 4. It is recognised that any
country must operate within the bounds set by the policies of others - the consequences of.
this are considered in section 5. In section 6, the application to Australia is discussed,and
in section 7, some problems posed for efficiency at the worldwide level are considered.
2. A Model of Tourism and International Aviation
The key aspect of this model is that tourism and international aviation are jointly
consumed services. Tourists come to a country by using international aviation services.
It is taken that there are no alternatives - this is effectively true of countries such as
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. It is less true of the U.K. and not true at all of many
European nations. It would be possible to generadise the model to allow for non-aviation
means of transport, but this is not allowed for here. It is also assumed that the services
are consumed in fixed proportions. Again this need not be the case - international visits
can be of varying durations, and it is likely that duration would depend partly on relative
prices of the travel and tourism components. This could be allowed for at the cost of
additional complexity.
Another key feature of the model is that both home and overseas tourists use tourist
facilities in the home country, and home and overseas tourists use international aviation.
Total tourism in the home country is given by h, the sum of domestic (d) and overseas (v)
4tourists. Overseas visitors v are the sum of visitors fi'om all other countries, i = 1 ...n.
(Consider the home country as country 0.) Thus:
n
h = d + _"_v, (2.1)
|=1
The total number of residents travelling overseas, a, is equal to the sum of those visiting
n
other countries, _a, The number of persons travelling between 0 and i is given by mi.
ia, l
ml = ai + v1 (2.2)
Tourism is assumed to include all travel, whether for business, leisure, or other purposes.
Tourism services in the home country are supplied at constant marginal cost, ck. Aviation
services between the home country and country i are supplied at constant marginal cost si.
Finagy, the price to residents who travel abroad of tourism services in country i is given
by ct. This may or may not equal marginal cost, but from the home country point of view,
it is fixed.
The prices charged for home tourism and aviation services need not equal marginal costs.
It is assumed that tourism services are "taxed" at a rate th, so that the price of tourism in
the home country, p,, is given by
p, = ch + t, (2.3)
Aviation services may be taxed, at a rate r,, such that the price of a trip to/from i, P_, is
given by
p, = sl + rt (2.4)
The overall price of a trip, including the tourism component, for a resident visiting " i:,p, is
given by
p_o = ci + s1 + r_ (2.5)
and the overall price to a visitor _om i, p_, is given by:
p/= c. + t. + s_+ r_ (2.6)
These "taxes' can be interpreted in several ways. Basically they represent divergences
between prices and marginal social costs. In the case of tourism, it could be that a
general tax is levied (e.g. a VAT) on services which tourists purchase. Specific tourism
taxes, such as accommodation taxes, could be levied. Alternatively, it may be the case that
there are externalities associated with tourism, and ch represents the marginal social cost
of tourism services and th is interpreted as a divergence between price and marginal social
cost. It could be negative - tourism may create negative externalities. It could be that
some of the resources used to provide tourism services are priced above or below their
shadow prices - for example, if there is unemployment, the wages of labour may exceed
its shadow price. Finally, there may be monopoly in parts of the tourism industry, and
prices may be above marginal cost. For most purposes, it does not matter which of these
explanations of divergence of price from marginal cost is operative. However, in one
case, it is necessary to be more explicit: this is the case of a shadow price of government
revenue differingfrom itsnominal value. In such a case,itmatterswhether the
government gains can amount, th, through taxation, or whether individuals gain it, e.g. in
the form of an externality.
With the 'tax' on aviation services, the same points can be made. However, the
interpretation is most likely to be in terms of firms setting prices above marginal costs.
Direct taxation of international aviation is not likely to be significant. Governments,
however, regulate aviation, and this regulation helps determine prices. For example,
capacity may be restricted, and airlines may raise prices. Sometimes governments own
the airlines serving international routes, and profits accrue to them. Again, if special
attention is to be given to the shadow price of government revenue, the model needs to be
adjusted to make this explicit.
Few countries have airlines which possess a monopoly of traffic on the international
routes. In some cases, countries at either end of a route, and perhaps others as well, can
compete for traffic. More common is the situation of where countries allocate a share of
traffic between each other. Either this takes place explicitly in bilateral air services
agreements, or implicitly (if a country's share becomes too smaU, things axe changed to
increase it). In this model, it is assumed that the home country has a share of traffic to
country i of" U. Thus, the profits on route i gained by the home country would be
#/m = (d+ (2.7)
In practice, pooling agreements often exist between airlines, and profits are not
proportional to traffic. The payoff to greater detail here is unlikely to be worth the cost.
Residents have a utilityfunctionsuchas
u = u(c_aj, a2, at ...an. x) (2.8)
where x refers to all other goods. They maximise utility subject to
p_.2 + p..x + _'_pai. d = y (2.9)
wherey is home income. This gives rise to demand functions
h = hO, p,, p'.,
l i I aa_ a,fph, p,. p o pa_, ...p _...p o...p ,. y).
The demand for tourism to the home country from country i is given by:
g =v, ...p',...p',, g) (2.12)
These functions are deh3_rately written with scope for considerable substitution. Thus
(10) a/lows for the 0ikdy) effect that changes in home tourism prices will affect demand
for overseas tourism. Destn_fions can be substitutes for one another, this possibility is
discussed in Section 3.
In this model, the government of the home country can be taken as maximising benefits
for its residents. It values consumers surplus of residents, and producers surplus from
production, along with net tax revenues. It does not value the consumers surplus of
foreign visitors - it only values profits and taxes generated by their spending. It cannot
price discriminate between the two, however. Problems similar to this one have been
analysed by Peston, Katz and Gravelle (1976) and Auquier and Caves (1979). The
problem of making the most from foreign tourism has been considered by Tisdell (1984).
3. The Working of the Model
The home country can be taken to be ma_'irni._ing an expression of the form of(3.1).
W= B(d(ph,p°,Px),)-a_ (,Ph,Po,P,,),...,a_(Ph, P°,P,, ),...,
a"(ph,p.,p=),X(ph,p°,p=)--d()c_-_..a' ()p'o -p:x
1
+ (Px'%)x +_v' (ph,p.)th + _ O_r,(a'(php.)+v'(php.) ) (3.1)
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where po and p, are vectors of trip costs to residents and foreign visitors, respectively,
over the n destinations/origins. The country is assumed to be maximis'mg the benefits to
residents making home and overseas trips and consuming other goods, x, less the cost of
home tourism and the cost of overseas tourism to residents and the cost to residents of
other goods px x. To this is added the producers surplus or tax on sale of other goods,
the surplus/tax from selling tourism services to foreign visitors, plus the country's share of
airline profits. This is maximised subject to a resource constraint which allows for the fact
that taxes on foreign tourists augment resources available.
The inclusionof "othergoods' in 3.1 is to highlight the possibility that there can be
interactions between travel and other goods. They may be substitutes or complements. If
these other goods are not priced at marginal cost, changes in travel prices can affect tax
receipts from sale of the goods. To make the model less cumbersome, it will be assumed
that these interactions are not important - either travel is not closely related to other
goods, or prices approximate marginal cost and a more partial framework will be used.
The term B( ) will be taken to be a money metric indicator of consumer's benefits,
dependent only on travel and tourism prices. The maximand can then be reduced to W 1 in
3.2.
B(d(.ps,po,),a1(ps,p ;),...,d(ps,p,,)....a_(p_p4))
- dO ch- 0 p', + (p pOt.
i i
i
(3.2)
This is similar to a consumers surplus plus producers surplus maximand. The government
chooses the tax/profit rates th and r _ so as to maximise 3.2 This results in first order
conditions.
J i
t t
_) = o
./,,,I j=l
j-i 0trl ( _, + _) + O_.(d () + v_O) = O (3.3a)
(3.3a)
It is assumed that the second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied - this is
'_ -_- respectively, and theplausible. The terms _-, _ _ can be replaced by a_ ,_ _,
terms "_-_',,A'vand _ can be replaced by _, _-,_,,and _ can be replaced by -_,_, _,-_-
and _-, respectively.
The equation (3.3a) can be interpreted as balancing the changes in consumers surplus on
ove,'seas and domestic travel by residents plus tax/surplus on domestic tourism resulting
from a rise in domestic tourism prices (lst four terms) with the change in tax/surplus on
foreign tourism plus the change in the share of profits in aviation. The equations (3.3b)
balance the consumers surplus changes with producers surplus changes brought about by
a change in the profit margin/tax in aviation on route i, r _. These terms are too general to
provide much insight into the workings of the model. Simplification is called for, and it is
probably best to start with the simplest model, and add additional complexities.
The Two Country Model
Suppose that there are only two countries, the home and foreign countries. Suppose also
that, for residents, domestic and overseas travel are unrelated
(.==o,, =o).
Suppose that consumers maximise such that _ =p,, _ = po.
Foreign tourists are indifferent between a change in trip cost caused by a rise in tourism
prices, Ph and an equal rise in air fares, i.e. _-- _.
The first order conditions now reduce to
-aO + _ t_+ (_ + _) + o(ao + vO) -'- o (3.4)
To simplify matters further, suppose the country obtains all the profits from aviation (0 =
1). On rearranging these conditions we get
_ _+
,_'-;th =-(r _-_ + th _, v)
(3.5)r =-(r_ +th _-
Given that -_ = _ it can be shown that
ar a t ,
t_/_p.(tO,9" = (eden) (a/d) (3.6)
where ¢o is the elasticity of demand for overseas trips by residents by ea is the elasticity
of demand for home tourism by residents. Equation (3.6) states that the relative weights
put on tourism and aviation taxes depends on the elasticities of demand for overseas and
home trips by residents, and the levels of overseas and home tourism (foreign visitors do
not affect the balance between these because they are equally affected by tourism or
aviation taxes, and all taxes accrue to the home government). To determine how the
taxes should be levied, it is a matter of balancing marginal distortions to home and
overseas tourisms by residents.
Equations 3.5 can also be expressed in the form
gad _ ffi- ,.t.v v
r+tj£aa A. ffi*'.V (-X-)- V (3.7)
where t, is the dasfidty of demand for tourism by foreign residents. These equations
indicate that the level of taxes depends on the elasticities of demand and the ratio of
foreign to domestic tourism (the higher the foreign relates to domestic tourism, the higher
the tax). These equations balance distortions to residents as against revenue from foreign
tourists.
Few countries are able to appropriate all the surplus earned in aviation - normally they
must share them with other countries. An alternative, extreme, assumption is that a
country enjoys no surplus from aviation (0 =0). If this were so, the home country would
seek as low an r as possible (to increase demand for tourism and take its profit on
tourism). For a given r, it would balance the revenues for tourism with the distortionary
costs to residents consuming local tourism services.
The most plausible case is where 0 < 0 < 1. As 0 varies, the balance between tourism
and aviation taxes will alter. Normally, as 0 falls (and the home country gains a reduced
share of airline profits), the reliance on tourism taxes will increase. Let Z stand for t,/_p,
(_o)-1. Then it can be shown that
= (v+a) e. _ d+ _ " (3.8)
9The second term is normally positive, but probably much less than unity. The first term is
negative, and (r+a)/d could be less or greater than unity, )/_ about unity and negative
and P'/, well above unity. Thus, _ is likely to be negative. As 0 fails, it is possible that
the optimal choice of r will become negative. Since the other country is enjoying most of
the airline "profits", it could be in the home country's interest to have aviation subsidised,
so that it can reap more through tourism taxes.
It is possible that one or other of the "tax' rates will be set exogenously. For example, a
country's aviation parmer may insist on having a tax or profit rate on aviation of a certain
level. If so, it can be shown that as r, the constrained aviation tax rate, falls, the tourism
tax will normally rise to compensate it. The rise will be larger the greater is 0. This result
may not hold when the possib'dity of home tourism prices affecting overseas travel by
residents, and overseas trip prices affecting home tourism prices affecting overseas travel
by residents, and overseas trip prices affecting home tourism, are allowed for. An
alternative constraint may be where it is difficult for the government to alter the "tax' on
home tourism. It may be difficult to levy a tax on the many services which constitute
'tourism'. If so, the government can only work through aviation taxes or profits.
Normally, the higher the price/marginal cost ratio in tourism, the lower the desired
tax/profit rate in aviation.
The Three Country Model
Additional possibilities are opened up when it is supposed that the home country has links
with two different overseas countries. To simplify matters, suppose that Ot ffi O_ ffi 1 - i.e.
the home country gains all airline profits. After rearranging, the first order conditions can
be written as
_dgh-"A'dg_ +_,a2 a:
p, p l Pi a
_ffi.,_y_ y._e . .y._
p_. _ _d 2d
_,t d ,,:d o_d 0.9)
The first equation is the equivalent of 0.6), only this time the distortions in two
international aviation markets are being considered. The second and third equations
correspond to 3.7. there are two price/marginal cost ratios, corresponding to the two
routes, to be determined. They depend on elasticities and shares of traffic. In general,
one would not expect that the elasticities ¢_ and s_ or s_ and _'_ would differ by much
- estimates of elasticities for international aviation are not very reliable either. However,
the ratio v/a, is the proportion of foreign to resident traffic on particular routes can vary
widely. Thus, differential pricing on air mutes is likely to be warranted not so much by
elasticity differences (the standard price discrimination case), but rather by differences in
traffic flow. Countries might well seek to have high prices and profits on routes for which
they have a higher share of the profits, but a low share of the passengers.
10
Generalising the Model
The extension from 2 to n countries will not produce results which are qualitatively very
different from those discussed. There can be quantitative differences, however, and these,
in practical terms, can be important. Suppose that th and re have been set for a large
number of countries, and that a particular route is being considered (perhaps it is to be
opened up). The solution to the optimisation problem will involve new values for all ri
and for ta. Unless the route is very large (and new routes are unlikely to be), changes will
be small. Thus, for purposes of analysis, th can be taken as given. The rate of tourism
tax/profit, tu, will only be changed in a many country world when aviation policy towards
all countries and tourism policy is being considered. For the new route, j, rJ is optimised
with th taken as given - the profit/tax on substimteYcomplement routes, i, r_, could well
vary substantially when riis changed however.
Another aspect worth considering in practice are the demand interactions between
different services. Domestic tourism prices affect overseas travel by residents, and
overseas trip prices affect domestic tourism. This can have a considerable bearing on the
actual relationship of tourism and aviation prices. It is probable that domestic tourism is
much larger than overseas tourism, (i.e. d > a) and that the cross elasticity of overseas
tourism with respect to domestic prices is quite high. If currently the price/marginal cost
ratio in domestic tourism is high, and the aviation tax is low (or the home country's share
is low), raising domestic tourism prices may be an ineffective way of gaining a greater
profit from foreign tourists - it simply induces the locals to go overseas.
Another interaction which can prove important is that between traffic, or residents and
foreign tourists, on international air routes. There are ot_en several ways of travelling
from country A to country B - directly, or via country C, country D and so on. Prices
charged on indirect routes affect the prices that can be charged on direct routes. Thus,
Sydney-Singapore (and then to London) is a substitute for Sydney-London. This means
that for a particular route, the choice of price and profit/tax level can be tightly
constrained by prices on other routes. Another consequence is that the indirect effects on
other routes of a choice of price or profit/tax for a particular route can be large relative to
the direct effects.
It is a straightforward matter to generalise this model to allow for the possibility that
government revenue is valued at above its nominal value (because, to raise revenue, it is
necessary to impose taxes) (see Findlay and Jones, 1982, and Browning, 1987). It would
involve multiplying government revenue changes by the appropriate shadow price. To
estimate the effects, it would be necessary to specify effectively what proportion of the
difference between prices and marginal social costs of home tourism services was due to
taxes/subsidies, and what due to profits and externalities. It would also be necessary to
specify what proportion of the difference between prices and marginal costs in aviation
accrue to the government in the form of taxes or shares of airline profits.
Allowance for this would not make the results very different qualitatively. It could affect
the balance of policies, however, especially if the shadow price of government revenue
were considerably higher than the nominal value. If, for example, the government's share
of aviation profits were small in relation to its share of tourism profits, the balance of
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taxes would shiR towards tourism. Demand interaction, especially between domestic and
overseas tourism for residents, would become more important.
Another possibility that can be allowed for is that the shadow price of foreign exchange
differs from its market price. This difference is unlikely to be large for most developed
countries, but it could be significant for many developing countries, and the foreign
exchange aspects of tourism could be important for them. It would be necessary to
identify the foreign exchange flows arising from the various expenditures - or domestic
tourism, and residents' trips overseas - and the flows which arise at the airline level.
If the shadow price of foreign exchange were significantly higher than the market price,
this could result in quantitatively different results. The country would have an incentive
to shift the balance of taxation towards airlines and away from domestic tourism - in order
to dissuade its residents from taking overseas trips and using up foreign exchange. It
would also wish to lower the overall level of taxation of tourism and aviation. This would
encourage more tourism by foreigners, which would have the advantage that it would
generate more foreign exchange.
4. Airline Poficy
In the preceding Sections, little has been said about the ownership and market structure of"
airlines- they are taken to provide services that tourists use, and the difference between
their marginal costs and prices is assumed to be taxes. It is necessary to be more explicit
about them, and investigate whether ownership or market structure may be a constraint
on aviation policy.
The simplest case is one where there is a government owned airline, and capacity or fares
are regulated. Given a level of costs, these determine the profits earned by the airline, all
of which accrue to the government. It is equivalent to the govcumnent setting a tax on
airline services. This situation used often be the case- governments oRen wholly owned
airlines, and they regulate capacities or fares on routes. Overall, government airlines were
not notably profitable, perhaps because they cross-subsidise loss making routes, from
profitable routes. The airlines may not be profit maximising firms; if the government gave
incentives for its firms to maximise profits, the result might be very similar to the case
outlined in the model above. Regulation was often for protection rather than profit.
If the sole airline were privately owned, it might be more oriented towards profit (though
it need not be, and as a regulated firm it may be required to offer unprofitable services).
The main difference is that the profits would accrue to the owners, not the government.
ff all that matters is which _ receives the profits, this case would equally well fit the
model. A possible complication is that the value of revenue to the government may
exceed its nominal value - if so, this would need to be allowed for in the model, and it
would be necessary to specify who owns the airline.
The approach as characterised in the model in Sections 2 and 3, whereby the government
levies a tax on international aviation services, was probably a reasonable approximation
for many airline routes. However, it should not be taken too literally. Governments
rarely actually impose significant taxes on international aviation services - it would be too
difficult to do so with other countries' airlines operating them and other countries'
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governments sharing the task of regulation Sometimes minor taxes, suchas airport or
departure taxes are levied, but in the main, if a country wishes to levy a "tax" on
international aviation, it does so through regulation which has the effect of raising prices
and profits.
Competition for the Market
A system such as that outlines may have little in the way of incentives for efficient
performance. These can be enhanced within the same fi'amework of capacity or price
controls by allowing competition for the market. A country would negotiate the rights to
offer a certain amount of capacity to another, or operate worth at a specified fare. The
government could then award the route to the airline which bid the most for it: this would
provide an incentive for minimum cost production, and profits would go the government.
The successful bidder might be drawn from one of the country's airlines, public or private.
If the government were minded to allow trade in airline services, airlines from any country
might be permitted to bit, subject to this being acceptable to the other country on the
route. If capacity, not price, is controlled, a minimum, not maximum,, price will be set. It
is possible that profit oriented airlines would set prices above the level that would ensure
full use of the permissible capacity. This price would be above the level regarded by the
government as optimal given the tourism implications. Apart from this, the main
proposition will hold - it is possible for the country to secure minimum cost production,
and maximisation of the rents from aviation, within the context of an aviation/tourism
pricing policy. It is also possible for it to import airline services if it chooses.
Competition
If competition in the market is allowed, the government loses control over price. As the
market becomes more competitive, airlines tend to set prices closet to marginal cost:
prices may approximate marginal cost. If the government wishes the country to obtain
rents fi'om the industry, it will need to impose a tax - and as mentioned above, this may be
difficult. In addition, as the market is opened up to more foreign competition, the share
of the home airlines will tend to fall, and so will the share of rents.
This will mean that the government will now need to determine the level of competition,
not the _ax rate' as a controlled variable. As competition from overseas increases, (i.e.
the route becomes more open), the share of traffic and rents going to the home country,
8, falls. The government is faced with a trade-off- as 0 falls the country loses rents, but
at the same time p, falls too, and residents obtain lower cost travel. This is a dilemma
ellen faced by governments. In addition, as 0 and p_ fall, benefits from tourism increase.
On many routes, additional competition from foreign airlines is an option. This can be
modelled by supposing that the government chooses 0, and through it p,, IX,, and not r
(which becomes a function of O).
This case gives rise to the poss_ility of a discontinuity, since r can be bounded f_om
below by zero if competition is present. If there are low cost airlines willing to enter the
market) the country can ensure that po and p, fall to below that level which would enable
the home airline(s) to cover its (their) costs. The country becomes a complete importer of
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airline services on the route, and has an interest in ensuring the lowest possible price. The
trado-offbetween airline rents and low prices for residents no longer exists.
This is shown in Figure 1. Curve A shows how airfine profits accruing to the country
vary as the price of airlines services, P, varies. At P, profits are zero. Curve B shows
benefits to residents travelling overseas and from home sales to foreign visitors - it is
monotonically declining as P rises. Total benefits are shown as Curve C. These reach a
maximum at P*. It is possible that P* ties to the lei_ of P: this would be the case if
benefits from tourism were very high, and the only way to have low airline prices involves
subsidies to the home airline. (This possibility was considered in Section 3.) If foreign
airlines are prepared to compete down prices, such subsidy is not necessary, and the total
benefits are shown by curve B up to price P, and then by Curve C beyond. There is a
minimum price, }3, below which airlines will not offer service. It is possible, as shown in
Figure 1, that benefits at this price exceed those at P*. If so, the country can do best by
not having an airline and by relying on foreign competition.
The diagram suggests that it is possible to have a quantum jump in aviation policy. It is
possible that }3 may be below P*, yet the country prefers restrictive regulation because it
gains profits at the expense of visitors. If P falls, it may be worthwhile giving up these
profits to get more tourists and the benefits fi-om them. It then switches to a competitive
policy and reliance on foreign airlines. Thus Spain realised that it could gain more by
having large numbers of tourists carried by cheap foreign charter airlines than it could
from profits for ks airline, and it allowed easy access to them. Several other countries
undoubtedly face this dilemma.
5. The Response Framework
Individual countries cannot simply determine, independently, what prices are to be
charged for aviation on routes to other countries. At the least, aviation prices can only be
set with the approval of other countries. The analysis so far only indicates the policies
countries would like to implement. Countries normally have greater discretion over their
tourism tax policies, but if others are perceptive, they may take account of tourism prices
in the home country when they determine aviation policies. Nevertheless, there are
normally a range of options that a country can choose from when considering its
aviation/tourism policy. Countries do have international aviation policies (though
sometimes, even the strongest like the US, cannot get their way). (For the Australian
Case, see Findlay, 1985.)
Countries' aviation policies exhibit different degrees of'rationality". Sometimes a country
will be apparently putting sole or dominant weight on to profits earned by its airline
(especially if these profits accrue to the government). In other cases, countries may treat
aviation and tourism separately, and maximise net benefits, to consumers and producers,
in aviation, but ignore the impacts on tourism. Finally, they may be completely rational,
and take account of prices at all levels, and evaluate how they affect net benefits. A
country's ability to obtain benefits from aviation and tourism depends on the policies
followed by its partner countries.
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A fully determinate model of aviation and tourism between two or more countries is
unattainable. At the heart of the problem lies a bargaining situation - two countries both
seek to increase their share of the benefits available (and the total depends on the policies
and shares in place). Thus, a good deal ofwhat happens might best be explained in terms
of bargaining models it should be noted that there is no uniquely appropriate model.
It is unrealistic to assume that each country is face with a unique solution on each route.
A typical country will find that it has room to move on many or most routes - the question
that arises is then one of whether it is maximising its benefits granted the flexibility that it
does have. A few possibilities can be considered here.
a) The Constraint Model
A country may find that it can choose the airline profit/tax rate r, or its tourism tax rate th,
or the overall price to foreign visitors, subject to a constraint. This constraint could be a
maximum or minimum. For example, a foreign country may impose a minimum r such
that its airline covers costs - it may be willing to a11ow higher levels of r and 0 .
Alternatively it may seek to protect it consumers through setting an upper limit on r. If it
is rational, it will look to the overall price of tourism, not just the airline price, and the
constraint it imposes will be on a combination of th, r and O. One possible level of the
constraint is that represented by the status quo. A foreign country may countenance
reductions in airline prices or overall trip costs, though not increases. Constraints can
easily be handled in the model of Section 3 - the home country maximises subject to the
constraints imposed by its partners. There need be no presumption that current policies
conform to the constrained optimum.
b) Discrete Options and Continuous Trade-Offs
The foreign country may be willing to agree to a range of policies under which it
considers itself equally well off. These policies would involve combinations of the control
variables. They might involve a discrete number of combinations, or a continuous trade-
off between the variables.
Consider a case of two countries determining an aviation policy. The foreign country may
be concerned to achieve a given level of profit for its airline. There are various ways in
which it achieves this - as the profit margin, r, falls, a rise in its share (1-0) will
compensate. The home country is fixed with a trade-off between r and 0- it can
maximise subject to this. Effectively, choice of r or 0 determines the other, and in the
model in Section 3, this can be handled by making one a function of the other.
(Analytically, this is identical to the increasing competition model discussed in Section 4).
The foreign country is being myopic by looking only at airline profits. If it were 'rational'
would look at overall benefits, and the trade-off faced by the home countD, would involve
th as well as Q and r. The choice of control variables by the home country to achieve a
maximum will result in a Pareto optimum, based on either myopic or 'rational' behaviour
of the foreign partner. This approach can be generalised for a number of foreign partners,
each of whom, i, insists on particular trade-offbetween th, _ and r_.
c) International Cooperation
A third possibility is that countries cooperate to maximise benefits _om tourism and
aviation. Prices would then be set equal to marginal costs in each industry, at least under
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some world social welfare run.ions. A simple approach might involve maximisation of
the sum of net benefits, perhaps weighted, of the two countries. In the case of
cooperation between two countries, the solution may need to be a second-best one.
because the policies ok and towards, other countries affect the solution. For example,
both countries may tax tourism to gain rents from visitors _om other countries. Granted
this, the best solution for tourism and aviation between them may be to subsidise aviation
(to compensate for the tourism tax which will remain in place).
Such cooperation is not often observed, for a very good reason. It is very likely that the
solution does not correspond to the individual maximum for each country. The two
countries are cooperating and a Coumot solution will not come about. However each has
a monopoly over one of the outputs into trips-tourism services within its borders. R is
quite likely that one will be a net exporter and the other a net importer. The former will
seek high prices (r, t=) and the other low prices; they would not both want zero taxes.
The analogy is one of a cooperative duopoly for which different prices maximise profits
for the different firms.
To achieve the optimum, side payments must be introduced. These rarely take place
explicitly, and publicly. H_owever, implicit payments frequently take place. Countries are
unable to agree on aviation policies - they resolve the difficulties by making tradc-offs in
other trade disputes. Thus one country liberalises its approach to aviation when the other
allows freer access for the first's agricultural products. Such trade in aviation and non-
aviation rights is often regarded with suspicion. However, it may well be, in cases where
there is an imbalance between flows of tourism, the only way to achieve an efficient
solution is through cooperation.
Overall, a country will be choosing its aviation/tourism policies subject to those of other
countries. These will differ, par0y because countries differ in the weight they put on
different aspects of beaefits - airline profits, benefits to home travell=,s, and benefits from
tourism. They differ also because the circumstances of countries differ - the degree of
market power they possess in supplying counUy-specific tourism services, and in the
flows of tourism from and to the various parmers. A rational country will have different
policies for different mutes, depending on the circunmtances. Thus Britain has a low
price policy for UK/Spain routes, on which many British tourists travel, and a higher price
policy for UK/Sweden routes, on which relatively few British tourists travel.
6. An Appfication to Australia
Australia is a country which fits the characteristics of the modal - for example, most
international travel to and from Australia takes place by air. It is experiencing a tourism
boom, several issues related to tourism and aviation are being raised and international
aviation policies are being questioned.
Before any policy conclusions can be drawn, it is necessary to quantify the model. This
cannot be done here, but for a country such as Australia, it is possible to obtain sufficient
information to come to some conclusions as to the relative magnitudes of the key
variables, and some policy directions.
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The central problem is to work out the benefits and costs of tourism. While much is said
about the importance of tourism in Australia, there is little concrete about its benefits or
costs (for a theoretical discussion, see Dwyer and Forsyth, 1993a). The problem is to
determine what the costs and benefitsof an additional tourist (for a period such as a
week) are, or what the value to Australia of an additional $1 spend by a tourist is. To do
this, it is necessary to estimate what the impact on tax receipts, government expenditures,
private profits and foreign exchange are. This can be done using computable general
equilibrium models (see Adams and Parmenter, 1992) The next stage is that of converting
effects into measures of benefits. In Dwyer and Forsyth (1993b) a rough attempt is made
to measure the benefits of additional tourism in the context of an evaluation of tourism
promotion. The main difficulty in this area lies in measuring and valuing externalities
which may come about through tourism. This difficulty is not unique to tourism.
R is a relatively straightforward matter to obtain estimates of prices and profits on air
routes. While route by route data cost are not available, it is possible to develop
estimates which are probably sufficiently accurate for the purposes here. (See Findiay,
1985, Ch. 6.) Estimates exist of tourism and air fare elasticities for various major
destinations and sources of tourists. (Bureau of Transport and Communication
Economics, 1988.) Cross-elasticities are harder to come by. The problem with elasticity
estimates is that they are, of their nature, not highly reliable. Data on tourism flows are
readily available. While simple characteristics of the aviation/tourism policies of other
countries are not easy to develop, in analysing the options for Australia it is possible to
outline the policies for the major trading partners (eg, NZ, the US and Japan). It is then
possible to specify the options open to Australia. Models of the aviation sector have been
developed; see Centre for International Economics, 1988 and Productivity Commission,
1998 for Australia and Gillen et al, 1997, for a Canadian model.
The information is available to make the model operational for Australia; indeed the
aviation side has been modelled. Estimates for the first part - what Australia gains from
tourism - would be interesting on their own. They could be used to examine how aviation
policies towards particular countries should be framed. General policies towards tourism
and aviation could be evaluated in the light of the model. There are many questions that
might be examined, but some of particular interest are as follows:
a) How liberal should Australian aviation policy be? Should it accept a lessened role
for the national carrier, in return for lower fares and more tourists.'? This would
involve a lessened opportunity to profit from aviation, but an increased
opportunity to gain from tourism, and it would mean greater benefits for residents
who travel overseas. For nearly two decades Australia has faced this question, as
competition from Asian carriers grew, as charter airlines sought to enter the
market, and as the US sought to increase competition on the Pacific route.
b) What would be the implications of liberal aviation agreements with particular
countries? Suppose Australia and Japan were to form a unified market for air
transport. Would a deregulated market be the best solution, granted any
distortions and externalities present in their tourism sectors? How might the
implications for other routes be assessed?
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c)
d)
c)
0
g)
Should Australia have a unified aviation policy, whether restrictive or liberal, to be
applied to all countries, or should it tailor its approach to particular countries?
Thus it can have a restrictive approach to Japan, but a liberal approach to the UK,
as it does, more or less, at present. It is possible to use the model to examine this
question by looking at the flows of visitors to and from Australia, the benefits
from tourism, and thus the approach to airline pricing which most advances
Austrafia's interest - this determines how liberal it should be. In principle,
discrimination is desirable if it is possible, but it may turn out that the benefits do
not justify the effort.
Does _ gain from current aviation pricing arrangements? On major routes,
prices are set by the airlines on trips from Australia, but often by other
governments on trips to Australia. Trip prices can differ substantially. When fares
to Australia are high, tourism to Australia is discouraged, though Australian
residents enjoy lower fares. Would it be in Australia's interest to pursue more
equal fares?
To what extend should Australia encourage international tourism? Currently it
has an explicit policy of promoting tourism, and currently it spends a lot to this
end. State governments also spend on tourism promotion. Tourism can also be
encouraged by differential tax treatment. Tourism may generate positive
externalities, profits and taxes. In addition, aviation policies with particular
countries (eg with Japan) may be regarded as too restrictive to generate maximum
benefit to Australia. If so, tourism might well be worth promoting and
subsidising. Currently, Australia does not know if its interests are best served by
taxing or subsidising tourism, or neither of these.
Changes in tax stru_ affect tourism and aviation. A move from direct
towards indirect taxes, eg towards a VAT, would result in tourists paying higher
prices. The benefit for Australia of an additional $1 spent by foreign tourists
would increase. Aviation prices and profits might be reduced if overall benefits to
Australia are to be maximised. Alternatively, would it be in Australia's interest to
grant exemptions from a VAT for foreign tourists?
State governments have seen the tourism boom, and have sought to gain from this
boom. NSW recently imposed an accommodation tax in Sydney, the main visitor
destination. Would the country as a whole gain from higher tourism taxation?
7. Concluding Remarks: Market Power and World Welfare
This paper concentrates on the links between tourism and international aviation. The two
are viewed as jointly consumed services. The question is raised of how an individual
country might be about making the most of its participation in tom and aviation. A
country will possess a degree of market power over the attractions it encompasses, and it
can use this power to extract profits or taxes at either or both the levels of tourism and
aviation_ It is constrained, and whatever level it chooses to tax at, there will be
undesirable consequences, such as losses of benefits incurred by home tourists or
residents travelling abroad. The model shows how it might choose taxes (or policies)
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which make the most of its possibilities, and which take account of the linkages and
distortions present.
Actual results, such as prices of international aviation, do not depend solely on one
country; they are the result of the interaction of many. As a first stage, it is necessary to
show how an individual country might make its choices. It is possible to allow for some
patterns of response by other countries, and while a country does not have complete
fi'eedom over what it does, it will often have some latitude. The question of what are the
best tourism and aviation policies often to a country are important practical ones which
have not often been rigorously analysed together..
A model such as this suggests what should be looked for when policies are being
formulated. As a first step, it is essential to put some measure on the benefits and costs of
tourism. It is not di_cult to derive approximate orders of magnitude, but this is rarely
done. It is more difiScult to come across reliable estimates of other relevant parameters,
such as own and cross price elasticities of tourism demand. Once this is one, it is possible
to put the pieces together, to come to some quantitative conclusions as to what policies
might make the most out of tourism and aviation.
Until now most the policy activity has been at the aviation level. Aviation policy is often
analysed quite separately from tourism. Under special circumstances, this will be
sufficient, but it is much more likely that the tourism consequences of aviation policy will
be important, and it is quite conceivable that any gains or losses through tourism of an
aviation policy change will outweigh the direct gains and losses at the aviation level.
Even if there is to be no explicit policy towards tourism, if an efficient policy is to be
formulated, it is necessary that views about the costs and benefits of tourism, and the
various links between the two industries, be made explicit and incorporated.
The models discussed indicate the interest of individual countries in exercising their
market power. They are constrained to an extent by their partners in the case of aviation,
but are rather less constrained with tourism taxation. Countries are able to extract rents
from aviation if their partners acquiesce. This is possible because not all countries have
the same maximand, and some wish to protect their airlines. Overall world welfare would
be maximised by a move to a more liberal environment, with prices at cost and a reliance
on trade to ensure that services are provided at minimum cost. In many trading situations,
a move towards liberalisation involves countries removing protection which creates costs
that primarily fall on themselves. In the case of aviation and tourism, countries possess
market power, and have got used to using it. Some countries will resist a move towards
liberalisation because they gain from a more restricted environment. Their airlines profit
fi-om higher fares charged to non residents. Thus purely aviation negotiations will be
insufficient to achieve a liberal environment, to achieve liberalisation, non aviation trade
offs will need to be included.
With aviation, there can be pressures from a country's partners to liberalise; with tourism
there is rather less pressure, because no one country suffers much from another's tourism
policies. For the most part, countries are price takers of tourism goods and services. Any
taxes are spread amongst tourists from many countries and it is not worth any one
country retaliating. Countries are able to gain from essentially levying optimal tariffs on
tourism. AS aviation liberalisation proceeds, and tourism grows, countries are showing
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more imerestinincreasingtheircn_ a_thetourismlevel,forexample,by levyingspecific
tourism taxes.Whilecurrentlylessofa distortionth_ airlinesregulation,thesedistortions
appear to be growing. Ithas been dif_cultenough to lessen distortionsat the aviation
level;itwillbe even more dif_cultto remove distortionsatthe tourism level,and enable
freetradeintourism as well as aviatiov_
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1 INTRODUCTION
While trade in most goods and services between the United States and Canada is generally
open, such was not the case for transborder airline services for most oftbe post-war period.
Indeed, for almost three decades the accord governing Canada-U.S. airline services was
among the most restrictive of all such pacts entered into by the United States. At the 1985
Shamrock Summit, Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan recognized the
inappropriateness of that state of affairs and that promotion of transborder air travel should be
encouraged. Yet it took the two nations a decade to remedy the problem; only in February
1995 did they sign a new all"services agreement (ASA) that significantly liberalized trade in
airline services between them.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the February 1995 ASA on the market for
transborder airline services. This issue is of particular importance because past regulatory
policies have affected the ability of individual carriers to benefit from the new ASK As a
result, the likelihood that competition in certain markets could be hindered is a real concern.
To assess these effects, the paper begins by reviewing the domestic, international, and
transborder aviation policies of the two countries. After discussing the provisions of the new
ASA, it then examines its impact on competition and concentration in transborder air services
market.
2 AVIATION POLICES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
The ability of Canadian and U.S. carriers to respond to the new opportunities created by the
February 1995 air services agreement h_. been shaped by their countries' prior aviation
policies. Consider first the domestic aviation policies of the two countries. The modem era of
U.S. domestic aviation began in 1938 with the creation ofthe Civil Aeronautics Board. For the
next forty years the CAB maintained tight controls over entry, exit, and pricing in domestic
markets. Most of the industry's output was supplied by twenty or so carriers. On most major
domestic routes two or three carriers typically provided service. In 1978, the regulatory regime
underwent substantial modification with the passage oftbe Airline Deregulation Act, and the
CAB itself ceased to exist after 1984. As a result of domestic deregulation, carriers are now
free to enter and exit markets and to price their services as they see fit. The experience has
generally been a positive one: new carriers have entered the industry, inflation-adjusted prices
have fallen, and flight frequencies and passenger traffic have risen. Although industry
concentration (measured by the four-firm concentration ratio) has risen above its pre-
deregulation level, concentration on individual routes has fallen. The number of major players
in the U.S. airline industry remains large by Canadian standards" American, United, Delta,
Northwest, US Air, Continental, TWA, and Southwest have extensive systems and compete
with one another on a nation-wide basis. With the exception of Southwest, all of these carriers
have developed large, complex hub-and-spoke operations which serve both domestic and
international markets. A seemingly constant flow of new entrants, most of which have focused
on providing low-cost service, have pressured the larger players to keep their costs and prices
under control.
Canadian domestic aviation policy has undergone a similar transformation. Federal regulation
of domestic air services commenced in Canada with the passage of the Transport Act of 1938.
2Governmental policy focused on creating a national network of routes. To cross-subsidize
unprofitable services, regulators established route monopolies in profitable markets. Under
this and successive legislation, Air Canada enjoyed a protected and favored position in many
key markets. However, in 1984 the government of Canada began to relax its regulation of
domestic airline service. The ensuing regulatory reforms divided the country into two zones,
northern and southern. Existing regulations in the northern, less populated zone remained
intact, as the area's thin population was believed to be unable to support competition. Most
regulatory controls on airline service were removed in the south, including restrictions on
capacity, frequency of service, and equipment type. Carriers were also granted power to
reduce prices as they saw fit, while their ability to raise prices automatically was limited by an
inflation index. Unlike the U.S. experience, however, the overall domestic market and
individual city-pair markets remained highly concentrated after deregulation. The industry's
concentration increased in the late 1980s, with the establishment of Canadian Airlines
International Limited (CALL), a new carrier created from the consolidation and merger of the
operations of CP Air, Wardair, and four regional airlines-EPA, Quebecair, Nordair, and
PWA. Most remaining regional carriers act as feeders either to CAIL or Air Canada. Air
Canada and CAIL are essentially a duopoly, controlling directly or through their affiliates
almost all domestic traffic.
These differences in the structure of the two countries' domestic airline industries have created
substantive differences in their international aviation policies. U.S. policy has generally
favored open competition in international airline markets, in part because U.S. policymakers
believe that U.S. flag carriers would dominate the world market and in part because they must
accommodate the desires of numerous carders to provide international services. Conversely,
Canada's international aviation policies initially were strongly influenced by Air Canada's
status as a Crown Corporation. Air Canada enjoyed a monopoly on all Canadian flag
international routes fi'om 1937 to 1948, when CP Air was designated as the nation's flag
carrier in the Pacific. Beginning in 1965, Canada adopted a "division of the world policy,"
granting each carrier exclusive regional spheres of influence. This approach was modified in
1987 when the Minister of TranspoRation reallocated international operating authority
between CP Air and Air Canada. Rather than grant exclusive rights to serve regions, the two
carriers were given exclusive rights to serve individual countries within these regions.
Wardair's entry into the transatlantic market and its subsequent purchase by CAIL eroded the
boundary lines established in the 1987 order. As a result, both CAIL and Air Canada may
provide service to London, Frankfurt, and Pads. While Canada has negotiated the right to
designate multiple carriers in 39 of the 61 ASAs it has signed, it has exercised this right only
in a few cases (Oum and Taylor, 1995).
These domestic and international policies in turn affected the transborder market. The basic
ASA governing transborder air services was signed in 1966, although it has subsequently been
amended several times. As amended, the 1966 ASA delineated 83 separate point-to-point
routes between the two countries. Only 19 of these routes-so-called "double track routes"-
were open to competition between carriers of the two nations. Thirty-eight of the routes were
reserved for U.S. carriers and the remaining 26 were limited to Canadian airlines (Lewis,
1995). On most of these routes, each nation could designate more than one airline only with
the permission of the other government. While capacity was left to the determination of the
designated carriers, either government was allowed to reject proposed fares on transborder
routes.
The United States allocated its transborder rights resulting from the 1966 pact among a
handful of firms. These route allocations reflected the then existing state of the U.S. airline
industry. Delta, for example, obtained transborder fights between Toronto and Pittsburgh but
not between Toronto and Atlanta. Air Canada possessed a Canadian-flag monopoly on all
transborder mutes until 1967, when CP Air received its first U.S.-Canada route, between San
Francisco and Vancouver. However, most of the routes authorized by the 1966 ASA as
amended were allocated to Air Canada. Thus CP Air, and its corporate successor, Canadian
Airlines, had little oppommity to expand its transborder service under the 1966 ASK
As part of the Shamrock Summit Declaration in March 1985, both countries promised to
examine the possibility of creating free trade in transborder aviation services. Neither side
liked the 1966 ASA, for its anti-competitive philosophy ran contrary to the aviation policies of
both countries. Both sides agreed that it was suppressing transborder travel and economic
activities between the two nations. For example, between 1980 and 1993, transborder air
travel grew only 1.8 percent annually, well below growth rates experienced in country-pairs
involving their other leading trading partners. Community groups on each side of the border-
particularly representatives of local airports, the United States Airports for Better International
Air Service (USA-BIAS) coalition and Association of Canadian Airport Communities
(ACAC)-complained bitterly that the existing ASA was hindering economic development of
their areas (Ir,aduck, 1996).
While both stood to gain opportunities to enter new transborder markets, the interests of
Canada's two primary flag carriers in the creation of a new, liberal ASA were asymmetric. Air
Canada had a strong position in the transborder market under the old ASA, while Canadian
Airlines had a very weak one. Should a liberal ASA be signed, Canadian Airlines had little
existing market share to lose; the reverse was true for Air Canada. The flip side of this
asymmetrical position was that when the new ASA was signed in February 1995, Canadian
Airlines was in a far weaker position to exploit the agreement than Air Canada. It was but a
minor player in the transborder market, serving a handful of U.S. west coast cities (San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu). Air Canada had a far greater physical presence (i.e.,
gates, cbeck-in terminals, etc.) and brand name recognition in most U.S. cities than Canadian
Airlines.
3 THE 1995 TRANSBORDER AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT
As a result of these pressures, the United States and Canada agreed to a new, much liberalized
ASA in February 1995. The new ASA allows each country to designate as many carriers as it
wishes to provide transborder services. Neither country may unilaterally limit the capacity
offered by any ofthese carriers. Carders are free to charge any prices they wish; such prices
remain in effect unless both governments disapprove of them. The grounds for disapproval are
limited to preventing unreasonable discrimination or exploitation of a dominant position (fares
too high) and protecting carders from competing against low fares resulting from government
subsidies or from low fares designed to eliminate competition. Canadian carriers were given
4access to scarce slots at LaGuardia and OTIare and allowed to purchase slots at Washington
National airport (Lewis, 1996). The pact offers the Canadian carriers a head start, as they are
immediately free to fly between any U.S. and any Canadian city of their choice. While similar
rights were ultimately granted to U.S. airlines, in the short run their ability to serve Vancouver
and Montreal was constrained for two years and for three years at Toronto. During the each
year of these phase-in periods, the U.S. government was allowed to designate a limited
number of carriers to provide new transhorder service to Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver
(MTV). In general, the U.S. government allocated these rights to carriers to fly between their
U.S. hubs and the MTV airports. As the transition period has expired, U.S. carriers are now
able to offer whatever services they wish to any Canadian city they choose.
4 THE IMPACT OF THE NEW ASA ON COMPETITION
The impact of the new ASA between the United States and Canada on competition and
concentration in the transborder market will be assessed using three definitions of the relevant
market:
* the entire transborder market
* transborder service at individual airports
* service in individual transborder city-pair markets
We first will analyze whether competition and concentration in air services between the
United States and Canada has increased or decreased considering the transborder market in its
entirety. Table 1 depicts the number ofweeidy, non-stop transborder flights using jet aircraft
offered by individual carriers _/t three points in time: January 1995, i.e., just prior to the
February 1995 Signing of the new transborder air services agreement; January 1996,
approximately ten months after the agreement was implemented; and January 1997, twenty-
two months later. Note that during this time period Canadian carriers were free to enter all
transborder markets, while the phase-in restrictions were in effect on U.S.-flag service to the
MTV airports. Note also that Table 1 utilizes flight share-the percentage of flights offered by
an individual carrier relative to the total number of flights offered in the market-to measure
the extent of competition and concentration. This is not a perfect measure of market power,
because it is an input measure rather than an output measure. However, previous studies have
shown that there is a high correlation between flight share and market share. Because timely
flight share data are readily available from such sources as the OfficialAirline Guide while
passenger share data are not, flight share data will be used.
As Table 1 indicates, Air Canada has been the dominant carrier in the transborder market, and
its dominance increased during the time period shown in Table 1. In January 1995, it offered
33.7 percent of all flights between Canada and the United States. As a result of the new ASA
and the restricted entry status of the MTV airports, Air Canada increased its dominance. Air
Canada accounted for 53 percent of the increase in transborder flights attributable to the new
ASA, raising its flight share in the market to 40.0 percent. Delta, the second-most important
carrier in the transborder market under the old ASA, retained that status. Despite a 12 percent
increase in its flight offerings from January 1995 to January 1997, Delta's share oftransborder
flights fell from 18.8 percent to 14.3 percent.
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The information presented in Table 1 can be used to calculate changes in concentration.
Concentration can be measured in several ways. The simplest measure is the four-firm
concentration ratio: the percentage of market output atuibutable to the four largest firms in
that market. By this measure, concentration in the transborder market declined over the time
period depicted in Table l, falling from 80.6 percent in January 1995 to 75.1 percent in
January 1997. However; aggregating the market shares of the four largest carriers masks the
rapid increase in Air Canada's market share with the declines of those of Delta, American, and
US Air. A second, more complicated measure of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares ofindividuai carrier market shares. The ttHI of a
perfect monopoly would be 10,000; a perfectly competitive industry would have an ttHI
approaching 0. The primary advantage of the HHI is that it is more sensitive to the size
distribution of firms than the four-firm concentration ratio is. The U.S. Department of Justice's
merger guidelines suggest that an _ over 1000 may raise antitrust concerns. As Table 1
indicates, the HHI of the transborder market rose from 2017 to 2161 from January 1995 to
January 1997, suggesting that the market was highly concentrated to begin with and that has
become more concentrated as a result of the new ASK Whether this is a temporary condition
attributable to the MTV phase-in provisions or a permanent one resulting from the head start
given Canadian flag carriers is a question worthy of scrutiny over the next several years.
We next consider the second market definition, transborder service at individual airports. Post-
deregulation, most U.S. carriers have focused on developing hubbing complexes, and most
new routes added by individual carriers represent additional spokes at those hubs. Existing
studies suggest that carriers have exploited the monopoly power that they have developed at
these hubbing complexes by raising prices, particularly in city-pairs involving the hubs of two
carriers. Accordingly, it seems r_asonable to see how the 1995 ASA has affected competition
and concentration oftransborder services at individual airports.
Table 2 reports the number ofweeldy nonstop transborder flights offered by individual
carriers using jet aircra/_ at Toronto; all of these flights served Pearson Airport. As the table
reports, in January 1995, carriers offered 620 weekly nonstop transborder flights. Air Canada
was the largest carrier in the market, offering 251, or 40 percent ofthe flights. The next largest
carrier was American, with 122, or 20 percent of the flights. Both Canadian Airlines and Air
Canada took advantage of the temporary constraints imposed on new services to Toronto by
U.S. carriers. By January 1997, Air Canada had more than doubled its service to Toronto,
while Canadian Airlines added over 60 new flights. Air Canada's share of the flights offered at
Pearson rose to 52 percent, while that of the second most important carrier, American, fell to
12 percent. The four-firm concentration ratio for transborder service at Toronto fell from 86.9
percent in January 1995 to 81.0 percent in hnuary 1997; however, its _ rose from 2461 to
3124 during this period.
Table 3 presents similar data for Montreal. As was the case with Toronto, all of the
transborder services reported in this table are to a single airport (Dorval). As a result of the
new ASA, Montreal has experienced a 27 percent increase in transborder service, from 326
weekly flights in January 1995 to 414 flights in January 1997. Air Canada offered the most
service to Montreal under the old ASK Although it added 24 weekly flights, its flight share in
this market fell slightly, from 38 percent in January 1995 to 36 percent in January 1997. Delta
6Airlines, the second largest carrier in the market under the old ASA, retained this position. It
expanded its services to Montreal more than any other carrier except Air Canada, although its
flight share has also declined modestly (from 28 percent to 27 percent). Accordingly, while
Montreal has had a significant increase in new service subsequent to the implementation of the
new ASh,, concentration of service at that city has declined. The four-firm concentration ratio
for transborder flights serving Montreal fell from 89.6 percent in January 1995 to 85.7 percent
in January 1997, while the I-IHI fell from 2633 to 2385 during this span oftime.
The third of the MTV cities, Vancouver, presents a picture similar to Montreal, as is shown in
Table 4. New services to Vancouver increased 70 percent from January 1995 to January 1997.
Canadian Airlines maintained its status as the largest provider of service at the city, although
its service rose only modestly, from 61 weekly flights in January 1995 to 72 weekly flights in
January 1997. Its share of flights fell from 37 percent in January 1995 to 26 percent in January
1997. United retained its position as the second largest provider oftransborder services to
Vancouver, although its share oftransborder flights also fell during this period. Vancouver,
however, is unique in two regards. First, it is the only airport where the presence of both
Canadian flag carriers is somewhat in balance. This is due Air Canada's taking advantage of
the new ASA to add services freely, while Canadian Airlines failed to aggressively exploit its
first-mover advantages at Vancouver, no doubt due to its extremely weak financial state in the
1990s. Second, the cumulative addition of new services by small U.S. carriers is quite
noticeable, accounting for 55 flights in January 1997, which is almost half of the total increase
in new services from January 1995 to January 1997. Accordingly, at this airport concentration
has declined as is indicated by a decrease in the four-firm concentration ratio (from 91.6
percent to 65.5 percent) and in the ttHI (from 2471 to 1552) during the two year period
depicted in the table. Services at other Canadian cities, including Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg,
Ottawa, Halifax, and Saskatoon have increased more modestly than at Vancouver, although in
the interest of space we will not provide comparable tables for these cities.
We next consider the third market definition, transborder service in individual city-pair
markets. Table 5 reports the number of carriers serving the twenty most important transborder
markets, as well as their HHI for the three study dates. In only a few of these markets has there
been new entry; in those markets where entry has occurred, the HHI remained quite high. This
lack of entry is attributable to two institutional factors. First, 19 of these 20 city-pairs involve
the MTV cities, the ability of U.S. carriers to enter MTV transborder markets was restricted
during the time period under study. Second, most of the limited rights granted to U.S. carriers
to enter MTV markets were allocated to brand new services from their hubs, not to these Top
Twenty markets.
$ CONCLUSIONS
Despite the dramatic changes wrought by the 1995 ASA, levels of concentration remain quite
high in the transborder market, regardless of the market definition or the measure of
concentration used. There has been some diminution of concentration in several markets, most
noticeably those involving Vancouver. Despite the high levels of concentration observed in
Tables 1 through 5, one must remember the starting point. Competition under the transborder
agreement in existence prior to February 1995 was extremely limited. The number of city-
pairs provided service reflected the patterns of commerce between Canada and the United
States circa 1966, and only a handful ofthese city-pairs received any competitive service. At
the key transborder airport of Tomnto, Air Canada aggressively took advantage of the phase-
in period to strengthen its position there. However, Air Canada's domination of Toronto is no
higher than that of many U.S. carriers at their domestic hubs. In short, despite the high levels
of observed concentration two years aider the signing of the new transborder air services
agreement, transborder travelers are still better offwith this agreement than without it, given
the paucity oftransborder services in many important North American city-pairs prior to
February 1995.
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Table1
Total Weekly Transborder Flights, by Carder
Total flights
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97
Share of Transborder Flights
(in percentage points)
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97
Air Canada 464 772 811 33.7 40.2 40.0
Canadian Airlines 66 177 145 4.8 9.2 7.1
American 205 241 236 14.9 12.5 11.6
United 91 119 98 6.6 6.2 4.8
Delta 258 203 290 18.8 10.6 14.3
Northwest 110 145 187 8.0 7.5 9.2
US Air 181 169 145 13.2 8.8 7.1
Continental 14 28 0.0 0.7 1.4
Alaska 54 48 0.0 2.8 2.4
All other 27 40 0.0 1.4 2.0
Total 1375 1921 2028 100.0 100.0 100.0.
Canadian flag 530 949 956 38.5 49.4 47.1
US flag 845 972 1072 61.5 50.6 52.9
Four firm
conc ratio
80.6% 72.5% 75.1%
2017 2152 2161
Table2
Total Weekly Transborder Flights
to Toronto
Air Canada
Canadian Airlines
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97
251 434 531
5 86 69
American Airlines 122 123 124
United Airlines 42 35 42
Delta Airlines 83 21 96
Northwest Airlines 34 0 41
US Air 83 81 70
Continental Airlines 0 0 14
Alaska Airlines
All other 0 13 26
Total 620 793 1013
Four firm
concentration ratio
86.9% 91.2% 81.0%
I-]_Index 2461. 3487 3124
Air Canada
Canadian Airlines
American Airlines
United Airlines
Delta Airlines
Northwest Airlines
US Air
Continental Airlines
Alaska Airlines
All other
Total
Four firm
concentration ratio.
Table 3
Total Weekly Transborder Flights
to Montreal
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97
125 167 149
34 41 42
91 112 110
34 34 48
42 47 48
14 14
3
326 415 414
89.6% 88.4% 85.7%
HHI 2633 2652 2385
Table4
Total WeeklyTransborderFlights
to Vancouver
Air Canada
CanadianAirlines
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97
49 35
61 78 72
American Airlines
United Airlines
Delta Airlines
Northwest Airlines
US Air
Continental Airlines
Alaska Airlines
All other
21 14 28
35 63 42
35 49 35
14 14 14
14 14
14 41
Total 166 295 281
Four firm
con_ntration ratio
91.6% 81.0% 65.5%
HHI 2471 1797 1552
Table5
Characteristics of Twenty Largest Transborder Market
Number of Competitors I-Ih'schman-Herfindahl Index
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97
Toronto New York
Toronto Chicago
Montreal New York
Toronto Los Angeles
Toronto l_fiami
Vancouv Los Angeles
Toronto Boston
Toronto Tamps/St. Pet
Toronto San Francisco
Montreal _/fiami
Vancouv San Francisco
Calgary Los Angeles
Montreal Chicago
Montreal Los Angeles
Toronto Philadelphia
Montreal Boston
Toronto Dallas/FW
Toronto Atlanta
Toronto Honolulu
Toronto Detroit
2 3 3 5008 4482 4329
3 3 4 3363 3378 2662
2 4 4 5284 3879 3928
1 1 1 10000 10000 10000
2 3 2 6867 5083 5346
2 3 5 5102 3795 2395
2 2 2 5184 5184 6574
2 3 2 5000 3600 6800
2 2 2 6250 6250 6250
2 0 2 5022 n.a 5000
2 4 3 6159 2649 3333
2 2 2 5555 5000 5000
2 2 2 5400 5095 5439
1 1 1 10000 10000 10000
1 2 2 10000 5007 5016
2 2 2 5002 5555 5312
1 1 1 10000 10000 10000
0 I 2 n.a 10000 5398
1 2 2 10000 6701 7812
1 1 1 10000 10000 10000
/ c! _:/r_j
An Analysis of Profitability of the World's Major Airlines / /
Tae Eoon Oum and Chunyan Yu
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ABSTRACT: Airline profitability depends on airlines' cost competitiveness
and their ability to price above costs. And the ability to set prices above cost
depends on market power and the firm's ability to make use of innovative
pricing techniques and market information. In the past, some carriers have
been profitable without being cost competitive because they were able to
charge exorbitant prices to consumers. Increased competition in the
international air transport markets have put pressures on carriers' ability to
raise prices. At the same time, input prices have been increasing
continuously. To counter-act such trends, airlines have made tremendous
efforts to improve e_ciency and productivity in order to cut cost. Using a
yearly panel of 22 major airlines over the 1986-95 period, this paper
exan_ines airlines' profitability changes by examining changes in
productivity and their ability to price above cost. The study found that
European and Asian carriers consistently improved productivity throughout
the period even during the time of rising profitability, achieving higher
productivity growth than North American carriers. However, European and
Asian carriers exgerienced much faster decline in price recovery ability than
North American carriers, because their input prices have increased rapidly
and airfares have declined under the pressures of. increased competition.
Overall, airline profitability have improved during the 1990s.
INTRODUCTION
International skies have been substantially liberalized since the
early 1980s. Like many other industries, the international airline industry
is becoming increasingly exposed to the pressures of the market-place as
deregulation and liberalization processes advance. Increased competition
generally has two conflicting effects on the firms: it creates downward
pressures on output prices, and it creates incentives for improving
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/productivity and efficiency (Spence, 1986). In the international air transport
marke;, the increased competition (together with increasing input pri_s)
has in many cases led to decline in firm profits, as carrier,s' monopoly
positions are challenged. Profitability is an important factor contributing
to airlines' survival. Many airlines have been forced to undertake major
restructuring in order to reverse the declining profit by improving
productivity and efficiency.
A number of studies, such as Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985),
Morrison and Winston (1986, 1995), Bruiting and Hu (1988), and Antoniou
(1992), have addressed the issue of airline profitability,. These studies
either posit possible relationships between profitability and a number of
potential pertinent variables, or test such relationships through regreszlon
analysis. In this study, we take a somewhat different approach to examine
the underlying dimensions of airline profitability. In particular, the
American Productivity Center (APC) model is used to decompose changes
in airline profitability into two components capturing changes in
productivity and price recovery ability ('Miller, 1984, Banker, Chang, and
Majumdar, 1993, 1996). The A,PC model is gross-profit oriented and
focuses on total factor productivity. Profitability is defined as the function
of productivity and price recovery.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describe the A.PC
model; Section 3 briefly describes the sampleairlines and the data; the APC
model is applied to explain changes in the performance of the world's 22
major airlines in Section 4; Section. 5 contains a summary and concluding
remarks.
TH_. APC MODEL
The APC model is based on actual quantities and prices of outputs
and inputs over a period of time. Changes in profitability are defined as the
product of changes in productivity and changes in price recovery. The total
dollar effects of both productivity and price recoy.ery are used to explain
changes in profitability from one period to another. For ou"tputs and inputs,
dollar values are determined by multiplying a physical quantity by unit
price. Change in profitability is m_ed by the comparison between
relative changes in values of outputs and inputs.
A profitability change ratio is defined as the ra.tio of profitability
for period t to profitability for base period 0. It can be ¢xpr_ as:
I_ t . ptyt/wtxt'"
lity(PFTBLT)- xo pOyO/wO xO (1)
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where
y' is the output quantity at period t, t = 0, I, 2 .... T
p' is the price per unit of output at period t, t = 0,1,2 ..... T
x t is the input quantity at period t, t = 0, 1, 2 ..... T
w' is the price per unit of input at period t, t = _,,1,2 ..... T.
t = 0 is the base period.
Tiffs profitability change ratio can be decomposed into changes ia
productivity, and changes in price recovery. The APC productivity change
ratio (APRDT) is the ratio of the values of cttrrent period outputs to base
period outputs, divided by the ratio of the values of current period inputs to
base period inputs. It is expressed:
pOy,/poyo
APRDT- w,x,/w,x o
Equation (2) holds output prices constant at base period levels while
capturing changes in output quantifies, and holds input prices con.s'tant at
current period levels while capturing changes ia input quantities.
The APC price recovery" ratio (APRCR) is the ratio of value of
outputs at current period prices to the value at base period prices, divided
by the ratio of the value of inputs at current period prices to the value at
base period prices. It is expressed:
p,y,/pOy,
APRCR = w, xO/wOx o (3)
Equation (3) holds output constant at current period level while output
prices are allowed to vary, and inputs are held constant at base period level
while input prices vary.
Equation (I) is the product of equations (2) and (3). Improvement
in productivity performance and/or price recovery ability will lead to
improvement in profitability. This decomposition is usegul for identifying
to what extent the change in profitability is irffluenced by changes in output
and input prices and by changes in productivity.
SM_IPLE AIRLINES AND THE DATA
Sample A Mines
The selected airlines are all international, carriers, and have
significant involvement in scheduled passenger services. Some of the
airlines are 100 percent state owned, some are private companies, while
others have mixed ownerstfip. For example, Air France, Iberia and Thai
3 Oum and Yu
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International are government owned, while the US carriers are all private
companies.
Exhibit 1 provides some recent descriptive statistics of the
airlines t. The size of the airlines, as measured by revenue torme-kilometres
(lq.TK) in 1995, ranges from 2.2 billion RTK for Scandinavian Airlines
Systems (SAS), to 19.6 billion R'rK for United Airlines. In terms of
number of passengers carried in 1995, it ranges fro,n 8.3 million (8.6
million in 1996) for Canadian Airlines International (CA/), to 87 million
(97 million in 1996) for Delta.
Aside from US carriers, most of the sample airlines provide mainly
international services, some do not provide domestic servicesat all. Qantas,
Singapore Airlines (SIA), Cathay Pacific and Japan Airlines (JAL) serve
mostly inter-continental traffic, while US Air and SAS have a large
proportion of their business in domestic or intra-continental traffic.
Profitability performance varies greatly anlong the sample airlines.
British Airways, SIA and Northwest Airlines were the most profitable in
1995, with net income of US$"/40 million, US$622 million (US$624 million
in 1996), and US$ 506 million (U_536 million in 1996), respectively. Air
France suffered the biggest loss, a net loss of US$581 million, in 1995.
Iberia and Canadian Airlines International (CA.I) also suffered losses in
1995, at a net loss ofUS$361 million and US$143 trdllion (US$137 million
in 1996), respectively. CA/is the only airline in our sample that incurred
an operating loss z in 1995. All of the Asian carriers were able to achieve a
positive net income in 1995.
Data Sources
A panel of 22 airlines over the 1986-1995 period forms the primary
data base for this study. The annual data were compiled mainly from
Digest of Statistics published by the International Civil Aviation.
Organization (ICAO), in particular, the annual series on Traffic, Fleet-
Personnel, and Financial Data. Additional dat_ were obtained directly
from airline companies, airlines' annual reports, the Airline Monitor,
IATA publications, Statistics Canada publications, and other sources.
Outputs
Five categories of airline outputs are considered: scheduled
passenger service (measured in revenue tome. kilometres or RTK),
scheduled freight service (measured in P,TK), mail, service (measured in
R.TK), non scheduled services (measured in KTK), and incidental services
(non airline businessas). Incidental services include a wide variety of non
airline businesses such as catering services, ground handling, aircraft
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°maintenance and reservation services for other airlines, sales of technology,
co_ulting services, and hotel business.
A quantity index is constructed for the incidental output in order
to include the incidental services in our analysis. The index is computed by
deflating the incidental revenues by a general price index constructed using
the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) index for GDP obtained from the Penn
World Table (Summers and Heston, 1991) and U.S. GDP deflator. The PPP
index adjusts for changes in market exchange rates and changes in real
price levels of various countries relative to the U.S., and the US GDP
deflator ensures that the quandty index is comparable over time.
A multilateral output index was formed by aggregating the five
categories of outputs using the multilateral index procedure proposed by
Caves, Christen,sen, and Diewert (1982). Output price was then computed
by dividing total revenues by the aggregate output index.
Inputs
We distinguish five categories of input: labour, fuel, materials,
flight equipment, and ground property and equipment (GPE). Labour input
is. measured by total number of employees. Fuel input is me.a_;ured in
gallons of fuel consumed. For flight equipment, a fleet quantity index is
constructed by aggregating different types of aircraft using the translog
multilateral index procedure proposed by Caves, Christen.sen, and Diewert
(1982). The leasing price series 3 for these aircraft types are used as the
weights for aggregation. The annual cost for each aircraft type is estimated
by the product of the lease price and the number of airplanes. Total
annualized aircraft cost is then computed as the sum across all categories
of aircraft. The real stock of ground properties and equipment (GPE) is
estimated using the perpetual inventory method. Under the assumption that
the flow of capital service is proportional to the capital stock, the annual
cost of using GPE is computed by multiplying the real GPE stock by a
GPE service price. The GPE service price is coustructed using the method
proposed by Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) which accounts for interest,
depreciation, corporate income and property taxes, and capital gains or
losses. Since. the GPE costs are small relative to the costs of flight
equipment, these two categories of capital inputs are further aggregated into
a single capital stock series using the translog multilateral ".indexprocedure.
The materials input contains all other inputs, not included in any of the
input categories disc_ above (labour, fuel, and capital). As such,
materials cost is the catch-all cost category, and _us includes numerous
items including airport fees, sales commissions, passenger meals, employee
travel, consultants, non-labour repair and maintenance expenses, stationery,
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and other purchased goods and services. The materials cost is computed by
subtracting labour, fuel and capital input costs from the total operating cost
reported in ICAO's Financial Data. As in the case of incidental output,
it is n_.,es._aryto construct a materials quantity index in order to include the
materials input in our analysis. Since the materials cost also includes
numerous items and activities, the same general price index is used to
deflate the materials cost to compute the materials quantity index.
As in the case of output, the five categories of inputs were
aggregated to form a multilateral input index using the translog multilateral
index procedure proposed by Caves, Christeusen and Diewert (1982) 4.
Price per unit of input was then calculated by dividing the total input cost
by the aggregate input index. Note that total input cost here includes costs
of labour, fuel, materials, flight equipment, and ground property and
equipment (GPE).
Airline profit is calculated by dividing total revenue by total input
cost. This measure reflects economic profit rather than operating profit,
since the costs of aircraft and GPE are included in the total input cost.
PROFITABILITY) PRODUCTI'I.qTYAND PRICE RECOVERY P _TTER/NS
This sectionexamines the changes in airlines'profitabilityin
relationtoproductivitychange ratioand pricerecoveryratio.
North American Carriers
Exl'dbits 2-9 present the APC ratios for the eight North American
carriers. Between 1986 and 1995, Northwest (NW), United Airlines (UA),
Air Canada (AC), American Airlines (AA), Delta, and Canadian Airlines
International (CA.I) increased profitability by 12%, 11%, g%, 5.5%, and
2%, respectively. In contrast, US Air experienced about 6% decline in its
profitability. There were some fluctuations in Continental's profitability
performance during the sample period, but not significant.
Most North American carriers improved their productivity during
the period, with Delta achieving the highest pro_iuctivit,) growth at 34%,
followed closely by CAI at 29.8%. On the other hand, the carriers' price
recovery ratios generally declined during the period, with the exception of
Continental. Delta and CAI experienced substantial decline in their price
recovery ratios, both at 21%. Profitability improvement from productivity
growth was off-set by the negative impact of falling price recovery ratio. As
a result, only modest profitability improvement _ observed at Delta and
CAI during the period. Northwest, United and Air Canada also achieved
considerable productivity growth, 21%, 25% and 19%, restx_tively, but
experienced less declinein price recovery ratio (7% 11% and 9*,
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respectively).Asa result,theywereableto achievehigherprofitability
improvement,12%,11%and 8%, respectively, banerican Airlines
improved productivity growth by 120/_ and endured 7% decline in its price
recovery ratio. The net result was a 4.7% increase in profitability.
Continental is the only North American carder which experienced a
negative productivity growth (7%) during the sample period. It is also the
only North American carrier which improved its price recovery ratio ('/%).
As a result, there was little change in Continental's profitability between
1986 and 1995. US Air achieved a 16% improvement in productivity, but
suffered a 20*/, loss in its price recovery ratio. Consequently, it experienced
a 6% decline in its profitability. It is the only North American carder
which experienced falling profitability during the sample period.
Overall, the improvement in productivity growth was due to
enhanced efficiency and changes in airlines' network characteristics (Oum
and Yu, 1995). For example, average stage length of the carders generally
increased during the sample period (Oum and Yu, 1997), leading to higher
observed productivity level. The declining price recovery ability could be
attributed to the fact that input prices have been rising faster than airline
yield (in nominal term) in North America ). Continental was the only
carrier in North America which saw its yield rose faster than its input
prices, thus improvement in its price recovery ratio.
European Carriers
Ex.hibits 10-16 present the APC ratios for the seven European
ca_ers. Among the European carriers, KLM and BA made the most
sigrtificant profitability improvement during the period, 15% and 14%,
respectively. Their profitability improvement was achieved through
sigrdficant productivity improvement of 43% and 36%, respectively, despite
the considerable loss of their price recovery ratio (20% and 17%,
respectively). The declining price recovery ability was caused mostly by
input prices rising substantially faster than airline yields. Swissair and
Lufthansa also suffered 17% decline in price recovery ratio, same as BA.
O 0Their productivity improvement (28 _ and 24 '/,, respectively), however, was
not as significant as BA's. Consequently, Swissair and Lufthansa were not
able to achieve as much profitability improvement as BA. SAS and Iberia
increased their profitability by 8% and 9%, respectively. This was a result
of productivity growth of respective 13% and 16%, and a decrease in price
recovery ratio of 8% and 9°/',, respectively. Air France appears to have
made substantial improvement in productivity, but it also experienced
significant decline in its price recovery ratio. The result was a mere 2.5%
increase in its profitability. While most European carriers suffered loss in
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pricerecoveryabilitybecauseofyieldincreasesnotbeingabletokeepup
withincreasesin inputpdces,AirFrance'saverageyieldactually declined
in nominal term between 1986 and 1995.
Asian Carriers
Exhibits 17-23 presents the APC ratios for the Asian carriers.
Qantas made the most significant profitability improvement at 23%. This
is a result of 32% productivity growth and 7% decline in price recovery
ratio, which was due mostly to the fact that input prices were rising faster
than average yields. Singapore Airlines and Thai Airways also improved
profitability considerably. Again, this is attributable to high productivity
growth, 20% and 48% respectively, after compensating for losses in price
recovery ratio, 9% and 23%, respectively. Korean Air achieved the most
significant productivity growth during the period at 53%. However, it also
suffered the largest decline in price recovery ratio (34°/,), which was a result
of 65% increase in input prices overpowering the 10% increase in average
yields. Consequently, Korean Air was not able to make any significant
profitability improvement. Japan Airlines (JAL) was able to make modest
profitability improvement (4%) despite a modest productivity growth (7%),
because it was able to maintain its price recovery ratio during the period.
All Nippon Airways (ANA) and Cathay Pacific suffered
considerable losses in profitability despite productivity growth of 9% and
14%, respectively. Again, this was caused by input prices rising faster than
yields. This was particularly true in the case of Cathay Pacific: 50%
increa._ in input prices versus 13% increase in average yields.
Comparison among North American, European and Asian Carriers
To compare across carders in different continents, average change
ratios for North American, European and Asian carders are reported in
Exhibits 24, 25 and 26, respectively. North American carriers, on average,
saw their profitability improved between 1986 and 1988 desvite of a slight
decline in productivity. This was a result of improved pdoe recovery ratio.
Since 1988, however, North American carriers' price recovery ratio has
been consistently declining. On the other hand, productivity change ratio
rose monotonically from 1991 to 1995. The combined effects of lower
productivity ratio and lower price recovery ratio led to lower profitability
during 1990-1992. Between 1992 to 1995, the positive impact of
productivity improvement was able to over-power the negative impact of
falling price recovery ratio, resulting in profitability improvement for the
carriers.
European carriers also experienced improved profitability between
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1986 and 1988. However, this improvement was a result of improved
productivity despite of a slight fall in price recovery ratio. In general,
European carders consistently achieved significant productivity growth
during the pe.riod, except for a slight stumble during the 1990-1991
recession. At the same time, their price recovery ratio dropped
substantially. Profitability -;,'as at the lowest point in 1990, remained
essentially unchanged between 1990 and 1993, then improved noticeably
thereafter.
Asian carriers followed a similar changing pattern to that of
European carriers. They achieved significant profitability improvement
beo, veen 1986 and 1988, higher than their North American and European
counterparts. Like the European carriers, this was mostly attributed to
productivity growth. Asian carriers also consistently improved their
productivity during the period, while suffering significant fall in their price
recovery ability. Profitability peaked in 1988, then dropped considerably
between 1988 and 1990, and had generally improved since 1990.
SUMI'vLARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper examines changes in the profitability, productivity and
price recovery of the world's 22 major airlines over a ten year period. The
increased competition in the international air transport markets have put
pressures on carriers' ability to raise prices. However, input prices have
been increasing continuously, especially in traditionally low-cost countries.
Cortsequenfly, the overall results show that airlines have experienced
continuing significant drops in their price recovery ratios during the ten-
year period. To counter-act such trends, airlines have made tremendous
efforts to improve efficiency, as borne out by the steady increasing trend in
productivity change ratio during the period. As a result, overall profitability
of the airlines have improved in the 1990s.
The results further show that European carriers and Asian carriers
consistently improved productivity throughout theperiod even during the
time of rising profitability. This is particularly true for Eiu'opean carriers.
The liberalization measures undertaken in Europe via package #2 (1990)
and #3 (1993) appear to have made significant impact on carriers'
performance. As a result, European carders have achieved higher
productivity growth than Asian and North American. carriers. North
American carriers, on the other hand, experienced a rather "flat" period in
productivity growth between 1986 and 1991, then started to exhibit
significant productivity improvement after incurring losses in profitability
during the recessions. This "flat" period may be explained by the fact that
the US carriers achieved tremendous productivity growth immediately
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followingtheUS domestic deregulation in 1978, then entered a "plateau"
period in the late 1980s.
European carriers aod Asian carriers experienced considerable
losses in price recovery ratio, much more than North American carders.
This is because their input prices have increased rapidly, while air fares
have declined due to increased competition.
Although overall irfipacts have been positive, the study shows that
different dynamics at work at the finn level. Some c_rriers seem to have
had difficulty adjusting to the deregulated environment and improving their
profitability and productivity in a sustained manner, while others are
consistent in the patterns of improvement of the various components of their
performance. It is important for carriers to achieve high efficiency and
productivity, thus lower cost. It is also important for carders to price
intelligently and properly manage yields in order to maintain and enhance
their price recovery ability.
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NOTES
1. More discussions on the airlines can be found in Oum and Yu (1995).
2. CAI earned a modest C_.$5.4million profit in 1997, its first since 1988
(Daniels, 1998).
3. The aircraR leasing price data were kindly supplied/o us by A_a'nark,
Inc.. .-, ..
4. Revenue shares (cost shares) are used as the weights in aggregating
outputs (inputs). As a result, higher weights are given to outputs with
higher fields. Similarly, more expensive input factors are given higher
weights in aggregating inputs.
5. Note that airline fares in real terms have been consistently.declining
over the last three decades (Boeing, 1997).
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1 GLOBALIZATION IN TIlE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
Much is being made of the growing trend towards globalization ofthe air transport
industry. Airline officials, economists, policy makers, and others publicly trumpet the
virtues of an air transport industry with fewer trade barriers, less government intervention,
increased levels ofprivatization, and more efficient airlines (Kaspar 1988; Gialloreto
1988; and OECD 1993 and 1997). For these observers, globalization is not only a reality,
but a welcome sign of progress in an industry that has been characterized historically as
highly regulated and influenced by politics, instead of market forces. This paper examines
the trend towards globalization in the air transport industry with special focus on the
behavior of governments and firms, namely airlines, and the tactics or strategies employed
by these groups in their efforts to shape the industry to meet their preferred outcomes. The
central issue in this study is whether the liberalization or regulatory reform that emerges
from the interaction of governments and airlines actually produces a globalized industry
that is better situated to serve the air transport needs of the global community, or a
restructured industry that is better situated to serve the interests of the dominant airlines
and the industrialized economies from which they operate.
This paper is distilled from a more comprehensive project on the implications of
globalization and liberalization in air transport. It is organized to give the reader with
some background in the political economy of the air transport industry, but perhaps a
limited knowledge of the concept of globalization, a sufficient foundation of knowledge to
make sense of the analysis and arguments about the current trends and probable future of
the industry. Thus, after an initial discussion of the concept of globalization, the second
section of the paper briefly outlines the history of the international air transport industry.
The third section discusses the American roots of current international liberalization
efforts and the particular role that American airlines play in the political and economic
transformation of this industry. This discussion is followed by an update ofthe industry,
which is changing quickly and, in some cases, quite dramatically. The final two sections
offer some analysis and conclusions about the ramifications of the current trends in
liberalization of the air transport industry with special attention on the impact of these
trends on policy making and economic growth and development in both the industrialized
and developing worlds. Two cases, one focusing narrowly on St. Louis, an American city,
and the other focusing broadly on Africa, help bring the theoretical and abstract discussion
into the real world of policy making and commerce.
1.1 Globalization: What is it and is it really global?
There is considerable literature on the phenomenon known commonly as globalization.
This literature is characterized generally by its inability to carefully define what is meant
by the term "globalization." In international relations theory, the literature splits along
familiar lines when discussing the concept, with liberal theorists seeing globalization as a
function of increasing, and for the most part welcomed, interdependence; and realists
seeing globalization as ephemeral or inconsequential.
For liberal scholars, globalization is part of the evolution of the international system to a
new plane of cooperation and peace that is facilitated by increasing levels of
communication and interaction. Not surprisingly, air transport is included among the
various technological means by which the global community is able to come together to
exchange not only goods and service, but also ideas and mutual interests. Moreover, the
globalization of air transport has special significance for liberal theorists who contend that
an efficient global air transport system facilitates economic exchanges that will help foster
further integration of developing world economies into themore successful economic
system of the industrialized world (Jonsson 1981). These scholars join together with
increasingly influential community of scholars and policy makers who firmly believe that
liberalization of trade in goods and services will serve the needs of the global community
in ways that the state-centered policies of the past were incapable (Button 1991).
Realists and skeptics of the positive impact of globalization continue to stress the abiding
relevance of the nation-state and power relationships between nation-states in the
international system. For realists, the transformation of the air transport industry is not
troubling, since much of what has happened, such as the increasing number of"open
skies" agreements, can be explained as a function of power politics, in which the United
States has been able to forcefully represent the interests of its own airlines (Nayar 1995).
This explanation is not completely satisfying, as will be shown later in this paper, but there
is some merit to the claim that nation-states, particularly the economically and political
powerful have attempted with some success to shape liberalization and globalization to fit
their needs and interests.
A more intriguing position on the issue of globalization, and the one that is presented in
this paper, is that despite realist claims, the nation-state is losing its grasp on the political
economy of the air transport industry. This argument has its foundation in the way in
which airlines, especially American carriers, seized on new technologies and strategies that
allow them to pursue their competitive advantage in the air transport industry. It is these
technologies and strategies that fundamentally changed the way in which international air
travel is conducted, and dramatically changed the relationship between governments and
airlines in the development and implementation of national airline regulations and
policies. The transformation, which is discussed in detail later, initiated a trend towards
liberalization of the global air transport industry. This liberalization has become
synonymous in the minds of many industry observers, policy makers, and scholars with
globalization. The widely accepted conclusion is that current liberalization efforts will
effectively globalize the industry and the global economy will reap the benefits of a more
efficient air transport system. This study questions the theoretical and empirical basis for
this conclusion and argues instead that the character of current liberalization efforts will
lead to a mix of positive and negative economic and political outcomes. The primary
argument is that the globalization of the air transport industry is not really global and will
create problems that are not easily solved.
2 HISTORY OF AIR TRANSPORT REGULATORY REGIMES
It is impossible to understand the current trends and issues in the air transport industry
without some background in the foundations of aviation regulation. While, early
discussions about sovereignty of the air can be traced to Europe prior to the development
of practical aircraft, most scholars begin their coverage of aviation regulation with the
Chicago Conference of 1944. The Chicago Conference established four basic principles
that have been more or less upheld since 1944, but have come under implicit challenge
from current liberalization and globalization efforts. These principles are:
• Sovereignty - each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air
space above its territory.
• Equal opportunities - all states are given equal fights to participate in aviation
regulated through international agreement.
• Non-discrimination - international aviation regulations must not discriminate
on the basis of nationality.
• Freedom to designate - each state has right and freedom to designate its
national carrier.
2.1 ICAO and multilateral cooperation
These principles were embodied in a newly created international institution - the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO has been held out as evidence of
multilateral cooperation in the management of international air transport, but this claim is
less compelling when placed in the broader context of aviation regulation. Despite the
efforts of some nations to develop and implement a multinational air transport services
agreement at the Chicago Conference, there was sufficient reluctance on the part of others
so as to leave the negotiations of air traffic rights to individual pairs or dyads of states.
The result was an aviation system regulated by a series of bilateral agreements in which
two sovereign nations decide between themselves the nature of the traffic fights and
standards of operation between and within their airspace. Not surprisingly, there are over
1,200 such bilateral air service agreements (Abeyratne 1996, World Tourism Organization
1994).
2.2 Power politics and bilateral air service agreements
The bilateral agreements typically spell out the nature of the relationship between the
governments and airlines of the two nations. Specifically, the bilaterals stipulate which of
the various "freedoms" will be included in the bilateral. In other words, the bilateral
codifies standards, tariffs, schedules, landing rights, capacity levels, safety regulations,
exemptions, and other operational issues. The model for most bilateral agreements is the
so-called Bermuda Agreement, signed by the United States and the United Kingdom in
1946 and renegotiated as Bermuda II in 1977 (Sochor 1991).
The bilateral regime, as it is ot_en called, is held up as evidence for the abiding relevance
of power politics in the air transport industry ('Nayar 1995). According to realists and
critics of the regime, bilateral agreements tend to favor the most powerful state in the
dyad, effectively creating a asymmetrical distribution of benefits from the trade in air
services between the two countries. Realists, as theorists of international relations, are not
unhappy with this conclusion since it seems to confirm their hypotheses about primacy of
national power. The claims of the critics of the regime are much more interesting in
general and are especially relevant for this study. These critics argue that the bilateral
framework is an anachronism in an age in which other sectors ofthe international
economy are liberalizing at break neck speed and doing so primarily through multilateral
agreements and institutions. Bilaterals, they say, are preventing the globalization of an
efficient air transport system that could increase and expand global economic development
(Feldman 1994; Oum et al 1993; and Hulbauer and Findlay 1996).
3 REGULATORY REFORM IN THE U.S. AND THE PUSH FOR OPEN SKIES
Not surprisingly, much of this criticism comes from governments and airlines that would
rather operate under a renegotiated bilateral system or a more liberal, open skies
arrangement. Momentum towards open skies began nearly two decades ago, shortly aRer
domestic regulatory reform in the US in 1978. The US government publicly committed
itselftoan international open skies regime in which the international air transport industry
would undergo regulatory reform much like the domestic reform undertaken in the US.
The international liberalization effort got off to a slow start, in part because the US
domestic air travel industry began a tumultuous period of competition, acquisitions,
bankruptcies, and consolidation which ran through the 1980s and has only recently showed
signs of calming. By 1990, however, it became clear to US airlines and the government
agencies that regulate them, that American carriers were ready to take on the rest of the
world and forge ahead with political efforts to open the skies (USDOT 1994).
Several major airlines in the United States, especially the so-called Big Three (Delta,
United, and American) survived the fierce competition of domestic regulatory reform and
liberalization to emerge as efficient, competitive carders ready to do battle with foreign
airlines. An important edge held by the American carriers was their extensive networks in
the lucrative US domestic air travel market. One of the other important ramifications of
domestic regulatory reform was the emergence of the hub and spoke system within the US
market. The air travel market is now characterized by hub airports and spoke or feeder
airports (Doganis 1991).
3.1 The emergence of the hub and spoke system
The basic structure of the hub and spoke system is quite simple and it reflects airlines'
efforts to consolidate operations and do business more efficiently. An airline, such as
Trans World Airlines (TWA) which operates a major hub out of St. Louis, Missouri, will
funnel its passengers through its hub instead of offering point-to-point non-stop service
between numerous city-pairs. A passenger who wants to fly TWA from Seattle,
Washington to Atlanta, Georgia would have to change planes in St. Louis where she will
join other passengers from around the country who fly into St. Louis before boarding
another TWA flight to their final destination. The practical effect for passengers is that
hubs limit choices, increase travel times, and increase chances of transfer delays and
mishandled baggage. The practical effect for the airlines is mixed. The hub carrier
benefits from having considerable control over originating traffic at their hubs (70-75% is
not uncommon for so-called fortress hubs) and a cost-effective means for managing
operations. Non-hub carriers or carriers operating out of someone else's hub suffer
because the strength of the hub carriers at their respective hub airports (Doganis 1991 and
GRA, Inc. 1994).
While the hub and spoke system has had considerable impact on the structure of the
American airline industry and the American airport system, it also has implications for the
liberalization of the international air travel market. For some observers, the hub system
conveys even further advantages on already strong American carriers, such that the gains
from more liberal skies will be illusory for those foreign carriers that might operate under
the more open regime. This issue is taken up in more detail later in the paper.
3.2 The International Airline Competition Act
The US government, acting on behalf of its airlines, passed legislation in 1979 that called
for the liberalization of the global air transport market. Not surprisingly, policy makers
and American carriers believed they could compete effectively against the foreign airlines.
As noted earlier, this initiative got off to a very slow start, in part because the US airlines
were busy trying to kill each other off in fare wars, acquisitions, and other commercial
battles for supremacy of the lucrative US market. In a rather odd turn of events, the
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carriers that primarily represented the US in the international market, Pan Am and TWA,
took severe beatings because they lacked crucial feeder networks within the US domestic
market. The Big Three, relying on their substantial domestic networks turned an eager eye
to the international market, and asked the government to do something to help.
There is not enough space here to detail all the bargaining, negotiations, and rhetoric
associated with the US government's efforts to cajole, pressure, or leverage the skies open
to American carriers, but one point is important for this study. The airlines were at a
minimum impatient and unhappy with the lack of progress being made in opening the
skies, and more likely, worried about their relative positions in the global air transport
market once it was eventually liberalized. The thinking among airline executives was not
if, but when the market would be open, and more importantly, would they be ready to
compete (Gialloreto 1988; and Oum et al 1993) This lack of patience and the competitive
urge to gain advantage led to a number of important innovations in the way airlines do
business in the international market. These innovations dramatically reshaped the
character of the airline business and what a liberalized or open air transport market would
actually look like.
4 NEW STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES
When governments in North America, Europe, and Asia began to talk about "open skies"
or some other liberalization or restructuring of the bilaterals that governed air services
between their various countries, the airlines watched carefully and in most cases actively
lobbied for their various interests to be preserved. As one might imagine though, the
interest of one US airline may not be the same as the interests of all US airlines. The
introduction of new technologies and commercial strategies exacerbated these potential
differences and created new problems for airline competition and government policy
makers and negotiators.
Among the most intriguing applications of new technology to the airline business is the
development and expanded use ofeomputer reservation systems (CRS). On its face, CRS
seems like just another computer-based information or management tool by which an
airline can better manage its sales of tickets, its marketing, and its service to its customers.
Upon more critical inspection though, and taking into account the way that CRS has been
used in the airline industry, this technology plays a tremendous role in the way business is
done, the way in which airlines compete, and the way a liberalized market might work. It
is therefore, important to understand how CKS and strategies that develop from its
application have restructured the relationship between governments and airlines and
transformed the market itself.
4.1 Computer Reservation Systems (CRS)
CRS technology allowed airlines to apply computer-based management and marketing
tools to their operations, with the intention of making the process of reserving seats,
processing tickets, and tracking consumer demand more efficiently. Frequent air travelers
might wonder at this point whether CRS really makes a difference since it seems that air
travel still involves an endless hassle of exchanging pieces of paper, confirmation
numbers, and phone calls in order to make a single flight. CRS has made a difference
though in that the booking of flights and itinerary information is much better managed
whether the consumer uses a travel agent or books his own flight. But this is not really the
important issue when one considers the impact of CRS on the air transport industry.
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The technological impact of CRS is only understood when one considers the broader
application of the technology in the form of new strategies, namely code-sharing and yield
management. Neither of these commercial strategies would be possible without CRS.
Moreover, the application of CRS technology in code-sharing and yield management
changes the character of competition in the airline industry in ways that are not yet
completely understood. The nature of liberalization or giobalization of the industry cannot
be understood then unless CRS, code-sharing, and yield management are examined
alongside other trends and issues that are shaping the evolution of modern air transport
(Learning 1993; Shenton 1994; GRA Inc. 1994).
4.2 Code sharing
Each airline in the world is assigned a two-character code that is used to designate that
carrier in all aspects of official airline business. For the purposes of reservations systems,
the code serves as the identification of an airline on a travel agent's computer screen.
Thus, a travel agent will read the two-character code and the flight number to determine
which airline and which flight is being booked. While seemingly mundane, this is an
important issue in any analysis of the air transport market, because of the development and
application ofcode-sharing.
Code-sharing is an agreement by two carriers to list flights under one carrier's code so that
a passenger does not know that she is actually booking the various legs of her flight on two
separate airlines. From the airlines perspective, this process is designed to serve the
consumer better, since "seamless" travel is available to more destinations. Consider, for
example, a passenger who wants to fly from Carbondale, Illinois to London, England.
Obviously there are no direct flights from Carbondale to London, so the passenger realizes
that connecting flights will be necessary. Two possibilities emerge that illustrate the code-
sharing issue.
In the first possible itinerary, the passenger calls a travel agent and books a
flight from Marion, the local airport, to St. Louis to connect with a TWA flight
direct to Gatwick Airport, which serves London. Although the Marion- - St.
Louis portion of the trip will be made on a propeller.driven aircraft operated by
a commuter airline, code-sharing shows the trip as seamless travel on TWA.
In the second possibility, the passenger decides she doesn't want to fly TWA
across the Atlantic so she asks her travel agent to determine which other
American carriers offer service to London. Her travel agent says she can get a
USAirways flight from St. Louis to Heathrow with a stop in Pittsburgh.
Because of the code-sharing arrangement between USAirways and British
Airways (BA), the leg of the flight from Pittsburgh to London will actually be
on BA.
None of this might matter to the passenger, if she is simply concerned about the cheapest
fares or convenient times. It would matter, however, if she doesn't want to fly on
commuter aircrat_ or does not want to fly a foreign carrier. From the consumer's
perspective, the lack of transparency in the CRS can amount to false advertising.
Why then do airlines and governments seem to find code-sharing so attractive? Code-
sharing is attractive to airlines because it allows them to expand, in some cases
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dramatically, the destinations that they can market as part of their route network.
Moreover, the airlines who conclude code-sharing agreements with airlines which serve
markets which they cannot serve themselves because of economic or political reasons,
effectively avoid the expense or the regulations that constrain their operations.
It should come as no surprise then that code-sharing has been used aggressively by carriers
who want to gain access to new markets, but cannot afford to do so or are prohibited by
various governmental or capacity restrictions. Code-sharing between US carriers and
European carriers illustrate the attractiveness of this strategy for solving a variety of
difficulties. In the case of Northwest Airlines and USAir, both airlines suffered during the
fierce competition after domestic regulatory reform and teetered on the edge of collapse.
In both cases, the airlines were saved by cash-infusions coming from KLM and British
Airways, respectively (Tarry 1996). A significant part of each deal was the conclusion of
code-sharing agreements that would give the European carriers substantial access to the
US domestic market without having to jump seemingly insurmountable political and
economic hurdles that limited their access. At the same time, the US airlines were able to
stave off collapse and market service to new foreign destinations which were actually part
of KLM and BA's existing route structure.
The political importance of these and other code-sharing arrangements is that airlines,
whether explicitly or implicitly, were able to circumvent the governmental process which
was meeting only limited success in opening the skies between Europe, North America,
and Asia. With CRS and code-sharing, airlines were able to do what government
negotiators were not. Code-sharing developed quickly into strategic alliances or marketing
alliances in which as many as five airlines around the world jointly market and coordinate
their flights (Shenton 1994, Learning 1993). Airline executives realized that code-sharing
and alliance strategies were not only critical while they waited for governments to sort out
the political problems associated with opening the skies, but would be especially important
in determining who would dominate the skies once opened. In that vein, American
Airlines and British Airways have proposed a code-sharing alliance which would join the
two dominant carriers' route networks together to create a global giant (Morrocco 1996).
Ironically, American was among the most vociferous opponents of the KLM and BA deals
with Northwest and USAirways.
4.3 Yield management
A more recent technique in the airline industry is also an off-shoot of the computer
reservation systems technology. Airline managers recognized that the information
available to them through CRS would not only help them market their product better, but
could also allow them to squeeze profits in ways that were previously unimaginable. Yield
management refers simply to the computer-based software that allows airlines to market
each seat on each aircraft in ways that reap the highest profit. Instead of offering simple
fares for each class, airlines can now tailor fares and discounts to increase the probability
that planes will take-off with as many seats filled as possible. Fares axe constantly
adjusted to account for changing demand and more importantly the willingness of the
flying public to pay certain fares. With aggressive yield management, it is possible that the
person sitting next to you paid over three times the amount you paid. Conversely, so you
don't become too excited, you might have paid three times as much as she did. Most
passengers understand that fares vary according to advanced purchase criteria, but most
don't consider the disparity in actual fares (Saporito 1995)
Code-sharing, strategic alliances, and yield management techniques are mentioned here
because they have and will continue to shape the competitive environment in the air
transport industry. A better understanding of the extent to which these technologies and
strategies are used to thwart competition is critical to any analysis or forecast of the global
air travel market. In a recent statement by the US Department of Transportation (DOT),
these issues were raised as potentially anti-competitive (Transcript 1997). The DOT noted
that CRS can be used to effectively exclude smaller and lower-cost carriers from the
choices readily available to the consumer. Larger carriers own CRS and structure them in
ways that are not entirely transparent or fair according to the DOT. The DOT went on to
say that yield management techniques are raising serious questions about predatory
pricing.
The inherent flexibility and dynamic pricing that make yield management techniques
attractive to the airlines also make them effective tools for rapid adjuslraent to low-cost
competition. It is a difficult question whether this use of the technology is anti-
competitive or merely an appropriate application of business tools that allow for more
efficient operation. Consumer groups argue the former, claiming that airlines who use
yield management do not do so transparently. They point to airline objections over
publication of average fare information as evidence that the airlines are trying to hide
something. The DOT expresses similar concern in that fares which decline to meet or beat
new low-cost carriers, almost always go back up when the competition has been
eliminated. Again, the question of whether this if fair or not is difficult, but to the extent
that the larger carriers are more likely not to be able to afford and manage yield
management systems, it seems that low-cost entrants are at a disadvantage.
The successful application of these technologies in the North American and European
markets raises important questions about the nature of a more liberal international air
transport market. In both the United States and the European Union it seems that the
technological and strategic innovations employed by the successful airlines have
outstripped both the regulatory and policy making communities in those polities. The US
Department of Transportation and the US Department of Justice seemingly made early
decisions on code-sharing and strategic alliances with insufficient data and analysis about
the impact of such arrangements. Similarly, the EU is grappling with the implications of
the proposed alliance between American Airlines and British Airways. To be fair, the
difficulty of making policies on-the-fly should not be underestimated. The industry is
changing quickly and policy makers have the difficult task of sorting through the claims
and counterclaims of the airlines themselves. How, for example, should a policy maker
who listened to American Airlines rail against the British Airways bailout of USAir
interpret the proposed alliance? The key perhaps is to remember that individual airlines
are best thought of as representatives of their own interests. Despite their occasional
claims of representing what is good for the consumer or their nation, the airlines are most
interested in their own success. One cannot blame them for this, but it is something that
must be remembered when we consider the effort of the dominant airlines tO further
liberalize the global air transport system. By keeping the events of the past several years
and the interests of the dominant carriers in mind we can paint a plausible picture of the
future.
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S THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL AIR TRANSPORT
The future will most likely be shaped by current trends and ideas about liberalization. As
of this writing, it is fairly clear that major airlines and governmental actors in the
international system are no longer talking about whether to liberalize or not, but when and
how. Moreover, it seems that discussions about air transport are being shaped by trends in
other industries and sectors, in which liberalization is in full-swing. In these industries the
concepts of privatization, elimination of subsidies, elimination of cross-subsidization, and
the implementation of standards are realities. Air transport seems to be heading in the
same direction.
Liberalization of air transport has a number of components. This study examines several
of these components with specific attention to their ramifications for the industry and the
flying consumer. These components include reform in the areas ofcabotage, foreign
ownership, subsidies, cross-subsidies, and privatization.
5.1 Cabotage and foreign ownership
Among the most difficult components of a comprehensive liberalization package are
foreign ownership and cabotage. It is common for nations to impose limits on foreign
ownership of its airlines. The limits vary, but the general rule is that controlling interest of
carriers must remain in the hands of nationals, or in the case of the EU, citizens of member
states. For some, the limits on foreign ownership are relics of a bygone era in which
nations were fiercely protective of their flag carriers for economic and security reasons, as
well as prestige (WTO 1994; OECD 1997; Button 1991; and Feldman 1995). For others,
foreign control of airlines represents a dangerous loss of sovereignty and autonomy.
Similarly, cabotage is held out as a matter of national security interests, but its impact is
more clearly economic.
Cabotage is the right of a foreign carrier to carry passengers on flights entirely within
another country. In other words, cabotage rights would give British Airways the right to
pick up passengers in New York and fly them to Dallas. A related issue is the granting of
beyond fights, which would allow, for example, United Airlines the right to fly from San
Francisco to Tokyo, pick up Japanese passengers and fly on to Seoul. As one can imagine,
the fear of granting such rights is that foreign carriers have the opportunity to take business
away from national carriers (Abeyratne 1996).
While both are included in official discussions about open skies, these issues are unlikely
to be resolved soon since cabotage and foreign ownership amount to direct concessions
from national airlines. Airlines, whether they are competitive or not are loath to open
themselves up for more competition. Some observers believe that change on these issues
will not come until the United States changes its position on limiting foreign ownership of
US carriers and allowing foreign carriers cabotage rights in the lucrative US domestic
market. Put simply, these issues are unlikely to be resolved in the near term, although
concessions might be made by the Americans in order to secure access to other countries.
5.2 Airport capacity
Perhaps a more intractable issue in the liberalization of the global air transport market is
that issue of capacity or, more simply, places to land and park airplanes. It is easy to think
of the airline industry as simply the firms that fly and maintain the airplanes that ferry
people and cargo from place to place. That this happens efficiently or at all is as much a
function of airport capacity as it is the successful operation of the aircraft themselves. It
should come as no surprise then that airports are a critical link in the process of
liberalizing the air transport market It will make little difference to the market if the US
government convinces the UK to allow more direct flights of US carriers to London if
Heathrow airport cannot handle any additional landings.
The importance of this issue is evident when one examines airport capacity in the major
cities around the industrialized world and realizes that most airports are at capacity. More
importantly perhaps, building new airports or expanding old ones is typically not an easy
economic or political task. Enormous financial, environmental, and political hurdles
confront virtually every airport project (Kaput 1995; Thurston 1995). To the extent that
new capacity will only slowly develop, the question shifts back to the trickier issue of
reallocating landing slots and terminal space in such a way that new competition can
actually compete (Hufbauer and Findlay 1996). Again, it should come as no surprise that
incumbent national airlines have the upper hand in protecting their share of landing slots.
Despite American complaints about Heathrow in London and similar difficulties
elsewhere, one sees similar intransigence at hub airports in the United States where, as
noted earlier, hub carriers can control as much as 75% of the business at a major airport.
There arc a number of proposals circulating in the air transport community which suggest
ways to liberalize the allocation of landing slots, but few seem to satisfy the various
stakeholders involved in the management and use of the world's airports (Hu_fbaucr and
Findlay, 1996). Ironically perhaps, the airlines themselves arc often opponents of airport
expansion and development because they are forced to shoulder the fmancial burden
through increased landing fees. No airline is interested in paying for the development of
new capacity if it will benefit its competition. Airlines, like other businesses, would rather
have someone else pay for the expansion and then let the airlines decide who gets to utilize
the new capacity. Needless to say, the issue ofairport capacity is among the most tricky
political issues to face local and national political leaders.
5.3 Privatization
One trend that recognizes the difficulty of satisfactory public policy solutions to the air
transport issue is to privatiz, both airlines and airports. Given the discussion of airport
capacity above, it is not difficult to understand why policy makers might be willing to give
up control over airports even though they represent an enormous potential for patronage
contracts and jobs, as well as a certain amount of prestige. For many political leaders in
the United States and Europe, the business of running an airport has lost its luster. The
regulatory reform which liberalized the airline industry in these markets changed the
relationship between the airport managers and their primary customers, the airlines.
Airports cannot rely on business as usual in an environment in which the airlines arc
constantly jockeying for competitive advantage (Tarry and Fuller 1997). The fierce
competition between US carriers and the liberalization of European air transport will
necessarily put additional pressure on airports to play some competitive role in the market.
Airports can no longer operate as public utilities, they must develop commercial strategies
and keep a vigilant eye on the market, which may determine whether the airline they
depend on will stay in business.
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Just as many airports have new pressures and demands placed on them to operate as
businesses, most airlines in the industrialized world are being cut off from their public
safety net. Subsidies and government bailouts are increasingly discouraged, either
formally through regulation or informally through political pressure. Governments, trade
scholars, and the successful airlines have all joined the chorus calling for an end to
government subsidy for unprofitable and publicly owned carriers (Button 1991; OECD
1997, USDOT 1994). Increasingly, governments are moving to divest themselves of their
airlines - hoping to force the carrier to compete in the open market as a lean, efficient
business, not as a bloated social service. The results are mixed and their interpretation
depends in large part on where you sit. If you are an economist or an executive of a
successful carrier, you are no doubt elated with the ability of the market to cull the weak
from the herd. On the other hand, if you are concerned about evenness of air transport
services or perhaps you had a job with one of the failed carriers, your interpretation
probably ranges from caution to despair, respectively.
5.4 More on subsidies and cross-subsidies
Of the more difficult aspects of the liberalization trend to deal with politically, is the
limiting or prohibition of subsidies and cross-subsidies. As noted above, it is often the
case that the interpretation of the utility of liberalization in these area depends on your
position in the market. It is also important to note that the nature of the airline industry
suggests that the prohibition of subsidies may have deleterious long term effects on the
provision of air transport services. This problem has more to do with the structure of the
air transport industry than it does with the operation of any particular airport or airline.
But the problem is critical and provides an exceUem window onto the troubling
possibilities if liberalization of air transport continues along its current path.
One of the lasting features of the air transport industry is its cyclical nature (Gialloreto
1988). In addition to being subject to disastrous downtums in business due to war, fuel
price increases, and even weather problems, the airline industry is also susceptible to
booms and busts that airline executives are unable, in many cases, to manage effectively.
While the way in which the airlines operate in boom times is interesting in its own right,
the busts are more interesting for this analysis. Imagine, for example, a city or region that
depends on a single hub airport which is dominated by a single airline. Imagine further
that the airline is not among the most profitable, but its management is doing what are
perceived to be the right things to get the airline in very good shape. All is well until the
industry experiences a downturn. Now the city or region risks losing its air transport
service and the unenviable task of finding a new hub airline. Is it not reasonable for the
city or region to subsidize the airline to keep it from complete collapse?
The answer, of course, from the free-traders and the dominant airlines is that subsidies
only distort the market and that all else equal the weak carrier should be allowed to die,
since the market will eventually adjust to provide air transport services commensurate with
demand. In many ways, this argument is persuasive, but for the community 'and economy
that relies on the failing airline, the prospect of losing it and waiting for the market to
respond is neither comforting nor encouraging. The obvious difficulty lies in the fact that
if one buys the argument that air transport is critical to economic growth and development
in the modern global economy, then one cannot entertain the risk of losing that service. In
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thismanner,globalizationof the economy in general makes effective liberalization of the
air transport industry a more onerous task.
The other subsidization issues raises similar questions. Cross-subsidization is best
described as the use of revenues generated from profitable routes to subsidize service
provided on unprofitable routes (OECD 1993 and 1997). Cross-subsidy schemes are
anachronistic in a liberalized economy. If the market is the arbiter of who gets service,
then cross-subsidies are merely a distortion of the market and wasteful policies. Not
surprisingly, airlines are not proponents of cross-subsidization, but governments find them
attractive distributive policies in which citizens who use popular and profitable routes and
modes of transportation, subsidize under-utilized and unprofitable routes and modes. As
an issue of social policy, cross-subsidization make good political, and perhaps economic
sense if they are thought of as temporary investments to foster economic development. As
an issue of strict economic or financial policy, they are wasteful in that some citizens are
given services below market value. Instead of making these citizens relocate or
encouraging the development of alternative modes of transport, the government
redistributes wealth according to political or social objectives.
The issue of cross-subsidization raises important questions for the globalization of the air
transport industry. Although good arguments can be made that the economies of North
America, Europe, and parts of Asia are prepared for the kind of liberalization discussed in
this paper, other areas (and perhaps some regions of North America and Europe) are not
ready for liberalization (Graham 1997). In fact, one might argue that the liberalization of
the air transport industry as conceived by the leading air transport firms and their
governments will not lead to globalization of the industry, but create even greater
disparities between the haves and have-nots in the global economy.
6 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON LOCAL AND REGIONAL
DECISIONMAKERS
Good arguments and substantial evidence can be presented to support the claim that
liberalization of air transport services makes sense for most of the industrialized world. It
is worth noting though that there will be some unevenness associated with this
globalization and the political and economic implications should be considered and
monitored carefully. With this in mind, the next section of this study presents some
conclusions from two quite disparate cases. The first case involves the City of St. Louis
and its efforts to at once keep TWA and expand its airport. The second case is a broader
examination of the implications of liberalization for air transport services in Africa. In
both cases, the concerns by policy makers are similar in that there is an overarching focus
on economic development and connections with the global economy.
6.1 Giobalization in the industrialized world: St. Louis and Trans World Airlines
The saga of TWA is well-known in aviation circles. The carrier was once among the most
successful international airlines in the world. Along with Pan Am, TWA served America's
foreign travel needs before the dramatic regulatory reforms of the late 1970s. From that
point on, the airline has struggled to stay aloft, fighting what has amounted to a rear-guard
action against better managed and more powerful competitors. TWA's story and the
ramifications of its difficulties for the City of St. Louis paint an intriguing story about the
darker side of globalization. Again, this is not to argue that liberalization is a bad thing,
but that it is not without cost and pain.
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In the regulated era of American air transport, TWA served as one of the nation's
international airlines. It flew almost exclusively from gateway airports, flying passengers
from the United States to destinations all over the world. At first glance it seems that such
a strong international route structure would give TWA, and airlines such as Pan Am, a leg
up against its competition in a deregulated industry. Unfortunately, the carrier's focus on
international routes left it without feeder networks within the domestic US market. With
deregulation the distinction between domestic and international carders was blurred. As it
turned out, Delta, United, and American were able to develop international routes more
easily than TWA was able to develop domestic feeder hubs and networks.
In the fierce competition that followed domestic regulatory reform, TWA floundered,
eventually filing bankruptcy and undergoing reorganization. Conditions did not improve,
however, since TWA was financially unable to expand and improve its fleet. While other
airlines were integrating newer, more fuel-efficient aircrait into their fleets, TWA was
busy trying to keep an increasingly older, inefficient, and costly fleet in operation. As fare
wars raged in the newly competitive market, TWA, whose cost structure was considerably
higher than its competition, sunk further and further into debt.
TWA's predicament goes well beyond the airline itself and extends to local and regional
politics. The evolution of the hub and spoke system created a hierarchy of airports across
the US. Cities with hub airports were afforded much better air transport services in terms
of quantity and quality of destinations, especially international destinations. Hub airports
became the new gateways for global air service. Cities with hub airports enjoyed direct air
travel connections to the global economy, whereas non-hub cities had less frequent and
more inconvenient service to foreign destinations. TWA's hubs at New York's La Guardia
Airport and St. Louis' Lambert International Airport created new and interesting political
problems for these cities and regions.
Neither city or state wanted to be saddled with TWA and its myriad problems, but they
also did not want to risk the loss of hub status and its economic and political benefits.
Thus, TWA's fate became inextricably intertwined with local and regional political
interests. This relationship has created some unusual circumstances for both the airline
and the local officials. In 1992, for example, when British Airways proposed to purchase
an equity stake in failing USAir, TWA and its political supporters stepped up to lobby the
US Department of Transportation for special and favorable consideration of the bailout.
Despite wide-spread concern by national political leaders about the prospect of increased
foreign ownership of American carriers, Senate leaders from New York and Missouri
argued that BA should be given the opportunity to save USAir (Newhouse 1993). This
support had little to do with the Senators' concern for USAir's employees and the cities
they served, but had everything to do with the fact that a revitalized USAir might acquire
failing TWA and secure hub status for La Guardia and St. Louis. Unfortunately for TWA
and its hub cities, the BA-USAir deal was restructured in ways that left USAir in no
position to play savior for the trouble carrier.
In 1993, after it became clear that an acquisition was unlikely, the City of St. Louis moved
to prevent TWA from complete collapse. In an unusual move in this era of privatization
and divestiture, the City purchased TWA's 57 gates and other equipment at St. Louis
International Airport for $70 million, forgiving the airline's debt of $5.3 million and giving
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the struggling carrier $65 million to meet its operating and other expenses. The city,
desperate to protect its hub status, decided that this scheme would allow St. Louis to avoid
the troubles faced by other hub cities in which airlines failed and bankruptcy proceedings
paralyzed any attempt to attract new airlines (St. Louis Airport Authority 1993).
The City of St. Louis and TWA continue the struggle to maintain and enhance their hub
status. Unfortunately, the efforts of the city combined with the TWA's dire circumstances
make policy success unlikely. In its most recent efforts, the city has proposed an enormous
expansion of its runway and terminal capacity. While the stated goal of this project is to
enhance the airport and help TWA survive in the competitive global air travel market,
critics of the expansion question the financial, technical, and commercial assumptions
behind it. It is quite possible, for example, that TWA, which has not been able to make
money in recent years while most other major carriers have achieved record profits, will
actually sink under the burden of much higher landing fees and operational disruptions
caused by the expansion. Ironically, recent cash infusions of up to $26 million in pre-paid
tickets by the St. Louis business community make the relationship between the city and the
airline uneven. The airline very existence depended on the cash it received earlier this
year. There is little the airline can do or say to go against the wishes of city decision
makers who are determined to expand the airport. St. Louis is in the unenviable position
of wanting to expand its airport capacity to save its hub cartier, while its efforts might
actually kill the airline and saddle the city with an expensive and infeasible project.
The story of TWA and St. Louis is interesting because it highlights the difficulties
associated with making local and regional policies in a liberalized global economy. In a
truly liberalized market, TWA would have vanished years ago. Instead, it limped along
through two bankruptcies and is alive today only because of the cash infusions noted
above. Those interested in efficient markets and industries might hold up TWA as their
case-in-point: the airline, despite recent efforts, is still inefficient and unprofitable
(although the airline has shown some stability in recent months). Moreover, while
successful carriers are expanding their global route structures, TWA is contracting and
abandoning foreign destinations. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this experience is
that the market has indeed changed such that local and regional political leaders can only
stave offthe inevitability of failure for inefficient carriers.
This conclusion begs the critical question though of how the loss or diminution of air
travel services actually affects the economies of cities like St. Louis. If, as many aviation
advocates suggest, air transport links to the global economy arc critical for a city or
region's economic well-being, then perhaps the failure of airlines like TWA represent
larger political and economic problems. This is an empirical question on which little
systematic analysis has been conducted. The question is further clouded by the circulation
of analysis which is motivated more by marketing than by rigorous examination of the
impact of the acquisition or loss of air transport services. It is possible, however, that in
most cases, cities, regions, and nations that lack quality air transport services will be at a
disadvantage in competition with their counterparts who axe well served, but this should
not be interpreted as justification to spend scarce resources to build airports, purchase
aircraft, and operate airlines, without respect for real costs (Caves 1993).
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6.2 Globalization and the developing world: The African dilemma
Ironically, much of the literature on the globalization of the air transport industry is
strangely silent on the subject of aviation in Africa (See OECD 1993 and 1997).
Seemingly for many analysts, globalization includes only Asia, Europe, and North
America, leaving South Amedca and Africa out of the mix. A closer analysis oftbe likely
impactoftheliberalizationeffortsdiscussedearlieron thenationsofAfricaprovidesgood
cluesabout why thecontinentisleftoutofotherwiseglowingrecitationsaboutthevirtue
ofcompetitioninairtransport.Unlike,thecircumstancessurroundingSt.Louisand TWA,
inwhich onlyasingleregion,islikelytobe adverselyaffected,and thenonlytemporarily
as themarketadjuststomeet demand, AfricalagsbehindtheindustrializedNorth inways
thatsuggestitsproblemsaremore intractable.
Africa suffers from its internal political and economic difficulties as well as a general lack
of integration with the global economy. More importantly for the issue of air wansport,
Africa has neither the airport infrastructure or airline industry necessary for participation in
a liberalized air transport market. Thus Africa poses an interesting case for policy makers
and scholars alike who hope to understand the true impact of globalization. As noted
earlier, liberal theories of international relations suggest that globalization of
transportation links will not only reduce the probability of conflict, but also enhance the
prospects for economic growth the development. Therefore, Africa emerges as a case in
which the promise of liberalization and globalization can be critically examined.
Preliminary analysis suggests that Africa will not gain from the globalization of the air
transport industry, especially if that globalization is defined primarily by a liberalization of
the industry. In that context, the differences between Africa and the indus_alized North
loom ominously. While observers complain about the lack of airport capacity or the poor
quality of the transportation infrastructure in some industrialized nations, those problems
pale in comparison to the general situation in Africa. In some sense, Africa is starting
from nearly ground zero in the development of its airlines and airports (Kaput 1995 and
Woolley 1984). This necessarily places it in a difficult position when the key to enter the
global economy is a commitment to liberalization and its various requirements.
The infrastructure and airlines that are now being privatized and deregulated in much of
the industrialized world grew up in an era of careful protection and indulgence from
national governments. Relying on arguments about national security, economic
deveiopmenL and social justice, governments around the world poured resources into the
development of their aviation infrastructure. To the extent the economies of these states
developed as well, aviation played an interactive role in the enhancement of economic
growth. This is a careful distinction from the simplistic argument ofaviation proponents
who suggest that if one builds airports and develops airlines, his economy will magically
grow and develop in ways that are impossible without air transport. A analogous and
illustrative example of this logic comes from the American National Business Aircraft
Association, who, as part of their "No plane, no gain" marketing promotion,' published
results of a study that purported to show that companies who owned their own business
aircraR were more successful than companies that didn't. An interesting correlation to be
sure, but it says little about causality. One could easily say that successful businesses are
more Likelytopurchaseand operateplanesthanfailingfirms,butthistellsuslittleabout
theeffectof planeownershipon firmperformance.
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Similarly, one is tempted to argue that since industrialized and newly industrialized
nations, such as those in Asia, worked hard to develop air transport infrastructure and good
domestic airlines, that such efforts are equally critical for the economic success of those
nations lagging behind. The central question is one of sequence. It is more plausible that
aviation, like other economic resources, develops simultaneous with other sectors of a
growing economy. Initial government protection and public support for these aviation
projects is critical since the private sector is unwilling or unable to take on the burden of
paying for and managing such enormous investments. A good aviation infrastructure helps
develop and is itself developed by a growing, dynamic economy. In short, aviation
projects and investments are "lumpy." In other words, you cannot build a quarter of a
runway this year and wait until the resources appear or demand becomes more evident
before adding the next quarter. Airports and airlines are complex and expensive
operations that typically require huge investments and careful management. To this end,
African nations are poorly situated to develop their aviation resources in any significant
manner. More importantly though, the current trends towards liberalization place
additional constraints on any efforts that might be made.
Recall that liberalization efforts include a number of provisions that are aimed at reducing
the role of government, as either protector or investor. Proponents of liberalization tout
the efficiency gained by privatizing state-owned airlines and airports, curtailing subsidies
for otherwise failing airlines, and ending route and slot restrictions that only serve to
protect inefficient domestic airlines. The empirical evidence for the benefits of
liberalization is in most cases preliminary, but seems to lend support to these claims.
Unfortunately, most of this evidence comes from the US and Europe, with some evidence
from nations of the Pacific. These are typically industrialized nations with mature aviation
industries and substantial infrastructure already in place.
The question then is how liberalization will affect the poorer, less-developed economies of
Africa and Latin America. If history is any guide, the results will be dismal. This is not to
say that progress in this area is impossible, but that earlier efforts to improve Africa's
aviation resources have produced woeful results. In particular, multilateral development
projects have done little to effectively improve Africa's aviation infrastructure. Similarly,
private initiatives have also floundered. The International Air Transport Association
(IATA), the organization of the world's airlines, launched a program in 1980 to help
developing countries airlines (WooUey 1984 and IATA 1996). Called the Program for
Developing Airlines (PDNA), the program was designed to give technical and
management assistance and training to airlines in the developing world. The idea is an
intriguing one because it recognizes that financial assistance to build airports and purchase
aircraft are likely to be wasted if pilots and managers are inadequately trained and poorly
prepared to operate them. The program got off to a slow start since the airline industry
was in dire financial straits generally in the early 1980s, but as that position improved,
airlines from the developed world increasingly offered assistance.
At_er early promises and raised expectations, the commitment to such programs declined
and most developing nations' airlines found themselves virtually alone once more. What
explains the initial interest in assistance and then a significant reversal? A powerful
explanation, and one that raises additional questions for the future of air transport in the
developing world is the nature of competition. Recall that in the early 1980s the
16
restrictivebilateral regime was still very much in place and as such emphasized the
primacy of national flag-carriers. With such protections in place, powerful airlines from
the developed world were unable to tap the markets of the developing world. Helping
these less-fortunate airlines in this regime implied no competitive costs to the dominant
carriers. American efforts to open the skies slowly changed this attitude by raising the
possibility of more liberal international competition. In simple terms, it no longer made as
much sense for the developed nations' airlines to assist the airlines of the developing
world.
The proponents of liberalization would likely agree that the incentive to help developing
nations' carriers has declined significantly, but they would quickly suggest that this is not
all that bad. In fact, they would argue that an open skies regime with no limits on foreign
ownership and cabotage will actually benefit the developing market since efficient airlines
from the North will move in to offer services to meet demand. In turn, the argument goes,
better service will increase economic development potential and the developing world will
be on its way to more effectively participating in the global economy. Early indicators
suggest that this argument is somewhat accurate, but care must be taken when drawing
conclusions.
Success stories in the developing world can be found in South America where American
carriers have expanded and enhanced service between the US and various Latin American
countries. By utilizing code-sharing and equity investments, domestic carriers have been
improved and service levels increased in many markets. Problems exist, however, and
they will be more difficult to address. The greatest problem is airport capacity. As noted
earlier in the case study of St. Louis, this is not exclusively a developing world problem,
but resource constraints are more severe in the South and likely to create significant
obstacles to timely development of aviation infrastructure.
A more intriguing problem concerns sovereignty and autonomy. Here the lines between
the proponents and opponents of liberalization will be more clearly drawn. If the
dominant airlines from Europe, Asia, and North America do in fact expand to offer air
transport services in Africa and other parts of the developing world, it will be at the cost of
the sovereignty and autonomy of those developing nations. For liberal theorists, the
answer is a resounding "So what?" but for critics of liberalization and concerned political
leaders of these nations, the loss of aviation autonomy, even if better services are received
in exchange, is a risk they are leery of taking. It is difficult to put a value on sovereignty
and autonomy, especially when objective empirical evidence of money saved, routes
served, and safety standards upheld are readily available to counter fuzzy arguments about
these abstract national interests. This is the important and difficult question to answer
when one considers the impact ofgiobalization of air transport.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper offers a rather broad stroke examination ofthe trends in air transport that have
been variously labeled as globalization, liberalization, and open skies. The paper does not
offer a definitive conclusion about the utility of liberalization, but raises the equally
important questions of whether the process of liberalization, which seems to be inevitable,
will actually create a more competitive air transport market and whether the liberalization
process will actually create a globalized air transport industry, competitive or otherwise.
The conclusions are preliminary, but suggest caution when reading about the triumph of
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liberalization and competition. The relationship between airlines and governments
suggests that dominant carriers will likely play a significant role in shaping the new
regulatory framework, whether that is a reformulated bilateral regime or an
institutionalized multilateral approach. These airlines, like all firms, are expected to
pursue their own interests and call for an air transport market that allows them to
maximize their profits and exploit their competitive advantage. One ramification of this
trend is that local and regional political leaders will be challenged with the task of
maintaining or enhancing their airport capacity in order to ensure good air transport
services. As the story of TWA and St. Louis shows, this is not an easy task in a rapidly
changing and dynamic market. Similarly, the trend towards liberalization suggests that
political leaders in the developing world will be faced with the choice of fighting the trend
and maintaining support for their flag-carriers or opening their markets and facing the
uncertainties associated with attracting and maintaining quality air transport services in a
highly competitive market that rewards only those carriers that contain costs by
abandoning routes and services that are unprofitable. The future is not altogether
troubling, but political leaders will need to proceed carefully, yet aggressively if their
cities, regions, and nations are to benefit from the globalization of the air transport
industry.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent tendency of globalization and/or internationalization stimulates the air-demand more
and more. In Japan, the 66.9 million passengers used the domestic flights in 1995. About
56.4 million passengers, 81% of domestic air passengers, used either of Tokyo International
Airport (henceforth called as TK'y) or Osaka International Airport (henceforth called as
OSA) or both. Only 19 % of domestic air passengers used other local flights. The flight
number of both airports reaches almost the limit of their capacity, and that of Kansai
International Airport (henceforth called as KIX) opened in 1994, is also estimated to be
saturated in the near future. Thus, New Chubu International Airport is being planned.
Under these situations, it is needed to develop the suitable and easy tools to analyze the
impact on the air passengers' flow by the construction of the new airport.
There has been many researches in the field of demand forecast under a given aviation
network. Researches by Modchi et al (1993), and Furuichi et al (1993) are the examples of
introducing the logit type models. However, these do not consider the strategic behavior
of airlines. Todorold et al (1992), Kita et al (1995) and Takase et al (1995) developed
models to consider the behavior of airlines and passengers. These are quite interesting in
the sense that they include the objective functions of both of airlines and passengers.
However, they lack the approach to an "equih'bda" between airlines and passengers.
Ohashi ¢t al (1996) formulated the equilibrium between airlines and passengers as the
"general equlh'brium" considering the aviation fee and flight fi'equency. Their model is very
precise fi'om the theoretical viewpoint. However, when that model is applied to the real
aviation network, it may be difficult to take the equll_dum solution because it requires the
quite huge size of computation. Taking these into account, the present paper aims to
develop an easier analytical tool to obtain the equih'brium flow in the air transportation
network.
In the real air transportation market, (1) the flow of passengers and / or goods is the
resultant equih'brium in the market through strategic behaviors of transportation agencies
(henceforth called as carrier) and passengers or shippers (henceforth called as user) under
the governmental policies which include airport construction and its management, (2) the
carrier has the perfect information about the users' behavior, but users have the limited
information provided by the carrier, (3) the relationship between the carriers and users is not
interactive. This situation of air transportation market constituted of the government, the
carrier and the ,user can be regarded as the gaming so called as Stackelberg Problem.
Under these understandings, Kuroda and Takebayashi (1996, 1997) developed a model to
obtain the Stackelberg equilibria among carriers (airlines and railways) and passengers under
given inter-regional O.D. distn'bution of demand. The present paper analyzes the impact of
the construction of New Chubu International Airport on the air passengers' flow based on
their model.
2 MODEL FORMULATION
As discu_ed previously, the equilibrium of the behavior of the carders and the users can be
regarded as the Stackelberg equilibria in the transportation market. The Stackelberg
planning problem is characterized as follows;
2
A4
1) There are two types of players in the game; the leader and follower.
2) The leader has the perfect information about the follower's behavior, while the
follower must behave under the constraints of the strategy provided by the leader.
The carriers, in this paper, are regarded as the leader, and the users as the follower. It is
notified that in the Japanese domestic transportation market, the airlines and the railway
company take the role of the carrier, because the long distance bullet train is a competitive
mode to the air transportation. The structure of the problem is shown in Figure 1.
Carries (Upper Problem)
IAirline Companies _l_l_Train Company
I Lower Problem
I Users (r°ute ch°ice) I
Figure 1 The Structure of the Problem
In the real world, Nash-type equih'brium between the airline company and the railway
company must be explicitly discussed. However, since the present paper focuses on the
influence of the strategy of the airline company on the domestic air transportation market,
the railway company is treated as the player who does not change his present service level
even if it plays a role as an alternative transportation mode.
2.1 Premises and Assumptions
In modeling of the airlines' and the passengers' behavior, followings are assumed and
premised;
1) Airport locations and its capacities are a priori given as the policy scenario by the
government.
2) The railway network including that of the bullet train (Shin-kan-sen) and the train
schedule are given, and the railway company does not change its train schedule and fare.
3) The capacity of train is assumed to be large enough to carry all the passengers between
any origin and destination.
4) Railway stations are assumed to locate at the centroid of each zone.
5) The access and the egress to the bullet train station in the zone are limited by the
ordinary train, while those to the airport are available by either of the ordinary train or
the limousine bus.
6) The O.D. distribution of passengers is a priori given. This means that the present
paper does not treat the long-term equilibrium of the system, but the short-term flow
equilibrium.
7) Passengers can choose whichever the railway or the airway.
8) Competition among air carriers is not explicitly treated, but implicitly considered by
introducing a load factor. ""
9) The airlines can decide their airway service route, the craft capacity, the fair, and the
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scheduledfrequencyundertheconstraintsoftheairport'scapacity.
10) The purpose of the airlinesisassumed to maximize theirnet revenue,while the
passengersbehave to minimize the totaltraveltime,totaltravelcost,or the total
generalizcdcost.
11)At the hub airport,the connectingtime necessaryfortransitpassengersisassumed
constant. Thismeans theRightscheduleisplannedtosatisfythisconstraint.
12) The airfareperpersonforeachairlineservicerouteisassumed constant.Thismeans
thereisa regulationon airfareby thegovernment inJapan.
2.2 Airline's Behavior
The airlines can decide their strategy to maxir_e their net revenue under the perfect
information about the passengers' behavior, but their scheduled flight frequency is
constrainedby theairportcapacity.Theirrevenuecomes from thefareoftotalpassengers
of theirflights,and theyexpendtherunningcostssuch asdepreciationof crafts,fuel,crew
expenditure,and so forth,and theairportcostssuch aslandingcharge,rentalfeeof terminal
facilities.Thus, referringto Figure 2, the objectivefunctionof the airlineand the
constraintsaregivenby
X 2e '-yl, cae* (for w,eSa)
- (/or Vl,feL.,
and Ipassenger'sbehaviorI
Vm)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
where
L: a set of links
La : set of airway links (La eL).
k : a route consisted of a series of links.
l : a link as an element of a route with its direction.
: same .link as the link l with opposite direction of I.
i,j: origin and destination zones.
x_,: travelers volume per day from the zone i to the zone j using the route k.
Ad:#: airfare per person for the link I.
e t : Kronecker's delta defined as
1 : the link I is included in the route kEKa
el (
0 : others
6ta : Kronecker's delta defined as
fl : the link I is an airwaye;
: others
Ka : set of routes including airway links.
RC,,/: one flight operational cost of a craft of size m for the link/.
APC_ :one flight airport charge of a craft of size m at the terminal h.
y_ : daily service frequency of crafts at the link I.
6_ : Kronecker's delta defined as
1 : terminal h is included in the link 1
6/
_-0 : others
CA./_: capacity of terminal h, expressed by maximum flight number.
H: a set of terminals.
Ha: a set of airports (Ha _H).
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The constraint Eq.(2) means that the total flight number at the airport h does not exceed the
capacity of the airport h. The constraint Eq.(3) means that the flight frequency of the link l
is the same number as that of [. The constraint Eq.(4) means the non-negative number of
each flight frequency.
Airport
h_ _J
/
!
i
I
6
Airport ht
Routeks
Bullet train
/,
Air service ]Jz_
Route
Local Train
Airports access or egress
Figure 2 Concept of Transportation Network
2.3 Passengers' Behavior
The passengers can choose either of the airway or the railway consulting their preferences
under the flight schedule and the capacity of flight provided by the air-carriers and those by
railway companies. The total travel time for aviation passengers considered is shown in
figure 3.
The passengers may prefer to minimize (1) the total travel time, or (2) to minimize the total
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travel cost, or (3) to minimize the generalized cost. IC Kuroda and M. Takebayashi (1996)
investigated above three criteria for air passengers, and concluded that the criterion of the
minimum total travel time was most appropriate to explain the air passengers' behavior.
Access time Ldnehaul travel
Waiting time at
departure airport; W'I'
average waiting time
Linehaultravel
Egresstime
) Destination
r,, .q
Waiting time at transit airport;
Figure 3 The Content of Aviation Passengers' Travel Time
Therefore, the present paper employs this criterion. It is formulated as follows;
minT(x_)" _ _ _ xo.k't_,
OT t "6 t
2h "_
IFI
R t t t OT
+6k (t_ 6*'t`+ ,_hX_'_ 62. "62h" 2"]_y t. )}
S.t.
2222 /-   k <y,. cae2,
ijkm
xvk _0
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
where
x_: passengers' volume from zone i to zone j using route k.
X#: the volumes of OD passengers between the zone i and the zone j (person/day).
CAP,,:: the aircraft's capacity of a craft of size m at the airline or railway service
route
l (person/craft).
WT: waiting time for transit at the airport (assumed as a constant value).
6ta :Kronecker's delta defined as
/ 1 : route k includes airlines
6_ L 0 : others
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6_ :Kronecker's delta defined as
: 1 : route k includes railway
6_ L 0 : others
tq,: travel time from i to j at route k.
tz_°': the total access and egress time at the route k between the zone i and the zone j(min).
tt: the line haul travel time at the link 1 (rain).
OT: the opened time of the terminal (hrs/day).
/(,,t: the load factor of the craft of size m at the link 1.
62tj,:Kronecker's delta defined as
6alk: _1 : link l is the first link included in route k
: others
63t, :Kronecker's delta defined as
fl : link l is the second link included in route k
631k L
0 :others
62th :Kronecker's delta defined as
j" 1 : terminal h is included in the link 1
,h t L.
0 : others
The constraint Eq.(7) means that the total number of passengers using all routes between the
zone i andj must be equal to its O.D. volume of passengers, and Eq.(8) gives the constraint
that the air passengers at any air transportation link must be less than equal to its total
capacity, and Eq.(9) gives the non-negative constraint for the variable x_,.
3 MODEL TEST BY PASSENGERS' BEHAVIOR
3.1 Numerical Conditions
Kuroda and Takebayashi (1996) discussed the model performance by applying it to domestic
transportation network in Japan, and concluded that the minimum travel time criterion can
well explain the behavior of passengers. However, they suggested that the constant
waiting time for transit passengers assumed in their model has given a discrepancy for local
line passengers. Then, in the present paper, the passenger behavior model is appropriately
modified as discussed previously. Therefore the present paper again discussed the modified
model performance for estimation of passengers behavior. In numerical computations,
following data is used;
3.1.10D Zones and OD Distribution of Passengers
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Prefecturegovernmental domain is employed as the OD zones (Table 1), and each of the OD
pair of passengers between every two prefectures is used as the data based on the Survey of
Passengers Movement by the Mirdstry of Transport of Japan in 1991 (Ministry of Transport,
1991). This OD distn'bution is assumed not to be influenced by the charge of the airline
policy, because the OD distn'bution is mainly determined through socio-economic activities
in the region. It is, however, noticed that the volume of air passengers, that is, air demand,
is, of course, influenced by the air line policy.
Table 1 OD Zones
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
! i
Hokkaido Aomori Ibaragi Toy4una Ship Tottori Tokushima Fukuoka Okinawa
Iwate Tochili Ishikawa Kyoto Shimana Kagawa Saga
Miyaci Gunma Fukui Osaka Okayama Ehimo Nagasaki
Akita Saitama Gifu Hyogo Hiroshima Kochi Kumamoto
Yarnagata Chiba Shizuoka Nara Yarnaluchi Oita
Fukushima Tokyo Aichi Wakayama Miyazaki
Kanapwa Mie Kagoshlma
Niipta
Yarnanashi
Nagano
3.1.2 Airports and Service Route Network
Since, in Japan, the airline policy is more or lessrestricted by regulation of the central
government, the airway routing and service frequency might not be optimal for air carriers.
Thus, the comparing with the existing airway routes and frequency and computation results
by the model is nonsense. Therefore, in the present paper only passengers behavior is
examined under the existing policy of airlines.. Airports considered in computation are the
first and the second class airports regulated in Japan, those and airline service routes are
shown in Figure 4. It is noticed in the figure that Kansai International Airport (K.IX) was
opened in 1994, and extension of Tokyo International Airport (TIC_ will be completed in
1997 which will supply more capacity than the present. Therefore the model test was
carried out for the condition before KIX was opened. However, simulation of airport
policy scenario in the succeeding chapter is carried out aster K.IX is opened and extension of
TICY is finished.: In Table 2 is listed the capacity of main airports.
3.1.3 AircraR and Costs
The aircraft type used for the domestic service, their capacity and their operation costs are
listed in Table 3. The airport charge is also listed in the same table. The operation cost of
aircraft is referred to the Airline Statistics in 1991 (Ministry of Transport, 1991), and it
includes the redemption cost of aircraft as an average value. The airport charge of all the
airport considered is the same. This is referred to the Airline Statistics in 1991(Ministry of
Transport, 1991). Load factor of all crafts is assumed as 0.7, which is considered as
average value in all service routes.
3.2 Examination of Passengers' Behavior
A4
As previously mentioned, model test is carded out only for passengers' behavior under the
air service network in 1991. The computation results by the model are compared with the
Airline Statistics in 1991 (Ministry of Transport, 1991).
Figure 4 Air Service Routes
Table 2 Capacity of Main Airports (1991)
Airport Capacity
(craft/day)
TKY 400
OSA 300
NGY 240
SAP 300
Table 3 Capacity, Operational Cost and Airport Charge
Type Capacity Operational Cost Airport Charge
(person/craft) (thousand yen/flight) (thousand yen/flight)
B747 569 6.037 475
DC10 318 4.750 374
B767 288 2,815 221
A300 308 3.187 : 251
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The air passengers' volume of all service routes estimated by the model and those by the
statistics are shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5 Comparison of Air Passengers Volume
The figure shows the model can well explain the behavior of passengers who chose the air
transportation. The correlation coefficient is 0.984. However, it can be seen that there
are some local service routes that can not be explained by the model. Those routes are the
local to local route whose flight service frequency is relatively small than the main routes.
The lower service frequency results in the longer interval time at the airport, which is defined
as the average waiting time in the model. Therefore, the model estimates that passengers
of the region that has an airport with relatively lower fxequent service choose the railway.
The model should be further improved to diminish this point in future. As already
discussed, the model test is carried out under the given air service routes which are more or
less regulated by the government. Then in order to investigate how much is the difference
of air carrier's behavior between the computed (assumed non-regulated free market) and the
present is compared. The results are shown in Figure 6. As can be seen in this figure and
Figure 5, the real service routes in 1991 employed by the airlines were almost optimized in
the sense that they maximized their net revenue. These results may suggest that ff air
transportation market is completely deregulated, air carders may withdraw from these local
service routes. This will be further discussed in the succeeding chapter.
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Figure 6 Comparison of Service Flight Frequency per Day
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4 SIMULATION OF AVIATION POLICY SCENARIOS
As stated in the previous chapter the extension of Tokyo International Airport (TKY) is
completed and extension of Kansai International Airport (KIX) is now being extended, and
further a new international airport is planned to open in 2010 in Chubu Re,on, central part
of main island of Japan, instead of closing of existing Nagoya International Airport. This is
temporally called as New Chubu International Airport (NCB). KIX and NCB are the
offshore airports and their locations are not so far from existing Osaka and Nagoya
International Airports, respectively. Corresponding to extension of KIX, there is some
opinion of closing of OSA airport, which is located at the urbanized area in Kinki Re,on,
because serious noise problem has been induced in the surrounding area.
Under these circumstances, this chapter discusses the influence of these plans and opinions
on the air carrier's strategy in the domestic transportation market and flow of air passengers
by scenario simulation using the proposed model. In the scenario simulation complete
deregulated air transportation market is assumed and the crafts' capacity employed and costs
are also assumed as same as the present, but the estimated OD distn'bution of passengers in
2010 is used. In numerical computations, the annual growth ratio of the domestic O.D.
passengers from 1991 to 2010 is assumed as 1.0% according to the Air Statistics (Ministry
of Transport, 1991). This leads the total of domestic O.D. passengers in 2010 as 108.83
millions (Figure 7). The O.D. distribution in 2010 is estimated based on this annual growth
ratio and the present OD patterns. Four cases of scenario for discussion are considered as
listed in Table 4.
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Figure 7 Comparison of Total Volume of OD Passengers from1970 to 2010
Table 4 Conditions of Airport Capacity
Case TKY OSA KIX Chubu
Case 1 800(extended) 300(present) 200(present) None
Case 2 800(extended) 300(present) 200(present) 300(oonstructed)
Case 3 800(extended) None 500(extended) 300(constructed)
Case 4 800(extended) None 500(extended) None
I
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The _st scenario is Case 1 that assumes that extension of TKY is finished but KIX's
extension is not finished and others are same as the present situation. The second scenario
is Case 2 which assumes that Case 1 plus New Chubu International Airport (NCB). The
third scenario is Case 3 that assumes that OSA is closed and NCB is opened and extension
of KIX is finished. The last scenario is Case 4 that assumes that NCB is not opened yet but
others are same as Case 3.
4.1 Influence of Open of New Chubu International Airport
Since New Chubu International Airport (NCB) is planned to be constructed at the offshore
island where is not so far from the present Nagoya International Airport (NGY), no
influence on other airports is anticipated but only change will be shift of the function of the
present NGY to NCB. It is true when we see Table 5 that lists the computed results of four
cases. In this table, carriers' net revenue is normalized based on Case 1.
Table 5 Impact of the Construction of Chubu New International Airport
Case Carrier's Net Revenue Total Aviation Passengers Average Travel Time
(thousand person/day) (minJperson)
Case 1 lOO 276.2 222.94
Case 2 100 278.2 222.94
Case 3 1 I0 278.1 219.86
Case 4 110 278.1 219.88
Comparing with Case 1 and Case 2, the influence of NCB on carrier's net revenue, total
volume of air passengers and average travel time of passengers can not be seen. This can
be also concluded fi'om Figure 8, which shows the total volume of air passengers of each
airport.
Figure 8 teaches us that the construction of NCB and in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 the close of NGY
gives no influence at all on air market. It is also notable that TICk"will invite much more air
passengers than other airports reflecting the greater increase of OD volume of the hinter
region and transit passengers.
t
This means that airlines proper to take the strategy of Hub-and-Spoke type network of their
service route in the free market for more cost-effectiveness.
4.2 Influence of Close of Osaka International Airport
InIhence of close of OSA can be examined by comparing with Case 1 and Case 3. From
Table 5 it will be estimated that close of OSA will result in increase of net revenue of airlines
and decrease of average travel time of passengers. Comparing with Case 2 and Case 3,
only change induced by close of OSA is the shift of function of OSA to K.IX. When OSA is
closed passengers using OSA may shift to KIX, and K.IX will be functioned as the Hub
airport more than the present as can be seen in Figure 9. •
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( ) shows the ratio of landing frequency to airport capacity.
--_250 (
P _200 I (79.5_)
5100 __),o.o 50
0
TKY NGY KIX OSA
Case 1
[] (ss.o_)
I (28.0%) (67.3'_)
('/9.5_) (81 ._1%) (81.3%) i
[] [] J
_._ v,_ ,-i ,,,t L.O 71) 1
TKY NCB KIX TKY NGY KIX
Case 3 Case 4
TKY NC8 KIX OSA
Case 2
Figure 8 Comparison of Total Volume o fAir Passengers at Each Airport
(I 9.5.4%) (19.54%)
_12
_I0
8
_, 4
_. 0
F-
(3.35%) (3.34%) (,2.94%) (2.94%) :
mmmm(,,.o%) mm m I/- l =m Ul
I
"IXY NGY KIX OSA TKY NCB KIX OSA TKY NC8 KIX "IXY NaY KIX
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Figure 9 Comparison of Transit Passengers at each Airport
From these it is concluded that close of OSA will improve not only the net revenue of
airlines but also the average travel time of passengers by strengthening the Hub-function of
K.IX. This conclusion may suggest that the extension of KIX will invite change of airlines'
routing strategy so as to collect their network from OSA to KIX in the regulation free
market because this change is better for both of airlines and passengers. In order to
examine this hypothesis, Case 4 is carried out. Results are discussed in the next section.
4-3 Influence of Extension of Kansai International Airport
It is easily anticipated that the extension of K.IX will at least influence on existing Osaka
International Airport because those are located very closely. In the previous section this is
suggested. In fact, the results of Case 4 shown in Table 5, Figure 8 and Figure 9 say that
the extension of K.IX will invite all airlines to KIX from OSA in order to make the Hub-and-
Spokes type network which is more cost-effective for airlines and consequently it gives more
convenient service for passengers. This may be true if regulation free market is
accomplished and airlines are assumed to make consortium. However, in the real market,
each of airlines may behave to maximize his own net revenue if independent service is more
profitable than making consortium. Therefore some airlines may serve at OSA and others
at KIX even if KIX is extended. Unfortunately the present paper do not analyze so-called
Nash-type Equilibrium between airlines. This is the future problem remained in the present
13
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paper.
5 CONCLUSION
The present paper proposes a tool to analyze so called as Stackglberg equilibria between air
carders and passengers in the domestic transportation market, and examines the model for
passengers' behavior by comparing with observed volume of passengers and the computed
ones by the model. The results say that the model can well explain the passengers'
behavior.
The paper also analyzes the influences of some aviation policy scenarios, which include the
extension of Tokyo and Kansai International Airports, the construction of New Chubu
International Airport, and the close of Osaka International Airport. Even the present
model gives much information about future conditions under those policy scenarios, these
are based on some assumptions and premises which must be improved. One of those is the
assumption of non-competitive situation among airlines in the market. When this is
considered in the model, a special computation algorithm should be developed. Another
improvement is about the cost function of airlines. The present model does not give the
detail cost function, which makes us imposs_le to analyze the change of airport management
policy such as landing cost and terminal rental fee and so forth.
The model also does not consider the international air passengers' behavior because the
structure of international aviation market is supposed not to be the same as the domestic one.
Therefore, a different approach to the international aviation market is needed. This is the
issue for future analysis of this study.
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Abstract
Spill models estimate average passenger loads when demand occasionally exceeds capacity.
Such models have been in use for over 20 years. The shape of the distribution of demand is
discussed from both theory and observation. Sources of variance are identified and calibrated.
Measurement problems and techniques are discussed. Two alternate spill formulas are
presented based on Normal distributions of demand. A revision is presented which responds
to changes in process caused by computer reservations systems and revenue management.
The concept that spill losses should be valued at discount fares is discussed. The recapture of
spilled demand is presented as well as when such a phenomenon is relevant. Comparison of
various sources of error is included. Finally, the use of spill models "in reverse" to imply
demand from load is shown to have poor accuracy. The paper is meant to offer to the
literature a reference for basic use. It is the result of 15 years' involvement in spill model
derivations, calibrations, and applications.
1. INTRODUCTION
Spill is the average passengers per departure lost off a group of flights because' demand
sometimes exceeds capacity. The group of flights can involve a flight leg for a month, season,
or year. Groupings can involve one leg, a small group of legs reassigned from one fleet type
to another, or all the legs served by a single aircraft type in a fleet. The spill model has been
used widely for over 20 years within the airline industry. However, there has been no
commonly available publication discussing its use. This paper attempts to put into the record
the formulation, its calibration, and some issues of use for airline analyses.
The basic idea behind spill is that demand for a group of flights can be represented as a
distribution about a mean. The integral of this distribution is the "fill" rate for seats on an
aircraft. This is shown in Figure 1. The integral of the fill rate beyond a truncating capacity is
the spilled demand. While spill is the term usually calculated, the model is commonly
employed to estimate the difference in spill between two possible capacities. This is the fill
rate for the extra seats. Perhaps the "spill" model should have been named the "fill" model.
Time and tradition prohibit this nomenclature, but spill model performance is judged by its
performance in estimating fill.
The discussion below begins with the characterization of the demand distribution. When is it
Normal and why? Development continues with two formulas for calculating spill when the
distribution is close to Normal. Discussion then maintains that the appropriate fares to apply
when valuing spill are discount fares. Arguments are put forth that the complications of the
recaptureof spill oftencanbeavoided.Finally, discussiondiscouragesof theuseof thespill
"in reverse"to estimatedemandsfromobservedloads.
2. UNDERLYING STATITICAL MODELS FOR DEMAND DISTRIBUTIONS
The idea behind spill is that the demand for a series of departures has a distribution about its
mean. The most central case in the airline business is the distribution of demand for a flight
over a month. For example, the demand distribution for the set of 30 executions of the 9:00
flight from Seattle to Chicago during the month of April.
The amount of variation in the distribution can be measured by the ratio of the standard
deviation to the mean. The convention within the airline industry is to refer to this ratio as the
"K-factor" [DeSylva, 1976].
One source of the variation in demand is pure randomness. Imagine that 1 million people in
Seattle are candidates to fly to Chicago at 9:00. Each day they flip a coin with a one in 10,000
chance of coming up heads. The probability distribution for such a series of Bernoulli trials
would have a mean of 100, a K-factor near 0.10, and a shape like a 10 th order Gamma.
With demands the size of an airplane, the Gamma shape is almost Normal. With smaller
demands the shape is more skewed and wider, as show in Figure 2. The small demand case
might be appropriate for first class seats. This one-day spill model applies for revenue
management planning. The motivation for the Gamma shape is that one can estimate the
probability of heads, but cannot avoid the random variations in how many heads result from
10,000 coin flips. With perfect estimate for the probability of heads, K-factors for a planeload
of demand are near 0.10.
The spill model for a month includes overwhelming further variations. These come from the
cycles of demand through the days of the week and throughout the weeks of the month. The
cyclical variations correspond to changing the probability of heads on the coin day-by-day. It
would be higher on Friday, and lower on Wednesday. For a single flight for a month, cyclic
variations alone are enough to create a K-factor of 0.30. Cyclic variations are larger than the
random variations, except for small demands such as first class. When cyclic variations are
from several sources, or when they capture uncertainty in the estimate of demand, they are
most naturally Normally distributed. Since total variation is a combination of cyclic and
random sources, the shape must in theory be a compromise between the Normal and Gamma
with the Normal being predominant.
Further cyclic variation occurs when considering not one flight leg but all the legs assigned to
an aircraft in a day. Still higher values apply for all the legs flown by one fleet type for the
month, or by a fleet type over the 12 months of a year.
Proprietary data on demand distributions has been reviewed covering a large number of cases.
Data has come from U.S., European, and Asian airlines covering both domestic and
internationalflying. Data from 15 years back has been examined, as well as data nearly
current. Most data has been daily onboard loads, but analysis has also been done on
reservation system bookings. Problems with the data are discussed below, but the overall
conclusions seem to be supported by most cases.
The primary conclusion is that the demand distribution is as close to Normal as anything else.
Considering the multiple sources of variation, the central limit theorem would lead us to
expect this outcome.
The second most important conclusion is that K-factors are surprisingly constant across
widely differing market types. Furthermore, the increments of variance seem statistically
independent. Table 1 presents the results of studies of the cyclical components of K-factor.
The random component is reserved for the subsequent paragraph. Table 1 says the day-of-
month variation produces a K-cyclic of 0.30. Broadening this to the flights that would be
assigned an incremental aircraft raises the value to 0.35. For instance, this would be the
variation among 4 legs transferred from service by small aircraft when one additional large
aircraft becomes available. This variation is driven by changes in demand by time-of-day.
The K-factor for an entire fleet adds the spectrum of demands a fleet type is expected to serve.
Usual circumstances would see a rise to 0.44 for this effect. The variations across the months
of a year would drive this K-factor to a total of 0.48. Finally, planning studies often accept an
additional uncertainty in the forecast of the mean demand of 20% or more. This can bring the
total cyclic K-factor up to 0.52. This addition is not presented in Table 1, since it is not an
observed variation.
Table 1: Typical K-cyclic Values
case Day Month .Season Year
Flight Leg 0.00 0.30 0.32 0.36
Aircraft Increment 0.18 0.35 0.37 0.40
Fleet 0.32 0.44 0.45 0.48
Random variations add very little to these cyclical components. Random variance is low for
demands of 100 or so. If everyone traveled alone, the standard deviation would be roughly the
square root of the demand. However, the (root mean square) average group size is closer to 2,
so the standard deviation is the square root of twice the demand. This increases a K-cyclic of
0.30 to a total K-factor of 0.33 for a demand mean of 100.
For small demands such as first class, the random variance is large and the demand
distributions are not Normal. For demands below 3, the monthly K-factor can be above 1.00
and he shape can approach a simple exponential distribution. Monthly total K-factors in
Figure 3 show a decline from high values at low demands toward a asymptote at high demand.
Figure 3 can be reproduced using detailed flight leg data.
Direct calculation of variance is difficult. Even with perfectly clean data, a month's worth of
data points gives a poor estimate. Unfortunately, the data are far from clean. Loads and
bookings are truncated by capacity. Low loads are often the result of flights with delays or
weathercomplications.Finally, high loadsaresometimestheresultof thecancellationof
somenear-byflight. Thesedistortionsfocuson thetailsof thedistribution. Unfortunately,
thetailsof thedistributionwouldprovidemuchof the informationaboutthesizeof
variations,if thedatawereclean.
Practicalcalibrationsof K-factorusethemedianto approximatethemean,andthedistance
from themedian to the25%ileobservationto estimatethestandarddeviation.Thisgivesup
abouthalf theformal statisticalefficiency,butproducesbetterresultson realdata. Thishas
beentestedby simulatingcleandataandsimulatingtheusualdistortionsfrom truncationand
delayedor canceledflights. Thesimulateddistributionscloselyresembledrealdata.
However,with thesimulationsthe"true" underlyingK-factorswereknown. Estimatesusing
the25%ileand50%ileloadscapturetheK-factorsunderlyingsimulationsoverusefulranges
of K. A practicalfit thatworksusingthestandardspill formulasevenfor smallerfirst class
cabinsis:
K-factor = (Loads0_iie- Load25_ile+ 1) / (0.674* Loads0_ile) (1)
Calibrations of K-factor are best done in months with low load factors. Averages over several
months are needed, even for clean data. Under few circumstances can the K-factor for an
individual flight leg be estimated accurately. However, similar markets have similar K-
factors, and values seem to be constant across a surprisingly large range of market types.
Where data is unavailable, the values from Table 1 are often used.
K-factors for markets that are purely local and purely one kind of traffic are up to 20% higher
than indicated in Table 1. Most data used for calibrations comes from flight legs with a mix
of business and pleasure travel, and a mix of local demand and demand connecting beyond the
local city-pair. There is imperfect correlation between the cyclic variations of demand for
business and pleasure or in different city-pairs. Over a broad range of mixes, the common K-
factors of Table 1 result. With data that allows separate analysis of components of the total
demand, K-factors for the components are seen to be higher.
3. SPILL FORMULAS
Presentations of spill model formulas date at least as early as 1976 [Shlifer and Vardi,
DeSylva]. P(x) is defined as the probability P of demand x. P(x) is Normally distributed with
mean l.t and standard deviation c. P(x) = N(I.t,_;x). For truncating capacity C, the number of
spilled passengers is (x-C) and the total spill S(C) is
S(C) = _(x-C)-P(x) dx = ty.N(0,1;B) - tr.B.(1-O(0,1;B)) (2)
c
Where _(0,1;B) is the cumulative Normal, and B = (C-l.t)/_.
This formulationprovedawkwardin practice.It representedasmalldifferenceof two larger
numbersandrequiredaccuracyin calculatingN and_. Therewasnoexplicit formulafor _,
soa5- or 7-termapproximationhadto beused.Thismadetheformuladifficult for
spreadsheetsandrelegatedspill calculationsto tablelookupsor usewithin largerscientific
languageprograms.
A simplification wasmadeusingthecommonlogit approximationof thecumulativeNormal
[Swan]. This wasnot accurateenoughfor @in calculationsusing(2), but it allowedan
alternativederivation. F(s) wasdefinedasthefill ratefor seats. Thefill ratewasthe
probability that demandequaledorexceeds. Forb = (s-ix)It,
F(s) = 1/ (1+ exp(1.7.b)) (3)
The integral of the fill rate for all seat counts above capacity C gave the spill value:
S(C) = i F(b)db = (cr / 1.7)- Ln(1 + exp(-1.7- B))
B
(4)
A further extension provides the displacement rate D. Displacement is the incremental spill
for an addition of one customer a day to the average demand Ix:
D = S/Ix + (C/Ix) * F (5)
Displacement values are higher than fill values because an added customer is more likely to
show up on a peak flight, while an added seat is added equally on all flights.
The simpler logit formulation meant spill could be coded into spreadsheets. This increased
the ease and frequency of use. Use now ranges from aircraft assignments to a schedule for a
month, to studies of seating configurations, to the costs of marketing promotions, and most
critically to fleet planning. Most major North American airlines employ this formulation, as
well as several major carriers in Europe and Asia. Other airlines maintain equivalent
formulations using Normal or Gamma distributions. Another distribution that should be
explored is the Log-Normal distribution. Comparison of these various derivations is beyond
the bounds of this discussion. It represents much-needed research.
Spill can be calculated numerically using any reasonable distribution as the underlying
description of variations in demand. Earlier discussion of demand distributions suggests that
the Gamma may be the most appropriate for small demands and small groups of flight legs
while the Normal may be best for broader applications. In any case, decisions are almost
always based on the difference of spill between two capacities. This is the fill rate for the
incremental seats. For typical demands, numerical differences between Gamma, Normal, Log
Normal, and Logit versions compared by incremental fill values are small. Such differences
are overwhelmed by uncertainty in the estimate of the K-factor or other parameters, which
will be discussed later.
4. REVISIONS
K-factors received a modest modification in treatment in 1983 [Swan]. Before then, K-factors
were treated as independent of demand size. This implied that all variation was driven by
cyclic factors. The random component was neglected in both discussion and estimation. A
single K-factor for all fleet planning applications allowed the spill model to be a table lookup
based on demand factor (demand divided by capacity) alone.
Recognition that there was a random component to variations explained some of the
differences between very large and small aircraft and between total demand and demand for
smaller component cabins. Revised versions of the spill model employ K-factors including
both cyclic and random components, as discussed in the earlier section. Cyclic variations do
not depend on the size of the demand, but only on the case being studied. Random variations
do not depend on the case, but are specific to the value of the mean demand. Overall variance
is the sum of the two effects. This means that K-factors change slightly with demand. This
was seen in Figure 3. For demand levels above 100, the random component of K-factor has
been a complication with little numerical significance. For smaller demands, it has improved
estimates meaningfully.
The second revision of the spill model changed the spill values significantly. It was
recognized that a flight's "truncating capacity" is not the seat count on the aircraft. A flight is
not full at 100% load factor. It is full when reservations are no longer accepted. Thelimited
number of reservations then translates through no-show behavior to a load at the gate.
Optimal overbooking policies [Schlifer and Vardi] mean that the expected load is 5%-10%
below the aircraft seat count. This 5%-10% is called "spoilage" in airline parlance. Spoilage
averaged below 5% in the days of a single fare and reliable no-show behavior. In those times
spoilage served solely to protect against excess overbooking, preventing denied boardings at
the gate. With discount pricing and revenue management there is a second reason for
spoilage. Revenue management holds some seats open for late-booking high-fare demand.
This demand does not always materialize, but airlines are willing to take the chance, since
revenues run three times the discount fares. When these seats are not called for, they add to
spoilage. With discounting and revenue management, the average truncating capacity
dropped toward 10% below seat counts.
These issues are illustrated in Figure 4. The "theoretical load distribution" has an impulse
function representing the 100% load factor cases of flights being full. This is the old spill
approach. The "actual load distribution" has a small hump of load outcomes in the 85%-95%
load factor range that represents the loads at the gate for cases when discount reservations
were no longer accepted. Simulations have shown that for spill calculations it is sufficient to
represent this "hump" as an impulse function at the new truncating capacity, in this case at
about 90% load factor.
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Thespill modelwasmodifiedto usethenewlowercapacities.Needlessto saythis increased
theestimatesof spill.
Optimalspoilagelevelsinvolveaninteractionof theoverbookingandspace-protecting
aspectsof revenuemanagement.Simulationshowsthattheoptimalspoilagelevelsfor a
givenmix of faresanduncertaintyriseswith thesquareroot of theaircraftcapacity.Thatis
for seatcountR, spoilages wouldbe:
s= c. x/-ff (6)
Studies showed that the factor c should be as low as 0.5 for a single fare case and could rise
above 1.0 for cases with discounts similar to current US conditions. Large c values were
appropriate when discount fares were low compared to full fares or when uncertainty in no-
show rates was high.
Average spoilage for an airline implies the value for c. Spoilage should be deduced from the
departing loads of flights that are closed to discount fares. When a flight is closed to discount
fares, demand is being spilled. It is not appropriate to measure spoilage only from flights that
are closed to high fare levels. These have low spoilage, but they are not representative. Nor
are flights that are regularly full typical. They often record unusually low spoilage. This
could be because no-show rates are more predictable, or it could be because stand-by demand
tops up the loads. For most planning uses, it is appropriate to calibrate spoilage from a broad
representation of closed flights and not from only from flights that are closed to full fare or
closed frequently. While it is important to include spoilage in predictions of fill or spill,
results are not overly sensitive to getting the exact spoilage value correct.
The concept of spoilage changes the spill formulas in a simple way. The capacity parameter
C becomes the seat count less the spoilage:
C = R - s (7)
5. REVENUES FOR SPILL
The spill model predicts spilled demand. The natural question is, what is the revenue for that
spilled demand? The discussion of spoilage recognized that spill takes place by turning away
discount demand as it requests a reservation. Revenue management systems' function is to
spill discount demand and maintain space for higher fare demand. So the question of what
revenue is spilled is either very complicated or completely simple. The complicated answer
involves understanding what a revenue management system is trying to do on a detailed level,
and how well it succeeds. The simple answer is that spill is at the local market discount fare.
Discussion will try to motivate the simple answer.
The purpose of a revenue management is to spill discount fares when spill must occur at all.
Most current revenue management systems group fares in to "buckets" and limit sales from
the lowestfarebucket. A typicalflight legis half local traffic, andthelocal traffic is usually
well overhalf at discountfares. Localdiscountfaresarelower thanconnectingdiscountfares.
Somostrevenuemanagementsystemslimit localdiscountsfirst.
Eventhebestrevenuemanagementsystemsdoapoorjob of spilling just discountwhenload
factorsarelow andspill issmall. However,whensignificantnumbersof passengersneedto
beturnedaway,it is easierto denymostlydiscountdemand.Furthermore,spill applications
valuedifferencesin spill. Thatmeansit is not theaveragefareturnedawaythatcounts,but
theaveragefareof onelast incrementof spilleddemandthatcounts. Simulationsof leg-based
revenuemanagementsystemssuggesthatwhenspill is not too small,80%of it is turned
awayat thediscountfare,andonly20%atanaveragemix of fares. This split is fairly
consistentfrom modestlevelsof spill up to veryhigh levelsof spill andoverarangeof
discountmarketsharesandprices. Therulebreaksdownat high levelsof spill, whenall the
discountdemandhasbeendeniedandhigherfaresneedto berefused.Thepractical
conclusionis thatspill revenuesarejust abovethediscountlevels.
Themostadvancedrevenuemanagementsystemstry to dobetter. Origin-Destinationbased
systemstry to turnawaydemandfrom two-legconnectingdiscountsif both legsarelikely to
bespilling. Therevenuelostperlegbecomesonly ashareof theconnectingdiscountfare.
Thevalueis well below thelocaldiscountfare. This line of reasoningmeansaveragespill is
atrevenuesslightly belowthelocaldiscount,notslightly above.
Overall, spill isat the localdiscountfare,or ata valuewithin 10%of thisnumberfor planning
cases.This is well within theuncertaintyof estimatesfor otherpartsof aplan, Formarkets
suchasdomesticUShubservices,thevaluerunsabout75%of theaverageyield allocatedto
aflight leg.
6. RECAPTURE OF SPILL
Recapture is the idea that spilled demand does not fail to take the trip. Some of it finds its
way back on to other flights by the same airline. This is easy to visualize on a daily or weekly
basis. Spill from the 9:00 flight will divert to seats on the 11:00 flight, and spill on the
Tuesday departure can arrange to go on Wednesday. For a day or a week, spill modeling
certainly needs to address the issue of recapture.
Recapture is less of an issue for fleet planning. In fleet planning, spill in August cannot be
expected to use space in February, and spill to London does not board the flight to Miami.
While some spill does find space on adjacent flights, the last incremental units of spill are left
with fewer and fewer open alternatives. The broader or longer-run the case or the higher the
spill values, the smaller the likelihood of practical recapture.
For the shorter-run, there is still a need for understanding recapture behavior. This has been
studied with demand models that simulate passenger choices and preserve the second, third,
and fourth choice departures for spilled passengers. It is important to preserve a list of
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alternatives,sinceif apassengerhasbeenspilledoff his first choice,he is latebooking. Other
flights arelikely to befull with primarydemandor earlierrecaptureddemand.While ashort
list is important,preservingavery longlist presentsa problem. At somepoint customers
give up andreplantheir trip aroundadifferentsetof timesor days. Nonetheless,the list-of-
choiceslogic hasbeenusedin simulationscoveringamonthof flights with day-of-weekand
time-of-daycycles. Theresultssuggesthefollowing simplification of recapturebehavior:
spilleddemandfor a city pairloadsitselfon flights asif it isseekingemptyseatswith little
attentionto schedule.After a first pass of primary demand and primary spill, the pool of
spilled demand distributes itself at equal load factors on the remaining available space in the
market. Available space is measured as the seats between the first-pass load and the
truncating capacity C.
This result is a lot less certain than earlier statements about spill. Modest load factors and
small spill will produce the more intuitive result that the more popular flights get most of the
recapture. High demands produce the obvious answer that all available capacity is used, and
the excess demand is lost entirely.
This understanding of recapture has an significant corollary. Extra seats on flights are not
only useful for preventing spill from the flight, they also have value for accommodating spill
from competitors flights or off other flights of the same airline. The reverse side of the
"recapture" coin is this constructive use of extra capacity. The term suggested for this
phenomenon is "refill."
Recapture means spill is lest costly less than it seems. This means extra seats are less
valuable. Refill means extra seats have increased value. The two parts of the recapture
phenomenon do not exactly cancel out, but they can be of similar size. It is not correct to
include one without the other.
In annual or fleet cases recapture is small, particularly for incremental changes. For monthly
cases for a single flight leg, recapture can be important, but the phenomenon of refill cancels
some of its value. Overall, recapture requires a great increase in complication. Unfortunately,
is also is an area where current research has leaves a great deal of uncertainty. Many analyses
choose to argue that recapture and refill are second-order effects and leave them out.
7. ERRORS IN ESTIMATION
Spill can be estimated, but how good is the estimate? Spill calculations require estimates of a
number of parameters. The mean demand, K-factor, spoilage, average revenues, recapture,
and refill all have uncertainties in their estimates. The way to test these estimates is to
compare their effect on the value of an incremental seat on the aircraft. The value of a seat is
the fill rate. This percentage will then be multiplied by the expected fare for spilled
passengers to get the value for an extra seat. The table below develops an example with
variations reflecting the separate uncertainties. Estimate of the uncertainty of individual
parameters is from experience in spill applications.
10
Table 2: Errors in Spill Value for a Flight-Leg Month
Estimated Estimate Range of result
Parameter Value Uncertainty (Seat Value)
Capacity (base $) 200 + 0 $31
Demand 150 5- 15 $17-$48
K-cyclic 0.30 5- 0.05 $26-$36
spoilage factor "c" 0.85 5- 0.15 $29-$33
Spill Fare $150 + $25 $26-$36
Table 2 shows a value of $31 for a typical case of a spill for a flight leg for a month. This
represents using spill to help decide which aircraft type to assign to flight legs in a published
schedule 3 months before the schedule will be flown. The $31 is the value of an incremental
seat using the estimated values for the list of parameters. The greatest uncertainties lie outside
the spill model. Demand uncertainty is the dominant source of error. Uncertainty in the mean
demand reflects not so much the forecast of industry demand three months ahead as the
uncertainty of allocation for one particular flight leg month after month. Uncertainties in the
fare represent both the difficulty of forecast for a single flight leg and the controversy about
exactly which fare is spilled. Uncertainty in spoilage has only 10% of the effect of demand
uncertainty, and doubt about the proper estimate for K-cyclic is under a quarter. For such a
short-run study, recapture and refill values would be relevant. Uncertainties in these would
equal demand effects.
For fleet planning, fill values are higher for the same demand factor, because the data for a
fleet for a year has more variation from its average than a flight leg for a month. Although fill
values are higher, the errors are lower. Averaging across an entire system reduces the
uncertainty in K-cyclic and spill fare estimates, and recapture and refill are much smaller
issues for annual and fleet spill.
8. ESTIMATING DEMAND
The spill model starts with an estimate of the unconstrained demand for a flight. Often, this
estimate comes from historical loads. This is fine when load factors were low. An iterative
process can establish what the demand should have been for spill to result in the observed
load. However, when spill is an issue, load factors are already high. With high load factors,
most flights are full and there is little information in the load distribution. It is very hard to
determine what the underlying demand distribution was from the shape of the observed load
curve. Another way to see this is shown in Figure 5. Implied demand factor is shown against
observed load factor for a flight leg for a month. This is based on numerical inversion of the
spill formula. Above 85% load factor, as little as a 0.5% point rise in observed load implies a
huge increase in demand. To make matters worse, errors in the estimated spoilage are likely,
particularly at high demands. Differing spoilage estimates will give large changes in implied
demand. Used in reverse, the spill model does not work in practice at high spill.
Numerically, the spill model is poor at "detruncation."
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Two methods are used to get around this. Neither are particularly convenient. The simplest is
to look at the leg in question at a lower load factor time, and scale the demand up in
proportions typical for similar markets suffering less truncation. The second is to collect
information from the revenue management system on day-by-day spilled demand and
establish the monthly average. To set its levels, revenue management must forecast the
unconstrained demand for each fare class for each flight leg. Unfortunately, these forecasts
are often used but not recorded. When they are recorded, they are not always very good
estimates. Forecasting within revenue management systems also suffers from diminished
information when spill is high and past bookings have been capped. Finally, recapture and
refill add passengers to observed loads, further complicating the issue. All these complaints
aside, estimates from the revenue management system are often far and away the best
available.
The overall conclusion on demand estimation is that the spill model is fine for predicting spill
when demand is known, but not good at helping with the estimates of demand to begin with.
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Spill estimates the demand in excess of capacity. The model uses a demand distribution and
truncates it with a capacity line. The demand distribution is usually normal. For a normal
distribution convenient formulas exist. Such modeling is broadly used within the airline
industry. Revisions to the model recognize an increase in the variance of the demand
distribution when demand levels are small, due to random variations adding to the usual cyclic
changes in demand. Revisions also adjust for overbooking and revenue management behavior
by truncating demand at a capacity somewhat below the physical seat count. The revenue for
spilled demand is close to the local discount fare. Spilled demand can be recaptured, and the
possibility of refilling with recapture adds value to extra seats. However, recapture is small
for fleet planning cases and can often be ignored. The great frustration with spill modeling is
that for all its effectiveness in estimating spill when the unconstrained demand is known, it
can seldom be employed with confidence to unconstrain demand from observed load
averages.
Overall, spill modeling has produced practical understandings that have found wide use in the
airline industry. Future use may be compromised by rising load factors and a developing
trend to use pricing to fill under-utilized capacity. As pricing manipulates demand away from
its underlying distribution over flights, the spill model use will require further inventiveness
and could become less practical.
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Figure 2: Normal and Gamma Shapes
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Figure 4: Loads: Theory and Practice
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Abstract
Most research on airline passenger spill has assumed the normal distribution of
the nominal demand. But, there are plenty of empirical evidences showing that
the normal distribution does not fit very well in many occasions, especially for
the demand for business and first class compartments. In this paper, we derive
formulae for calculating the expected number of spilled passengers for a group
of flights for the cases where the nominal demand is assumed to follow a
normal, a logistic, a lognormal and a gamma distribution. The spills under the
alternative distributional assumptions arc compared numerically. Finally, the
paper demonstrates that, for each of the four distributions, one can construct a
generic observed load factor (OLF) table, which does not depend on aircraft
seating capacity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Spill models predict average lost sales when demand exceeds flight capacity, and has been
used by the airline industry since mid-1970s (see Schlifer and Vardi, 1976). The spill models
• provide critical information for selecting aircraft size to use for a particular market, how to
assign an airline's existing aircraft fleet to various markets and schedules, and to determine
type of aircraft for meeting future demands. They also form an integral part of dynamic
pricing and yield management system. The idea behind a spill modelling is that demand for a
group of flights can be represented by a probability distribution around a mean value. The
group of flight can be defined according to the wishes of the analyst or the airline that wishes
to use the results. For example, the group can involve one flight segment, a small group of
segments served by single or multiple aircraft types or all the segments served by a single
fleet type.
Airline passenger spill analysis has traditionally relied on the normal distribution
assumption of the nominal demand. But, there are plenty of empirical evidences showing that
the normal distribution in fact does not fit very well in many occasions, especially for the
demand for business or first class compartment. In this paper, we derive formulae for
calculating the expected number of spilled passengers for a group of flights when the nominal
demand is assumed to follow a normal, a truncated normal, a logistic, or a gamma
distribution. The spill rates under various distributional assumptions are compared
numerically. Finally, the paper demonstrates that, for each of the four distributions, one can
construct a generic observed load factor (OLF) table, which does not depend on seating
capacity of the aircraft.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical foundation of the
airline spill analysis by first establishing an important distribution-free identity relationship
among the observed load factor, the nominal load factor and the spill. The main focus of this
section is to extend the traditional wisdom of normality assumption of the nominal demand by
deriving the spill calculation formulas for several other practically probability distribution
functit_s, namely, logistic, log-normal, and Gamma distribution. Section 3 starts with the
discussion of parameter conversions and the role of CV in the shape of the demand
distributions. We will then present a few numerical comparisons on spill calculations under
the four distributions discussed in Section 2. The last section is the conclusion.
2. ANALYTICAL FOUNDATION OF SPILL ANALYSIS
2.1 Definitions and Notation
Let X be the random demand for a flight, or a fare class; and C the seating capacity level
under consideration. Since X is the true demand for the flight, X is frequently called as the
nominal demand in order to distinguished it from the observed demand which is the number
of seatsactuallysold) During the booking process, once the number of booking requests
exceeds the capacity, the airline refuses any additional booking. These additional passengers
rejected in reservation process are called spilled passengers. However, since the demand is
random the airline can not be certain about the exact number of spilled passengers. Also, the
truncation of random demand by capacity limitation makes difficult to examine true empirical
distribution of the demand. On the other hand, for airline spill analysis and demand
forecasting it is important for the airline to identify accurately the true (nominal) demand
distribution from observable demand data.
Let us first introduce a few relevant concepts that will standardize our presentation.
Definition 1: Let Xbe the nominal demand for a flight with capacity of C. 2 Then
1. Nominal load factor (NLF) is def'med as E(X) / C;
2. Observed mean load is the expected value of the nominal demand X truncated at the
capacity level £7, that is, E(min(X, C)); and the mean observed load factor (OLF) is
defined as E(min(X, C))/C;
3. The fill rate (FR) for the p-th seat is defined as P(X > p), that is, the probability that
demand is equal to or greater than p;
4. The spilled passengers (SP) is the number of passengers turned away because the
flight is fully booked. 3 Or mathematically speaking,
sP = el(X- c0 hx, o], (1)
where I(x • o is the indicator function defined as I(x • _(x) = 1 ifx > C and 0 ifx < C.
5 The spill rate (SR) is defined as the ratio of spilled passengers over the mean of the
nominal demand, that is,
SR - SP / E(X) - E[(X- C) l(x >c_] /E(X) (2)
For a standard normal distribution N(0,1), let ¢(x) and ¢a_(x) be the corresponding
probability density function and the cumulative probability distribution function respectively,
that is,
1 ___L x
_(x)=--_e ' and O(x)=I_=_(t)dt.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary for us to establish a simple but useful relationship
between the nominal load factor ('NLF), the observed load factor (OLF), the spill passengers
(SP) in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: It is always true that OLF=NLF- SP/C.
In this paper, we will use the flight demandand the nominaldemandinterchange.ably.
2 The capacity here is not necessarily the physical capacity of the flight. Nowadays, airlines tend to use the
effbctive capacity for the spill analysis, see Swan (1992).
3 Sometimes, we also call the spilled passengers simply as the spill.
Proof: First note that the observed demand Xo is the nominal demand truncated at the
capacity level C:
Xo = X ltx <cl + C ltx>cl.
Therefore, the expected load is given by,
E(Xo)
:..- + ,.-
=lax -SP
Therefore, we have that OLF = (lax - SP) / C = NLF - SP / C, as required.
It follows immediately from the above lemma that OLF = (I - SR) x NLF, which is an
universal relationship among OLF, NLF and the spill rate (SR).
2.2 Spill Formula for Some Common Distributions
In this subsection, we derive the basic spill formula for several commonly used distribution
functions. As is well-known, the traditional spill analysis has mainly been focused on normal
distribution, and occasionally Gamma distribution. On the other hand, empirical distributions
for the observed demands are usually more diverse. Therefore, it is interesting and necessary
to explore other types of probability distribution for the demand. According to Swan (1992),
the demand for the first class cabin is usually neither a normal nor a Gamma distribution.
In this section, analytical formulae for the expected spill and the spill rate are to be
derived for four alternative demand distributions.
(A) Normal Distribution
Let X follow a normal distribution with the mean la and the variance o 2, or simply, N(la, o2).
The density function for X is:
1 _(_-.I..____'
2o- l
f (x ) - "_ a e , - oo < x < oo.
Then the expected number of spilled passengers is given by:
4 This expression in (3), to our knowledge, was first appeared in Shlifer and Vardi (1975) in a different
context. In a more focused paper on airline spill analysis, Swan (1983) derived both of these formulae.
SP = E[ (X- C)I( x,¢) ] = _:( x - C) f (x )dx
t z
= jb_ cr[ _ 2dt-crb[_(t)dt (3)crfTt_b)q_(t)dt= ,_ t -- ®
Jb 42_ _b
cr l.__[ e-,',_l"':
= t- ,,.b - orb(l- ¢(b)) = cr[¢(b)- b(1- ¢(b))]
where b = (C - p)/o-, which is often known as the buffer. Consequently, the spill rate for the
normal distribution becomes
SR = SP / p = CV x [¢(b) - b(1- @(b))], (4)
where CV = a lit is the coefficient of variation, which is usually used to measure the
variability of a probability distribution.
(B) Logistic Distribution
The logistic distribution has been frequently used in airline spill analysis. The popularity of a
logistic distribution in spill analysis is mainly due to two reasons: (a) logistic distribution
gives a reasonable approximation to normal distribution; and (b) a simple formula for spill
calculation can be obtained from the logistic distribution. Also, the logistic approximation
could be calibrated to fit nicely between the results of a normal distribution and a Gamma
distribution in the relevant ranges of spill calculation (Swan, 1992). This subsection gives a
closed-form expression for the spill formula when a general logistic distribution is used to
model the nominal demand.
A random variable X is said to have a logistic distribution with parameters 0 and p
if it has the following probability density function:
exp{(x- 0) / fl}
f(x)=fl[l+exp{(x_O)/fl}]2 for -oo < x < oo, (5)
where 0 is the location parameter such that -00 < 0 < 00 and fl is the scaling parameter such
that 0 < fl < o0. We will denote this distribution by L(O, _. It is easy to check that a L(O, fl)
distribution is symmetric around 0 and also has a bell-shape look as a normal distribution.
But we should bear in mind that the logistic density function has a relatively longer tails and
is more peaked in the center than the normal density function.
The mean and the variance ofa L(O, [3)distribution are given by:
E(X)= 0 and Var(X)=ff_/3
This implies that 13= _13ax/rc. Now note that
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SP = E((X - C)Icx>c_) = _(x- C) f (x)dx
co
= (x- C)
c ]3(1 + e(X_o),a) 2 dx
i eY
= [/3y+O-C](l+e,)2 dy (bytaking y=(x-O)//3)
(c_)_#
co e y
=/3I(Y-C)(l+e,)2 dy (bylettingc =(C-0)//3)
¢
=fl (y-c)(- ) _l+e
co -y
=0+/31" e" dy= /3[-ln(l+e-')]_ =/31n(l+e-C),
_l+e-'
i.e.,
SP=/3In(1 + e -c) =/31n(l + e-W-°va).
Consequently, the spill rate is
SR=SP/ E(X)=(/3/ O)ln(1 +e-W-°va).
(6)
(7)
To our knowledge, the above formula is new. Interestingly, there was an indirect
application of logistic distribution in spill calculation due to the fact that it can be used as an
approximation for the normal distribution. The original attempt was mainly done by Swan
(1983). For the purpose of comparison, let us address this issue in more details.
Recall that, in the derivation of SP formula for the normal distribution, in (3) we have
= cr[7(t - b)qb(t)dtSP (8)
_b
where b = (C-I_)/cr is the buffer, as defined above. Instead of using the exact normal
distribution function and derive the spill formula, in equation (8) one can use the following
logistic density function as an approximation of the normal density function _t):
we wt
f,,(t) - (1 + e" )2 (9)
where w = 1.7. This leads to the following formula for SP:
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I_ J we wtSP=_ (t-b)(l+e_,)2 dt
: ) at
t=b
c_ ® 1 cr _
Then the corresponding formula for the spill rate under this approximation becomes,
CV
SR = °" In(l+ e -_) = --'n'" + -t._b.
w/a 1.7 I U e )
Equation (7) can be rewritten, in terms of the buffer b, as follows:
(10)
SR=(p / 0)1n(1+e
cr , c-, CV
_ ln(l+e-_Tiw)=_ln(l+e-LS'3sb)
/a x _ 1.8138
(I1)
This is different from the spill rate formula (10). The difference between (10) and (11) is
caused mainly by the difference in distributional assumption of the nominal demand. In fact,
according to Johnson et al (1995, p. 119), when w = 1.7017456 the logistic distribution in fact
provides the best approximation to the standard normal distribution.
(C) Log-normal Distribution
Now consider that nominal demand, X, follows a log-normal distribution, implying that there
exist some constants y, 6 and 0 such that
U = ),+6 In(X-/7) ~ N(0, 1).
With this relationship, it can be shown that the probability density function of Xis given by,
t_ e -(r÷6_tx-O))2/2, X > O.
f(x) = -_(x - O)
For our purpose, let 0 = 0.
given by
Then, it is straightforward to check that the r-th moment of X is
E(X') = cxp { r/a + (r_)2/2 }
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where p = - Z/S = E(In(X)) and o _ = I/6 2 = Var(ln(X)). Consequently, the mean and the
variance of the Xare given by
E(X) =eUe ½°: and Var(X) = e2Ue°: (e _'-1).
"With 0 = 0 and using the parameters /.t and cr, the density function of the log-normal
distribution can be rewritten as follows:
f(x)=._o.xe "' , forx>O.
Let us now derive the formula for spilled passengers for a log-normal distribution:
SP = E[(X- C)I(x,c)] = I:(x- C)f(x)dx
= j_e ax
c 42r_ox
1 7 -'c'"')' - C 7 "("-')' dx
-_le " " aX-_le " "
*_ ,: ® _,2 =lnx-p)= _ f e"-rere"÷"dt - _ [ e "-cMt (by taking t
42zrcr J, 427rcr J, cr
i =o . _+0.212 0c O o)"
_1. e ,,-_,.-2, e f -"-", 'J
- --- _d2rr ,
= e"+°:'2 (1 -@(c -a))- C(1 - @(c))
where c = (In C - p)/cr. Consequently, the spill rate will given by,
SP C
SR - E(X) - (1- @(c- a)) e_,.o,,2 (1- @(c)). (13)
(D) Gamma Distribution
According to Swan (1983), there are three main reasons why Gamma distribution is attractive
for modeling the nominal demand. First, the guarantee of non-negative demand is more
realistic than a normal distribution. Second, Gamma distribution appears to be closer to the
shape of the observed load distribution, especially for some flights on high demand days since
they generally have fatter positive tails than the normal distributions. Finally, the Bernoulli
trial component variation is a Gamma distribution.
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But interestingly,therehasnot been any formal development of the spill analysis
using Gamma distribution. Recall that the probability density function of a standard two-
parameter Gamma distribution is
x a-l e-_
f(x) = fl*F(a)' for x _>0 with F(a) = _:xa-'e-_dx.
In this two-parameter Gamma distribution, a is the shape parameter and fl is the scale
parameter. It is easy to show that the moment generating function of the Gamma distribution
is given by re(t) = E(e t x) = ( I- fl t) "_. And the corresponding mean and variance are
E(X)=afl and Var(X)=afl 2. Hence CV= I/,la. Now let us derive the spilled passengers:
SP= E((X-C)I,x,,o)= _2_(x-C)f(x)dx
** C xa-_e-"'# = =[x*e-X_# dx- C_"xa-te-_/#)
=  a[1 - G(C, + CI1-
where G(x, a, if) is the cumulative probability function of the Gamma distribution with the
parameters (a,/5'):
f la-le-tl#GCx,a,#) = dr.
o
Therefore, the spill rate is given by,
SR = [1- G(C,a + 1,fl)]- _c_[1 - G( C,a,fl)].
a#
Since exponential distribution is a special case of Gamma distribution with a = 1, it is each to
check that the spill rate under an exponential distribution is given by SR = e .c/_. But in
practice, the exponential distribution is rarely used to model the demand.
It is worth noting that the spill calculation under a general Gamma distribution is far
more numerically demanding than the other distributions, and direct uses of CV and the buffer
b in the spill calculation are possible, but as natural as under the other distributions.
3. COMPARING SPILL VALUES
3.1 Conversion of Distributional Parameters
From the discussions in the previous section, it is clear that there is no closed-form solution
for the spill calculation except the case of assuming a logistic distribution of the nominal
demand. In the initial stage of spill analysis and application in the1970s, logistic
10
approximationto thenormaldistributionwasanaturalandconvenient choice because of its
simplicity. Direct application of the normal or Gamma distribution would have involved
substantial amount of additional coding and computational requirements. Dramatic changes
have occurred in spill analysis as the spreadsheet software has become much sophisticated
since the early 1990s. The purpose of" this section is to use MS Excel to perform a few
numerical calculations and comparisons for the spill analysis.
Over the years, practitioners in the airline industry have been calculating the spill or
spill rate by directly applying the coefficient of variation (CV) and the expected demand E(X)
(i.e.,/ax). Table 1 summarizes these parameters of the alternative distributions discussed in
this paper.
Table 1: Parameterizing Demand Distributions by Using CVand ft_¢
Demand Location/Shape Scale Spill
Distribution Parameter Parameter Formula
Normal /z = Px _= CVx px cr[_(b)-b(l-q>(b)],b = (C-Px)/Cr x
Logistic
Log-normal
Gamma
0=px
I
(Z_m
CV'
a =_hnO+cz:)
= CV:x l_x
fl ln(l + e -_c'_' _ )
_x(l-*(c-a))- C(l-*(c)),c = InC-/a
,x [1- G(C,a + 1,p)]- C[l - G(C,,',,p)]
3.2 The Shape of Demand Distribution and the Value of CV
One of the important tasks in airline spill analysis is to accurately model the demand
distribution. As pointed out earlier, Swan (1992) indicates that the normal distribution does
not fit all situations. One of key issues is that the shape of the demand distribution is skewed
to left for small cabins, implying a relatively large value of CV. Figure 1 below graphically
illustrates this point, where all of the four distributions are assumed to have same values for
the mean and CV.
One can make a few general observations from these figures. First, for small values of
CV, all of the three non-normal distributions are close to a normal distribution, implying that
there may not be any big difference in spill calculations under the four distributional
assumptions. Second, a normal distribution becomes increasingly inappropriate to model the
nominal demand as the value of CV increases. The spill calculated by assuming a normal
distribution (or its logistic approximation, not shown in the figure) will clearly over-estimate
the true spill when the value of CV is large. Third, the difference in spill between a log-
normal distribution and a Gamma distribution will be surprisingly small for a large CV.
Fourth, as the value of CV becomes larger, the Gamma distribution is getting close to the
shape of an exponential distribution, which is usually not a good shape for demand. On the
I1
otherhand,thelognormaldistributionbehavesmuch more "robust"forthelower portionof
the demand. Finally,for largevaluesof CV, neithera normal nor a logisticdistribution
appears to be appropriateto model nominal demand because these distributionshave
relativelyhighprobabilityof takinga negativedemand while a negativevalue isimpossible
undera IognormaloraGamma distribution.
Figure 1: The Shape of Demand Distribution and the CV
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3.3 Numerical Comparisons of Spills Values
In this section, the spill values computed using the formulae derived for the four alternative
distributions are compared numerically. For each of the four distributions, we calculate the
spill for three different capacity levels, namely, C = 300 (large capacity), 150 (medium
capacity) and 30 (small capacity), and three values ofthe CV: 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8.
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Tables2, 3, and4, reportsspill valuesfor capacity level 300, 150 and 30 seats per
aircraft, respectively. Each of these tables are arranged so as to make it easy to compare spill
values for the four alternative distributions (A = Normal distribution; B = Logistic
distribution; C = Log-normal distribution; D = Gamma distribution) at different levels of
mean and coefficient of variation (CV) of the nominal demand.
Table 2: Spill Table - Capacity - 300
CV = 0.2 CV = 0.5 CV = 0.8
/_x A B C D A B C D A B C 12
220 0.6 0.9] i.3 1.13 15.0 14.4 18.4 18.2 37.3 35.3 38.0 41.2
230 1.3 1.6 _ 2.2 1.9 19.1 18.2 21.9 22.0 43.7 41.2 42.7 46._
240 2.4 2.6 3.4 3.1 23.7 22.4 25.1 26.2 50.3 47.6 47.8 52.3
250 4.2 4.2 5.2 4.9 28.8 27.2 30.0 30.8 57.3 54.2 53.0 58.2!
260 6.6 6.3 7.6 7.3 34.3 32.4 34.6 35.7 64.5 61.2 58.5 64.4
270 9.8 9.3 10.6 10.4 40.2 38.1 39.5 41.0 72.0 68.5 64.2 70.7
280 13.8 13.0 14.2 14.2 46.4 44.1 44.7 46.6 79.7 76.0 70.1 77.2!
290 18.5 17.6 18.6 18.7 53.0 50.6 50.2 52.5 87.6 83.8 76.2 83.9
300 23.9 22.9 23.7 23.9 59.8 57.3 56.13 58.6 95.7 91.7 82.5 90.8
310 30.1 29.1 29.4 29.7 67.0 64.4 62.1 65.0 104.0 99.9 88.9 97.9
320 36.1 35.9 35.7 36.7 74.3 71.7 68.4 71.7 !12.4 108.2 95.6 105.1
330 44.0 43.2 42.7 43.2 81.9 79.3 75.0 78.6 121.0 116.7 102.4 112.4
Note: A = Normal; B = Logistic; C = Lognormal; D = Gamma.
Table 3: Spill Table - Capacity ---150
CV = 0.2
/z x A B C 12
115 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.9
120 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.6 11.9
125 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.5 14.4
130 3.3 3.2 3.8 3.7 17.1
135 4.9 4.6 5.3 5.2 20.1
140 6.9 6.5 7. I 7. 23.2
145 9.2 8.8 9.3 9.3 26.5
150 12.0 11.5 11.8 11.9 29.9
155 15.( 14.5 14.7 14.9 33.5
160 18.4 17.9 17.9 18. 37.2
165 22.0 21.6 21.3 21.6 41.0
170 25.8 25.5: 25.0 25.3 44.8
CV = 0.5
A B cl
9.6 9.1 11.13
11.2 12.g
13.6 15.0
16.2 17.3
19.0 19.8
22.1 22.4
25.3 25.1
28.7 28.0
32.2 31.0
35.9 34.2!
39.6 37.5
43.5 40.9
CV = 0.8
D A B C D
11.0 21.8 20.6 21.4 23.3
13.1 25.2 23.8 23.9 26.2
15.4 28.6 27.1 26.5 29.1
17.9 32.3 30.6 29.2 32.2
20.5 36.0 34.2 32.1 35.3
23.3 39.9 38.0 35.0 38.6
26.2 43.8 41.9 38.1 42.0
29.3 47.9 45.9 41.2 45.4
32.5 52.0 49.9 44.5 48.9
35.8 56.2 54.1 47.8 52.5
39.3 60.5 58.3 51.2 56.2
42.8 64.8 62.6 54.7 59.9
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Table 4: Spill Table - Capacity ,= 30
CV = 0.2 CV = 0.5 CV = 0.8
_x A B C D A B C D A B C D
20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.2 2.6 2.5 2.9 3.1
22 0.I 0.I 0.I 0.I 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.8 3.7 3.5 3.8 4.1
24 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.6 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.2
26 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 3.4 3.2 3.5 3A 6.5 6.1 5.8 6.4
28 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.7 8.0 7.6 7.0 7.7
30 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 6.0 5.7 5.6 5.9 9.6 9.2 8.2 9.1
32 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 7.4 7.2 6.8 7.2 11.2 10.8 9.6 10.5
34 5.2 5.I 5.0 5.I 9.0 8.7 8.2 8.6 13.0 12.5 I0.9 12.0
36 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.'_ 10.6 10.3 9.6 10.(314.7 14.3 12.4 13.5
38 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.4 12.2 12.0 II.I 11.6 16.5 16.1 13.8 15.1
40 10.4 10.4 10.2 10.3 14.0 13.7 12.7 13.2 18.4 17.9 15.4 16.7
42 12.3 12.3 12.1 12._ 15.7 15.5 14.3 14.8 20.3 19.8 17.0 18.3
Note: A = Normal;B = Logistic; C = Lognormal; D = Gamma
From the above three tables, it is possible to make the following general observations:
• It is clear that the differences in spills among the four alternative distributions are
quite small when CV= 0.2. This indicates that distributional assumption does not play
a significant role in spill calculation when the demand is not very volatile, i.e. small
CV value. This observation is consistent with the fact that, for small CV, all of the
three non-normal distributions are close to a normal distribution.
• On the other hand, the differences in spill values between a normal distribution and a
log-normal distribution are quite large for all three capacity levels, and increases with
the value of CV. Therefore, the choice of a demand distribution becomes a far more
serious issue when the demand is quite volatile. Furthermore, the capacity level has
virtually no role to play when deciding which distribution should be used to model the
demand. This is contrary to the findings of other studies on first class or business
class spill analysis.
At this juncture, it is important to reiterate that whenever the spill model is used, the
decision variable usually is not the spilled demand volume itself. It is usually the difference
between the spill volumes for two competing cases. Consider the decision whether to assign
a 130 (Ci) or a 150 (C2) seat aircraft to a flight leg. The relevant question is, how many extra
passengers will the extra seats accommodate, and whether or not the extra revenue would
cover the extra cost of using a larger aircraft? The answer involves evaluating the difference
in spill between the two cases. For a single incremental seat, this is thefill rate for the flight.
For 5 incremental seats, it is simplest to take the difference of the two spill calculations,
which is summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5: Difference in Spills Between CI -- 130 and C2 =150
CV = 0.2 CV = 0.5 CV = 0.8
lax A B C D A B C 12 A B C D
115 2.9 2.6 2.9 2.9 6.7 6.3 5.2 5.7 7.9 7.6 5.3 6.G
120 4.2 3.8 3.9 4.0 7.4 7.1 5.8 6.3 8.4 8. i 5.7 6.4
125 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.3 8.1 7.9 6.4 6S 8.8 8.7 6.1 6.8
130 7.1 6.8 6.5 6.7 8.8 8.6 7.0 7.5 9.2 9.1 6.5 7.2
135 8.6 8.4 7.9 8.1 9.4 9.3 7.6 8. 9.6 9.6 6.9 7.5
140 10.0 10.0 9.3 9.5 10.0 10.0 8.2 8.7 10.0 10.0 7.3 7.9
145 11.3 11.5 10.6 10.9 10.5 10.6 8.7 9.2 10.3 10.4 7.6 8.2
150 12.6 12.9 12.0 12.1 11.1 I 1_2 9.3 9.8 10.7 10.8 8.0 8.5
155 13.7 14.0 13.2 13.3 11.5 11.7 9.8 102 11.0 11.1 8.4 8.8
160 14.6 15.0 14.3 14.4 12.0 12.2 10.4 10.'2 ! 1.2 ! 1.4 8.7 9.1
165 15.4 15.9 15.3 15.3 12.4 12.7 10.9 11.2 11.5 11.7 9.1 9.4
170 16.2 16.6 16.1 16.1 12.8 13.1 11.4 11.6] 11.7 12.0 9.4 9.7
Note: A = Normal; B = Logistic; C = Lognormal; D = Gamma
Table 5, together with Tables 2, 3 and 4, suggests that compared with the log-normal
and Gamma distributions, use of a normal distribution will not only over-estimate the spill at
each capacity level, but also over-estimate the difference in spill when used to evaluate two
alternative capacity levels. This over-estimation becomes increasingly serious as CV
increases.
3.4 Generic OLF Table
For practical reasons, it is often important to have information on the observed load factors
(OLF) associated with spill calculations. Before dealing with the numerical issues related to
OLF, let us first establish the following surprising result.
Lemma 2: If the demand follows a normal, a logistic, a log-normal or a Gamma distribution,
then the observed load factor (OLF) depends only on the nominal load factor (NLF) and the
value of coefficient of variation (CV) of the distribution.
Proof: By Lemma I, we know that OLF = (1 - SR)xNLF. Therefore, to prove the lemma, it
suffices to show that the spill rate (SR) under each of the four distributions can be expressed
in terms ofNLF ( = lax / C) and CV. This is summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6: Representation of Spill Rate by CV and NLF
Demand Spill Rate
Distribution Formula
cv × [_(b) - b(l - ¢(b)],b = (_--_F - 1)/ CVNormal
Logistic _ _ ln[l +e _3cn s_ 7]
43 ¢.;v
Log-normal
Gamma
(1- (I)(c - o')) - _ (1- ¢(c)), c = _NLF ,(7 = %/ln(l+ CV2)
[1 - G(CV2 × NLF ,a + 1, 1)]- [1 - G(CV2 × NLF ,a, 1)]
It is clear from Table 6 that the spill rate under each of the four distributions is a function of
CV and NLF, as required.
An important consequence of this result is that it is possible to generate a generic OLF
Table, which is not related to the capacity level. Table 7 below is such a generic OLF table.
This kind of table is of great importance to practitioners in airline industry since only the
value of OLF is observable.
Table 7: A Generic OLF Table
CV = 0.2 CV = 0.5 CV = 0.8
NLF A B C D A B C D A B C D
0.667 0.666 0.666 0.665 0.66¢ 0.639 0.639 0.626 0.628 0.58(3 0.585 0.569 0.563
0.733 0.731 0.730 0.729 0.730 0.683 0.685 0.672! 0.673 0.609 0.616 0.607 0.596
0.800 0.792 0.791 0.789 0.790 0.721 0.725 0.714 0.71: 0.632 0.641 0.641 0.626
0.867 0.845 0.846 0.841 0.842 0.752 0.759 0.751 0.74', 0.652 0.663 0.672 0.652
0.933 0.887 0.890 0.886 0.886 0.779 0.786 0.784 0.771 0.668 0.680 0.700 0.6761
1.000 0.920 0.924 0.921 0.920 0.801 0.809 0.813 0.805 0.681 0.694 0.725 0.697
1.067 0.944 0.9471 0.948 0.946 0.819 0.828 0.839 0.828 0.692 0.706 0.748 0.716
1.133 0.961 0.963 0.966 0.964 0.834 0.8431 0.861 0.841 0.701 0.716 0.769 0.734
1.200 0.973 0.974 0.979 0.977 0.847 0.856 0.880 0.865 0.709 0.724 0.788 0.75C
!.267 0.981 0.981 0.987 0.985 0.859 0.866 0.896 0.880 0.715 0.7313 0.805 0.764
1.333 0.987 0.986 0.993 0.991 0.868 0.875 0.911 0.894 0.721 0.736 0.821 0.777
1.400 0.9913 0.989 0.996 0.994 0.876 0.883 0.923 0.905 0.725 0.740 0.835 0.789
Note: A = Normal; B = Logistic; C = Lognormal; D = Gamma
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This implies that one can quickly obtain value of the unobservable NLF from a generic OLF
table if the distributional property of the demand is known to be one of the four distributions
treated in this paper. With the information on the values of OLF and NLF, one can easily get
the value of spill rate (SR) by using Lemma 1.
4. SU1Vh-MARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we re-examined airline spill problem and went beyond the traditional
assumption of normal demand distribution. We first established a distribution-free
multiplicative relationship between the observed load factor (OLF), the nominal load factor
(NLF), and the spill rate (SR). In addition to deriving the spill formula for the normal
distribution again, new spill formulae were derived under a logistic, a lognormal, and a
Gamma distribution. Furthermore, each of the four spill formulae is rewritten as a function of
the mean demand and the coefficient of variation (CV), which are the common inputs used to
calculate the spill in practice.
In our numerical example, the spills under three different levels of CV are calculated
at three different capacity levels for each of the four distributions. It is found that for
relatively small value of CV, there is no significant difference in the value of the spills across
the four alternative distributions. As the demand become less stable, or equivalently, more
volatile, the use of a normal distribution becomes problematic because of the increasing
probability that the demand will assume a negative value. The numerical examples in fact
show that the normal demand will not only over-estimate the spill at a given capacity level,
but also over-estimate the difference in spill when two capacity levels are compared.
This paper also found the possibility of using a generic OLF Table for each of the four
distributions because the expression for OLF is not directly related to the capacity. This table
can be very useful to practitioners in spill analysis as it allows to infer the value of the
nominal load factor from the OLF.
The main goal of this paper is to address some technical issues in airline spill analysis,
especially in deriving the spill formulas. There are still a few areas that need further research.
First, the estimation issue is non-trivial because of the fact that the observed demand was
truncated at the capacity. Second, it will be quite interesting to study the implication of yield
management system on the spill and vice versa. It is well known that modem yield
management model typically uses the nested booking policy, implying that many low fare
classes were closed before the flight departure time. Whenever a class is closed, there will be
spill. It is not clear yet how to integrate these two. Finally, it is important that the demand
based on real booking data need to be characterized empirically so that some useful
guidelines for implementations can be set.
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1.INTRODUCTION
It is to standard for practice airline companies to allow passengers to cancel
reservations booked in advance without penalty. In these circumstances, the
likelihood is high that even with a given fight booked solid, seats would
remain empty at take-off because of cancellations or passenger no-shows. In
order to reduce the number of empty seats, airline companies resort to
overbooking. Through carefully controlled overbooking, the airline
companies can reduce the number of empty seats and at the same time serve
the public interest by accommodating more passengers.
A number of conventional airline overbooking models have been developed
in the past several decades. Various techniques have been attempted, yielding
different degrees of success in their experiments. These include recognition
approaches, such as a single overbooking level of single fare model
developed by Beckmann (1958), Thompson (1961), Rothstein and Stone
(1967), Rothstein (1971), Shlifer and Vardi (1975), Gerbracht (1979), Bodily
and Pfeifer (1992); a comprehensive non-nested seat allocation and
overbooking model developed by Chatwin (1993); a comprehensive nested
seat allocation and overbooking model by Belobaba (1987).
2. A DYNAMIC MULTIPLE-FARE OVERBOOKING MODEL
The model of this paper contains a more comprehensive and exact treatment
of the airline reservation's process than any of the foregoing. A discrete time
approach is used and the reservation's procedure is viewed as Multiple-stages.
With the aid of non-linear programming, solutions to the overbooking
problem are obtained that maximize expected gain (passenger revenue minus
costs of passengers denied boarding). The operating characteristics
considered are the probability of cancellations, no-shows and denied
boarding, and constructs multiple-fare penalty cost function that addresses the
practical airline companies" operations under denied boarding situations. The
model also considers the competition of different fare classes with each other
in zero stage. Then overbooking process can include the operation of variable
bookings of multiple-fare class. It better addresses the practical airline
companies' operations under overbooking situations.
The model relates to a fixed nonstop flight and class of multiple-fare service.
The system changes state from time to time according to a request arrival
before departure at a reservation system. As above phenomena to be
described, we construct the following model:
2
Ko_}_
n_Z _./7V_"f,"n_j'.(B"=.,+PL_.,)1
i=1 j=O
(1)
t," o__'
-S, _ f,"(j_osc,(j-(_cc,+Pl&ur.,_)
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Where:
o ;'," : integer number ofoverbooking level on fare class 1"when decision period n,
n=O,l,2 ..... N.
BL" : the integer number of booking level when decision period n.
fan j) : the cumulate probabilities of the number j of survival reserving
passengers on fare class i when decision period n, j = 0,1,2 ...... ;
1=1,2,3 ..... K
f, the fareclass, f_>f2> ..... >fx " 1"= 1,2,3 ..... K
n •
B Oct" .t
in the constrain of booking capacity, the total booking passengers
who are accepted on board in decision period zero on fare class 1
when decision period n. It is constructed as
,BC,- + r,l ,
P l. "_,.. .... :protection level considered average survival (the average of cancellation
probability and no-shows probability on fare class 1' when decision
period n.
OSC, (.) :oversales cost function on fare class i.
BL" :is the overbooking limit when decision period n.
In (1),therearetwo conditions,:(a) oversalescondition,and(b) spoilage
condition,formulatedas
X O_p
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n + nK (PV_s_.i B_cc,i)
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i=1 j=O
for j < ( eL"avs_, , + Ba"c¢,i+ 1)
A useful extension of the analysis in the previous section is to consider the
OSC, (o) (oversales cost function for class i ) and f_ (e) (theparameters
probabilities of the number j of survival booking passengers on fare class i when
decision period n).
(a) Oversales cost function on fare class i ; OSC, (.)
The function OSC, (*) can be expressed in terms of single Oversales cost OSC ,
which are often assumed(Beckmann (1958), Thompson (1961), Rothstein and
Stone (1967), Rothstein (1971), Shlifer and Vardi (1975), Gerbracht (1979),
Bodily and Pfeifer (1992)). Rearranging and rewriting (1) gives
x o,;"
rmx Z _f'/(j). f . rrim[j,(B"ox,i + PL2_r,,]
/=! j=o
(2)
K Ol,'n
-E E
+=tS:( eL_:,_,,+t_,+ )+l
subject to OV/ >_.O
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Where:
OSC " oversales cost.
(b) the probabilities of the number j of survival reserving passengers on fare class
1" when decision period /1 ; ffl (e).
The function ff (e) can be expressed in terms of binomial survival constant
probability, which are often assumed(Bodily and Pfeifer (1992)). Rearranging
and rewriting (1) gives
. ,\ J
i=]g=(l,C;.s,v_+_acci)+j
subject to OV,">_O
K
BL"=Zov,"
i=1
Where:
pn
realsur, i : binomial survival constant probability on fare class 1 when decision
period //, i = 1,2,-3 ..... K
•3. A COMPREHENSIVE MULTIPLE-FARE SEAT ALLOCATION
AND OVERBOOKING DYNAMIC MODEL
We combine the multiple-fare overbooking dynamic model and multiple-fare
seat allocation dynamic model constructed by Cheng(1997). The multiple-
fare seat allocation dynamic model is given by the following function.
(a) Multiple-fare without multiple seat bookings, and with both cancellations
and no-shows probabilities
The function gives :
(
S,-j = _S" - 1
l S" +1
for n>O, S" > O,ACC > RE]
otherwise
(4)
ACC = f, "pL., ,i = /,2 ........ K (5)
n-i
REJ = EMSRavs_,r ( S. ) (6)
_t'here:
S n :available seats when decision period n. The initial value is booking
capacity(B C )
A C C :the expect revenue of accepting the reservation when decision period a.
REJ :the expect revenue of holding a seat from period ( n - 1 ) to period zero after
rejecting the reservation.
Ps"_., :survival probability on fare class i when decision period n,
1"=1,2,3 ..... K.
Edk[SR_-v_(*) . from period ( n - 1 ) to period zero, the expected marginal seat
revenue function considering both cancellations and no-shows
probabilities.
(b)Multiple-fare with multiple seat bookings, and with both cancellations and
no-shows probability
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j=l i=1
(9)
Where:
M_ :the number of seats per request on fare class 1 when decision period n.
CA_' :the number of seats per cancellation on fare class 1' when decision period n.
To determine an optimal booking limit (BL") from the multiple-fare
overbooking dynamic model, we rearrange and rewrite (4)-(6) and (7)_(9).
(a)comprehensive multiple-fare
multiple seat bookings
The function gives •
seat allocation and overbooking without
S,,_,=IS"+(/_-&'Y')-I
lS" +(/_' -BL_')+ I
_a>0, [.9' +(/_' -/L_')] > 0,A__> RBr
(10)
ACC=f_ "Psur,i ,i=1,2 ........ K (11)
RE.J n-I n
= EMSR,_,s.r (S ) (12)
(b)comprehensive multiple-fare
multiple seat bookings
The function gives •
seat allocation and overbooking with
I K
n÷ ! 11S°+(BLO-BL )-_M, ^"
S,,-I = ,_1 Iota>O.[S° +(BL"- BL"÷_)] ->_-'M,".ACC > REI
I=l
(13)
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i=|
(14)
K
K
iffil
RE_.J= Z n-I n nEMSRavsu,.(S - _., M_ + j) (15)
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4.EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This model has been extensively tested on Taipei to Macau international
airline of TransAsia airways" booking system in Taiwan. 26 fights' data are
used for the comprehensive multiple-fare seat allocation and overbooking
strategy models. The results are summarized in Table 1.
In terms of total revenue, our model increases 6% revenue in comparison with
the rule-of-thumb approach of experienced staff, and increases 30.5%
revenue in comparison with the model of Belobaba(1987). With respect to
each flight revenue, our model increases 22 flights revenue in comparison
with the rule-of-thumb approach of experienced staff and increases all flights'
revenue in comparison with the model of Belobaba. One major reason that is
the comprehensive multiple-fare seat allocation and overbooking dynamic
model consider the cancellation probability. The model is suitable for
situation where a strict confirmation process is implemented which reduces
the probability of no-shows, and increases the probability of cancellation.
Table 1. Compare different comprehensive multiple-fare
Strategies
Revenue
of
each flight
and overbookin
seat allocation
Belobaba[1987]
475,652(3)
521.976(2)
strategy models
This research
564.164(1)
565.400(I)
unit:NT$,
Rule-of thumb
505,140(2)
512.464(3)
553,984(2) 564.020(I) 518,884(3)
38o,864(3) 562.548(I) 509.564(2)
385.192(3) 554.224(I) 482.692(2)
359,224(3) 552.512(2) 554,224(I)
352.756(3) 502.384(1) 497,056(2)
547.376(I)
512.704(i)
331.116(3) 530.016(2)
476,984(2)445,784(3)
322,460(3) 546,616(1 ) 462,860(2)
483,452(3) 542,476(I ) 490,776(2)
497,720(2) 552,5129(1)
558.980(1)461.812(3)
425.192(3)
32O.272(3)
270.240(3)
545.284(I)
547.852( I )
525.976(I)
_546.616(I)
439.220(3)
529.920(2)
507.O92(2)
495,772(2)
496.44O(2)
338.536(3)
134,168(3) 520.316(1) 520,268(2)
367.880(3) 547.376(I) 531,728(2)
442.408(3) 504.808(2) 536.056(I)
211,216(3) 539.292(I)
573.960( I)
466,284(2)
494.252(2)
513.468(I)
541.000(3)
337,584(3)
279.276(3)
494.536(2)
519.316(2)
541.048(2)
524.784(1)
497.676(1)
153.764(3 ) 457.964(2 )
331.212(3) 537,532(t) 518.412(2)
Total 9,724.740 13,988,932 13,159,782
Percentage of 0.695 0.940
the maximum
Note: ( ) is to arrange each flight revenue in order
5.CONCLUSIONS
Airline companies may still fly with empty seats even though the booking
demand for the flight is higher than its capacity. In order to reduce the number
of empty seats, airline companies resort to overbooking. Through carefully
controlled overbooking, the airlines can reduce the number of empty seats and
construct an optimal revenue management.
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This research develops a dynamic multiple-fare overbooking strategy
model. It considers the competition of different fare classes with each other in
zero stage. Then overbooking process can include the operation of variable
bookings of multiple-fare class. It constructs multiple-fare penalty cost
function that also better addresses the practical airline companies' operations
under deny boarding situations. It better addresses the practical airline
companies' operations under overbooking situations. Although this model has
been extensively tested on an airline company booking system in Taiwan, the
underlying approach provides a conceptual framework to handle a multiple-
fare overbooking strategy model and a comprehensive multiple-fare seat
allocation and overbooking strategy model.
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1. BACKGROUND; THE PROBLEM
There are many facility operational planning/scheduling situations for which,
within a given time window, arriving and/or departing transporters carrying units
originating at the facility, terminating at the facility, continuing through on the
same transporter, or transferring to another transporter over some intra-facility
transfer route, must be assigned physical locations within the facility. The
assignments may be made as part of an advance plan, or dynamically ,e.g.
shortly preceding the time window, perhaps while all arriving transporters are en
route, in the context of a real-time decision support problem. It is proposed that
the assignments consider desirable operational efficiency criteria for the facility
and/or the transporters and/or the units. It is realized the dynamic version may be
ill-advised if it is felt that repetitively transferred units should habitually have the
same transfer route.
Examples are: (1) at an air/bus terminal, planes/busses arriving and/or departing
with passenger/luggage units must be assigned gates between which units
transfer, and (2) at a freight transfer terminal, freight vehicles arriving and/or
departing with cargo units must be assigned docks between which units must be
transferred.
The assignment of transporters to locations must consider the feasibility of each
transporter being serviced at the alternative locations. Such feasibility should
recognize transporter and unit needs such as physical compatibility with the
different locations and approaches to them, maintenance, restocking,
access/egress (e.g. ramps, conveyors), etc.
This paper deals with the assignment of transporters to locations according to a
quantitative criterion. Suggested criteria consider measures for the transfer of
originating units from the facility entrance(s) to their departing locations, plus the
transfer of all terminating units from their arriving locations to the facility exit(s),
plus the transfer of all transferring units over intra-facility location-to-location
transfer routes. Such measures can be time, distance, or some combination
thereof. Hereinafter the measure used is distance.
It is recognized that the problem may be trivial or worthy of little management
attention in small low-activity facilities. It is likely to be more meaningful for
large high-activity facilities wherein absence of an objective criterion for
assignments may invite very inefficient ones.
2
1.1 Problem Solution Criteria and Key Assumption
Initially it is assumed that scheduled transporter arrivals and departures are such
that, considering times to traverse distances between all locations to which
transporters might be assigned, within the time window transfers can be made
between all pairs of transporters. Under this "all-are-time-feasible" assumption,
there is enough time for transfers (i.e. connections) between the latest arriving
transporter and the earliest departing transporter. (See "Relaxing the All-Are-
Time-Feasible Assumption" in Section 2. below re: ignoring this assumption.)
A first suggested criterion for assigning transporters to locations is that the sum of
all individual transfer "costs" should be minimized. "Cost" for any one transfer is
defined as number of units transferred multiplied by the distance between the
locations involved in the transfer. Stated in this manner the problem is completely
analogous to various other location, layout, and design problems which have
been formulated as quadratic assignment models. The quadratic assignment
model is in general known as a mathematical optimization (programming)
problem which can be very difficult to solve. A number of approaches exits,
ranging from 1) optimally solving a nonlinear integer programming problem, to 2)
linearizing the model at the expense of adding additional integer variables/
constraints, and optimizing, to 3) using heuristic methods that can give good but
perhaps non-optimal results for large problems within reasonable computer time.
This paper begins with the quadratic assignment model as a base formulation for a
preferred first problem solution criterion. Then two different problem solution
criteria are formulated, followed by relaxing the all-are-time-feasible assumption.
2. QUANTITATIVE FORMULATION AND EXAMPLE
As stated above, the problem of assigning transporters to locations so as to
minimize the total cost of making transfers between transporters can properly be
modeled as a quadratic assignment model. Quantitatively, the base model is:
Let:
t, u -- indices for transporters whether terminating, continuing, or originating;
T = total number of transporters to assign to locations during the planning
time window;
g, m = indices for locations to which transporters may be assigned;
L = total number of locations to which transporters may be assigned;
Qtu = the number of units transferring from transporter t to transporter u ;
De m = the transfer distance from location g to location m, with symmetric
distances;
A t = the set of all locations to which transporter t may be feasibly assigned;
Tg = set of all transporters that may feasibly be assigned to location g.
For making assignments, the decision variables are:
xtg which is to be set to 1 if transporter t is assigned to location g and
otherwise to be set to 0. These variables are defined for t = 1, ..., T and
g_A t .
Given the above notation the quadratic assignment model is formulated as
follows:
Minimize
T T
t*l u=l t_A t m_A t
I_u d_nl
(1)
subject to: x,t <_1
t_T t
Vg=l,-..,L (2)
V t = I, ...,T (3)
x,t _(0,1} Vt=l,...,TandgeA t (4)
Equation (1) calculates the total cost of all transfers as a function of the
assignment variables. Each inequality (2) ensures that at most one transporter is
assigned to any location. Each equation (3) ensures that each transporter is
assigned to exactly one location. The constraint (4) states that the assignment
variables can take only the values 0 or 1.
It is noted that the model (1), ..., (4) accommodates only the transfer costs for
transferring units from transporter to transporter. To consider as well transfers
from an initial location (e.g. entrance) at the facility to a transporter, and from a
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transporter to a final location (e.g exit) at the facility, it is presumed that the T th
transporter is a dummy that is pre-assigned to both the entrance and exit. It is
also presume that the L th location is a dummy location occupying both the initial
and final locations in the facility. Multiple entrances/exits may be accommodated
by extending this concept.
The problem is thus modified as follows: the decision variables are defined only
for t = 1, ..-, T -1 and g e A t , and none of the sets, At, would contain L, and the
model becomes:
T-I T-I T-I
Minimize £ __,(.Q,rDtL +Qr, Du)x,t+_-'__, _._ _-'_Q,.Dt.,xttx.,,,
I=l teA I t=l _=1 teA ImCEA t
(la)
subject to: y' x,, ___1 Vg=I,...,L-1 (2a)
leT e
__xtt=l Vt=I,...,T-1 (3a)
tea e
x,t _{0,1} Vt=l,...,T-landgeA t (4a)
The first term in the objective function calculates the cost of all transfers to all real
transporters from the dummy transporter plus the cost of all transfers from all real
transfers to the dummy transporter. The rest of the model is unchanged except for
the number of decision variables and constraints.
To illustrate application of the model, consider operations at an airline
terminal/hub. Indeed, airport passenger transfers between flights have escalated
noticeably with air travel growth and since hub airports were introduced. Transfer
activity may inferred to be heaviest at "central" and hub airports within a country
or continent. One airline spokesman has suggested that for a central and hub
airport, as many as 85% of enplanements may be from passengers transferring
from arriving connecting flights.
Suppose that over a specified time window (e.g. "bank" in airline terminology)
six airliners are to be assigned to six gates at the terminal. For simplicity we
suppose management is only concerned about the transfer distance of passengers
who must change planes as opposed to those originating or terminating at the
terminal. The simplification means we may use the first model (1), ..., (4). The
data for the problem are given in the tables below.
TABLE 1
THE NUMBER, Qtu' OF
TRANSFERRING PASSENGERS
TABLE 2
DISTANCES, D£m (IN YARDS),
BETWEEN GATES
from/to
fit 101
fit 102
fit 103
fit 104
fit 105
fit 106
fit fit fit fit fit fit
101 102 103 104 105 106
0 40 30 20 0 5
10 0 10 5 0 40
0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 10 0 0 5
10 5 20 5 0 10
20 20 20 20 0 0
from/to
gate 1
gate 2
gate 3
gate 4
gate 5
gate 6
gate gate gate gate gate gate
1 2 3 4 5 6
0 80 130 190 230 300
80 0 50 110 150 220
130 50 0 60 100 170
190 110 60 0 40 110
230 150 100 40 0 70
300 220 170 110 70 0
Note: Flight 105 is a terminating flight and thus it
receives no transfers while Flight 103 is an
originating flight and thus it offers no transfers.
Source: Author-fabricated data.
Source: Author-fabricated data
Feasible gate assignments lead to the set definitions given below. These feasible
assignments are based on a hypothetical scenario in which flights 103 and 106 are
large planes that cannot be accommodated at gates 2 or 5. Also flight 101 arrives
before gate 5 is cleared from a previously departing flight (not one of the six) so it
cannot be assigned there and flight 104 cannot be assigned to gate 2 for a similar
reason. Given this scenario the feasible gate sets for each flight is as follows:
Afltl01 = {gate 1, gate 2, gate 3, gate 4, gate 6}
Afltl02 = {gate 1, gate 2, gate 3, gate 4, gate 5, gate 6}
AfltlO 3 = {gate 1, gate 3, gate 4, gate 6}
Afltl04 = {gate 1, gate 3, gate 4, gate 5, gate 6}
AfltlO 5 = {gate 1, gate 2, gate 3, gate 4, gate 5, gate 6}
AfltlO 6 = {gate 1, gate 3, gate 4, gate 6}
The optimal solution to this problem was found using the general purpose non-
linear spreadsheet model solver available within Microsoft EXCEL. The EXCEL
solver allows one to define and solve a quadratic assignment model. Although
details are not given here, efficient spreadsheet implementation may take
advantage of matrix multiplication tools. The solution was found with some
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difficulty, requiring restarts with different values for parameters of by the solver.
As an alternative, the problem was also reformulated and solved using LINDO
Systems Inc.'s LINGO non-linear mathematical programming software package.
As strongly advocated by LINGO proponents and others, the quadratic assignment
model may be converted into an equivalent linear, integer program by intro-
ducing a large number of additional 0-1 variables and additional constraints. Such
conversion provided for the LINGO approach to reliably find an optimal solution.
Both the EXCEL and LINGO solutions cost 36400 passenger yards, and assigned:
flight 101 to gate 4
flight 104 to gate 5
flight 102 to gate 2
flight 105 to gate 1
flight 103 to gate 6
flight 106 to gate 3
The largest transfer cost for a single route was 6000 passenger yards, namely, 20
transferring units from flight 105 at gate 1 to flight 106 at gate 3.
2.1 Problem Formulation Alternatives
A second suggested criterion recognizes that a solution that minimizes total cost
may use, as one of its transfer routes, one with a very large transfer cost. To avoid
using such an extreme transfer cost route, or any of the largest transfer cost routes,
a different criterion would be to minimize the maximum transfer cost encountered
by any particular pair of transporters. Such a criterion might be appealing from an
equity point of view. For example, in the airport gate problem this criterion
would produce solutions that would not unnecessarily inconvenience the
passengers of one flight in order to improve the convenience of the passengers of
other flights.
To model this problem the following additional notation are introduced:
Qtu = Max(Otu ' Qut )'
K = any sufficiently large number.
and an additional decision variable, c, the maximum transfer cost, is defined.
To ensure that c actually equals the maximum transfer cost a series of constraints
are added to the problem. By definition a maximum transfer cost is greater than or
equal to all individual transfer costs. This leads to linear constraints of the
following type:
7
Q,. Z Dt.,x,t < c + K(1 - x.,, ) (5)
tCA t
When assignment variables satisfy the assignment constraints (2), (3), and (4) the
summation on the left-hand-side of constraint (5) calculates the distance between
location m and the location to which transporter t is assigned. Thus the entire left-
hand-side calculates the highest cost of transfers to or from transporter u assuming
u is assigned to location m. If u actually is assigned to m then the factor K is
removed from the right-hand-side of the constraint which in turn causes the
constraint to require c to be at least as large as the requisite cost. If u is not
assigned to m then the constraint is irrelevant for determining c, and in this case
the factor K is not removed so that the constraint is satisfied by any non-negative
value of c. For purposes here K may be set equal to the maximum possible
transfer cost.
A constraint of type (5) is required for every pair of transporters and every
possible location. In the case when any transporter can be assigned to any
location and there are T real transporters and L locations available for assignment
of transporters, the number of constraints of this type that are needed is
LT(T + 1)/2. If not all assignments are feasible then fewer constraints are needed.
The minimax model counterpart to the first problem, (1) through (4) may now be
stated.
Minimize c
Subject to:
Q,_ Z Dt.,x,t <-c+K(1-x_m)
LIAr
for t =I,...,T-1;
(6)
u = t + 1,..., T; Vm e A,, (7)
_x,t<-I Vg=I,-..,L (8)
teT t
_"_x,t = l V t = I, ...,T (9)
x,t _ {0, 1} Vt = 1, ..., T and g _ A t (10)
2.1.1 Illustrative Example Reconsidered Using the Minimax Criterion:
Considering the previous problem it is noted that if any plane could be assigned
to any gate the number of constraints of type (7) is 90, but given the flight-to-gate
feasibilities in this example only 73 such constraints are actually needed. For the
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example problem the minimax criterion version was quickly and reliably solved
using the EXCEL solver, giving the following solution:
flight 101 to gate 4
flight 104 to gate 5
flight 102 to gate 2
flight 105 to gate 6
flight 103 to gate 3
flight 106 to gate 1
The minimax route transfer cost was 4600 passenger yards, namely 20
transferring units from flight 106 at gate 1 to flight 104 gate 5. No minimax
solution was attempted using LINGO.
This maximum route transfer cost is 23% less than that for the minimum total
cost criterion problem solution. In general, the maximum route cost for the
minimax cost criterion problem solution would be expected to be no more than
that for the minimum total cost criterion problem solution.
The total transfer cost for this minimax transfer cost problem solution was 39212,
7% higher than that for the minimum total cost criterion problem solution. In
general the total cost for the minimax cost criterion problem solution would be
expected to no less than that for the minimum total cost criterion problem
solution.
A third suggested criterion recognizes that a solution for the minimum total cost
criterion may use the transfer route with a very large transfer distance. It may be
desirable to avoid using this extreme distance route, or possibly any large
distance routes. A solution for a criterion of minimizing the maximum distance
used by any transfer route may be obtained by solving the problem under criterion
2 with the number of transferring units defined as 1 for each active transfer. As
might be intuitively expected from problem data, since there is a transfer in at
least one direction between every pair of flights, the minimized largest transfer
distance is 300 yards.
2.1.2 Relaxing the All-Are-Time-Feasible Assumption:
Consider a case in which at least one unit must be transferred from transporter t to
transporter u. Depending on the location assignments for these two transporters
the time to make the transfer could be greater than the time between the arrival of t
and the departure of u. This is a situation in which the assumption is not true. The
absence of this assumption means that the location assignments must be
constrained further than they have been in any of the preceding models. To model
this situation some additional data are needed. In particular, we suppose that the
time to make a transfer is a known function of the distance and the number of
units transferred.
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Denote the function f(Q,,,, Dr,,), which is the time to transfer Q,_ units when t is
assigned to location g and u is assigned to location m. Further, let S,_ be the
amount of time available to transfer all the units from t to u considering their
respective arrival and departure times. Then
y. f(Q,,,,Dt.,)x,e<_S,,, .K(1-x,,,,,) ',g m_Ao (11)
ttlA t
One will note the similarity of these constraints with those introduced for the
minimax formulation, and they work in the same way. A sufficient value for the
factor, K, is the transfer time between the locations that are the greatest distance
apart. Any number of constraints of type (11) could be added to any one of the'
three previously introduced models as necessary. No computerized solutions of
this formulation were attempted.
3. PREVIOUS PROBLEM RECOGNITIION
The above problem might be called the "Transfer Location Assignment Problem
(TLAP)". Its quadratic assignment model formulation is believed to have been
originally conceived by the first author who investigated it in an airport gates
context using LINGO software in 1991. It was then submitted to LINGO
developers for computer model streamlining, and has since appeared in LINGO
problem sets which contain sample quadratic-assignment model applications.
Previous recognition/formulation of the problem, especially in an airline gates
context, was sought by World-Wide-Web-computer-searching two bibliographies.
The Annual Comprehensive Index of the Institute for Operations Research and
Management Science ("INFORMS") was searched using the following key word
sequences:
terminal gate assignments, airline gates, airport gates,
gate assignments, quadratic assignment problem, mimmax assignment
This index references numerous publications from 1982 to 1996. Also searched
were papers from proceedings of annual AGIFORS (Airline Group of the
International Federation of Operations Research Societies) meetings, through
AGIFORS' web site catalogue of such proceedings. The search "hits" revealed a
few integer linear programming formulations of the problem, e.g.. Mangoubi and
Malthaisel (1985). However no quadratic assignment formulations of the problem
were revealed. Quadratic assignment formulations were not identified in either of
the comprehensive references Teodorovoic(1988) or Richter (1989).
10
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Assigning transporters to terminal locations must address numerous managerial
and operational considerations. However in many applications the assignment
should not neglect the "costs" of accomplishing the transfer. The problem
formulations presented above provide for applying different solution criteria for
assignments. The computerized approaches demonstrated may be sufficient for
infrequently solving small problems. Frequent or larger problem solutions
required in a (perhaps intra-day) Decision Support System context invite
investigating choices from among specialized available quadratic assignment
model solution computer packages.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In 1996,Canadabecame the first nation to fully commercialize its air navigational system
(ANS). Other jurisdictions had placed their ANS under a government controlled and owned
entity, but the Canadian solution went further. The assets and personnel were transferred
from Transport Canada (TC) to a non-share corporation called NAV CANADA, governed by
a board of directors drawn from stakeholder groups. Transport Canada retained a purely
regulatory role, ensuring that safety standards were maintained.
In the process of negotiating the transfer, some argued that the nascent ANS corporation
should only be responsible for the southern airspace, while TC should continue to manage the
northern and remote areas, where low traffic densities and high operating costs make full cost
recovery for the system infeasible. This view was rejected, and the ANS transferred in its
entirety. Northern stakeholder groups were alarmed that this might mean that full cost
recovery would be implemented in their fragile economy. They lobbied for exemptions in the
Bill C-20 _ which would protect northern interests.
This paper concerns the lobbying process, the safeguards in the ANS Act, and the early issues
in implementing a commercialized ANS in the northern and remote regions. 2
1.1 Origins of Commercialization
In the federal budget tabled in February of 1994, the government stated its intention to study
the potential for commercialization of the ANS in order to improve efficiency and achieve
long-term savings for the Crown. This was part of a comprehensive rethinking of government
involvement in transportation, which included commercialization of port facilities or transfer
to provincial control, transfer of airports to local operating authorities, and the privatization of
the Canadian National Railroad (a Crown corporation). Air Canada had been privatized in
1988-89 under the Progressive Conservatives, but the movement toward decreased
government control was, if anything, accelerated under Liberal Transport Minister Doug
Young.
In part, the government was responding to the views of its stakeholders. The air traffÉc
controllers union (CATCA), the airline pilots unions, the Air Transport Association of Canada
(ATAC) which represents air carriers, and the Canadian Business Aircraft Association
Statutes of Canada 1996, Chapter 20, An Act respecting the commercialization of civil air
navigation services, (hereafter C-20 or the ANS Act).
2 The author currently manages the NWT CARS program, which is administered for NAV
CANADA by the Government of the Northwest Territories. In 1997, he also represented the
Consumers' Association of Canada on the federal Transport Minister's Committee on Air
Policy Issues. This paper and its conclusions are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Government of the Northwest Territories, NAV CANADA, or the
Consumers' Association of Canada.
(CBAA), hadlobbiedfor theANSto berunasa business.Theideahadalsobeenproposed
byaRoyalCommissiononNationalPassengerTransportation,3andaMinisterialtaskforce.
At thetime,theANS employedover6000people,including2300air traffic controllers,1000
FlightServiceSpecialists,and1100electronictechnicians.TC maintained105FlightService
Stationsand55controltowers,aswellastheradioaidsto navigation(navaids),radar,and
dataprocessingsystemsrequiredfor thework.4 The system provided services for the world's
second largest country, and a considerable portion of the North Atlantic. Annual expenditures
were $800 million:
The system was funded by an Air Transportation Tax (ATT) which was levied on passenger
tickets. This raised about $550 million in 1994. Revenues from fees on international flights
generated another $50 million. The remainder of the expense was funded from general tax
revenues (TP 12203E: 6).
The general view of the user community was that the system was underfunded, and would not
keep up with future requirements. Fiscal restraint in the federal government gave little
comfort that new appropriations would be found as soon as they were required. At the same
time, there was a feeling that government procurement, staffing, training, and labour relations
processes were far too cumbersome and added unnecessary cost to the system.
1.2 Structure of the Corporation
The term "commercialization", as is it used by the Canadian government, refers more to a
series of desirable traits than to a specific structure. A commercialized ANS would manage
resources and people efficiently, be responsive to user needs and be able to rapidly adopt new
technologies, would make decisions on commercial principles, and would have access to
capital markets (TP 12202E: 9). Several models were discussed for the new entity, including a
Special Operating Agency of govemment, a Crown Corporation, a government owned -
company operated enterprise, a mixed enterprise, a not-for-profit corporation, and a fully
privatized enterprise (TP 12202E: 20-24).
In the end, a not-for-profit corporation, reporting to a stakeholder Board of Directors was
chosen. NAV CANADA was incorporated as a non-share capital corporation. All profits
generated must be reinvested in the corporation, used to pay down debt, or repaid to the users
in the form of decreased fees. The Board is composed of five members nominated by the
industry, two by unions, three by the federal government, and four by the board itself, plus a
Chief Executive Officer. 6 Directors are required to be Canadian citizens, but may not be
3 Canada Communications Group. Directions. Volume 1, pp. 126-127.
4 Transport Canada "Discussion Paper Number 1: Principles and Options for
Commercialization" TP 12203E, Appendix A, in The Study of the Commerciali:ation of the
Air Navigation System in Canada, p. 5.
-_Costs and prices in this paper are expressed in Canadian dollars.
Commercialir.ation of the Air Navigation System, page 8.
electedofficialsor civil servantsof anylevelof government,or employeesor directorsof
organizationswhicharemajorsuppliersor customersof NAV CANADA.
TheANS consultationprocessbeganin latesummerof 1994.TheANS Commercialization
StudyTeam toured the country consulting with stakeholders. A meeting with the Northern
Air Transport Association (NATA) was scheduled in Whitehorse, capital of the Yukon
Territory, on September 15 (TPI2203E, Appendix A, p. 26). NATA is the primary
organization of northern aviation operators. Although not all operators participate in NATA,
the "majors" -- Canadian North, NWTAir, and First Air -- are members, as well as many
smaller fixed wing and helicopter operations.
1.3 Northern and Remote Regions
The "northern and remote regions" referred to in the document include the Northwest
Territories, Yukon Territory, northern Quebec, and the northern parts of several provinces. 7
The area is very sparsely populated, and consists of widely scattered small settlements,
separated by some of the most inhospitable terrain on the planet. Most of these settlements
are wholly dependent on air transport. There is little substitution possible with other modes,
since most communities are not linked by roads, and the short shipping season of the Arctic
restricts most coastal communities to a single barge sea-lift per year.
The harsh operating environment produces a tough breed of aviators, the "bush-pilots". The
great distances mean that few alternate airports are available. Harsh and unpredictable
weather increases risks.
The low population and large distances involved create a low traffic density for air transport
operators. High operating costs are otten barely covered by revenues. Otten there is little
effective competition because, while there may be low barriers to entry, the low traffic
volumes do not allow a second operator to fly profitably. Demand for staples is inelastic, but
other items, such as fresh fruit, vegetables and dairy products have higher price elasticity of
demand. The typical northern operator makes profit, if at all, on freight, rather than
passengers. Fresh food costs are subsidized by a program called "food mail", s
The north is still economically dependent on the southern tax base. Its economy, based on
natural resource extraction and harvesting of wildlife is not sufficient to sustain it. Living
costs are very high. Transportation costs are a major component of goods prices. Fuel and
energy costs are very high, both because of the severe climate, and because of transportation
costs.
The future high potential of the resource base cannot be exploited without infrastructure. The
withdrawal of the federal government from infrastructure such as airports, and deficit-cutting
7 The communities are specified in Schedule A of the Department of Transport Agreement,
between NAV CANADA and Transport Canada.
8 This program is run by the federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
(DIAND).
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by the territorial governments has put a severe strain on resources. At the same time, the
aircra_ which are projected to replace some of the aging types now in service will require
longer runways. New standards for snow and ice contamination suggest that some investment
in runways will be required, even to accommodate the existing fleet.
The discussion papers which formed the basis for public consultation contained a clear
recognition that a subsidy program of some kind was inevitable and acknowledged the need to
"insulat[e] an ANS corporate entity from the potentially costly and conflicting roles of
managing in commercial and social environments simultaneously (TP 12204:12). 9
1.4 Bill C-20
Recognizing the unique problems in the northern regions, the ANS Act included safeguards.
These were not added capriciously, but as a consequence of determined lobbying on the parts
of territorial governments and northern operators. In addition to the safeguards in legislation
territorial governments felt that they were also given verbal assurances which went beyond
this.
One source of comfort for the northern stakeholders was that the NAV CANADA Board of
Directors, even before its official inception, was headed by John Crichton, the President of
ATAC. _° Mr. Crichton had many years of association with First Air, which operates the most
extensive route system in the north, including long-haul jet routes from the south, and smaller
volume turboprop services throughout most of the Northwest Territories.
The assurances contained in the Act are encapsulated in the Summary, which presumably
provides guidance to the intent of the document, since it is meant as an executive summary for
members of parliament, states that among the key components of the enactment is:
the preservation of air navigation services to northern and remote communities,
including a special process involving provincial and territorial governments for
service reductions proposed by NAV CANADA
The actual assurances are more specific. With respect to fees levied for service (charging
principles), the legislation states that:
charges for designated northern or remote services ... must not be higher than
charges for similar services utilized to a similar extent elsewhere in Canada
[C-20: 35. (1) (g)].
9 This concern reflected the sentiments of the Airways Corporation of New Zealand, which
had prepared a working paper on the international experience (TP 12205E), and which
operated as a State Owned Enterprise in a much more interventionist government structure.
10On November 18, 1997, Crichton became President and CEO of NAV CANADA, replacing
Ken Copeland. He resigned as President and CEO of ATAC and Chairman of the Air
Transport Security Corporation, as these would conflict with his new duties.
Thisreflectsthe most central concern of the stakeholders at the time, which was that the ANS
operator would attempt to extract full cost recovery at the site level, which would make the
costs on many routes too high for the delicate market to bear.
The complete dependence of northern communities on air transport was also recognized.
Northern and remote services are guaranteed as part of the requirement to provide
"Humanitarian or Emergency Flights" in the event of a work stoppage by NAV CANADA
employees (C-20:73 (1)definitions, 74).
In addition, the Act imposed a notification and consultation requirement on NAV CANADA.
Where the operator of the ANS ("the Corporation", in the Act) proposes a termination or
reduction of services, and this will affect "a significant group of users or residents in a material
way", it must notify affected parties of its intent (C-20: 18). The Corporation may only
proceed with such changes if, within 45 days, it has received no notice of rejection from the
provincial government, t_ In the event that a province does reject the proposal, or the users
have rejected it, the Corporation may only implement it with the approval of the federal
Minister of Transport (C-20: 20). The Corporation is not entitled to compensation if the
Minister does not approve the change in service (C-20:20 (2)).
The Ministers of Transport or Defence may also direct the Corporation to provide new
service at northern or remote locations (C-20:24 (1)), but in this case, the crown must
compensate NAV CANADA for any losses sustained in complying with the direction
(C-20:31).
The legislation also required the Corporation to set out, within one year after the transfer
date, its Level of Service (LOS) Policy (C-20: 23). This must then be applied consistently,
although it may be revised from time to time. Where services are requested in excess of the
LOS Policy, these may be provided ifa consensus of users is in favour of it, but such services
will be charged out in addition to existing charges (C-20:23 (5)).
2.0 THE LEGISLATION IN PRACTICE
The ANS Act imposed a rapid timetable on NAV CANADA. It had to develop and publish
LOS Policies by the first anniversary date of transfer, as well as announcing a fee structure
which would be phased in as the Air Transportation Tax (ATT) was phased out. _2
,1 The Act uses the word provincial in most cases, but this is understood to also include the
two territorial governments of Yukon and NWT.
_2Users have pointed out that the tax is not eliminated, but merely reduced to zero, implying
the ability of future governments to raise it again. This remains a concern in an industry
already subject to heavy taxation.
2.1 Fees and Charges: The Issues
The first test of the legislation came in early summer of 1997, when NAV CANADA
announced its proposed fee structure for phase one. On the surface, the changes made were
uncontroversial, at least with the major carriers who operated in the southern domestic
airspace and internationally. The proposal shifted the charging basis from a tax based on
passenger tickets (ATT) to a fee based on maximum take offweight (MTOW) of the aircraft
and distance. _3 At the same time, terminal charges were assessed on aircraft departing
aerodromes served by NAV CANADA units. _4
The new fees were to be introduced in two phases. During phase one, planned to commence
on 1 November 1997, the large commercial aircraft were to be charged onc half the fee, with
the remaining costs met by ATT. By November of 1998, full fee implementation would take
place, and the ATT reduced to zero. In the second phase, smaller aircraft would also be
charged fees.
The Act had recognized the need to switch from a tax base to a fee structure, and had
included a number of constraints on the nature of fees, such as safeguards against
discriminatory imposition of costs, while attempting to allow the Corporation as much
flexibility as possible in going about its business. NAV CANADA was also constrained by
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) charging principles, and by the need to be
consistent with international practice.
One aspect of the change which was certain to be addressed was the fact that ATT applied
only to the passenger carriers. Scheduled or charter carriers generated significant revenues to
the government (and in the transition period, NAV CANADA) through the ATT applied to
passenger tickets, __while all-cargo operators using the same type ofaircratt were not charged.
The major scheduled carders objected to the "free-riding" of cargo operators. General
aviation and operators using aircraft of less than 8 tonnes were also exempt from ATT.
Northern operations have certain structural features which made the transition to MTOW-
based fees more complex. First, northern operators generally use aircraft which are larger
than would be used on a similar route in the south. Route segments are generally longer than
they would be in the south, and the relative lack of alternates implies a need for greater range.
Second, northern operators tend to use combi configurations. Profitability for northern
carriers is a function largely of the freight they carry. Third, freight is uni-directional. Almost
all aircraft carry significant freight loads northbound, but there is next to no southbound
freight.
13The proposed enroute charging formula was $0.02174 x Distance x MTOW °gin phase one.
t4 The proposed terminal charge was $7.74 x MTOW 09 in phase one.
_ The ATT calculation for a domestic or transborder flight is a fixed fee of $6.00, plus 7 per
cent of the price of the air fare, to a maximum of $55.00. International (other than US) flights
are charged a $55.00 fee.
A northernoperator,therefore,typicallycarriesasectionor two of passengersandanumber
of freightpalletsnorthbound,andreturnswith a low passengerloadfactor,but no freight.
Underthepreviousregime,theATT appliedto thepassengers,but not thefreight,andwas
similarwhethertheaircraftwassouthboundor northbound.
UndertheNAV CANADA fee structure, the reduction of ATT may reduce a southern
operator's total ticket price. The application of the MTOW-based fees and terminal fees is
off-set by reductions to ATT, and total average ticket cost may even decline. For the
northern operator, since relatively fewer passengers are carried, the ATT reduction does not
come close to off-setting the MTOW-based fees and, as operators were quick to point out,
are applied equally to aircraft which are southbound, carrying no freight to off-set costs.
A second concern was raised by the imposition of terminal charges at Community Aerodrome
Radio Stations (CARS). While NAV CANADA provides ANS services through ATC towers
and Flight Service Stations (FSS), it also funds another service at smaller airports. The CARS
are operated by territorial governments, the government of Quebec. The three types of ANS
service are very different. Towers provide separation between aircraft in the zone, and
control ground vehicles, but provide only limited weather services. Flight Service Stations
provide an aerodrome traffic advisory service identifying conflicting air traffic, manage ground
vehicle movements, and also provide a broad range of flight planning and weather briefing
services. CARS provide basic advisories of known traffic, and limited weather information,
but no weather or flight planning briefings. The primary purpose of the CARS is to provide
the weather observations necessary to support a terminal forecast (TAF), and current weather
for arriving and departing aircraft.
The CARS system is staffed by observer/communicators who are recruited in their
communities, trained in radio procedure and weather observation at Aurora College in Fort
Smith, and then return to their communities to work. The system serves the basic need for
reliable weather observations, at a relatively low cost, and using a northern and largely native
workforce.
Some users objected to the requirement that they pay user fees at CARS which were identical
to those being charged at international airports, where ATC terminal units existed. Service
levels had been dropping in the north even while Transport Canada was still operating the
ANS. NATA complained that while these terminal and enroute charges might be appropriate
in the south, where a full range of services including weather and ATC radar were available, it
was unreasonable to pay the same fees for the relatively spartan services provided in the north.
2.2 Carrier Reaction and NAV CANADA Response
The publishing of the new fee structure drew a rapid response from the northern flyers.
NWTAIr, in its initial CBC radio interview, suggested that this would result in a 20 per cent
increase in freight rates. Certainly, NWTAir was likely to see a large impact. Their fleet
consisted of several B737 combi aircraft equipped for gravel runways, and a Hercules
transportaircraft. Thesizeof theaircraft,andtherelativeimportanceof freightto thebottom
line,madethemparticularlyvulnerable.
Othercarriersandstakeholderswerequickto enter the skirmish. Transportation costs are
always a political "hot button" in the north, and politicians and native groups reacted with
increasing alarm.
NAV CANADA reacted with some degree of surprise to these assertions. While some impact
would be felt by any carrier for whom freight was a major component of the business, this
impact was generally considered to be low. The proposal also had the potential to reduce
overall ticket prices for the major carriers, as cargo operations were now required to carry
their share of the burden. The generally higher operating costs of smaller carriers would
mean that the increases, as a percentage of revenue, would tend not be significantly different
than they would be for the majors. Finally, if NAV CANADA succeeded in reducing system
costs, these savings would eventually be passed down to the users. On the whole, the equity
and transparency of the system were both improved by the proposal.
The protections afforded under the Act for intervention by territorial/provincial Ministers of
Transportation provided a basis for a concerted effort led by the Government of the
Northwest Territories (GNWT). The NWT was clearly the most affected jurisdiction, and the
government sought support from other provincial transportation ministries. It also
coordinated its response with that of NATA, and the individual carriers. Another ally was the
federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). The DIAND
food mail subsidy program was "capped" by budget restraint measures, and could not
accommodate a large increase in freight costs. Any such increase would not be buffered, and
would be borne by consumers in the least economically developed region of the country.
The GNWT invited NAV CANADA to present a briefing on its proposals at a meeting of the
Airline Consultative Committee (ACC), which is a regular meeting between the Arctic
Airports division of GNWT and the carriers it serves. The northern carriers put forth their
position rather forcefully, and were supported by the Assistant Deputy Minister of
Transportation (GNWT), and members of the department's operating arm, Arctic Airports,
and its transportation planning group.
NAV CANADA had doubts that the impact was nearly as high as some stakeholders felt it
was. t6 The carriers, in the height of the profitable summer season, had limited resources to do
the sort of route by route analysis which was required. NAV CANADA, on the other hand,
did not have the financial data required for the work. Eventually, the parties shared their
analyses, and came to the conclusion that the initial indications were high. First Air would
later attribute price increases of 3 per cent on passenger tickets and 5.5 per cent on freight to
16NWTAir was later quoted as estimating the range from 20-30 per cent, and this range
became widely quoted ("New Fees mean 'staggering' jump in air freight rates", Nunatsiak
News, August 1, 1997, p. 3).
the impact of phase one fees. t7 The airline indicated that in late 1997, its scheduled services
were running at a loss. _8 By NAV CANADA's calculations, the net impact on First Air's
operations would be close to 3 per cent of operating revenues, but this would represent an
additional cost to northern consumers of $2 million per year. 19
On August 13th, NAV CANADA announced changes to the proposal. The implementation of
phase one fees was deferred until March 1998 to allow the carriers more time to reprogram
their computer reservation systems for the tax changes. CARS were exempted from terminal
charges for the period from March 1 until November 1, 1998, and NAV CANADA indicated
that this exemption might later be extended, based on the results of user consultations. The
aircraft size to which phase one fees applied was raised from 5.7 metric tonnes to 8 tonnes,
again until November 1, 1998. 20 These changes did not address the main cost issue, which
was the impact of switching the charging basis from the ATT to user charges based on
MTOW. The exemption of CARS terminal charges was of greatest significance to First Air,
which has the largest route system of any carrier operating in the NWT.
The second phase user charges are a more difficult matter, both in terms of equity and ease of
administration, and will require considerable consultation with stakeholders. The phase two
fee structure applies to smaller aircraft of types used by bush operators and private aviators.
It is to be implemented in November 1998, at which time NAV CANADA will operate on a
full cost recovery basis, and the ATT will be reduced to zero.
In this case, NAV CANADA is faced with a conundrum. Ideally, it would charge small
operators on a charging formula similar to the one established for the larger aircraft.
Practically, however, this presents the problem of significantly increasing bureaucratic
overhead and complexity, for a relatively small increase in revenues. One approach under
discussion is some form of fiat fee, but this is not without pitfalls. Small operators and private
pilots are very sensitive to the magnitude of the fees, while the large operators, who provide
the bulk of the revenues (and are heavily represented on the board) may not wish to subsidize
the system and, to some extent, their competition.
Another scenario was a tax/levy on aviation gasoline, which would be paid to NAV
CANADA. This would provide a user charge based on activity without the administrative
complexity of a per-use charge, but many of the types in commercial operation are turboprop
aircraft, so some arrangement such as a fiat fee would still be required. This method also
17 '_First Air Prices Take Off" in News/North, 24 November 1997, p. A23. The NAV
CANADA increases were to take effect on 1 March, 1998. At the same time, the airline also
announced tariff increases of 3 percent on passenger fares and 4.5 per cent on cargo, effective
1 January, 1998, which it attributed to overall economic conditions in the north.
18"Our Fares are Going Up in the New Year. We'd Like You to Know Why." Paid
advertisement News/North, 1 December, 1997.
19User Charges: Presentation to Northern Air Transportation Industry, Northern
Governments, November 26, 1997.
20NAV CANADA News Release No. 17/97.
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chargesthe operator whether the NAV CANADA service is used or not. Helicopter
operators may seek a different formula than fixed-wing, since their bush operations often
make little use of NAV CANADA services.
No matter what formula is used, however, it will not satisfy all stakeholders. The consultation
for phase two fees is to be completed by summer the of 1998, for implementation in
November.
2.3 Levels of Service Policy: The Issues
The rapid timetable in the Act also required NAV CANADA to consult with stakeholders and
to publish a Levels of Service (LOS) Policy by the first anniversary of ANS transfer (C-20:
23). The LOS issues were vital to NAV CANADA's rationalization program nationwide, but
again the north was strongly impacted.
Level of Service implies a set of services to be provided at a location, and is linked to traffic
levels. For example, an ATC tower is justified by annual movements above 60,000, while a
FSS is justified by traffic exceeding 40,000 movements, but less than 60,000. 2t By these
criteria, the tower at Yellowknife, the capital of NWT, was barely viable. The tower in
Whitehorse Yukon's capital, recorded only 42,575 in 1996, though in earlier years this total
had exceeded 50,000. 22 Complexities in traffic management were cited as a rationale for
retaining the facility.
None of the FSS in the NWT met the movements criteria. This situation had been
acknowledged by all parties for some time. Transport Canada, when it operated the ANS, had
earmarked the majority of the NWT's Flight Service Stations for closure. In the early 1990s,
it had closed the FSS at Coppermine (Kugluktuk) and Tuktoyaktuk, replacing them with
CARS facilities. Of the remaining 11 FSS, 5 (Cambridge Bay, 23Yellowknife, Fort Simpson,
Fort Smith, and Hay River) had been identified as candidates for closure in 1994. The FSS
slated to remain in service were retained for "safety and special considerations". Traffic at
the Mackenzie valley sites slated for retention in 1994 had dropped marginally since then.
The LOS also ignored the existence of CARS. While the NAV CANADA-operated facilities
were mentioned in the policy, no reference was made to CARS. The 32 CARS operated by
the GNWT greatly outnumbered the FSS, and only Yellowknife is served by a tower. CARS
is, arguably, the standard level of service in the north. NAV CANADA indicated that the
reason for this was that CARS were established on criteria which were not activity-based.
There were also a number of legal issues involved.
2t The policy is actually more complex, recognizing unique characteristics such as traffic
complexity and the mix of commercial and non-commercial traffic. While the activity criteria
were occasionally applied rigidly under Transport Canada, NAV CANADA uses these as the
basis for initiating Aeronautical Studies (see section 2.5).
22Statistics Canada. 1996. Aircraft Movement Statistics. Annual Report.
23 Cambridge Bay FSS was closed in 1995 and replaced by a CARS.
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2.4 GNWT Reaction and NAV CANADA Response
The difference in treatment of the CARS program extends beyond the fact that it is delivered
by the territorial governments, rather than by NAV CANADA itsclf. Some NAV CANADA
personnel openly resented the fact that the Corporation had been saddled with the northern
airspace, and felt that some CARS existed more for the purposes of job creation in their
communities, than to serve any operational requirement. Certainly, the evolution of the
CARS program had involved some social development motivations on the part of the GNWT.
CARS had, however, been activity-based, though not in the sense that NAV CANADA uses
the term. CARS was originally conceived as a means of delivering the basic support necessary
for flight planning and the conduct of an instrument approach. They were located at "Arctic
B & C" airports, which had, in turn, been established at communities which had stable
populations of 100 or more and scheduled air service.
Some stakeholders felt that by denying that CARS represented a level of service, the
Corporation made its own future requirements less stringent. If there was no CARS LOS,
then it followed that modifications in the delivery of CARS services were a purely operational
decision on the part of the Corporation, and would not require broad public consultation.
CARS would be argued to be merely the sum of its parts; and were any part (such as weather
observations) no longer required, or available more cheaply in some alternate form of delivery,
then this could be implemented with little difficulty. An earlier attempt by Transport Canada
to replace manned weather stations with automated sensors (AWOS) had failed because of
technical shortcomings of the devices. A moratorium was in place on AWOS deployment but,
despite repeated assurances by NAV CANADA, stakeholders were very sensitive about the
safety implications of loss of human weather observers.
NAV CANADA tended to view its provision of services at the northern and remote sites as a
responsibility mandated by the Act, rather than a part of its core service. The CARS program
is one viable method of meeting its commitments. Alternate options, such as weather
observations through private contractors, or the carriers themselves, need to be explored. If
the deficiencies of AWOS could be corrected, and this demonstrated to the satisfaction of
users, AWOS might again be a viable option in some cases. Further, there had never been a
comprehensive review of the services needed, and how best the resources of the ANS should
be deployed to meet these requirements.
The public consultations required by the Act were met by publishing the proposed LOS on the
Corporation's web site in September. NAV CANADA had presented its initial draft policy to
NATA in June, but were unable to present the final draft to NATA and the GNWT before late
October, at which time it argued that it was too late for amendments, since the policy had to
be published by the end of the month to meet the statutory requirement. The GNWT and
NATA responded with letters indicating that they believed that CARS represented a de facto
level of service.
The issue of CARS LOS may have been addressed by the Corporation in public statements
that it would not change a level of service, or the manner of deliver, of a service, without an
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AeronauticalStudy. It hasalsopubliclystatedthatit will notdeployAWOS,evenif the
moratoriumis lifted,without consultationswith its customers.
2.5 Aeronautical Study: The Q850 Risk Management Process
The final major provision of the Act was a prescription for broad public consultation when the
Corporation wished to change a LOS. While the Act required this only for reductions in the
LOS (C-20:18), NAV CANADA has indicated that the process which it will use for
reductions will be applied for all proposed changes, including the commissioning of new sites,
increases in the LOS, or changes in means of delivery.
The Aeronautical Study is an application of a Canadian Standards Association risk
management model. The Q850 model includes a process for identification of safety and
economic risks, public consultation, and mitigation of risks considered significant by
stakeholders. It was developed by incorporating some of the best practices in international
risk management.
A study is divided conceptually into six phases which aim to identify needs issues and
concerns of stakeholders (broadly defined), evaluate the risk associated with change in
service, identify the mitigation strategies which may address these issues, and control and
monitor the changes. These phases may be repeated where more information or analysis is
required, and the process aims to achieve a high degree of communication with stakeholders.
2.6 Fort Simpson Aeronautical Study
Fort Simpson was not the first use of the Aeronautical Study in the NWT. The process had
been used to justify the reduction of hours of operation at Fort Resolution CARS the previous
year. This LOS change did not represent much of a challenge, since it was conceded by
GNWT that the additional hours were not required by the air carriers.
The Fort Simpson proposal seemed rather innocuous on the surface. NAV CANADA wished
to remove the midnight shill at the FSS so that it could bolster staffing at another station. The
study ran into difficulties almost immediately, however, because economic interests in the
community were angered at the potential loss of a person-year of salary. The community had
lost a considerable number of jobs in the previous year as the result ofa GNWT austerity
program, and merchants and politicians were sensitive to any reduction in spending in the
community. Any perceived service reduction to the community would also, it was argued,
make it more difficult to attract investment.
NAV CANADA has no mandate to subsidize local economies, and was likely prepared to
weather the storm on the service reduction, however unexpected difficulties were raised in the
consultation process. These were identified first by Arctic Airports (GNWT), and later by the
carriers. The first was that the maintenance of the airfield is compromised if there is no 24-
hour presence. Fort Simpson has a paved runway, and in the event of freezing rain, urea must
be applied within the first half hour to be effective as an anti-icer, lfice is allowed to form, it
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maybemanydaysbeforetherunwayis fully serviceable.FSSandtheGNWThadaprotocol
that thespecialistswould notify theairportmanagerimmediatelyof freezingprecipitation
during"the quiethours". Sincetheairportis somedistancefromthetown, somearrangement
wouldhaveto bemadeto avoid"losingtherunway"to freezingrain. Themaintenanceof the
runwayis the GNWT's responsibilityasairportoperator,but therearebothcostandsafety
implicationsto thestakeholders.
Therewould also need to be a protocol established for medevacs. The nearest airfield in 24-
hour operation is Hay River, but it is too distant for its altimeter to be used for an instrument
(IFR) approach. IFR medevacs would require a weather observation and current altimeter
setting before departure from Yellowknife.
The most surprising finding, however, was almost unrelated to operations at Fort Simpson.
While the station traffic on the midnight shift is low, it remains in use as an IFR alternate,
especially for the busiest station in the north, Yellowknife. Hay River, located on Great Slave
Lake, is closer to Yellowknife and has an instrument landing system. What it lacks, and Fort
Simpson has, is commercially available jet fuel. While some carriers maintain their own
bowsers at the airport, there is no guarantee that fuel will be available for other carriers. For
that reason, Fort Simpson, 200 nautical miles distant from Yellowknife, is the preferred flight
plan alternate. No pilot is likely to divert to an alternate where there is no fuel supply for the
aircraft.
The operational effect of the reduction in hours was that no weather observations would be
available to support a terminal forecast (TAF). While an Area Forecast can be used for an
IFR alternate, the legal approach minima are considerably higher than they are with a TAF.
Without 24 hour weather observations to support a TAF, Fort Simpson would be available as
an alternate less often. This, carrier representatives argued, implied significant increases in
fuel uplift for IFR aircraft, which presented an unacceptable financial burden on the operators.
Pilots suggested that it would reduce safety by increasing the pressure on the captain to land
in Yellowknife, regardless of the weather conditions.
2.7 The "North of 60" Aeronautical Study
The Fort Simpson process reinforced the point made by many experienced "Arctic hands",
both inside and outside the Corporation. The north, because of its limited infrastructure must
be viewed as a system, rather than as a collection of parts. A piecemeal approach tends to the
conclusion that most of the sites do not require their current level of service. When viewed as
elements of a system, however, the importance of the web of services across the vast and
inhospitable territory becomes more understandable. The consultative process of the
Aeronautical Study was successful in identifying this issue.
Successful consultation, however, did not solve NAV CANADA's problems. The long
expected rationalization of services had reduced its long run training requirements, and
management had reacted accordingly. In the short run, however, delay in implementing the
program had left NAV CANADA with a severe staff shortage. As well, the Corporation was
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expectedby its stakeholdersto reducecosts.24Therewasclearlyaneedto reduceservicesin
someareas,andperhapsto redeployresourcesto bettermeetuserrequirements.Cartier
representativesat theFort Simpsonconsultations,for example,hadusedtheoccasionto press
thecasefor increasedhoursof operationat CambridgeBay,thehubof thecentralArctic.
ThishadbeenoutsidethescopetheFortSimpsonstudy.
BeforetheFort SimpsonAeronauticalStudywasconcluded,NAV CANADA changedits
approach.At thefall AirlineConsultativeCommittee(ACC) meeting,NAV CANADA
announceda comprehensiveapproachto ANSservicesin thenorth,whichwouldbe
conductedasa singleAeronauticalStudyof massiveproportions.TheFort Simpsonstudy,as
well asa similarstudyonResoluteBayFSS,wouldberolledinto the largerstudy,though
somedecisionson theseparticularsiteswouldbemadeasearlyaspossible,for operational
reasons.
TheTerms of Reference (TOR), dated 24 September, was presented to NATA and the
GNWT on 20 October. 25 The study would encompass Yukon and Northwest Territories, but
would exclude northern Quebec, which had its own distinct operating features. Sites in the
northern sections of the prairie provinces might be examined as parts of the "system", where
these were discovered to affect northern operators, but would not fall within the scope of the
study itself.
The Aeronautical Study Team would include two members of government of the NWT and
one from Yukon, a member from the Northern Air Transport Association, as well as members
of the Safety and Service Design (S&SD), Air Traffic Services, and Technical Services
divisions of NAV CANADA's western and central regions, and an S&SD representative from
its Quebec region. Subsequently, First Air was approached to place a member on the team.
Based just outside Ottawa, and therefore convenient to NAV CANADA's head office, First
Air also had the potential to devote management resources to the project which the smaller
northern operators would not have been able to afford.
The study team would be supported by a risk management team with head office and regional
NAV CANADA representation. This group would be responsible for research and the
generation of cost-benefit analyses using complex economic modeling software, and for the
development of risk mitigation strategies for issues raised in the Aeronautical Study Team's
public consultations.
24In September 1997, the Corporation expressed its intention to reduce costs by $135 million
by the year 2000. This was to be accomplished largely through the reduction of management
and administrative overhead (Shaping Our Future: 1997-2000 Statement of Corporate
Direction: overview).
25 NAV CANADA 1997 Aeronautical Studv Terms of Reference, Airport Advisory and Flight
Information Services Provided in Northern and Remote Areas. Some of the following details
were added on the basis of comments made at the initial consultation meeting with NATA on
20 October, 1997.
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Theinitial consultationsto identify "needs, issues and concerns" took place in December of
1997. The "North of 60" study is expected to be completed in the third quarter of 1998.
3.0 CONCLUSIONS
The unique problems facing aviation in the northern and remote areas of Canada were
addressed in the legislation which transferred control of the ANS to NAV CANADA. The
dratters of the legislation were faced with a need to ensure the viability of air transportation,
while allowing NAV CANADA the flexibility to conduct its business in a commercial fashion.
The transition from a ticket tax to a user fee based on aircratt weight impacted the north
disproportionately because of the operational characteristics of northern aviation, and has
indirect effects on other non-aviation related systems such as nutritional subsidy programs.
While consumer costs may actually decline as a result of transition in the south, the fragile
northern economy will see increases. The initial impact will be felt in March 1998, with a
second impact of similar magnitude in November 1998. These increases will compound
already high transportation costs. As rationalization takes place in future years, northern users
will benefit from any cost reductions at the same rate as southern users.
Services provided may well decrease at the same time as costs increase. Two separate
processes are at work, and the pricing of services is outside the scope of the team which is
responsible for the Aeronautical Study. Users, and the consumers they serve, see these issues
as related. NAV CANADA will have to communicate its views well to overcome stakeholder
resistance. Initial overstatement of impacts by carders may have made this a issue more
difficult, but both NAV CANADA and the carriers have worked constructively to ascertain
the true impacts.
It will be difficult for users to make informed decisions on the services which are required,
when the costs of the options are not known. While the basic tenet that safety must not be
compromised is held by all parties, site specific fees are not ruled out. The temporary
exemption of CARS from phase one fees was a concession to northern carders, but it makes
choosing the appropriate level of service more difficult where FSS closures and other service
options are being considered.
The technical nature of the issues at hand makes it difficult for consumers, who ultimately pay
for the system through ticket prices, to take a meaningful part in the discussion. Communities
have concerns about employment and development which are legitimate, but are not within
the mandate of NAV CANADA. The involvement of the territorial government is therefore
very important. Arctic Airports also operates the airports in the NWT, and manages the
CARS program, so determining the public interest is a complex task.
The ANS Act provides the territorial Minister of Transportation with a mechanism to elevate
any NAV CANADA reduction in service to the level of the federal Minister of Transport for a
decision. The political level may not be the most favorable forum for NAV CANADA. It is
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therefore in its interest to make the best use of the Aeronautical Study process, and to achieve
some degree of agreement among the affected users and communities.
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1. THE INPUT DATA FOR THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Let us assume that index i appears in set I, where I--{ 1,...,i,...I}, where I is the number of
all flight direction change points on a given territory.
It is assumed that index I appears in set L, where L={ 1,...,I,...,L}, where L is the number
ofaerodromes/DCPs located on a given territory.
Let us assume that the air traffic over a given territory takes place within corridors
determined by the flight corridor axis, i.e. by the lines 'connecting' individual points of
space over the direction change points.
It is assumed that each flight direction change point is assigned a set of numbers of flight
direction change points directly adjacent (contiguous) to it. Let l(i) be a subset of set I
for each i_L i.e., let l(i_._I. Each pair (i,i') such that with i-th number of flight direction
change point given, number i'_l(i), which means that the i'-th flight direction change
point is adjacent to the i-th flight direction change point. It is assumed that for each i_l
flight direction change point there is given set I(i).
In a given corridor spreading between two adjacent flight direction change points,
aircraft flights may take place at different flight levels.
Let us assume that for each pair of adjacent flight direction change points (i,i') where i_L
i'El(i) there is given set P(i,i') of the numbers of all flight levels on which there may take
place aircrait flight between two adjacent flight direction change points.
Let P be a set of all flight levels. Flight levels are numbered by means of variable p.
Therefore, we assume that pep and that P={ 1,...,p,...,P}.
It is also assumed that P(i,i')c_P. In exceptional cases the following may be true:
P(i,i')=P, which indicates that air traffic between flight direction change points of
numbers i and i' may be distributed with flexibility.
It is assumed that the change of aircrait flight level or its take-off would be caused by the
necessity to avoid collision with another aircraft. Such a collision may be avoided in a
given corridor by changing either the aircraft's flight level or its take-off moment,
providing the change is admissible (possible), meaning that the level the aircraft is
directed towards is not occupied by another aircraft, or - in the case of take-off moment
change, the altered moments of flights over each DCP retain the separation times
determined for those DCP. Simultaneously, in case of flights in the same direction, the
beginning of the time interval when the section between adjacent DCPs is occupied by an
aircraft must, for the sake of safety, be shifted in time in respect to the beginning of the
moment when this section is to be occupied by other aircraft. Ifaircratt fly over the same
section between adjacent DCPs, but in opposite directions, the moment of entering a
section by the currently co-ordinated aircrait must be delayed for at least the length of
separation time obligatory in this section, in regard to the moment when previously co-
ordinated aircraft had left this section.
It is assumed that air traffic is planned and realised in thus determined flight corridors.
For every flight of every aircraft the following factors are known: aerodrome of
departure, desired take-off moment and the moments of reaching all flight direction
change points characterising a given route, as well as the desired flight levels between
adjacent DCPs, and the landing moment at the aerodrome of destination. For each
aircraft there is also known the cost caused by (forced) change of flight level or of
change of the moment oftake-offfrom the aerodrome of departure.
Therefore, it is assumed that there is given mapping o, which maps Cartesian product
SxP into a set of real positive numbers R+, i.e.:
o:SxP---------_R+, where quantity o(s,p)_R+, is interpreted as the cost of an s-th aircraft
on p-th flight level.
Let S be a set of numbers of aircraft that are to perform flights over a given territory. It
is assumed that each aircraft will be numbered by means of variable s so that set S of the
numbers of aircraft has the following form: S={ 1,...,s,...,S}, where S is the number of all
aircraft.
It is assumed that the route of an s-th aircraf_ taking off from an l-th aerodrome is
presented in the form of vector w(s,l) of components interpreted as follows:
w(1,s,1)=i, the number of the aerodrome of departure (io_lo) of an s-th aircraft;
w(2,s,I)=pt the number of the flight's level (the number of the 'fast' flight level for
a given route), on which the s-th aircraft taking off from aerodrome 1oought to be
found;
w(3,s,l)=i_ the number of the flight direction change point (the number of the
'first' flight direction change point for a given route), over which the aircraft
ought to change flight direction;
eeo
w(n,s,l)--i, the number of the flight direction change point (the number of the n-
th flight direction change point for a given route), over which an s-th aircraft
ought to change flight direction;
w(n+l,s,l)=p° the number of flight level over which an s-th aircraft ought to be
found between flight direction change points i_ and i_+l;
w(n+2,s,l)=i_l the number of the flight direction change point (the number of
n+ 1-st flight direction change point for a given route), over which an s-th aircraft
ought to change flight direction;
toe
w(N(s,i),s,l)=iN0) the number of the aerodrome of destination (landing; iN¢s)_k)
for an s-th aircraft.
As a result the route of an s-th aircraft, taking off flom an l-th aerodrome is characterised
by means of vector w(s,1) as:
w(s_l)=<w(l_s_l)_w(2_s__)_w(3_s__)_____w(n_s__)_w(n+__s__)_w(n+2_s__)_____w(N(s_l)_s_l)>
where N(s,l) is the number of components of vector w(s,l), and each vector is interpreted
as above.
Flight planning for each aircraft consists in determining - for a given sequence of
numbers of flight direction change points (that constitute the aircraft's route) - the
number of flight level (not necessarily consistent with that determined by the person
placing the flight order) between adjacent flight direction change points whose covering
in a given sequence enables the aircraft to reach the aerodrome of destination.
Moreover, for each flight route there will be determined the moment of aircraft take-off,
taking into account the existing traffic situation, i.e. there will be determined such a
moment of aircraR take-off that enables non-collision flight along the route and,
consequently, non-collision arrival at the aerodrome of destination.
It results fi'om the above that the "cheapest" route, from the point of view of the costs of
flight from the aerodrome of departure to the aerodrome of destination, is the route the
aircraft actually covered on its way to its destination. For a given traffic situation there
may arise the necessity to choose another, 'worse' from the point of view of the costs of
flight, route of aircrat_ flight. It is assumed that the cost of aircraft flight according to
route depends on what level between adjacent flight direction change points the aircraft
flies on. It is assumed that the cheapest is flight taking place on the levels determined by
3
the person placing the flight order. Every change of flight level, caused by an existing
traffic situation between any adjacent flight direction change points, increases the costs
of alrcratt flight.
Operative flight route planning is performed assuming the existence of a time horizon.
The duration of the horizon (the horizon's granulation) is conditioned by 'constancy'
during the traffic situation. It is assumed that the duration of a given, "constant" traffic
situation is a multiplicity of a given constant quantity that constitutes the length of the
adopted time horizon.
A term of temporal constancy of a given traffic situation is used for "normalising" flight
level changes. It is assumed that time distances between flight direction change points are
large enough. An aircraft covering this distance may simultaneously perform many
manoeuvres (e.g. change its flight level in order to overtake another aircratt or in order
to let an aircraft flying in the opposite direction, pass). It is thus conventionally assumed
that the time distance between existing adjacent flight direction change points is divided
into a number of smaller time intervals. A constant temporal length of an interval is
connected with an aircraft's 'temporal capacity' to change its flight level. This means that
the constant temporal length is determined by that time interval length which is necessary
for the aircraft to perform the manoeuvre of flight level change. Thus in practice it is
impossible for an aircraft to change its flight level during two (or more) lengths of time
intervals. After it has changed its flight level, an aircraft may continue its flight on the
new level for many time intervals, until there is a new decision situation, determining a
new type of manoeuvre to be performed by the aircratt. It is thus assumed that between
existing adjacent flight direction change points "additional" flight direction/flight level
change points are added. The result is the division of flight time into shorter intervals of
length determined on the basis of an earlier assignation.
The result of previously adopted assumptions is the fact that vector w(s,l) describing the
flight route of an s-th aircraft taking off from an l-th aerodrome, consists of a greater
number of components. The number is increased because of an arbitrary division of the
time interval between existing adjacent flight direction change points, while the
interpretation of the components remains the same.
The essence of planning each aircraft's flight will also be changed. As previously, it
consists in determining, for a given sequence of flight direction change points
(constituting the aircraft's flight route), flight levels (not necessarily identical with those
determined by the person placing the flight order) between the flight direction change
points, whose covering in a given sequence allows the aircraft to reach the aerodrome of
destination. Similarly, for each flight route, there will be determined the aircraft take-off
moment taking into account the existing traffic situation, i.e. such an aircraft take-off
moment that allows a non-collision flight along the aircraft's route and, consequently,
free from collision arrival of the aircraft at the aerodrome of destination.
2. THE DECISION VARIABLES OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Let us introduce the following decision variable:
x(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)),
of its value equal zero or one.
1t2 x(w(n,s,l),p,w(n+2,s,l))=l, then an s-th aircraft, taking off from an l-th aerodrome is
on p level, between flight direction change points of numbers determined by the
numerical value of quantity w(n,s,1), and by the numerical value of quantity w(n+2,s,l).
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Otherwise, i.e. when x(w(n,s,l),p,w(n+2,s,l))=0, then an s-th aircraft, taking off from an
l-th aerodrome, is not on the level determined by the numerical value of quantity p,
between flight direction change points of numbers determined by the numerical value of
quantity w(n,s,l) and by the numerical value of quantity w(n+2,s,l).
Let us define the following decision variable:
t(w(n, s, I), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)),
adopting its values from within a set of real positive numbers, i.e.:
t(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)) _ R+
The decision variable:
t(w(n, s, 1),p, w(n + 2, s, 1)),
is interpreted as the moment when an aircraft taking off from an l-th aerodrome, enters a
level determined by the p-th numerical value; the aircraft is between flight direction
change points defined by numbers determined by the numerical value of quantity w(n,s,1)
and by the numerical value of quantity w(n+2,s,l).
3. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM RESTRICTIONS
The numerical values of decision variables are to be established when the following
restrictions are satisfied:
1e - there may be no more than one aircraft on a p-th flight level, contained between
selected flight direction change points, for aircraft heading in opposite directions on the
same p-th flight level:
_-'_,[x(w(n, s), p, w(n + 2, s)) + x(w(n + 2),p, w(n,s))] _<1
20 - restriction concerning s and s' aircraf_ entering p-th level, using the same level "in the
same direction":
where 8(s,s') is the value of separation between y s and s' aircraft, assuming that the
aircraft enter the p-th level in the following sequence: first - s-number aircraft, next - s'
t(w(n,s',l),p,w(n + 2,s',l)) > t(w(n,s, 1),p,w(n + 2,s,1)) + 8(s,s')
aircraft. The above restriction ought to be apply to every pair of aircraft entering a given
flight level and flying on the same level in the same direction;
3 0 - restriction concerning an s-th aircraft's flight continuity:
_" t(w(n,s,l)p, w(n + 2, s,1))x(w(n, s,1), p, w(n + 2,s, 1)) + x(w(n,s,1), w(n + 2,s,1)) =
p_P(w(n_ 1).w(n+ 2,s. I))
_ t(w(n + 2,s,1),p, w(n + 4,s,1))x(w(n + 2,s,1),p, w(n + 4,s,1)
p_P(w(n+ 2.s,I ),w(n+4,.s,l ))
where x(w(n,s, 1),w(n+2,s, 1)) designates the time needed for an s-th aircra.q to cover the
distance between the flight direction change points determined by the numerical values of
quantities w(rg s, 1) and w(n+2,s, 1);
4 0- restriction concerning an s-th aircraft's selection of flight level between given flight
direction change points:
_-" x(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)) = 1
t_P(w(n.,s, 1 ), w(n + 2.s.1 ))
r
5 0 - aircrat_ flying on the same flight level are not allowed to "meet" above a flight
direction change point;
t(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)) + x(w(n, s, 1), w(n + 2, s, I)) ;_
t(w(n', s', 1'), p, w(n + 2, s', 1')) + x(w(n',s',l'), w(n + 2,s', 1'))
this restriction ought to apply to every pair s,s' of aircraft that may meet above a flight
direction change point of the following number w(n+2,s,l)--w(n+2,s',l'), as well as to each
flight direction change point over which aircraft might meet;
60 - restriction concerning the selection of an s-th aircraft's take off moment from an l-th
aerodrome:
T'(s,I) _<t(w(1,s,l), p, w(3, s, 1)) _<T" (s,l)
where T" (s,l), T"(s,l) designates the earliest and the latest moment, when an s-th aircraft
may take off from an 1-th aerodrome (prescribed quantities);
70 - when given: earliest and latest take-off moment for aircraft taking off from an l-th
aerodrome are not disjoint intervals, each aircraft's selection of the take-off moment
ought to simultaneously satisfy the following set of restrictions:
T" (s, 1) < t(w(1, s, 1), p, w(3, s, 1)) < T*"(s, 1)
t(w(1, s', 1), p, w(3, s', 1)) > t(w(1, s, 1), p, w(3, s, 1)) + 5(s, s')
when aircraft take off from an l-th aerodrome in the following sequence: first s-number
aircraft, then s' aircraR;
8o. the formal restriction concerning the numerical values of decision variables has the
following form:
x(w(n, s, l), p, w(n + 2,s,l)) _ {0,1 }, t(w(n, s, l), p, w(n + 2,s,l)) _ R +
4. THE CRITERION FUNCTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The criterion function comprises the total cost of all aircraft flights taking place in a
given area. The cost is to be minimised.
Let us assume the following form of the criterion function:
S L N(_I)
_-_ _-'_ _ _ x(w(n,s, 1),p, w(n + 2, s, l))o(s,p)
s=l I=I n=l pEP(w(n,s,l),ikw(n+2,s,l))
The search for optimum, in the sense specified above, solution is to be performed only
when all restrictions ensuring flight schedules free from collision are satisfied.
5. THE METHOD OF SOLVING THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
5.1. The construction of a flight graph
The suggested method of solving the optimization problem is based on a flight graph
illustrating flight schedules submitted for co-ordination.
6
The first step while generating the above mentioned graph is to define its nodes. In the
suggested method graph nodes correspond to the ordinal indexes of aerodromes declared
in the flight area, as well as flight direction change points.
The second step consists in generating flight graph arcs, representing the connections
between adjacent aerodromes and/or flight direction change points resulting directly from
the submitted flight plans.
The third and last step of generating a flight graph is to replace graph arcs with new
nodes, while the indexes describing the new nodes are not changed in relation to the arcs
they were generated from. Thus a flight graph is generated with the connections between
neighbouring aerodromes and/or flight direction change points are "reduced" to the form
of a graph node.
The analysis of non-collision aircraft flight co-ordination on the basis of the above graph
form is restricted to surveying and removing conflicts only in the graph nodes.
5.2. The rule of selecting a priority flight schedule
The rule of selection concerns designating the first, undisturbed flight plan serving as the
standard, in comparison to which other flights would be tested from the point of view of
their being free from the possibility of collision. In this way every new plan would be co-
ordinated with already generated flight plans.
5.3. The mechanism of making flights free from the possibility of collision
The key procedure of the main program - Plan Co-ordination, verifies the temporal
moments of occupying stable, ground elements of flight area (or the moments of flying
over them), as well as the time intervals of occupying air connections, by surveying
submitted and correctly arranged flight plans, from the point of view of indexes pointing
to specific flight area elements, repeated in various flight plans
The legend to the block diagram:
P - number of aerodromes/DCPs in a given flight area,
pj - presently analysed aerodrome/DCP,
S - number of aircraft operating in a given flight area,
si - presently analysed aircraft,
to - take-off moment of an I-th aircraft (I-th flight plan),
tj - temporal moment of an air event (presence) of an aircraft over an j-th
aerodrome/DCP,
p_ - consecutive aerodrome/DCP along the flight route of an i-th aircraft,
S,+l - consecutive flight plan (aircraft) according to flight graph load,
Opj - total value ofj-th aerodrome/DCP load by all aircraft (concerns the number of air
events),
O,i -value of flight graph load (network) by an i-th aircraft (flight plan).
- separation time suggested for currently analysed element of flight area
(aerodrome/DCP or air corridor).
5.4. The block diagram of an algorithm of ensuring non-collision of flights
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5.5. Computer implementation of an algorithm of ensuring flights free from
collision
5.5.1. Input data form
The executive program uses the following input data:
a) aerodromeJl)CP data specifying:
• aerodrome/DCP number,
• aerodrome/DCP parameters, such as:
• aerodromeJDCP availability (logical variable),
• separation time between air events,
b) flight area data specifying:
• possible air connections between suggested aerodromes/DCPs,
• the availability of air connections between suggested aerodromes/DCPs,
• separation time between air events operative for a given air connection between
suggested aerodromes/DCPs,
c) flight plans (introductory) specifying:
• aircraft flight route submitted for co-ordination, particularly taking into
account:
• the numbers of aerodromes/DCPs suggested for a given flight area,
• assumed time moments (hours, minutes) of aircraft flights over
subsequent aerodromes or flight dire_on change points (DCP) located
along the flight route. This concerns every individual aircrafL
The form of input data has been defined globally (for all data types) as two-dimensional
record tables. Depending on whether the description concerns area data or flight plans,
records indexed by means of the above mentioned tables may consist of 5 (in the first
case) or 2 (in the second case) areas.
Source code notations are as follows:
type //Tablica Plan6w Lotu
Times = packed record
DCP : integer;
moment: integer,
end;
TTimes = array[1..MaxS,1..MaxL] of Times;
type I/Obszar Iot6w(pierwotny)
Dane = packedrecord
link
nazwa_lot
TSep
new_DCP
dir
end;
: string[I];
: string[20];
:integer,
:integer;,
: string[2];
TDane = array[1..MaxL,1 ..MaxL] of Dane;
Some of the areas of the record describing area data are suggested together with the first
referral to them and then re-suggested automatically by the program depending on what
component has been selected by the user (using the mouse). Any edition of records
corresponding to input data, stored in the computers memory, ought to be concluded
with pressing the right button - usually 'Apply'. The use of the button initiates an internal
procedure, whose aim is to optimise data stored in the computer's operational memory,
regarding the indexes describing the data (from the point of view of their value). For
example if a user promises 15 new air connections between aerodrome/DCPs in a given
flight area, corresponding to indexes 11..25 (indexes 1.. 10 by pre-arrangement describe
aerodromes/DCPs) and then establishes the availability parameter as false for
connections 19..21, then after the opposite operation is performed, i.e. after the above
mentioned parameters (of the same connections) are changed to logical truth, the
previous indexes do not necessarily appear in the records. Why? The main program
continually supervises the assignment of successive indexes, and its main priority is to
preserve the continuity of all available air connections.
5.5.2. Computational example
Suggested flight plans:
Flight
Plans
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
I
lOmin
10:20
5
lOmin
09:40
1
10 min
11"10
2
10 min
11:30
6
10 rain
10:25
2
10 min
12:10
3
lOmin
12:30
3
lOmin
11:10
4
10 rain
12:50
5
lOmin
13:20
2
lOmin
12:05
Illustration of suggested flight plans:
4
lOmin
12:45
Table
10:20
11:10
11:30
12:10
12:05
12:50
12:45
12:30
11:10
13:20
10:25
9:40
10
Fig. 1
Forsubmittedflightplanstherearedefinedloadindexes-essential for determining flight
plan priorities. For each flight area element (aerodrome/DCP, the connections between
neighbouring aerodromes/DCPs) the load index defines: how many times a flight area
element is mentioned in the description of all submitted for co-ordination flight plans. A
flight plan load index is the total sum of those flight area element loads that appear in the
description of the flight route.
Flight plan number Flight plan load index
1 7
2 8
3 4
Table 2
A new sequence of flight plans (conflict situations have been highlighted)-
Flight
Plans
3
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
5
10 rain
09:40
1
10 rain
10:20
1
10 rain
11"10
6
10 min
10:25
2
lOmin
11:30
2
10 min
12:10
3
lOmin
11:10
3
lOmin
12:30
4
10 rain
12:50
2
10min
12:05
5
10 rain
13:20
4
10min
12:45
Table 3
The methods of determining the take-off moment delay for a co-ordinated aircraft:
t,..mov = tpp - tp + tsep
ts_mov= tkp " tp + tsep
(1)
(2)
where:
tpp - initial moment when an aircraft performing a flight plan of higher priority in
comparison to the previously co-ordinated flight plan (lower priority), enters an area
element,
t_ - moment when an area element is left by an aircraft performing a flight
according to a higher priority plan in comparison with the flight plan currently co-
ordinated (lower priority),
tp - initial moment when a currently co-ordinated aircraft enters an area element,
tin, - separation time between air events suggested for a given flight area
element.
(1) - used for eliminating collision situations (between aircraft) located:
a) over aerodromes/DCPs,
b) within air connections between adjacent aerodromes/DCPs, for aircraft
heading in the same direction,
11
c) (2) - used for eliminating collision situations (between aircraft) located within
air connections between adjacent aerodromes/DCPs, for aircraft heading
in opposite directions.
The take-off moment of plan number 1 - according to formula (2), is to be shiRed by 45
min.
Flight
Plans
3
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
5
10min
09:40
1
10 min
11:05
1
10 rnin
11:10
6
10min
10:25
2
10 rain
12:15
2
10min
12:10
3
lOmin
11:10
3
10 rain
13:15
4
10min
12:50
2
10min
12:05
5
10 rain
14:05
4
10rain
12:45
Table 4
The take-off.moment of plan number 3 - according to formula (1), is to be shifted by 5
rain.
2
3
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment _
5
10 rain
09:40
1
10 min
11:05
I
10 min
11:15
6
10 rain
10:25
2
10 min
12:15
2
10min
12:15
3
10 min
11:10
3
10 rain
13:15
4
10min
12:55
2
10min
12:05
5
10 rain
14:05
4
10min
12:45
Table 5
The take-off moment of plan number 3 - according to formula (1), is to be shifted by 10
rain.
Hight
Plans
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
5
10rain
09:40
1
10min
11:05
1
10 min
11:25
6
10rain
10:25
2
10 rain
12:15
2
10min
12:25
3
lOmin
11:10
3
10rain
13:15
4
10 rain
13:05
2
10 min
12:05
5
10 rain
14:05
Table
4
lOmin
12:45
6 (The result: co-ordinated flight plans)
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Illustrationof co-ordinatedflight plans:
11:25
11:10
10:20 12:25.
11:05 12:10
12:05
13:05
12:50
12:45
12:30
11:10 13:15
10:25
9:40
13:20
14:05
6. CONCLUSIONS
1. Algorithm was created in DELPHI environment, version 3.0.
2. Sugested algorithm may be use for any set of fligth plans.
3. Algoritm is limitated by available PC's memory for data storage/input.
4. Results achived so far has taken a direct impact for continue and improvment of
presented algoritm.
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1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVEMENT
The study of aircraft movement in a curve is particularly complex. In fact, the main landing
gear not having a differential, the aircraft approaching the curve occurs with a series of
characteristic drags in the driven wheel.
The aircraft, on having entered the curve at the connecting points between the runway and the
taxi path, it follows the guide line, which is traced on the surface, with the nose-wheel following the
entry and exit paths. These paths are based on straight traits, on circular, polycentric or
clotohydrical type curves.
Yet, while the nose-wheel follows the trajectory, the main landing gear has a different path
which takes the wheel or the entire group of back wheels to follow an inside curve towards the
margin of the paved surface, reducing the safety especially during high speed.
Therefore, the problem of studying a geometry of exit paths has occurred so that the security of
the aircraft trajectory increases, and at the same time the traffic capacity of the runway can increase.
2. THE MANOEUVRE OF AN AIRCRAFT IN A CURVE
The distance between the external principal landing wheel and the margin of the runway must
conform to the minimum requirements set out by the I.C.A.O. The conformity to such requirements
requires the creation of enlargement strips at the intersections between the taxiway and the runway.
The possible manoeuwe methods of an aircraft, so that it can face such a curve are as follows: -
a) to follow a central line on the runway with the nose wheel, while the wheels of the main
landing gear delineate a trajectory nearing that of the margins of the same runway.
b) to follow a mixtilinear guideline external to the central line while the entire main landing
gear remains on axis to the same line.
The b) method could be advantageous because it seems to be the most economical solution as it
eliminates the necessity to build extension strips. But all in all, the advantages are not as good as
they seem. In fact, we must separate the guidelines for every type of aircraft for both directions of
circulation. Such solution therefore, becomes impractical due to the multiple lines that would be on
the surface of the runway. In particular, at night time or during scarce visibility it would be
extremely difficult for an aircraft to follow the correct guide line. Thus it is preferable to adopt the
turning method a) as it permits tracing only one guideline on the surface which would be followed
by all aircraft, and the strips of extension would be based on that of the largest aircraft considered
capable of using the curve.
The first step in designing extension strips is to determine the theoretical trajectory of the
centre of the main landing gear. Two different techniques exist [2], below there is one technique
briefly explained based on a mathematical model developed by the I.C.A.O.
A few fundamental definitions are reported so that the problem can be examined more closely.
Terms relative to the aircraft.
• Aircraft reference point "S". It is the ideal point on the longitudinal axis of the aircraft that
follows the guideline of the traced surface signals, and is positioned vertical to the cockpit.
• Pivot. "P" point, the centre of instant rotation.
• Theoretical axis of the mare landing gear. It is perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the
aircraft, passing through point P.
• Theoretical length of reference "d". It is the distance, which lies between reference point S and
the theoretical axis of the main landing gear.
• Centre of the main landing gear "U". It is the intersection point between the longitudinal axis
and the theoretical axis of the main landing gear.
• Carriage way of the main landing gear "T". It is the distance, which runs between the external
wheels.
• Guiding angle or visual "fl'" It is the angle formed by the tangent of the guide line S with the
longitudinal axis of the aircratt.
• Steering cvigle. It is the angle formed by the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the direction of
the axis of the fore steering landing gear.
• Guide line. Trajectory of reference point S, traced on the runway with horizontal signals and/or
lights.
• Centre of guide line "0". It is the camber centre of the guide line in its circular part and is the
origin of the fixed system of polar co-ordinates.
• Deviation of the main landing gear "2". It is the distance between the centre of the main
landing gear U and the guide line measured perpendicularly to the guide line.
Glossary of symbols.
The following symbols will be used from now on, to describe the trajectory of the centre of the
main landing gear and in the planning of the curve extensions.
• d = theoretical reference length of aircraft.
• M = minimum distance existing between the external wheel of the main landing gear and the
margin of the paved surface.
• O = camber centre of the guide line.
• P = centre of instant rotation.
• r = radius of the extension strip arch.
• R = bending radius of the guide line of point S.
• S = reference point of aircraft,
• T = track of main landing gear.
• U = centre of main landing gear.
• ot = angle between the radial OU and the tangent of the trajectory of point U.
• 13= guiding angle.
• Z, = deviation of main landing gear.
• P, 0 = polar co-ordinates of a point (S or U) in the system of polar co-ordinates with origin in O.
• L = width oftaxiway.
3. THE TRAJECTORY OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR IN CASE OF CIRCULAR
TURNS
Generally the connections between the taxiways and the runways, with the parking areas and
other taxiways, are established by circumference arches and straight traits. The calculation method
described below refers to an aircraft in taxiing on a horizontal surface. It is of general validity and
allows for sufficient precision to study for extension strips in a curve.
When taxiing the aircraft follows the guide line with the S point, passing from a straight line to
a curve. During the course point S continues to follow the trajectory axis of the taxiway, while the
main landing gear follows a different course, tending to near the internal margin of the curve with
consequent reduction of safety.
Such behaviour on behalf of the aircraft can be more or less accentuated according to the
distance of reference, more or less wide, that passes from the centre of the theoretical axis of the
main landing gear and point (reference S) situated vertical to the cockpit.
During movement in curve reference point S follows a circumference arch of centre O and
radius R. To study the movement of the aircraft it is necessary to have a system of reference co-
3
ordinates. Both OX and even more p and 0. are the polar co-ordinates of point U. In the entry of the
curve the straight line US remains tangent in U in trajectory.
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Fig. 1: Explanation of symbols
Under these conditions we obtain the differential equation of the points U:
dO. (1)
tana = p'_p
Expressing p as d, R and ct we obtain the following differential equation:
p = d. cosa + _]d 2. cos 2a - d _ + R 2 (2)
where the positive sign has the value ofa > 90 ° and the negative sign ct < 90 °.
Separating the variables the equation (1) can be written as follows:
dp d . sen a .tan a
P - ,/R2+d_(co.,_ ,- I)
.da
(3)
The solution of the differential equation (3) provides a bi-univocal relationship between 0u and
ot for the initial conditions given.
Ou- O0= r'I sena. tana ] (4)ioo  o_l)
The integrationof thisexpressionissimpleonly inthe particulareaseinwhich the bending
radiusR oftheguidelineisequaltothereferencedistanced oftheaircraR.
Inthiscase,infact,assumingtheinitialconditionsare0o = 0,ao = 0 and p = 2d we obtain:
Ou= tana- a (5)
with the angles expressed in radiants.
The polar angle, which defines the position of the reference point S therefore, has the value
a_= tan a (6)
and the corresponding guide angle yields
fl=2.a-rc/2
The deviation of the main landing gear is therefore equal to:
7 = 2.d.cosct-d = d.(2.cosa- 1) (7)
The general case R _ d is solved with complex calculations, which does not justify the
construction of a fillet or a simple widening of the curve.
In practice, it is convenient to apply to the extension zone the approximate method explained
below. The knowledge of guide angle 13in all the trajectory points of reference S of the aircraft,
allows to construct the points of centre U of the main landing gear and to specify the trajectory of
this when veering on the ground.
Supposing, that for small movements of the aeroplane the guide angle 13does not change, the
centre of instant rotation becomes P point, the so-called "pivot" and not point O. Consequently the
aircraft reference point in following the guide line describes a small circumference arch equal to:
R
ds = -- x sen 13x d x 0s (8)
d
where d is the theoretical reference length of the aeroplane and R and 0s the polar co-ordinates of
point S with respect to axis OX. We can suppose with approximation, that while reference point S
of the aircraft follows the guide line, the variation of guide angle 13has the value of
dp= 1- dR--.senfl-d. 6_
(9)
therefore establishing a bi-univocal relationship between 0s and 13according to the initial conditions
given, in analogy as to what was given before:
a (lo)
e_R.senp"dP
The integration of (10) is obtained considering only the case in which both R>d and presuming
furthermore that by:
R X K = x/"_- 1
d
solving (10) for 13/2 and finally introducing the initial conditions 0o = 0 and 13o= 0 we obtain after
simple passages the following expression of 13:
ti= 2"arctan'[ l-eX_ 1X-K- X. x_ - K.e x_
with Os expressed in radiants.
R>d (11)
4. THE SWERVE OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR.
On the carriage way, according to the initial conditions the swerve of U centre of the main landing
gear can occur externally or internally to the curve of the guide line traced on the paved surface and
follows in sequence reference point S of the aircraft.
Fi
Fig. 2:Explanation of symbols
Along the carriage way or slip path, at the moment in which point S faces the curve, the
swerve, initially, of the U centre of the main landing gear is external to the circular curve, and it
becomes internal during the completion of the trajectory. With reference to fig. 2 we have the
following:
lr (12)
vso: 7 +-ti
(R+ 2): : R2 +d :- 2.d.R. cos. (if__. p)
The solution &this equation gives the internal and external values of the swerve.
Aint = _]R: +d 2-2.d.R .senti-R
;test : _R _ +d 2 +2 .d.R.senfl - R
(13)
If we express the swerve values as percentages of the length of the aircraft reference d we
obtain, with the previous positions:
2. _/1+X2+2X.senp-X--_.. •d
(14)
with the sign + or - in the case of external or internal swerve.
At the end of the ground trajectory curve, aircraft reference point S reaches the straight trait of
the taxiway before the main landing gear. During this manoeuvre 13 guide angle diminishes
progressively as indicated in fig. 2.
With the previous positions we have:
log. tan _ =l°g" tan fl max2 Fd (15)
the (15) allows calculating the guide angle 13so that reference point S of the aircraft follows a
distance F on a straight stretch of the carriage way.
( flmax (16)
fl= 2.arctan.exp_log.tan -_ F].
At the end of a straight trait, the residual swerve of U centre of the main landing gear, assumes
the value of:
2 (17)
-- = sen pd
4. BROADENING IN CURVE.
The geometry of a curve should be that, when the cockpit is positioned on the axis of the
taxiway, the safety distance between the external margin of the main landing gear and the limit of
the taxiway, should not be less than that specified by the I.C.A.O. rules.
Up to now, it has been possible to know the exact position of point U and consequently also the
internal point of the landing gear of the aircraft, in any manoeuvrable sequence in which reference
point S follows the guide line consisting of circumference arches and straight tracts. From this
knowledge it can, considering the minimum safety margin, determine the internal limit of the fillet.
If the taxiway is used in both directions, the calculations must be done for both directions and then
the internal envelopment chosen.
Rigorous calculations would be long and useless, as previously explained, and only the
utilisation of calculus programmes could make them acceptable. Furthermore, the layout of the
slipway likewise obtained could be difficult to execute on the ground. A simple way to face the
problem is to follow a fillet built with a circumference concentric arch with a guide line, two tracts,
which are the initial and final tracts, and rectilinears which join the edge of the runway at the points
and acknowledge the position taken by the aircraft and that they are furthermore tangent to the
circular tract.
In these conditions, it is sufficient to calculate the radius r from the central pan of the slipway
and the distance between the tangential point of trajectory S of the terminal points of the rectilinear
slipway.
Referring to the previous definitions, it is easy to realise that it is sufficient to take:
r = R +_,._ - safety dist. + (18)
where_,minis theminimumdeviation,withasignobserveduringthechangeof direction.
Moreover:
f = F min- d. cosfl (19)
where:
• fis the co-ordinate for specification of the final point of the linear slipway.
• 13is the guide angle when F = Fmin;
• Fmin is the minimum distance travelled from reference point S on the rectilinear axis, so that:
_,=L__2 ( safety dist' +T] (2O)
Starting from the initial condition 0 = 0° 13= 0°, fixing the comer 0 an interval of variation Aq,
it is possible to cross (11) and (14), know (_i,_,i/d) for every 0i=0i.l+Aq, which determines the
position of point U, the centre of the main landing gear. For this purpose, reference point S is
positioned on the guide line based on its polar co-ordinates 0_i and R and thus the direction of the
longitudinal axis of the aircraft is traced, based on the noted value of the guide angle 13 of the
aircraft. Subsequently to the distance equal to the theoretical reference length, starting from S, along
the axis of the aircraft, position of point U can be identified.
For every position obtained for U, starting from this point towards the internal part of the curve
and perpendicular to the aircraft longitudinal axis, this leads to a distance equal to T/2 and the
existing safety distance is verified between the rim of the main landing gear and the margin of the
paved surface, and be not less than that indicated in the I.CA.O. rules.
In the rectilinear tract, starting from the initial conditions F = 0, 13 = 13m_x,3. = _,_x, which
corresponds to the position in which the reference point of the aircraft can be found between the
source of the circumference arch and the beginning of the rectilinear trajectory fixing the distance F
an interval of variation AF, it is possible through (16) and (17) to know (13i, Z,i/d) for every Fi = Fi-i +
AF, which determines the position of the landing gear. Based on the data, obtained in the same way,
the safety distance can be verified. A further check to be made is the steering angle. In fact, the
device, which regulates the direction of the nose-wheel, is built so that it works within a certain
steering angle. Therefore, it is necessary to verify the steering angle of the nose-wheel, in order to
follow the guide line, so that it is maintained within the limited values allowed and ratified for the
considered type of aircraft. To calculate the steering angle, it is possible to apply to the owners
manuals, or to use the appropriate tables, prepared by the ICA.O., which provide its value
expressed in degrees, considering the value of 13 of the guide angle and the relationship of X
between the theoretical reference length d and the effective distance inclusive of the nose-wheel
axis and the centre of the main landing gear.
7. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL.
The mathematical model described in the previous paragraphs was studied and implemented
using computer software in order to determine the trajectory of aircraft on carriage ways of Naples
- Capodichino airport and the effect that the jet motors can have on the location of the hard
standings and on the vicinity of other infrastructures. This study was done in order to examine and
execute the tracing of fillets planned in the Master Plan of the airport which has been prepared by
the British Airport Authority and is based on previous studies done in Italy, mainly at the
"Fondazione Politecnica per il Mezzogiomo d'Italia".
To study the trajectory of an aircraft on a generic fillet, a spreadsheet was used where, knowing the
geometry of the project of the guide line and the theoretical reference length of the aircraft that will
be manoeuvred, it is possible to obtain the guide angle 13necessary for the following tracing of the
trajectory of the centre of the main landing gear. To study the trend of the main gear wheels while
inside the curve, the aircraft has been geometrically planned as a T in which the wing represents the
main landing gear and the core represents the theoretical reference length in which the extremity
(point S) follows the guide line traced on the paved surface. The generic position of the aircraft, and
thus that of T, during the turn manoeuvre, is seen in a horizontal plan, by parameters 13 and 0s.
Assuming the increasing variation of 0s is equal to 5 °, throughout the spreadsheet, by automating
the equations (11) and (16), we obtain the respective values of 13 and Z,. With these results, with
good approximation and by using AutoCAD software, we can trace the behaviour ofT where this is
inserted as a slide. Inserting these graphic results on the Master Plan of the B.A.A. for Naples -
Capodichino airport, simulation of aircraft movement of this type can be obtained. Such analysis
has evidenced, among other things, a certain number of points of conflict, as we can see later on,
which otherwise would have been difficult to have noticed.
A MD11 model-sized aircraft was used for analysis, as this can be considered without doubt,
the largest aircraft for the near future to be used at the Naples airport. This aircraft, thanks to the
analytical results obtained by analysing various bending radii of the guide lines and at the same time
the 2, swerves from the centre of the main gear, it was possible to collocate the correct position on
the runway of the start line in order to offer a longer take-off run compatibly considering the effects
of the jet motors have at this stage. (See fig. 6) In figures 4 and 5 studies on the trajectory have been
reported, where the broadening in curve is evidenced, which is necessary when manoeuvring this
type of aircraft.
The MDI 1 is a medium-long distance commercial freight aircraft. A summary table follows
naming the characteristics of the aeroplane.
Table 1: MD 11 characteristics
Passenger capacity ....................................................................
Max air travel distance ................................................................
External dimensions
Total length ............................................................................
Wing span .........................................................................
Total height ............................................................................
Weight and load capacity
Max. landing weight ...................................................................
Max. take-off weight .................................................................
Max. weight without fuel .............................................................
Max. fuel capacity ....................................................................
Landing gear
Main gear inter-axis....................................................................
Nose gear - main gear inter-axis ....................................................
Max. turn angle of nose gear .........................................................
Nose wheel tyre width ................................................................
Rear wheel tyre width .................................................................
External rear landing wheel inter-axis ...............................................
Central rear landing wheel rater-axis ................................................
Nose wheel inter-axis .................................................................
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12,987 Km
61.21m
51.66m
17.60m
195,044 Kg
273,289 Kg
181,437 Kg
117,480 Kg
10.57 m
24.61 m
+ 70 °
40 cm
54 cm
140 cm
100 cm
46 cm
The wake effect is considered of three distinct categories:
a. gust effect, in which air turbulence caused by the rotation of rotor blades (prop wash), by
helicopter motors (down wash) and by jet motors (jet wash) are indicated.
b. flood effect, in which the effects of air turbulence in the form of gusts and heat are indicated;
c. vortex effect, in which the effects of the air vortexes generated by an aircraft in flight are
indicated (wake vortex).
The combination of these three effects is called "wake effect".
As a general rule, winds at a speed superior to 56 Km/h are to be considered disturbing to both
people on the ground as to the aircraft in flight operations. The flow of motor jet discharge can
provoke air gusts with speeds many times superior to this limit, even at significant distances from
the aircraft.
The intensity of the gusts depends on the thrust of the motors, which in turn depend on the
operating conditions of the aircraft. On an aerodrome, critical conditions can be found at parking
areas and in correspondence to the beginning of the take-off points and at the end of the runway.
Considering the weight of the aircraft, its configuration and environment factors, the maximum
thrust movement from the parking area varies from 50% to 60% of the max. continual thrust
(MCT), while the max. taxi force varies from 15% to 25% MCT. In relationship to such thrust
values, the MD11 generates a flow that at approx.30 metres distance the aircraft reaches a speed of
180 Km/h when taxiing and 420 Km/h on take-off Instead, a B747 at the same distance reaches a
speed of 143 Km/h when taxiing and 260 Km/h on take-off This is due to the different motor
configurations.
Figure 3: Speed behaviour of the air jets of the motors when taxiing and on take of.
Therefore the aircraft, fi'om the wake point of view, that creates the greatest problems at
Capodichino airport at least at the heading of the runway, is the MD11.
Table 2: Distance from the tail of the aircraft when the air jets acquire the speed of 56 Km/h.
1o
Parked aeroplane Taxiing aeroplane / Aeroplane in take-off
64 m 180 m .[ 480 m
The behaviour of air jets of three jet motor planes, such as the MDI 1, is distant from those
produced by aircraft with motors positioned under the wings. This is due to the presence of central
tail motors that on the MD11 are 10.00 m from the ground, with respects to wing motors which
only have a distance of approx. 2.50 m. from the ground. This motor configuration produces in a
•vertical plan of the aeroplane, a very high area of turbulence.
Substituting in the previous slide on the measurement of T of the MD 11, with the behaviour of
air jets referred to in figure 3, the state of the jet motors of this aircraft in the taxi phase and when in
take-off have been studied. Such study has bought about interventions not only to the apron area, by
moving the stands reserved for non wide body aircraft, but also interventions in proximity to the
runway heading, by adopting suitable anti-flow barriers.
In diagrams 7 and 8 we can see the graphic analysis of the effects that the MD11 jet motors
have during exit and entering the runway, heading 24, after using the first right fillet, as positioned
in the Master Plan of the B.A.A. of Naples Capodichino airport. By studying the fan shaped
envelope at the various jet speeds, it has been observed that during the manoeuvre towards the
entrance of the runway, the effects produced by the high speed of jets, are not compatible with the
standards of comfort and safety for vehicles in circulation on the nearby motorway. Furthermore, by
analysing the behaviour of jet speeds on a vertical plan, such study has allowed anti-flow barriers to
be placed on the banks of the roadway compatible with the regulations set out by the I.C.A.O. on
aeronautical obstacle limits.
By substituting again the T on the MDI 1 with the effective outline of the aircraft, the analysis
of the movement that we obtain, as illustrated in figures 9 and 10, has allowed a study on the course
of the wing tips to be done, This has been determining when planning the circulation trajectories of
the parking area, the distance required when entering the runway, when positioning waiting lines on
the slipways and distancing the various hard standings especially for "nose-In" type of aircraft.
Finally, it must be stressed how this study can be implemented, and not only the study on jets,
but also that of the behaviour of the isophonic curves produced by motors and, therefore, the effects
they have on personnel working not only in the parking areas, but also on the surrounding airport
areas and on the urban environment.
11
IFig. 4: Course of the MD11 undercarriage on leaving the rumcay heading 24
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\Fig. 5: Course of MD l l undercarriage on entering runway heading 24
13
I
I
I
I
I
I
f
Fig. 6: MDI I in take.-off heading 06
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Fig. 7: Course of jet motors of the MD11 on exit of runway heading 24
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Fig. 8: Course of jet motors of MDl l on entering runway heading 24
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Fig. 9: Course of wing extremities of the MDl l on exit of rulnuay heading 24
Fig 10: Course of the wing extremities of the MD11 on entering runway heading 24
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Developing an On-line Air Traffic Flow Management System :./?
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1 INTRODUCTION
The air traffic, especially domestic flights, increase significantly in Taiwan. Average annual
growth rate is about 20%. Taiwan is a small island, approximately 210 by 75 nm. There are
totally sixteen commercial airports in this island. Nine domestic carriers provide 36 service
routes. Most of domestic traffic is heavily distributed in the west coastal corridor. These
domestic flights operate in city-pair shuttle services.
Sung Shan Airport (RCSS), located in Taipei, is the largest and busiest domestic airport in
Taiwan. Currently, RCSS provides more than 500 flight operations daily and the annual
passenger trips have exceeded 15,000,000. RCSS has only one single runway. The official
runway capacity is 40 operations per hour. It can only offer 16 hours service due to curfew.
The average annual V/C ratio is greater than 0.8. It suffers serious delays due to limited
runway capacity. However, it is very unlikely to add another runway because this airport is
surrounded by dense residential area. The situation gets even worse whenever the
meteorological condition changes in RCSS. A 40% reduction in capacity could be resulted.
The whole flight schedule could be seriously disturbed, and thus, traffic flow management
(TFM) is required.
Four general procedures of TFM implemented in Taiwan include airborne holding, ground
holding, en route re-routing, and restriction of metering rate. Ground holding is the most
effective one since Taiwan has very limited airspace and the domestic flight times are quite
short (one hour for longest). There won't be too many TFM options after the aircraft is
airborne. Therefore, the coordination of ground holding and restriction of metering rate
provides the backbone of TFM.
Effectiveness of ground holding policy depends on the implementation timing. This
involves the recognition of congestion occurrence, its duration and seriousness. Early
implementation or late release of ground holding policy or too small metering rate will cause
loss of capacity and unnecessary delays; on the other hand, the airspace may be overloaded
with airborne holding aircraft and extra fuel consumption is resulted.
This study develops a real time operation system to help the air traffic controllers to
determine when and how to implement the strategies of ground holding policy. This
operation system will be displayed by a personal computer at the air route traffic control
center of Taipei FIR. It is expected to upgrade this system to a workstation and provide
information to all important air traffic control facilities.
2 SYSTEM STRUCTURE
Air traffic flow management has obtained more and more attention in the world. Many
countries have established their own flow management systems. For example, Europe has
the flow management handled by the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) in Brussels.
CFMU estimates the demand according to the flight plans. The supply is obtained from the
capacity reports provided by each individual air traffic control center. CFMU, then,
computes the slot times based on the demand and supply and automatically sends the result
to each airlines[15]. The United States has the Air Traffic Control System Command Center
(ATCSCC) in Herdon for handling flow management decisions. ATCSCC collects real time
informationregardingweathercondition,weatherforecast,andtrafficcondition,andthen
estimatesfuturetrafficbasedontheaboveinformation[11]. Japanalsoestablishedits flow
managementcenterinFukuokain 1994115].
Thecontrolphilosophyof theabovesystemsmaynotbethesame.TheATCSCCconcerns
with themanagementof airportcapacity.Japanesesystemworkswith theairspaceflow
management.However,themainprincipleof thesesystemsisto matchthedemandandthe
supply.
A system structure for flow management in Taiwan is proposed as Figure 1 after studying
other flow management systems and discussing with the Taiwan CAA. The main
components of the flow management system are input data, static flow distribution database,
flight time estimation module, dynamic flow distribution module, capacity database and
decision supporting system. This system also provides friendly interactive user interface.
The Windows NT is selected as the operating environment.
The functions of this flow management system include (1)dynamically predicting the
arrivals and departures in selected airports during next two hours, (2)providing the
associated capacity information, (3)proposing the suggestions for ground holding strategies,
(4)evaluating the impacts of each proposed suggestions, and (4)allowing the flexibility for
controllers to modify the strategies and also evaluating the associated impacts.
It is noted that the Taiwan CAA currently uses the Loral system for the air traffic control
automation system. Although the Loral system also has some flow management functions,
the Taiwan CAA prefers developing a new system from the very beginning.
3INPUTDATA
This flow management system needs four types of input data: (1) repetitive flight plan (RPL),
(2) filed flight plan (FPL), (3) updated messages regarding flight plan, and (4) weather
information. The input data provides the necessary information for predicting the flow
demand and capacity supply.
RPL lists flight plan data associated with scheduled flights which are operated regularly.
The information in the repetitive flight plan includes its applicable time period, days of
operation, aircraft identification, type of aircraft and wake turbulence category, departure
aerodrome and time, cruising speed, cruising level, route, and destination aerodrome and
total estimated elapsed time.
When a flight is operated temporarily, it must obtain its air traffic control clearance by FPL.
FPL has the information, such as aircraft identification, flight rules, type of flight, number
and type of aircraft, wake turbulence category, departure aerodrome and time, cruising speed,
cruising level, route, destination aerodrome and total estimated elapsed time, alternate
aerodrome(s), etc..
The updated information regarding flight plan includes messages associated with
modification, cancellation, delay, and departure. The airlines do be required to submit
updated messages whenever they want to change their flight plans, but they are not required
to do that immediately. For example, the delay message should be submitted when flights
wouldbedelayedformorethanone hour. Such a rule adds relatively large uncertainty for
estimating departure time. The error could be as large as 59 minutes. Compared with the
short domestic flight times in Taiwan, the error seems very intolerable.
The important information about weather condition includes visibility, ceiling, wind
direction/speed. To predict the available capacity, it is very important to know the predicted
weather status and its duration. Although the weather information is updated every 30
minutes, it does not provide any information beyond next 30 minutes.
The above data except the repetitive flight plan are transmitted by teletypewriter channels.
This study develops an expert system to screen, correct, and analyze the above data received
from teletypewriter channels. Although ICAO has certain format requirements for filing the
above data, it is observed that some entry of data may contain errors and need to be corrected.
In addition, more types of data than needed are transmitted by teletypewriter channels. An
expert system is developed to distinguish the useful data, not to miss any one, for updating
system status. It is noted that even missing one single needed data could cause inaccurate
prediction results.
4 FLOW DEMAND DISTRIBUTION
To dynamically represent the flow demand distribution, this study first establishes a static
flow distribution database, and then, updates the (estimated) departure times with the
updated messages. This study also develops a flight time estimation module. Therefore,
whenever the departure time is known, the arrival time can be projected based on the
estimated flight time.
The static flow distribution database is established based on RPL data. The static flow
distribution database has the total number of arrivals and departures for every fifteen minute
time interval at each individual airport. Most of domestic flights are included in RPL data.
Basically, the static flow distribution database can roughly represent the demand distribution
pattern. However, some flights may be operated temporarily and some may be delayed, or
canceled, and thus, the flow distribution pattern changes accordingly. Such a problem gets
even serious when the capacity is reduced.
In stead of estimating the flight times by trajectory analysis, this study develops a flight time
database using the empirical SAR tape data to reflect the local characteristics. It is noted that
the flight time function should be simple enough for easy application but still provide
enough precision.
It is observed that the origin-destination pair, aircraft type, airlines and cruising level may
affect the flight times. These factors may have some correlation. For example, the cruising
level is usually related to the origin-destination pair and aircraft type. To avoid the
homoscedasticity problem and to keep the flight time function simple, this study tries to use
as few factors as possible. The flight times are grouped by O-D pair first. The minimum,
maximum, average, and standard deviation are computed for each group. If the standard
deviation of each group is not small enough, each group would be further divided by another
factor. The results show that the origin-destination pair and aircraft type are two major
influentialfactorsfor flighttimes.AftergroupingbyO-Dpairandaircraftype,mostgroups
havestandardeviation less than one minutes.
5 CAPACITY DATABASE
The major weather factors affecting airport capacity are visibility, ceiling, and wind
direction/speed. It is well known that the capacity under IMC operation may be significantly
reduced compared with that under VMC operation. The choice for IMC or VMC operation
depends on the visibility and ceiling. Most of domestic airports have only one runway in
Taiwan. The runway direction under operation may be switched when wind direction/speed
changes. Different runway direction has different requirements regarding separation,
visibility, and ceiling, and thus, has different capacity. The capacity database establishes
various capacity values associated with visibility, ceiling, and wind direction/speed for each
airport. Table 1 shows the available capacity under various weather situations for Sung Shan
Airport. Therefore, whenever the weather condition is known or forecast, the available
capacity for each airport can be determined or predicted.
To determine which strategy should be implemented for air traffic flow management, the key
information includes current capacity and predicted capacity for the entire flow management
time horizon. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain not only the weather status, but also how
long the weather status will last. It is noted that the weather information obtained from the
teletypewriter channels does not provide the predicted weather status beyond the next 30
minutes and it doesn't specify the effective time period of provided weather status either.
Such a deficiency cause a problem in determining the available capacity beyond the next 30
minutes, and thus affect the stability of predicted capacity.
6 DECISION SUPPORTING SYSTEM
The decision supporting system is to help air traffic flow management commander to decide
when to impose the flow control and how to do it. To determine the timing for implementing
flow control, it is necessary to know when the congestion occurs and how serious it is.
Several indices are computed to indicate the occurrence and seriousness of the congestion.
These indices include the congestion occurring time period, its duration, the maximum
queue length, and the total waiting time. The notations used to compute these indices are
defined in the following:
number of flights which are scheduled to depart at Airport K in Time period t and has
already airborne.
DpKt• number of flights which are scheduled to depart at Airport K in Time period t but has
not taken off yet.
A_ number of flights which are scheduled to arrive at Airport K in Time period t and has
already airborne.
K .A_ number of flights which are scheduled to arrive at Airport K in Time period t and has
not taken off yet.
Ct x : the available capacity of Airport K in Time period t.
m: the time period with the maximum queue length
W: the total waiting time
TU: the length of a time period. This study let TU = 15 minutes.
These indices are computed as follows:
1. The congestion occurring time period, T:
The congestion occurs when the demand exceeds the supply.
K K K K K
D., + DpT+A., + Ap, > C,
2. The congestion duration, n time periods:
T÷a T÷n
K
EA2 +A_, +D2 + D,_-<EC, _
t-T+l I-T+I
3. The maximum queue length:
T÷m
max[ E(A._ +A_ + D_ + D_- C,':)] m=1.2,
m t=T+l
4. The total waiting time:
n-I T+j
w=_ _(A_+A_+D_+D_-C_)xTU
j=l t=T+l
This study suggests to implement flow control only when the congestion is expected to last
more than certain time periods. It is noted that the capacity is not a rigid value. The official
capacity just represents a conceptual number. The air traffic controllers have the capability
to smooth the traffic if the congestion is not very serious. Therefore, it is not necessary to
implement flow control immediately when the congestion just occurs. Currently, this study
recommends that flow control is needed when the congestion duration n is greater than 2.
Further evaluation is helpful for validating such a recommendation.
At first, this decision support system tries to develop an algorithm to suggest which aircraft
should be delayed on the ground and for how long. This algorithm will be developed based
on the analysis of ground holding policy. The ground holding policy problem has been well
discussed in [2,3,5-14]. However, it is necessary to take some modifications to apply the
ground holding theory in real time situation.
Theproblemsinvolvedin on-lineapplicationarethedataavailability,its accuracy,and
precision.Thetimereadyandintendedfor take-offis therequiredinputdatafor ground
holdingpolicyproblem.However,it isverydifficultfor theoperationsystemtoobtainthis
inputdata.Althoughtheoperationsystemcanobtainthescheduledeparturetimefromthe
flightplan,theflightmaynotbereadyandintendedfor take-offbythattime. Thatis,the
scheduledeparturetimeonly provideroughestimationfor thereadyandintendedfor
take-offtime. Theerrorbetweenthescheduledeparturetimeandthereadyandintended
fortake-offtimecouldbeaslargeas59minutesincetheairlineisrequiredtosubmitadelay
messageonlywhentheflightwill bedelayedformorethanonehour.Suchanerrorcausesa
problemfor managingair trafficflow inTaiwanduetorelativeshortflight times.
Suchaproblemprohibithisstudyfromdevelopinganalgorithmformanagingthedeparture
sequenceandtiming.To improvethisproblem,it issuggestedthattheflight shouldapply
andobtainitsairtrafficcontrolclearanceviadatalinkinsteadof voice.Theairtrafficcontrol
clearanceis thepermissionfor a flight tojoin thequeuefor take-off. Thetimeof filing
applicationfor clearancecanbe treatedas the time readyand intendedfor take-off.
Currently,theapplicationis filedviathevoicecommunicationchannels,whichprohibitsthe
flowmanagementsystemfromacquiringsuchinformation.Datalinkmaybehelpfultopass
informationto theflowmanagementsystem.
Thegroundholdingdecisionwill beaffectedby theairbornecost,groundcostandchain
effect.Thesecostcomponentsareaircraftyperelatedandalsoaffectedbyflightloadfactor.
Thechaineffectdependsonairlines'ownflight routingandschedulingplan. Thesedata
maynotbeavailableormaynotbeaccuratewhileoperatingin realtimesituation.
Dueto thelimitationsmentionedabove,thisstudycurrentlydecidesto providetherough
departureratefor flow management. It is notedthatwhenevertheprecisereadyand
intendedfortake-offtimeisavailable,thedecisionsupportsystemcanbeeasilymodifiedto
providethesuggestedeparturesequenceandtiming,. Althoughthissystemwill provide
someflowcontrolsuggestions,theflowmanagementcommandercanalwaysoverwritethe
systemsuggestions.Theflowmanagementcommandercanproposevariousflowcontrol
strategies.Thissystemcanevenevaluatetheimpactofeachstrategy
7FIELD TEST
Currently, the main part of this system has been completed and is under field test. Some
problems are observed about the quality of input data. These problems are listed as follows:
1. The input data may not provide correct information. Sometimes, the airlines do not
submit updated messages, as required. Thus, the decision support system cannot present the
real condition correctly. It is observed that some flights has taken off without sending any
departure message or some flights has been canceled without sending any cancellation
message.
2. The input data is not precise enough for estimating the departure time and the arrival
time. The airlines do not need to submit any delay message unless the flight is expected to be
delayed more than one hour. That is, the possible error of estimated flight times can be as
largeas59minutes.Suchaproblemisespeciallyseriousin Taiwan because the domestic
flight time is less than one hour.
3. The input data does not provide enough information for predicting the capacity. The
input data only provides weather information for the next 30 minutes. This enforces the
system to use some default values for predicted capacity beyond the next 30 minutes, and
thus, may generate some prediction errors.
To avoid the incorrect input data (problem 1) affects the system performance seriously, this
study decides to automatically cancel a flight when its delay exceeds certain limit. Currently
this study suggests to use 60 minutes as the limit. However, the user is allowed to specify
any number for this limit. Theoretically, the predicted flow pattern won't be accurate when
the limit is too small or too large. The appropriate number could be determined based on the
empirical delay distribution
Most of functions of the flow management system has been tested comprehensively, and the
results show that it works quite well. The decision support system is also tested. However, it
is suggested to develop a simulation model to evaluate the performance of ground holding
algorithm since the real world cannot provide a good environment for conduct a
comprehensive test.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study tries to develop a real time decision support system to decide when and how to do
flow control. This system can dynamically display the flow demand and capacity of certain
airport for any selected time period. Based on the information of demand and capacity, this
system determines whether the congestion occurs or not and its impact. If the congestion is
expected to last more than certain time periods, the system will send a warning signal and
also give a suggestion about ground holding strategy. However, this system does not enforce
to implement the suggested strategy. The flow management commander can always modify
the strategy or propose a new one. This system will evaluate the performance of each
strategy and let the commander make the final decision.
This system is under field test currently. The results show that this system works quite
reasonable. However, the quality of input data will affect the system performance
significantly and needs to be further improved.
It is recommended to incorporate the input data from the radar data processor (RDP).
Currently, to obtain a workable system, this study does not intend to integrate the data from
the complicated RDP system. The RDP can provide information about in-aviation aircraft
status, including its real time position, cruising speed and cruising level. These data are very
helpful for obtaining precise estimated arrival time.
This system could be extended to have interaction with the airline operation center (AOC).
This can provide the AOC with the real time information about demand and capacity
distribution. It is helpful for the AOC in making decision regarding flight dispatching and
scheduling. The AOC can also provide the newly changed flight plan information to this
system. Therefore, the system can update its status efficiently. In addition, this system can
bemodifiedto providepassengerswith theupdatedflightestimatedepartureor m-rival
times.
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